A quick war plan. "white plan" - the first blitzkrieg experience. The beginning of the war of Germany against the USSR. the collapse of Hitler's "lightning war" strategy
German imperialism began preparations for an armed attack on the Soviet Union long before it was committed. The political plan of aggression matured long ago in the minds of the fascist leaders, who were relentlessly and consistently striving to expand the "living space" of Germany and who by that time had succeeded in enslaving many European states. And this is how it happened.
Plans for the creation of the "German Empire in the East"
Hitler put forward the task of the violent seizure of the European part of the USSR in order to form a German empire in continental Europe back in 1927 in his book Mein Kampf, which openly called for a campaign to the East, an attack on the Soviet Union. "If today we are talking about new lands and territories in Europe," he wrote, "we turn our eyes primarily to Russia." At the same time, the long-standing claims of Kaiser Germany on the territory of its eastern neighbors were spiced up with ardent anti-communism and racist ideology, such as that "fate itself points its finger at Bolshevik Russia." "The new living space in the East," SS Reichsfuehrer Himmler broadcast, "opens up a sphere of activity that has never been more extensive and tempting in German history." To implement the delusional plans for the formation of a German empire in the East by the military defeat of the USSR, Hitler's long-cherished plans for the formation of a German empire in the East by the military defeat of the USSR, the "all-crushing" Wehrmacht was created - the most powerful army in the entire capitalist world, generously equipped with the latest military equipment for that time.
Already in the mid-30s, as can be judged by the archival materials, as well as the service diaries and memoirs of the Wehrmacht figures, the political and military leadership of Germany in dealing with issues of domestic and foreign policy proceeded from option "A", which meant an armed invasion of the USSR ...
Those who planned the polygon of aggression and determined the solution of the related political and economic problems, naturally, felt a huge need for intelligence information. The role of intelligence in the process of strategic planning and decision-making at the state level has grown enormously. All services of "total espionage" were ordered to speed up the collection of information about the Red Army and the Soviet defense industry in every possible way, to start checking the data obtained earlier. They were called upon to begin creating all the necessary prerequisites for reconnaissance support for the main directions of the future eastern campaign.
The dominant role in this belonged to the Abwehr, who was primarily interested in the strategic military capabilities of our country. Through the intelligence channels, the state of defense of the border areas, as well as the location of military-industrial enterprises, airfields, power plants, transport hubs, stations, sea and river ports, bridges, arsenals and warehouses, which, with the outbreak of hostilities, were to become objects of bombing and sabotage, were carefully ascertained. ...
Since the second half of the 1930s, the Soviet Union has been declared the main enemy of the secret services of Nazi Germany. Even the attack on Poland, and then the military campaign in Northern Europe, did not weaken the intelligence interest in our country and did not in the least affect the activity of the Nazi secret services, which continued to remain quite high.
Despite the fact that on August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed, and at the end of September of the same year, an agreement "On Friendship and Border" between the USSR and Germany was signed, Hitler considered his most important task, as before, a military defeat socialist state, the conquest of a new "living space" for the Germans up to the Urals.
With the capture of Poland in 1939, fascist Germany and the Soviet Union became neighbors. The presence of a common land border and the fact that the German and our armies were face to face naturally made it easier for the Abwehr and the SD to carry out intelligence operations against the USSR, allowing them to work "by close method". On the side of the Nazi secret services there was also the undoubted advantage that in the course of two years of hostilities in Western Europe, preceding the attack on the Soviet Union, they completely fit into the military adventures of the leaders of the Third Reich, accumulated considerable experience in subversive actions in foreign territories, and created professional cadres. the scouts of the "new school" have finally adapted their organizations and tactics to wartime conditions. To a certain extent, the expansion of the SD's capabilities to work against the USSR was facilitated by the fact that with the occupation of Poland, the Nazis managed to seize part of the archives of Polish intelligence. Schellenberg, who accompanied Himmler, who ensured Hitler's safety during his trip to Warsaw, had at his disposal an extensive filing cabinet of the Polish spy network abroad, including those located in the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. Measures were taken to locate the agents and reorient them to actions in the interests of Nazi Germany.
“From the beginning of the Polish campaign,” writes G. Buchheit, “the Soviet Union fell into the orbit of close attention of the Abwehr. Before that, the USSR was more of a political factor, and everything that was associated with it or the communist movement as a whole was considered the competence of the SD. After the capture of Poland, military intelligence, despite the strict border control by the Russians and the language barrier, managed to achieve certain results. "
Previously, intelligence operations against the Soviet Union, associated with undercover penetration into the country, were carried out, as former leaders of the Abwehr say, "irregularly, from time to time, when a real opportunity arose for this," not associated with great risk and definitely promising success. According to P. Leverkühn, at that time it was extremely rare for the German military intelligence to send its confidants and secret agents from Germany to the USSR. Crossing the Polish border was much easier.
By the end of the 30s, the main directions of the activity of the Abwehr were clearly defined, which became an important component of the military machine of Nazi Germany, the starting point of espionage and sabotage operations against the USSR. He was tasked with quickly refreshing the available information on the progress of the Red Army's armaments and the command's measures to deploy troops in the event of a military threat, on the deployment of headquarters and large formations. Since the difficulties of collecting this kind of information were aggravated, as they argued in the Abwehr, also by the severe frosts that stood in the USSR in the winter of 1939/40, at first the German military intelligence was practically unable to find out, at least approximately, the number of units of the Red Army and their dislocation before all on the territory of Belarus, which was considered by the Wehrmacht command as the main theater of future hostilities, where, as the Nazis were sure, they would be able to defeat and destroy the main forces of the Soviet troops.
But the promoted intelligence mechanism was gaining momentum. According to the testimony of former representatives of the operational leadership of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, for a relatively short term- from the end of the Polish campaign until June 1940 - the Abwehr managed, using the geographical proximity to the Soviet Union, to update some information about the combat capability of the Red Army. Part of the information obtained was related to the military-industrial facilities and economic centers of the USSR, the increased interest in which was caused by the need to create favorable conditions for solving the problem of the second stage of hostilities, when the war, as planned by the Nazi elite, from the phase of destruction of the Red Army to the phase of economic suppression of the country. This presupposed, even before the winter of 1941, the capture during the pursuit of the remnants of the retreating Red Army, or at least the destruction of the main vital industrial and economic centers (Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass, the oil regions of the North Caucasus), necessary to recreate the defeated armed forces. However, according to eyewitness accounts, Admiral Canaris was able to provide only limited and sometimes inaccurate information, for “the Abwehr agents were invariably neutralized in the SCSL. According to the confessions of the leaders of the Abwehr, the German military intelligence offices in Krakow, Ljubljana and Konigsberg, with all their efforts, "failed to penetrate deep into Russia."
The sharp increase in intelligence activity against the Soviet Union refers to the moment of the surrender of France, when, in the opinion of the highest Nazi leadership, the rear of a future war was reliably provided and Germany had enough material and human resources to continue military operations. After all, as you know, after the end of the war with France, Germany was not weakened militarily and economically. Its armed forces retained their combat capability, and the military industry, which was able to harness the economic potential of 12 captured European states, worked for full power... But the matter is not only and not so much in the surrender of France. In essence, all the criminal acts of aggression by Hitlerite Germany prior to June 22, 1941, associated with the forcible submission of other countries to her domination, were nothing more than a preparatory stage for an armed attack on the Soviet Union. Hitler wanted to ensure the most advantageous strategic positions for his troops, which would allow him to confidently and without great risk begin the fight against the Soviet country. For this, he annexed Austria, dismembered Czechoslovakia, attacked Poland, then tried to incapacitate France in order to provide himself with a reliable rear. In a word, Hitler decided to take advantage of the favorable outcome of the war in the West and, without making a long pause, suddenly move the already wound up military machine, accustomed to easy victories in two years, towards the Soviet Union, so that, as the Nazis hoped, to achieve decisive success in a short-term campaign. We know the content of Hitler's conversation with Keitel and Jodl immediately after the end of the 1940 French campaign, in which he declared: “Now we have shown what we are capable of. Believe me, the campaign against Russia will be compared to this simple child's game. "
The Hitlerite generals, guided by the instructions of the Fuehrer, given at a secret meeting on November 23, 1939, began to develop appropriate strategic plans.
In the summer of 1940 and at the beginning of 1941, preparations for armed aggression against the USSR acquired an especially wide scope, becoming in the full sense of the word complex. It covered the economic, diplomatic and ideological spheres and, especially, the military and intelligence.
This is understandable: the Soviet Union was for German imperialism the main obstacle on the way to the extension of its unlimited domination to other countries and peoples. Hitler understood that the guarantee of the establishment of domination over Europe, to which he strove, to a decisive extent depends on the outcome of the German-Soviet war.
The full picture of the planning and preparation of aggression against the USSR was revealed later, when materials of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, memoirs of political and military leaders, heads of intelligence services, as well as documents of secret archives were published.
Germany's lightning war plan
As already mentioned, according to the instructions of the leader of the Nazi party Hitler and his accomplices, the armed aggression against the USSR was to become a special “war for living space in the East”, during which they did not even think about reckoning with the civilian population. In this war of conquest, a stake was openly placed on the physical extermination of the majority of Soviet people. The criminal intentions of the German imperialists in relation to the Soviet people were recorded in the so-called "master plan" "Ost", the author of which was the main imperial security directorate.
In May 1940, the plan, which acquired additional ideas and details with each new discussion, was presented to Hitler "as the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht" and approved by him as a directive that obliged the German command to prevent the planned withdrawal of Soviet troops during hostilities and to achieve a complete depletion of the military and military-industrial potential of the USSR. Thus, the issue of unleashing an armed aggression against the Soviet Union by this time had already been resolved in the highest spheres of the Nazi party and the generals of the Wehrmacht and moved into the area of practical preparation for the invasion, in which intelligence was called upon to play a crucial role.
A well-polished mechanism for planning military operations and working out specific options for their conduct was re-launched in July 1940. In accordance with Hitler's order and taking into account the guidelines developed by the RSHA, as well as the intelligence information provided by the Abwehr and the SD, the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Field Marshal Brauchitsch, took up the final polishing of the detailed strategic and tactical plan for the attack on the Soviet Union, work on which proceeded in the situation the strictest secrecy. Subsequently, this plan, developed by the RSHA with the active participation of the central apparatus of the Abwehr and its groups at the headquarters of the branches of the armed forces, was scrupulously studied and refined in the highest military authorities. At the end of July 1940, Hitler gathered all his main generals in Berhof. At this meeting, the goals of the war were clearly defined and the timing of the troops' performance was determined. Summarizing the results of this meeting, Hitler said: “Russia must be destroyed. The deadline is the spring of 1941. The operation will only make sense if we defeat the country with one blow ”. So, the aggression against the Soviet Union was planned and prepared as a lightning-fast military campaign, which, as Hitler emphasized, could be victoriously completed thanks to the factor of surprise.
In the same place, in Berhof, the leaders of the Abwehr and the SD were informed of the Fuehrer's directive: using intelligence channels, to probe the possibility of obtaining the consent of Finland and Turkey to become allies of Germany. To encourage the entry of these countries into the war, Hitler was ready to cede some territories of the USSR to them "after the victorious end of the campaign" in the East.
There is a lot of documentary evidence of how intensive was the preparation of Nazi Germany for the war with the Soviet Union. “At the end of September 1940,” said General Zukertor, who held an important post in the Wehrmacht, “I personally had the opportunity to make sure that preparations for an attack on the USSR were in full swing. I then visited the Chief of Staff of Army Group C, commanded by Field Marshal Ritter von Leeb. At the same time, by pure chance, a huge map with a plan for the deployment of German troops in the area of the Soviet border and their attack on the Soviet Union came into my field of vision. The location of the German units and the objectives of each offensive were indicated there. "
No less significant are the confessions made on this score by General Pickenbrock: “I must say that already from August - September 1940, the flow of reconnaissance assignments to the Abwehr in the Soviet Union began to grow noticeably from the part of the foreign armies department of the General Staff ... connected with the preparation of a war against Russia. " The Wehrmacht Intelligence and Counterintelligence Directorate, asserted Pickenbrock, “already from September 6, 1940, was preparing with all its might in all areas of espionage and subversion an attack on the SSFL.
Evidence of the active participation of the Abwehr in planning and preparing an armed aggression against the Soviet Union was also cited in the testimony of General Franz von Bentivegni, given by him at the Nuremberg trials. According to Bentivegni's testimony, in August 1940, Canaris strictly confidentially warned him that Hitler had come to grips with the implementation of the plan for a campaign to the East, that the formations of German troops were gradually being secretly transferred from the west to the eastern borders and deployed at the starting positions of the upcoming invasion of Russia. Informing about this, the head of the Abwehr proposed to immediately start creating the prerequisites for the widespread deployment of reconnaissance work on the territory of the USSR, paying special attention to the importance of collecting information to predict the possible pace of quantitative and qualitative build-up of the Red Army forces, as well as the real time frame for the reorientation and practical translation. Soviet industry to solve military problems.
General Pickenbrock testified at the same trial in Nuremberg that at the end of December 1940, together with Admiral Canaris, he was at the next report to Field Marshal Keitel in Brechsgaden. At the end of the report, Colonel-General Jodl, the chief of staff of the operational leadership of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, invited them to his office and announced that in the summer of 1941 Germany would start a war with Russia. A few days later, Canaris warned Pickenbrock that the attack on the USSR was scheduled for May 15th. In January 1941, at a meeting of the chiefs of the Abwehr departments, Canaris specified the date of the German troops' attack.
In the archives where captured materials of Hitlerite Germany are stored, reports of the head of the Abwehr II department, General Lahusen, addressed personally to Canaris, were found, from which it follows that this department, like other Abwehr units, was inextricably linked with the preparation of fascist aggression against our country.
The role of German intelligence in the Barbarossa plan
After a unified point of view was developed on all the main issues of waging the war against the USSR and the most important decisions were made on this score, on December 18, 1940, Hitler signed the famous Directive No. 21 on the attack on the Soviet Union (plan "Barbarossa"). Preparations for aggression were ordered to be completed by May 15, 1941. The directive was so secret that it was printed in only nine copies. Into the secret strategic plans only a relatively small group of generals and officers of the high command and heads of intelligence agencies was devoted to the war. The directive instructed the German armed forces to be ready "to crush Russia with a swift blow even before the end of the war with England." Hitler was firmly convinced that he could crush the Soviet Union in one swift operation.
The goal of the campaign was formulated as follows: "In the north, a quick exit to Moscow - the capture of the capital in political and economic terms is of decisive importance." "Taking possession of this city," the Barbarossa plan emphasized, "means a decisive success from both a political and an economic point of view, not to mention the fact that the Russians will in this case be deprived of the most important railway junction." The Nazis hoped that with the fall of Moscow they would be able to paralyze the functioning of the apparatus state power, deprive him of the opportunity to restore the defeated armed forces and, thus, the fate of the bloody battle will be decided - the Soviet Union surrenders to Germany, and the war will quickly end.
Alfred Rosenberg, the main ideologue of the Nazi party and the newly appointed Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, wrote about the end of the war: in order to ensure the possibility of unhindered conduct of German world politics and to guarantee the danger of the Reich ... Therefore, a war with the aim of creating an indivisible Russia is excluded. " Germany's task, the head of the Nazi punitive apparatus, Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, argued, "is not only the division of Russia into small states, but also the spread of the German sphere of influence far beyond the Urals."
Following directive No. 21 and in pursuance of it, detailed instructions were issued to the "total espionage" services, which were charged with the obligation, first of all, to maximize the scale of collecting intelligence data about the USSR. Their main interest was centered around finding out the production capacity of the defense industry for the deployment of military production and the development of new, advanced models of military equipment and the timing of their adoption. They were also tasked with ensuring the planting of "strong points" on Soviet territory along the path of the forthcoming advance of German troops by sending their agents into the country by the time of the attack on the Soviet Union.
In the winter and spring of 1941, preparations for the invasion reached a climax. By this time, all the main links of the military and intelligence departments of Nazi Germany were involved in it. Brauchitsch and Halder held meetings continuously. The commanders-in-chief of the army groups, their chiefs of staff, and the leaders of the Abwehr were invited here every now and then. One by one, representatives of the Finnish, Romanian and Hungarian armies visited. The headquarters agreed and clarified plans for conducting military operations. On February 20, 1941, at the General Staff of the Ground Forces, a discussion of the operational plans of the army groups took place, which were considered quite acceptable. General Halder wrote on this day in his service diary: "Our joint discussion was crowned with the best results."
In the headquarters of army groups in February - March 1941, numerous exercises and military maneuvers were held, in which they were gradually played possible options actions of troops and the procedure for organizing their supply. A major war game involving the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General Halder, and the commanders and chiefs of staff of the armies was held at the headquarters of Army Group A (South) in Saint-Germain, near Paris; the actions of Guderian's Panzer Group were separately played. After revision, the plans of army groups and individual armies were reported on March 17, 1941 to Hitler. “The attack on Russia,” declared the Fuehrer, considering these plans, “will begin as soon as our concentration and deployment are over. It will take about a week ... It will be a massive offensive of the highest class. Perhaps the most powerful of all that history has ever known. The case with Napoleon will not happen again ... "
Exercising unremitting control over the planning of offensive operations of army groups and armies, the General Staff constantly demanded that the Abwehr provide information on quantitative and qualitative indicators characterizing the Armed Forces of the USSR, on the state of the Soviet economy, the transport system, investment in defense industries, the composition and equipment of military equipment. groupings of the Red Army on the western borders, the nature of the fortifications in the border districts. The aerial photo reconnaissance department of the Air Force headquarters systematically took pictures of the border regions of the USSR. However, despite the efforts made by Admiral Canaris and the head of the Department of Foreign Armies of the East, Colonel Kinzel, to activate the German intelligence network abroad, they were unable to ensure the flow of accurate and reliable information in the amount that would suit the General Staff. General Halder's diary often contains notes indicating a lack of clarity in the general picture of the deployment of Soviet forces, a lack of reliable information about fortifications, etc. During the war, it was very difficult to form any accurate picture of Soviet Russia and its armed forces.
The role of German intelligence in ensuring the surprise attack on the USSR
As in the development of the infamous Barbarossa plan, the German general staff and the "total espionage" services relentlessly followed Hitler's "fundamental concept" in its implementation. The Fuhrer expressed the essence of this concept before the invasion of the territory of the USSR in the following words: “One single blow must destroy the enemy. Air raids, unheard of in their massiveness, sabotage, terror, acts of sabotage, assassination, assassination of leaders, crushing attacks on all the weak points of the enemy defense suddenly at the same second ... I will stop at nothing. No so-called international law will deter me from taking advantage of the advantage given to me. "
Thus, the main directive of the Nazi elite in the preparation of the war against the USSR included the immutable requirement that the blow be delivered in conditions of strategic surprise, which would put the Soviet troops in a critical position.
It was supposed in a relatively short time to pull up from the west and concentrate along the entire border of the USSR an almost five-millionth army with a huge number of tanks, guns, vehicles and other modern military equipment... On July 6, 1940, the General Staff, in accordance with Hitler's directive, began an intensive transfer of troops and equipment from west to east.
The statistics that became known later showed that if on July 21, 1940 there were 15 divisions in Poland and East Prussia, then by October 7 there were already 30, and a week later, that is, on October 15, General Halder wrote in his service diary: “Now we have 40 divisions on the Russian border, and soon there will be 100 divisions. " From January 1941, the scale of the transfer increased sharply, and in March-April, echelons with German troops and equipment went to the Soviet borders in a continuous stream. Since May, the command of the Wehrmacht began to send up to 100 echelons per day to the eastern borders on a military schedule. Only from France to Poland it was necessary to redeploy several armies of about 500 thousand people. By mid-June, the deployment of the German invasion army was almost complete. Fascist Germany, which had been preparing for an attack on the Soviet Union for a long time, had by this time concentrated enormous armed forces near the western borders, which had taken initial positions for the throw. In total, they included 190 fully equipped divisions (including satellites), 3,500 tanks, 4,000 aircraft, 50,000 guns and mortars. On the territory of Poland, the construction of roads and bridges was launched, warehouses were erected, supplies were prepared, the communication system and air defense were improved.
In order to be able to attack the Soviet Union suddenly, it was important to do everything secretly, in deep secrecy, and for this, as planned, resort to the use of a whole set of techniques and methods of camouflage inherent in the aggressor. A strictly limited circle of people was devoted to the plans for an attack on the USSR, carefully guarded by the Nazi counterintelligence. With a special directive, Hitler ordered the main headquarters of the Wehrmacht and the heads of the secret services, primarily the Abwehr and the SD, to provide cover for the German advance to the east and, as far as possible, make it invisible. In pursuance of this directive, the headquarters of the operational leadership in early September 1940 issued a document with the following content, addressed to the leadership of the Abwehr:
"The Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters of the Führer on 6. 9. 1940
Operational management headquarters 7 copies
Country Defense Department, copy. No. 4
No. 33264/40 Top secret
For command only
In the coming weeks, the concentration of troops in the east will increase significantly. By the end of October, it is necessary to achieve the position indicated on the attached map. Regroupings at (borders) of Russia should by no means give the impression that we are preparing an offensive to the east. At the same time, Russia must understand that there are strong and combat-ready German troops in the general government, in the eastern provinces and in the protectorate, and draw the conclusion from this that we are ready at any moment to defend our interests in the Balkans with sufficiently powerful forces in the event of a Russian interference.
In the work of our own intelligence, as well as in possible responses to Russian inquiries, one should be guided by the following basic principles.
1. To mask, if possible, the total number of German troops in the east by spreading rumors and news about the allegedly intensive replacement of military formations taking place in this area. The movement of troops should be justified by their transfer to training camps, reorganization, etc.
2. To create the impression that the main direction in our movements falls on the southern regions of the General Government, the protectorate and Austria, and that the concentration of troops in the north is relatively small.
3. To overestimate the level and assessment of the state of armament of formations, especially tank divisions.
4. Disseminate appropriately selected information to create the impression that after the end of the western campaign, the air defense in the eastern direction has become much more effective and that the anti-aircraft defense of all important objects is being strengthened by captured French equipment.
5. Work on improving the network of highways and railways and airfields to explain the need for the development of the newly conquered eastern regions, referring to the fact that they are carried out at a normal pace and pursue mainly economic goals.
The extent to which individual authentic data, for example, the numbering of regiments, the number of garrisons, etc., can be transferred to the Abwehr for use in counterintelligence purposes, is decided by the main command of the ground forces.
For the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Jodl. "
In a directive of Hitler, dated January 31, 1941, it was emphasized that the advance of concentrated troops to the border should occur at the last moment and be unexpected for the enemy. As in all previous military operations of Nazi Germany, this was done with the aim of catching the victim of aggression by surprise, depriving her of the opportunity to prepare to repel an attack.
The highly experienced Admiral Kana-Ris, who knew all the moves and exits, all the springs and levers of the Nazi government apparatus, directed and coordinated the actions of various Reich departments to ensure secrecy and operational-strategic camouflage of the prepared armed aggression. It was the head of the intelligence and counterintelligence department of the Wehrmacht, turned into the main center of disinformation, who was instructed to comprehensively think over and solve the issue of the mechanism for disseminating false information about the forces and means that should be used in order to hide the scale of the transfer of troops to the borders of the USSR, to mislead the public. opinion both inside and outside Germany and thus distract attention from the criminal intentions of the Nazi elite.
As the International Military Tribunal later established, the Nazi elite considered ensuring the surprise of an armed attack on the Soviet Union as an indispensable condition for the rapid defeat of the Red Army directly on the western borders. Naturally, this area of activity of the Abwehr became one of the most important on the eve of the outbreak of war.
A group of professionals from the Wehrmacht intelligence and counterintelligence department, in accordance with the order of the Supreme High Command of August 26, 1940, entrusted the Abwehr with the task of "thoroughly disguising the concentration and deployment of German troops on the German-Soviet border", relying on the accumulated experience, proposed a set of practical measures for disinformation ... Since these measures affected many aspects of the life of the Reich, they were reviewed and approved by Hitler himself.
First of all, it was considered necessary to maintain the appearance of good-neighborly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. All the political actions carried out at that time to put together an anti-Soviet military bloc were to be kept in the strictest secrecy. In a decision taken at a meeting with Hitler on February 3, 1941, it was explicitly stated that agreements with neighboring states taking part in the operation could not be concluded as long as there was any need for camouflage. German representatives in negotiations with the allies on aggression were forbidden to touch on the details of the Barbarossa plan. A limited number of people were involved in the preliminary activities for the implementation of this plan. At the same time, the protection of the borders with the USSR was strengthened. All residents suspected of sympathizing with the Soviet country were evicted from the German border strip. Counterintelligence work was widely deployed in the places of concentration of German troops. In Germany itself and in the countries occupied by it, under the control of the counterintelligence agencies were taken everyone who could potentially threaten the secrecy of military preparations by their actions. By a special government order of April 2, 1940, all types of communication with countries declared hostile to Nazi Germany were categorically prohibited. Restricted movement between the Reich and the territory captured by German troops. Permanent or temporary departure from these territories to Germany and back required a special permit. A number of regulations were issued aimed at tightening the passport regime, the conditions of stay of foreigners in Germany, etc.
The coordinated and methodical implementation of these measures was intended to confuse people and, thus, to mislead Soviet intelligence, to make it difficult to "guess the intention of the Germans to make an attack." Curious generalizing evidence on this score is given in the memoirs of W. Schellenberg. “The hour of the great general offensive,” he wrote. - was getting closer and closer. Much effort was required to disguise our action against Russia. It was necessary to protect especially threatened places from spies - marshalling yards and border crossings. In addition, it was necessary to block the enemy's information channels; we only used them to transmit misleading information, such as the transfer of troops and cargo to the west in preparation for the renewed Operation Sea Lion. How much the Soviets believed in this misinformation can be judged by the fact that as early as June 21, Russian infantry battalions stationed in the Brest-Lithuanian citadel were engaged in combat training to music. "
Hitler's secret directive on disinformation of the USSR
On February 15, 1941, Hitler issued a new, highly secret "Directive on Disinformation", which obliged the main headquarters of the German armed forces and the Abwehr to take additional measures to strengthen the camouflage of preparations for Operation Barbarossa in order to avoid their disclosure by Soviet intelligence.
Justifying in this directive the importance of a disinformation campaign for delivering a surprise strike with powerful strategic reserves, Hitler indicated that it would go through two closely related stages.
At the first stage (approximately from February 15 to April 16, 1941), the main content of the campaign was to be a set of disinformation measures aimed at convincing Soviet intelligence that the regrouping of German forces was not connected with their concentration in the eastern part of the country, but represents the usual systematic "exchange" of troops. Everything was supposed to look as if some formations were being withdrawn to the east for rest and study, and fresh troops, stationed by the din, were pulling up with guns and equipment to the west in connection with the upcoming operation "Marita" (invasion of Yugoslavia). To solve the problems of this stage, the main headquarters of the Wehrmacht was instructed, in particular, to determine how long the alleged transportation of military units by rail can be issued as a normal exchange of troops in a given area.
At the second stage (from April 1941 until the moment the German troops invaded the USSR), the strategic deployment of the armed forces was to be portrayed as a disinformation maneuver, ostensibly to lull the vigilance of the British, to divert their attention from the ongoing preparations before the invasion of the British Isles. ... At this stage, the Abwehr had to decide how and using what channels to push false information into Soviet intelligence that the German navy and aviation, which had recently refrained from participating in hostilities, were accumulating forces before a large-scale decisive attack on England. For this, as the former deputy chief of the Abwehr II Colonel Stolze testified, “a significant part of the German navy was planned to be transferred to ports on the French and German coast North Sea, as well as the concentration of aviation formations at French airfields ”. Immediately before the attack on the Soviet Union, it was planned to begin the movement of German ships in the direction of England, in order to create the appearance of the beginning of the landing operation on the British Isles. All this, taken together, was supposed to confirm the main thesis that in 1941 the main goal of the Nazi command was the defeat of England. Actions such as the adaptation of schools, theaters, and institutions on the northwestern and northern coasts of France to accommodate troops and hospitals, the creation of naval bases in the ports of Palis and Bordeaux, and the eviction of residents of cities on the northern coast of France were also designed to mislead Soviet intelligence.
At the same time, the Directive on Disinformation prescribes: “Despite a significant decrease in activity in the implementation of Operation Sea Lion, it is necessary to do everything possible to strengthen the conviction in our own troops that preparations for the landing of troops in England continue, although the troops intended for this are assigned to the rear up to some point. " It is also important, it was emphasized in the directive, for as long as possible to keep in error about the actual intentions even those troops that are selected to take part in hostilities directly on the Eastern Front.
At the beginning of May 1941, in Krampnitz, near Potsdam, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht's operational leadership, General Warlimont, a special meeting was held to discuss the question of how much camouflaging of the impending attack on the USSR was ensured and what should be done to enhance its effectiveness at the final stage prepared aggression. This representative meeting was attended by senior officers of the operational leadership headquarters, the head of the Wehrmacht department, Colonel Rudolf, the leaders of the Abwehr Lahusen and Stolze, and senior officials from the command of the branches of the armed forces.
In the program of disinformation measures designed to create the necessary general picture, a special place was occupied by an action with the help of which Hitler managed to mislead the top Soviet leadership. As it became known, at the beginning of 1941, when, despite the precautions taken, the flow of signals from various sources about the concentration of large formations of German troops in Poland increased especially strongly, J.V. Stalin, worried about this, sent a personal message to Hitler, where he wrote that it seems that Germany is going to fight against the Soviet Union. In response, Hitler sent JV Stalin a letter, also of a personal nature and, as he emphasized in the text, "confidential." Hitler did not deny that large military units were indeed concentrated in Poland. But at the same time he insisted, being sure that his revelation would not go further than Stalin, that the concentration of German troops on Polish territory pursued other goals and was in no way directed against the Soviet country. And in general, he intends to strictly observe the concluded non-aggression pact, which he vouches with his honor as the head of state. In a "confidential" letter to Stalin, Hitler found an argument, which, as Marshal GK Zhukov later said, Stalin apparently believed: the Fuhrer wrote that the territory of West and Central Germany "is being subjected to powerful British bombings and is clearly visible from the air. Therefore, he was forced to withdraw large contingents of troops to the East ... ". And he did it as if with the aim of being able to secretly re-arm and re-form them there, in Poland, before a decisive attack on England.
In a word, everything was done to strengthen the Soviet leadership in the opinion that the concentration of large German troops on the German-Soviet border was just a diversion in connection with the measures under the Sea Lion plan and that before the defeat of England, at least until the middle 1942, Hitler would not be able to turn his troops east. And, as we now know, the Nazis quite succeeded and cost dearly our army and people. As a result of the infliction of a huge blow, planned by Hitler, which turned out to be completely unexpected for the Soviet leadership, on the first day of the war, only 1200 aircraft were destroyed, and the overwhelming majority at the airfields. This blow could not but cause a certain nervous shock in our troops.
So, although the general meaning of the campaign was to disorient public opinion and conceal preparations for an armed attack behind the created "smoke screen", the main camouflage actions developed in two directions.
The first was aimed at convincing the people and the armies of their own country that Germany was indeed seriously preparing for a landing on the coast of the British Isles and, in general, intended to start a "big war" against England. (True, Hitler, back in July 1940 and later, in the circle of his entourage, repeatedly expressed the idea that the landing operation was a very risky undertaking and that it was possible to resort to it only if there were no other ways to crush England.) Moreover, although Hitler practically abandoned this idea long ago, it continued to be used quite widely as a disinformation tool. And, as it later became known, it was not unsuccessful: they believed in the reality of the landing plans both in Germany itself and abroad.
The second direction, as will be seen from the further presentation, included a whole range of measures related to the dissemination of false information about a threat to the security of the Reich allegedly emanating from the Soviet Union.
Admission of Germany with Preventive War
History convinces that every aggressor government is striving at all costs to misinform the world community, to create the appearance that circumstances, the interests of self-defense, compel it to direct military action. Perhaps it is difficult to find a case when any state would directly, frankly admit that it decided on unprovoked aggression, to unleash a war for the sake of conquering foreign territories. A feature of Hitler's military strategy was, first of all, that an armed attack on other countries was carried out without a declaration of war, but with the active use of provocations arranged by intelligence, which were undertaken with the sole purpose of obtaining a pretext for aggression. After all, the Hitlerite government asserted that the conflict with Poland was provoked by it, and the Nazis declared the reason for the war a ridiculous desire to "prevent the encirclement of Germany." Along with the action we described in Gliwice, the Nazis were preparing another similar provocation at the same time. As it turned out during the investigation into the case of the terrorist agent detained in Warsaw sent by the SD, several spies entered Poland from Germany in the second half of August 1939 with the task of killing peasants from the German national minority, so that Berlin could blame the Poles for this. ...
To justify the capture of Denmark and Norway by Nazi troops in April 1940, the most awkward version that one can think of was used: they tried to present this blatant aggression as a "measure of protection" of the named countries from the British invasion. At the same time, the Abwehr and the SD, whose actions were based on the same patented method of the German attack, were asked in no way to give grounds for concluding that Germany is seeking to create strong points here for its future military operations.
"We will continue to tell the whole world," Hitler said, "that we were forced to seize a certain area to ensure order and security." And in subsequent years, the Nazi leaders justified their aggressive policy in the same way. It was exactly the same during the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. Acting in accordance with Hitler's sanctioned disinformation program, Canaris is launching a targeted campaign to spread false rumors about an allegedly growing threat to the security of the Reich from the Soviet Union, whose armed forces are "on the verge of launching a preemptive strike against Germany." As if “it was the military preparations of the USSR that put Hitler in front of the need to take measures to strengthen the defense in the East, forced him to resort to a“ radical response to the impending danger ”.
Since the disinformation campaign became extremely important, everything connected with it was constantly in the focus of attention of Hitler himself and the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht. The media, diplomatic correspondence, and the Nazi intelligence network abroad were widely used to spread the necessary rumors. Disinformation, worked out in the depths of the Abwehr, was supplied to German military missions in neutral countries and the military attachés of these countries in Berlin. The headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht specifically instructed the Abwehr to mislead the Soviet military attaché in Berlin in order to divert his attention from the movements of German troops near the border of the Soviet Union.
The actions of the Nazi services of "total espionage" were limited to "backing up" with concrete facts and making the version of the preventive nature of the attack on the USSR public knowledge, thereby contributing to the solution of the main task set by Hitler: to shift responsibility for the outbreak of a bloody conflict to the Soviet government. For example, in the very popular at that time in Germany "weekly review" (weekly newsreels. - F. S.) the employees of the Wehrmacht propaganda department invariably displayed footage showing Soviet troops and equipment of the Red Army. The Nazis made no secret of the fact that this measure was designed to create the impression "how great is the danger coming from the East." Claiming that “today there are 150 Russian divisions on our border” and that “Moscow, by deploying its forces, violated the provisions of the friendship treaty by committing a“ dastardly betrayal ”, the Nazis staged statements by“ Soviet officers ”about the alleged training“ planned Soviet offensive ”.
Summing up some of the results of the widespread disinformation campaign on the eve and during the invasion, in which, along with the Abwehr, the main imperial security directorate also took an active part, the chief of the latter Heydrich reported on July 7, 1941: “According to reports, the idea that from the Soviet Union came a kind of "threat" to the Reich and that the Fuehrer struck again at the right moment. "
It is now known for certain that the intensive disorientation, combined with the secrecy of the transfer and concentration of troops, allowed the German command to achieve tangible results in ensuring a surprise invasion of the USSR and thus guarantee itself obvious advantages in the initial period of the war.
Summarizing the above, we can conclude that the top leaders of the Nazi regime, who did not reckon with international legal norms too much and even showed complete disregard for them, resorting with the help of the Abwehr and the SD to various methods of disguising their expansionist plans, did everything in order to shift responsibility for unleashing war on others. The explanation for this should, obviously, be sought primarily in the fact that although war at that time was considered a legitimate means of implementing politics, in the world public consciousness only defensive war was recognized as justified. Aggressive war was outlawed by international law.
The second, no less significant circumstance, noted by Western authors so far, is that the leaders of the Third Reich were aware of the danger that the recognition of the aggressive nature of their own aspirations would negatively affect the morale of the soldiers of the Wehrmacht and the Allies. Was it possible to reveal to the world, its own people that it comes about the physical extermination of millions of people, the seizure of foreign lands and wealth. On the day of the surprise attack on our country, Hitler, as Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, in his order-address "To the soldiers of the Eastern Front" who entered the war against the Soviet Union, suggested that the USSR was pursuing an aggressive policy and now Germany was forced to take retaliatory actions. “The main thing is,” Hitler said on July 16, 1941, to his accomplices, “so as not to tell the whole world about our goals. It's not needed. It is important that we ourselves know what we want. "
Information about the German attack on the USSR
Now it is already reliably known that the task that the political leadership of the Reich set for the Nazi intelligence was to hide from outside world preparation of fascist Germany for an attack on the Soviet Union - she failed to decide.
Soviet state security agencies, border troops, military intelligence not only correctly assessed the military-strategic plans of Hitlerism, but at the right time were aware of the concentration of German-fascist troops on the western border, quite accurately determined the expected timing of the start of hostilities. Since the summer of 1940, they regularly provided the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government with information on the progress of the military preparations of Nazi Germany against the USSR. Suffice it to refer at least to firmly established facts and genuine documents stored in the archives of the CPSU Central Committee, the State Security Committee and the USSR Ministry of Defense.
Let's consider them chronologically. Back in the middle of 1940, the Soviet foreign-policy intelligence acquired information that the German Ministry of Railways, on the instructions of the Wehrmacht General Staff, was calculating the capacity and clarifying other railways capabilities in connection with the upcoming transfer of troops from the Western to the Eastern theater of operations that was being prepared.
On August 9, 1940 it became known that “underground structures and artillery fortifications were being built on the coast of the Baltic Sea from Stettin and Swinemunde to Memel. Fortifications are erected in the forests and are well camouflaged. In the port of Swinemünde, new berths have been built, equipped with the latest technology, access roads and berths are hidden under water in concrete canals. In the Memel Canal, berths for ships with a large draft are being built. At night in Memel, German troops are being pulled up to the Lithuanian border. German officers and soldiers and Germans living in Memel learn Russian and practice Russian colloquial speech… » .
In October 1940, on the basis of materials received from Soviet intelligence agents "Sergeant Major" and "Corsican" (German anti-fascists who worked in the General Staff of the Air Force and the German Ministry of Economy), the authorities were informed about the military preparations of Germany. "..." Corsican "... - indicated in this message, - in a conversation with an officer of the headquarters of the high command I learned that at the beginning of next year Germany will start a war against the Soviet Union ... The goal of the war is to sever part of the European territory of the USSR from Leningrad to the Black Sea from the Soviet Union and the creation on this territory of a state entirely dependent on Germany ... An officer of the headquarters of the high command (department of military attachés), the son of the former minister of colonies ... told our source ... (a former Russian prince, connected with military German and Russian circles) that, according to information, received by him at the headquarters of the high command, in about six months Germany will start a war against the Soviet Union. "
On November 6, the state security agencies of the USSR presented a generalized information on the military preparations of Germany as of October 15, 1940. The certificate, in particular, said that a total of more than 85 divisions were concentrated against the Soviet Union, that is, more than one third of the ground forces of the German army. Typically, it was emphasized in the certificate, that the bulk of the infantry formations (up to 6 divisions) and all tank and motorized divisions are located in the border zone with the USSR in a dense grouping. In addition, 12-13 divisions (including two tank divisions) in Austria, 5-6 infantry divisions in the Czech Republic and Moravia, and 6-8 infantry divisions in Norway.
On December 25, 1940, the military attaché at the Soviet embassy in Berlin received an anonymous letter about the impending attack by Nazi Germany on the USSR, outlining a plan of military action. As subsequent events showed, this plan was close to reality.
At the same time, Soviet intelligence informed the government of the essential details of the "Barbarossa plan," the proposed deployment of German armed forces along the Soviet western borders. The information, simultaneously sent to the General Staff of the USSR, said: “Germany's action against the Soviet Union has been finally decided and will follow shortly. The operational plan of the offensive provides for a lightning strike on Ukraine and further advance to the east ... "
Information about the preparation of the Germans for the war against the USSR
In February 1941, Soviet intelligence learned of Hitler's intention to postpone the invasion of the British Isles until the end of the military campaign in the east. A few days later, it was possible to obtain information about a confidential meeting of the Romanian military-fascist dictator Antonescu with a prominent German official Bering, during which the details of Romania's participation in the anti-Soviet aggression were discussed.
At the same time, in February 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was sent a message from Berlin from the "Corsican" that "the military-economic department of the German statistical office received an order from the high command to draw up maps of the location of industrial enterprises of the USSR by region ". The maps were supposed to serve as a guide when choosing objects for aerial bombardment and sabotage operations.
At the beginning of March 1941, an agent of Soviet intelligence in Berlin, through an official of the committee for a four-year plan, obtained information that a group of committee workers had been given the task of urgently compiling estimates of the reserves of raw materials and foodstuffs that Germany could receive as a result of the occupation of the European part of the USSR. The same source said that the chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General Halder, expects unconditional success and lightning-fast occupation by the German troops of the Soviet Union and, above all, Ukraine, where, according to Halder, the good condition of the railways and highways will contribute to the success of the operation. Halder also considers the occupation of Baku and its oil fields an easy task, which the Germans will allegedly be able to quickly rebuild after the destruction of the hostilities. According to Halder, the Red Army will not be able to provide adequate resistance to the lightning offensive of the German troops and the Russians will not even have time to destroy the reserves. On March 6, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of Defense were informed about the materials presented.
On March 11, 1941, the information received by our counterintelligence from the British embassy in Moscow was brought to the attention of the authorities. According to this information, “On March 6, the British Ambassador Cripps convened a press conference attended by British and American correspondents Chollerton, Lovell, Cassidy, Duranty, Shapiro and Magidov. Having warned those present that his information was confidential and not subject to use for the press, Cripps made the following statement: “... Soviet-German relations are definitely deteriorating ... A Soviet-German war is inevitable. Many reliable diplomatic sources in Berlin report that Germany is planning an attack on the Soviet Union this year, probably in the summer. The German General Staff has a group advocating an immediate attack on the USSR. Until now, Hitler is trying to avoid a war on two fronts, but if he is convinced that he cannot make a successful invasion of England, he will attack the USSR, since in this case he will have only one front ...
Answering questions, Cripps said that the German General Staff is convinced that Germany is able to seize the Ukraine and the Caucasus, right up to Baku, in two or three weeks. "
On March 22, 1941, Soviet intelligence reported to the government about Hitler's secret order to suspend the execution of orders from the USSR.
On March 24, 1941, the Soviet state security agencies received from Berlin and submitted to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) a message with the following content: “An employee of the German Aviation Ministry, in a conversation with our source, said that intensive work is being carried out in the German General Aviation Staff in case of hostilities against USSR. Plans are being drawn up to bomb the most important objects of the Soviet Union. The plan is to bombard communication bridges in the first place in order to prevent the supply of reserves. A plan was developed for the bombing of Leningrad, Vyborg and Kiev. The aviation headquarters regularly receives photographs of Soviet cities and other objects, in particular the city of Kiev ...
Among the officers of the aviation headquarters, there is an opinion that the military action against the USSR was supposedly timed to end April or early May. These terms are associated with the intention of the Germans to preserve the harvest for themselves, hoping that the Soviet troops during the retreat will not be able to set fire to green bread. "
By March 25, 1941, data was collected on the transfer of 120 German divisions to the Soviet border area.
On March 26, 1941, the Soviet state security authorities intercepted a cipher telegram from the Turkish ambassador to the USSR, Haidar Aktay, to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which it was reported: “Judging by the noteworthy report that the Swedish envoy to Berlin sent to his government and a copy of which I managed to obtain ... the Germans believe that the action against Russia has become an urgent need. This explains the significant strengthening of the German troops located on the Russian border. It has finally been established that a significant concentration of troops has been taking place on the Russian border over the past 2-3 weeks. Swedish engineers working in the vicinity of Warsaw personally stated that German motorized units were sent in large numbers to the Russian border every night. Berlin political circles believe that the attack on Russia will be carried out by ground forces, and on England - by large air formations and a submarine fleet; it is even said that three army groups are being prepared for this attack: the Warsaw Group under the command of Marshal von Bock, the Königsberg Group under the command of Marshal von Runstedt, and the Krakow Group under the command of Marshal von Leeb. To ensure a quick victory over the Soviet armies, a lightning offensive plan from the above three points will be applied. The target of this offensive will be Ukraine; it is also possible that it will spread to the Ural Mountains.
Informing you of the above information, which is trustworthy, as well as other information that the Germans are preparing to attack Russia, which have been spread here recently, that the Germans are preparing to attack Russia, I ask you to keep them secret. "
In April 1941, the agent "Sergeant Major" reported from Berlin: "In case of war with the USSR, the headquarters of German aviation has outlined a number of points on Soviet territory for the bombing of the first stage in order to disrupt the supply of reserves from east to west and disrupt supply routes going from south to north. ... Military operations against the USSR are supposed to begin with the bombing of these points with the active participation of dive bombers.
In addition, Soviet airfields located along the western border of the USSR should be bombed first of all.
The Germans consider the ground-based aviation service to be the weak point in the defense of the USSR and therefore hope to immediately disorganize its actions by means of intensive bombing of airfields. "
On April 10, 1941, an intelligence report was also sent to the Soviet government about the content of Hitler's conversation with the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia, Pavel, from which it followed that Hitler decided to start hostilities against the USSR at the end of June 1941. On the same days, through the channels of military intelligence, a message was received from Richard Sorge, who documented the intentions of Nazi Germany and the specific dates of its attack on the USSR.
In early May 1941, it became known from the overseas agents of Soviet military intelligence about the inspection of units of the German troops located on the territory of the General Government and in East Prussia, and reconnaissance in the border zone by the highest ranks of the army. On May 5-7, Hitler, Goering and Raeder were present at the maneuvers of the German fleet in the Baltic Sea near Gdynia. In mid-May, Hitler arrived in Warsaw, accompanied by six senior officers of the German army, and on 22 May began to inspect the troops in East Prussia.
On June 6, 1941, the USSR state security organs reported to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks intelligence data on the concentration of a four-million German army on the western border of the Soviet Union, and a few days later that the group of German troops located in East Prussia received an order to occupy by June 12 starting positions for the attack on the USSR.
On June 11, 1941, a Soviet intelligence officer, who was among the employees of the German embassy in Moscow, announced a secret order from Berlin to prepare the embassy personnel for evacuation within seven days and immediately begin to destroy archival documents.
In mid-June 1941, with reference to information received from a reliable source working at the headquarters of German aviation, the state security agencies of the USSR informed the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks that “all German military measures to prepare for an armed uprising against the USSR are completely over and the strike can be expected at any time ...
The objects of the raids of the German aviation, first of all, will be: the Svir-3 power plant, Moscow factories producing individual parts for aircraft (electrical equipment, ball bearings, tires), as well as car repair shops ...
... Hungary will take an active part in hostilities on the side of Germany. Some of the German aircraft, mainly fighters, are already at Hungarian airfields.
… Important German aircraft repair shops are located: in Königsberg, Gdynia, Graudenz, Breslau, Marienburg. Milic's aircraft engine workshops in Poland, in Warsaw - Ochacz and especially important - in Heiligenkeil ... ”. A source working in the German Ministry of Economy reports that the heads of the military-economic directorates of the "future districts" of the occupied territory of the USSR have been appointed. The Ministry of Economy says that Rosenberg also spoke at a meeting of business executives intended for the "occupied" territory of the USSR, who said that "the concept of the Soviet Union should be erased from the geographical map."
A week before the outbreak of an armed conflict, through the channels of Soviet intelligence, a sample of a phrasebook handed out to German soldiers was received, the content of which betrayed the real aspirations of the leaders of the Reich. It contained, for example, the following phrases: "Russ, give up", "Who is the chairman of the collective farm? ..", etc.
As can be seen from the above documents and facts, the KGB agencies and military intelligence from mid-1940 to June 22, 1941 received extensive and reliable information through their channels about the upcoming aggression, in particular about the accumulation of strategic reserves for a surprise strike, and timely reported this to the Central Committee. VKP (b) and the Soviet government. But it so happened that the information received through intelligence channels, as well as warnings coming from other sources, including Churchill, did not inspire confidence in the country's political leadership, and the bias of Stalin's position prevented him from giving a correct assessment of the current situation. ... which, as you know, predetermined the heavy losses of the Soviet people in the initial period of the war.
§ 27. DISRUPTION OF HITLER'S PLAN OF "LIGHTNING WAR"
THE START OF THE WAR. Germany is the second time in the first half of the XX century. made an attempt to establish domination over Russia. But if in the first world war the Germans announced the attack through diplomatic channels, then in 1941 they acted treacherously.
For the top leadership of the Soviet state and the Red Army, it was not only the suddenness of the attack by Hitlerite Germany that was unexpected. GK Zhukov subsequently noted: “The main danger was not that the Germans crossed the border, but that their six-fold and eight-fold superiority in forces in decisive directions was a surprise to us, and the scale of the concentration of their troops turned out to be a surprise to us. , and the force of their blow. "
Hitler, starting the war, formulated the task as follows: "Russia must be liquidated ... The duration of the operation is five months." To this end, the Barbarossa plan was developed. It provided for the swift destruction of the Red Army forces in the western regions, the encirclement and defeat of the remaining combat-ready Soviet troops, the achievement of a line from which the bombing of German territory by Soviet aviation would become impossible, etc. The ultimate goal of the operation was “to create a barrage against Asian Russia along the common Volga - Arkhangelsk".
For the war with the Soviet Union, Germany allocated huge and technically equipped forces.
In 1941 the population of the USSR - 194 million, Germany (together with the allies) - 283 million
By the beginning of the war, the command of the Red Army managed to concentrate in the western military districts 3.1 million people (out of 5.7 million of the total number), more than 47.2 thousand guns and mortars, 12.8 thousand tanks (2242 of them required repair) , about 7.5 thousand aircraft (serviceable - 6.4 thousand).
The German army was led by generals who had experience in the fighting of the First World War and two years of the Second World War. The highest generals of the Red Army were heterogeneous in ability and experience. Only an insignificant part of it has undergone combat hardening. Many talented commanders were shot or were imprisoned.
By the end of the first day of the war, the Germans had advanced almost 60 km deep into the territory of the USSR, and in three weeks - almost 500 km. The Baltics, Belarus, Moldova, part of Ukraine were commissioned. But even in these most difficult conditions, Soviet soldiers displayed heroism and courage.
The Red Army suffered heavy losses: hundreds of thousands of killed, wounded, captured; thousands of destroyed tanks, aircraft, guns; thousands of square kilometers of territories surrendered to the enemy. Such was the price of political and military-strategic miscalculations of the country's leadership and insufficient preparation of the army for a war with a strong enemy.
Fascist plane shot down near Moscow. Summer 1941
The composition of the combat forces and means of Germany by the middle of 1941
The first three weeks of the war showed the weaknesses of not only the Red Army. In 20 days of fighting, the Nazis lost about 100 thousand soldiers - the same as in two years of war in Europe.
Guard
The country's leadership took measures to organize the fight against the enemy, to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of commanding the troops and the activities of the state apparatus. Were created Headquarters of the Supreme Command (SVGK) led by Stalin, State Defense Committee (GKO) composed of: Stalin (chairman), Molotov (deputy), Voroshilov, Malenkov, Beria. Specially created Evacuation Board determined the objects, means of transportation and the location of the enterprises and the population in the East of the country. State authorities and administrations have acquired a new structure.
The losses of the army were replenished in manpower. In the first two weeks, 5.3 million people were drafted into its ranks. And nevertheless, the Red Army did not leave the streak of failures.
The Germans broke through to Smolensk. They believed that the road to Moscow lies precisely here (this was also the opinion of Napoleon in 1812).
Recording in the people's militia. Summer 1941
Bodies of state power and administration of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War (1941 – 1945)
A bloody battle unfolded for Smolensk. In the battles near Orsha on July 14, 1941, a battery of barrelless rocket artillery systems ("Katyusha") fired the first salvo at the enemy. The battery commander, Captain I.A.Flerov, died in battle, but before his death he did everything possible so that the rocket launchers would not get to the enemy. Subsequently, installations of this type terrified the Nazis, but the German designers failed to unravel the secret of Soviet rocket launchers. In 1995 I.A.Flerov was awarded the title of Hero of Russia (posthumously). In late August - early September, a Soviet counteroffensive was launched in the Yelnya region. The enemy grouping was thrown back, Yelnya was liberated. The enemy lost about 47 thousand people in killed and wounded. The Soviet Union was born here guard.
Evacuation of enterprises to the East. 1941 g.
The battle of Smolensk and the capture of Yelnya delayed Hitler's offensive against Moscow.
A difficult situation arose in September in the Kiev region. Here conditions were created for the encirclement of a huge group of Soviet troops. Stalin resolutely opposed her timely withdrawal to the East. The order to retreat was given when the enemy closed the encirclement. The enemy took Kiev.
Defense of Sevastopol
For a long time, Odessa resisted the enemy. Only 73 days later, the defense was terminated, and the defenders of the city were evacuated by sea. Even before the end of the war, Odessa was declared a "Hero City".
One of the most heroic pages war - 250-day defense of Sevastopol. There, the Nazis lost about 300 thousand people killed and wounded - as many as in all theaters of military operations before the attack on the USSR.
REBUILDING OF THE PEOPLE'S ECONOMY. The loss of large territories, on which a significant part of industrial and agricultural products were produced, put the national economy of the Soviet Union and the Red Army in the most difficult conditions. In the first few months of the war, the industrial potential of the USSR was halved. For the successful conduct of hostilities, the army lacked equipment, weapons and ammunition.
The government and the people were required to unite the front and rear into a single, monolithic organism. For this, a number of measures were outlined and implemented that ensured the preservation of significant production resources and the construction of new plants and factories for military needs.
Deportation
In the conditions of the rapid offensive of the Nazis, one of the most important tasks was the evacuation of industrial enterprises, agricultural machinery, and livestock. In 1941 - 1942. more than 3 thousand factories and factories, many other material and cultural values were sent to the East. Together with enterprises, about 40% of the country's labor collectives were transferred to the East. In 1941 alone, 1.5 million railroad cars, or 30 thousand railroad trains, were employed for the evacuation. Built in one line, they would occupy the path from the Bay of Biscay to the Pacific Ocean.
What is the meaning of the term "guard" in the modern army?
The production of equipment, weapons, equipment necessary for the front was carried out at evacuated enterprises in incredibly difficult conditions.
The food issue has sharply escalated. After the mobilization of men into the army, the labor force in the village consisted of women, old people and adolescents. The production rate set for adolescents was equal to the minimum pre-war rate for adults. The share of female labor in the national economy has increased to 57%. All women from 16 to 45 years old were declared mobilized for production.
Yakovlev Alexander Sergeevich (1906 - 1989) - aircraft designer (left)
PLANTING "NEW ORDER". Even before the war, the top leaders of the Reich determined what the "new order" should be in the conquered Russian space.
Administrative structures were created in the territories occupied by the Nazis. The supreme body was the Ministry of Occupied Territories in the East. Below were the Reichskommissariats, which were divided into general commissariats, districts, districts (counties), headed by the commissars. In the cities, a system of city councils was established, in the villages, volost foremen and headmen were appointed. Punitive power structures were formed, similar to the gendarmerie. In most settlements, police were appointed. All residents were instructed to unconditionally obey the new authorities.
In the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, the Germans were solving three tasks set by Hitler: mass executions of "superfluous" people; economic robbery of the country; deportation(expulsion) of the working-age population to Germany.
We must wipe this country off the face of the earth.
A. Hitler
Document
The machines are installed in workshops when there are no walls yet. They begin to produce airplanes when there are still no windows or roofs. Snow covers the person, the machine, but the work continues. They don't leave the workshops anywhere. They also live here. There are no canteens yet.
From the memoirs of aircraft designer A.S. Yakovlev
Among the "superfluous" people were, first of all, Jews, Gypsies and prisoners of war. Mass extermination of Jews (holocaust) took place throughout the occupied territory (the place-symbol of it is Babi Yar near Kiev). Millions of civilians and prisoners of war died in the gas chambers and from hunger. In concentration camps, mortality in the winter of 1941-1942. accounted for up to 95% of the total number of prisoners. In general, according to incomplete data, up to 3.5 million Soviet people died in concentration camps.
Concentration camp Auschwitz. About 4 million people of various nationalities were exterminated here.
The Nazis resorted to the mass deportation of Soviet people to the West. The removal was cruel: parents were torn away from their children; pregnant women were forced to have abortions; villages were burned if the inhabitants were hiding, etc. The number of the deported was about 5 million people (they planned to take out 15 million).
Resettlement camp of Soviet children before being deported to Germany
The USSR did not bypass such a phenomenon as collaborationism. In almost all countries, which the Germans entered, there were local residents who collaborated with them. In France, for example, after the war for treason, many collaborators were put on trial, some were executed. Among the traitors were former Prime Minister Pierre Laval and Marshal Henri Petain.
Collaborator
The holocaust
Among the Soviet people who embarked on the path of betrayal, there were those who suffered from Stalinist repression and collectivization, and adherents of the pre-October and pre-February political regimes... Among the traitors were also nationalists who saw the Nazis as their like-minded people, simply cowardly or selfish people who had lost faith in victory over Hitler.
It would seem that the white emigration could become a special force of the anti-Soviet movement, but this did not happen. Part of it, putting aside political differences for a while, stood up for the victory of compatriots over fascism (A.I.Denikin, P.N.Milyukov, etc.). In France, Boris Wilde, the "red princess" Vera Obolenskaya and many other emigrants took part in the Resistance movement.
But not all representatives of the White emigration wanted the USSR to win. Former Kuban and Don Cossack chieftains V. Naumenko, P. Krasnov offered their services to the Germans. The Nazis allowed them to create the so-called Cossack units. Generals A. Shkuro, S. Klych-Girey, S. and P. Krasnovs, and others, well-known from the Civil War in Russia, showed particular zeal.
Quite large collaborationist forces were the army of the former Soviet general A. Vlasov, the 14th SS Division "Galicia" and others.
From the fall of 1944 to January 1945, the Armed Forces of the KONR (Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia) were formed, consisting of 50 thousand renegades. They were headed by General Vlasov. They soon entered fighting on the Western Front against the allies of the USSR, but they could not bring benefits to Hitler: the practice of battles showed the low combat effectiveness of these units. In the days of May 1945, the Vlasovites were captured by Soviet troops: their attempts to surrender to the American army were unsuccessful. Vlasov and 11 of his closest associates were sentenced to death.
Karbyshev Dmitry Mikhailovich (1880 - 1945)
ORGANIZATION OF THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT. From the first days of the war, partisan detachments began to form and operate behind enemy lines. In Belarus, detachment V. Z. Korzh was created in the evening on June 22, 1941. It numbered 50 people and on June 28 entered the battle with the Nazis.
Kuznetsov Nikolai Ivanovich (1911 - 1944) - Soviet intelligence officer
In July, the partisan movement gained such strength that the commander of the 11th fascist army, General E. Manstein, stated that with the creation of the partisan movement, the Germans in Russia began to acquire a second front.
The number of partisan detachments and groups grew continuously. On October 1, 1941, in the Ukraine and Belarus, there were 28 and 12 thousand people, respectively. In 1941, in the Moscow region alone, 41 partisan detachments and 377 sabotage groups operated.
Many guerrillas placed a sense of duty above their own lives. So, already in the first months of the war, followers of Ivan Susanin appeared in several detachments, repeating his feat. The first "Susanins" in 1941 were the scout N. Drozdova and the collective farmer I. Ivanov. Old people and children became "Susaninites". MK Kuzmin was 86 years old, N. Molchanov - 13. In total, 50 such feats were accomplished during the Great Patriotic War.
With the creation in May 1942 Central headquarters of the partisan movement the struggle of the partisans has become noticeably more effective. Marshal K. E. Voroshilov was appointed commander-in-chief of the partisan movement, and former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus P. K. Ponomarenko was appointed chief of staff.
All social strata of Soviet society were represented in the partisan detachments - peasants, workers, office workers. Along with adults, teenagers also took part in the fight against the fascists. They were especially useful in intelligence and communication with the underground. Marat Kazei, Lenya Golikov, Volodya Dubinin and others were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Kosmodemyanskaya Zoya Anatolyevna (1923 - 1941) - partisan
As a result of the partisan struggle in the occupied territories, entire areas were formed where the power remained Soviet. The partisans kept in touch with the underground workers in cities and villages, received valuable information from them and transmitted it to Moscow.
BATTLE FOR LENINGRAD: BLOCKADA. According to the plan of the Hitlerite command, the capture of Moscow was to be preceded by the capture of Leningrad.
On August 30, 1941, the enemy managed to cut railways connecting the city with the country. Having seized Shlisselburg, the Germans reliably closed the blockade ring.
On September 9, 1941, the enemy came to the nearest approaches to the city. In this situation, extraordinary measures were taken. JV Stalin sent General G.K. Zhukov to Leningrad, who, having skillfully organized defense in the most dangerous sectors of the front, fettered the enemy's actions.
Bergholts Olga Fedorovna (1910 - 1975) - poet
The city bravely defended itself. 4100 were built on its territory. pillboxes(long-term firing point) and bunkers(wood-earth firing point), equipped with 22,000 firing points, installed 35 km of barricades and anti-tank obstacles. Every day hundreds of artillery shells, incendiary and high-explosive bombs fell on the city. Air raids and artillery attacks often lasted 18 hours a day. There was not enough food in the city. The situation of the blockade was very difficult.
The only way to deliver food, medicine, and ammunition to besieged Leningrad was "The road of life"- a transport highway through Lake Ladoga. Only in the first blockade winter of 1941/42, under continuous shelling and bombing, more than 360 thousand tons of cargo were transported through it, and over the entire period of the blockade - 1615 thousand tons of cargo.
Shostakovich Dmitry Dmitrievich (1906 - 1975) - composer
Unconquered Leningrad was of great military and strategic importance. Hitler's hopes for a quick capture of the city collapsed at the very beginning of the war. The German fascist troops, which were planned to be sent to the capture of Moscow, were pinned down and could not be sent to other fronts. Leningrad is the first city in two years of World War II that was able to withstand a powerful German war machine.
Document
... b) first, we blockade Leningrad (hermetically) and destroy the city, if possible, with artillery and aviation ... d) the remnants of the "fortress garrison" will remain there for the winter. In the spring we penetrate the city ... we will take out all that remains alive into the depths of Russia, or we will take prisoner, we will raze Leningrad to the ground and transfer the area north of the Neva to Finland.
From the report of A. Hitler "On the blockade of Leningrad"
"The road of life". From September 1941 to March 1943, she connected Leningrad with the country along the ice of Lake Ladoga
BATTLE OF MOSCOW. Having defeated the Kiev grouping of Soviet troops, the Hitlerite command resumed the offensive of Army Group Center on Moscow. It began on September 30 with a flank attack by the tank army of General X. Guderian in the direction of Tula. The enemy threw the main grouping of his troops in the direction of Vyazma, where he managed to close the encirclement, but the Soviet armies continued to fight, pinning down the forces of about 20 Nazi divisions.
This delay made it possible to strengthen the Mozhaisk line of defense. 450 thousand residents of the capital were mobilized for the construction of defensive structures around Moscow. But on this line it was possible to concentrate only 90 thousand fighters, which was clearly not enough. The situation was becoming critical. The evacuation of government offices began. On October 20, 1941, a state of siege was introduced in the city by the decision of the State Defense Committee. At the front, holding back the superior enemy forces, Soviet soldiers fought to death.
Having superiority in manpower and equipment, the enemy began to bypass Moscow from the north and south. The Germans were separated from the capital by several tens of kilometers, but, exhausted in stubborn battles with units of the Red Army, the German fascist troops were forced to suspend the offensive in order to gather for a decisive thrust.
Document
In October - 400 g of bread a day for workers and 200 g for dependents.
In November - respectively 250 and 125 g.
11,085 people died in November.
In December, 58,881 people died.
Statistics of besieged Leningrad (1941)
The commander of the Western Front, G.K. Zhukov, used the Germans' respite to regroup and build up the forces of the Red Army. In Moscow itself, on November 6 and 7, 1941, a ceremonial meeting in the Kremlin and a parade of troops on Red Square in honor of the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution took place.
On November 16, a new rapid offensive of the Germans began. They came so close to Moscow that they were already preparing to shell the Kremlin from two long-range guns located in Krasnaya Polyana, north-west of the capital (by special order, the guns were destroyed).
Simultaneously with the repulse of the enemy offensive, there was a hidden build-up of human and material reserves and a counteroffensive was being prepared.
The composition of the opposing forces and means of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army on the eve of the decisive battle near Moscow (early December 1941)
With such a balance of forces and means, the Soviet command issued the order to begin the counteroffensive. On the night of December 6, 1941, Soviet troops dealt a powerful blow to the enemy. For 10 days of fighting, the Nazis were driven back from Moscow by 100 - 250 km. The German army lost more than 500 thousand people, over 1000 tanks, 2500 guns. The immediate threat to the capital was eliminated.
The first six months of the war were a time of testing the courage of the peoples of the Soviet Union and its army. Fa-worms captured the territory where 40% of the country's population lived before the start of the aggression. In June - December 1941, the losses of Soviet troops amounted to about 4 million people, over 20 thousand tanks, about 17 thousand aircraft, over 60 thousand guns and mortars. But these six months also marked the beginning of the defeat of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht. The Battle of Moscow is a vivid confirmation of this.
1941, December 5 - the day of the beginning of the counteroffensive of the Red Army against the Nazi troops near Moscow
The significance of the Moscow battle is great. Germany's first major defeat in World War II dispelled the myth of the invincibility of the German fascist army. The victory helped to strengthen the anti-Hitler coalition and weaken the fascist bloc, forced Japan and Turkey to refrain from entering the war against the USSR, and gave strength to the liberation movement in Europe.
ATTEMPTS OF THE RED ARMY COUNTER OFFENSIVE. At the beginning of 1942, the forces of both sides were approximately equal. After many failures and the first major victory near Moscow, competent and thoughtful decisions were needed. But Stalin ordered an offensive on all fronts, which, however, positive results did not give.
In the winter and early spring of 1942, an attempt was made to break the blockade of Leningrad. The fighting was carried out in difficult terrain. The troops lacked weapons, ammunition, food, vehicles. The offensive, although at first put the Germans in a difficult position, drowned. The enemy launched a counteroffensive and surrounded the units of the 2nd Shock Army that had moved forward. The commander of the army, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov voluntarily surrendered.
Tanya Savicheva's diary. From the chronicle of besieged Leningrad
At the turn of 1941 - 1942. the Soviet command carried out an amphibious operation with a landing on the Kerch Peninsula. Kerch and Feodosia were liberated. However, carried away by the offensive, the command did not provide the necessary defense and soon paid for it. With a blow along the Feodosiya Gulf, the Germans defeated the Soviet group and took Kerch. The defeat in the Kerch region seriously complicated the situation in Sevastopol, which had heroically defended itself since the fall of 1941. For nine months this city attracted significant enemy forces, but in July 1942 it was abandoned by the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet and soldiers of the Red Army, and Crimea was completely occupied.
In the midst of the battles for the Crimea, the offensive of Soviet troops began in the Kharkov direction, which were able to advance 25-50 km in three days. But having significant forces in this sector, the Germans launched a counteroffensive and surrounded three Soviet armies.
After the capture of the Crimea, the failure of the Kharkov offensive, the Germans struck from the Kursk region in the direction of Voronezh. Their blow, no less powerful, followed in the Donbass. As a result, the enemy received a number of advantages and, having brought in fresh reserves, began a rapid advance in the great bend of the Don towards Stalingrad. The Red Army was forced to retreat. This forced Stalin to issue order number 227, better known as the order "Not one step back!" It stated: “It's time to end the retreat. No step back! This should be our main appeal now. " The order took effect immediately. Violation of it was punishable by firing squad.
And nevertheless, the enemy broke through to the Volga. And the Soviet troops were drained of blood and exhausted. A real threat was created to capture Stalingrad, a large center of the defense industry and an important strategic point, as well as the enemy's exit to the North Caucasus. The country again found itself in an extremely difficult situation.
Poster 1942 Artist V. B. Koretsky
QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS
1. In what way was the surprise of fascist Germany's attack on the Soviet Union manifested? What was the balance of forces and means of the belligerents at the initial stage of the war?
2. How was the restructuring of the economy of our country on a military basis?
3. Describe the "new order" that the Nazis planted in the occupied territory.
4. What were the tasks of the partisan movement?
5. How did the battle for Leningrad develop? Why did the Nazis, having a huge military superiority, fail to take the city?
6. Why did our troops fail to defend Brest and Minsk, Kiev and Smolensk, dozens of other large cities, and did not surrender Moscow and Leningrad to the enemy?
7. Why did the Red Army's counter-offensives in 1942 fail?
This text is an introductory fragment. From the book of the Great Civil War 1939-1945 the author Burovsky Andrey MikhailovichBlitzkrieg Failure Operation Barbarossa ended in failure. In the first months, the Wehrmacht advanced even more successfully than expected. But nevertheless, it was not possible to defeat the USSR in the course of one campaign, before the cold weather. Why? First, the Wehrmacht itself was not enough. It turned out that
From book Big game... British Empire against Russia and the USSR the author Mikhail LeontievII. Breakdown. From Afghanistan to Crimea “England exists as long as it owns India. There is not a single Englishman who will dispute that India should be protected not only from an actual attack, but even from the mere thought of it. India is like a little child
From the book Russia in the War 1941-1945 author Vert AlexanderChapter IV. Smolensk: Nazi Germany's First Failure in the "Lightning War" The State Defense Committee, which Stalin announced in his July 3 speech, was responsible not only for the conduct of the war, but also for the "rapid mobilization of all the forces of the country." Many solutions
From the book Falsifiers of History. Truth and lies about the Great War (collection) the author Nikolay StarikovFailure of the "Blitzkrieg War" Undertaking an attack on our country, the German fascist invaders believed that they would certainly be able to "end" the Soviet Union in one and a half to two months and would be able to reach the Urals in that short time. Need to say,
From the book Reform in the Red Army Documents and materials 1923-1928. [Book 1] the author Team of authors From the book Russia in 1917-2000. A book for everyone interested domestic history the author Yarov Sergey Viktorovich2.5. The split of the Hitlerite bloc One of the directions of the USSR's foreign policy during the war years was the diplomatic isolation of Germany's allies and their withdrawal from the war. The satellites of Germany entered into negotiations only when their
From the book "European Union" by Hitler the author Vasilchenko Andrey VyacheslavovichChapter 4. The European Economic Community - the legacy of the Hitler regime
From the book The Defeat of Fascism. USSR and Anglo-American allies in World War II the author Olshtynsky Lennor Ivanovich1.4. Japanese aggression against the United States and England Formation of a coalition of the United Nations, two politicians - two plans for a coalition war Japanese aggression in the Pacific
From the book Secret Operations of Nazi Intelligence 1933-1945. author Sergeev F.M.PREPARING FOR THE "LIGHTNING WAR" As already mentioned, according to the instructions of the leader of the Nazi party Hitler and his accomplices, the armed aggression against the USSR should have become a special "war for living space in the East", during which they did not even think
From the book 900 DAYS OF BLOCKADE. Leningrad 1941-1944 the author Kovalchuk Valentin Mikhailovich5. Reasons for the collapse of Hitler's plan to seize Leningrad The collapse of Hitler's plans to seize Leningrad was of great military-strategic importance. By stopping Army Group North, the Soviet soldiers not only prevented the enemy from cutting off the country from the northern
From the book Maritime Policy of Russia in the 80s of the XIX century the author Kondratenko Robert VladimirovichChapter 4 Participation of the Maritime Department in solving foreign policy problems. Kuljin crisis. Akhal-Teke expedition. Marine demonstration at Dulzigno. Development of a plan for a war with China The beginning of a new year, 1880, turned out to be alarming for the Russian government. Shortly
From the book Reform in the Red Army Documents and materials 1923-1928. tons of 1 authorNo. 31 Report pom. Chief of the Operations Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters V. Dragilev to the Chief of the Directorate "on the system for developing a war plan" No. 2041021 May 1924 Sov. SecretAbout the system for developing a plan of war I. The system of developing a war plan, carried out so far by the Headquarters of the Red Army
From the book Boris Yeltsin. Afterword the author Mlechin Leonid MikhailovichBreakdown or riot? In his psychotype, Yeltsin differed from other members of the Politburo. He is not a man speech culture, he was uncomfortable among the craftsmen and talkers who had long settled in Moscow. He wanted to excel. But at the huge table of the secretariat of the Central Committee, Yeltsin was not
Strategy
Blitzkrieg is based on close interaction of infantry and tank formations with the support of aviation. The blitzkrieg strategy is similar to the theory of a deep offensive operation adopted in the USSR on the eve of World War II (S. N. Ammosov, V. K. Triandafillov, K. B. Kalinovsky, etc.). According to the blitzkrieg strategy, tank units, with the support of infantry, break through to the enemy's rear, bypassing and surrounding heavily fortified positions. The encircled formations of the enemy, experiencing difficulties with the supply of ammunition, equipment and food, are easily achieved by the attackers or surrendered.
An important feature of the blitzkrieg is that the main enemy forces are not the main targets of the offensive. After all, a battle with them gives the enemy the opportunity to use most of their military potential, which means, unjustifiably delaying a military operation. The priority task of the blitzkrieg is to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to continue successful hostilities even with the preservation of manpower, equipment and ammunition. And for this it is necessary, first of all, to seize or destroy control systems, transport infrastructure, supply and transport hubs.
Practical use
One of the first attempts to conduct a blitzkrieg was made by German forces during the First World War on the Western Front. According to Schlieffen's plan, it was supposed to inflict a lightning strike on France, end the war with her in 1.5-2 months by signing a victorious peace, and then switch to the Eastern Front. However, the resistance of the French and Belgian troops thwarted these plans, the lack of tanks and the imperfection of aviation of that era played a role, as well as the successful offensive of the Russian army in East Prussia, which required the transfer of part of the forces to repel it. All this led to the fact that the German troops advanced too slowly, and the Allies managed to pull up forces and win the Battle of the Marne in September 1914. The war became protracted.
For the first time, the blitzkrieg in practice was brilliantly carried out by German military strategists (Manstein, von Kleist, Guderian, Rundstedt and others) at the beginning of World War II during the capture of Poland: by the end of September Poland had ceased to exist, although more than a million unmobilized people of military age remained in it. In France, manpower reserves were also not exhausted by the time the armistice was signed. The entire campaign in France took only 6 weeks: from May 10 to June 21, 1940, and in Poland - 5 weeks from September 1 to October 5 (the date of the end of resistance of the last regular units of the Polish army) 1939. At the beginning of World War II, the blitzkrieg strategy allowed the Nazi Germany to quickly destroy Soviet troops in a strip 100-300 km east of the border between the USSR and Germany and its allies. Nevertheless, the loss of time by the Nazis to destroy the encircled Soviet troops, wear and tear of equipment and the resistance of the defenders ultimately led to the failure of the blitzkrieg strategy on this front.
Links
Notes (edit)
Wikimedia Foundation. 2010.
See what "Lightning War" is in other dictionaries:
- (Blitzkrieg) (German Blitzkrieg from Blitz Lightning and Krieg War), created in the beginning. 20th century by the German military leadership, the theory of conducting a fleeting war, according to which victory is achieved within days or months before ... ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary
A short war (for weeks, months). The theory was developed by the German militarists at the beginning of the 20th century. and was used by them as the basis for Germany's aggressive strategy in the 1st and 2nd world wars. Calculations of the German General Staff for the "Lightning War" ... Marine Dictionary
- ("blitzkrieg") (German Blitzkrieg, from Blitz lightning and Krieg war), created at the beginning of the XX century. by the German military leadership, the theory of waging a fleeting war, according to which victory must be achieved within days or months, up to ... ... encyclopedic Dictionary
"Lightning War"- LIGHTNING WAR, blitzkrieg (German Blitzkrieg, from Blitz - lightning, Krieg - war), the theory of aggressive warfare, developed by Germany. militarists at the beginning. 20th century and the underlying military. German strategies in the 1st and 2nd world wars ... Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: an encyclopedia
- "blitzkrieg" (German. Blitzkrieg, from Blitz lightning and Krieg war), the theory of warfare created by the German militarists in order to achieve complete victory over the enemy in the shortest possible time, calculated in days or months. Calculations of the German ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia
"LIGHTNING WAR", "blitzkrieg"- (German Blizkrieg, from Blitz Lightning and Krieg War), a way of waging an aggressive war, DOS. on the surprise and swiftness of actions, ensuring the defeat of the pr ka in the shortest possible time, before he was able to mobilize and deploy his armed forces. ... ... Military encyclopedic dictionary
war- all-devouring (Golen. Kutuzov) Epithets of literary Russian speech. M: Supplier of the court of His Majesty, the partnership of the Quick Press A. A. Levenson. A. L. Zelenetsky. 1913. War About just wars. Great, popular, protective (outdated), folk ... Dictionary of epithets
The war generated by the imperialist system and originated in the beginning within this system between the main fascists. states by Germany and Italy, on the one hand, and Great Britain and France, on the other; in the course of the further development of events, adopting the world ... ... Soviet Historical Encyclopedia
Arab Israeli conflict Raising homemade fl ... Wikipedia
From German: Blitzkrieg. Translation: Lightning War. The military strategy of hostilities, which was used by Hitler's generals during the war with France, Poland and tried to apply in the war with the USSR. This expression was already encountered in 1935 in ... ... Dictionary of winged words and expressions
Books
- Hitler's Blitzkrieg. "Lightning War", Baryatinsky Mikhail Borisovich. This book is the deepest study of the strategy of "lightning war", a story about the rise and fall of the Panzerwaffe, about the grandiose triumphs and crushing collapse of Hitler's blitzkrieg. ...
The meaning of the word "blitzkrieg" (Blitzkrieg - "lightning fast", Krieg - "war") is known to many. This is a military strategy. It involves a lightning-fast attack on the enemy using a large number of military equipment. It is assumed that the enemy will not have time to deploy his main forces and will be successfully defeated. This was the tactic the Germans used when they attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. We will talk about this military operation in our article.
History of the issue
The lightning war theory originated in the early 20th century. It was invented by the German military leader Alfred von Schlieffen. The tactics were very ingenious. The world was experiencing an unprecedented technical boom, and new weapons were at the disposal of the military. But during the First World War, the blitzkrieg failed. Affected by the imperfection of military technology and weak aviation. The impetuous German offensive against France was drowned out. The successful application of this method of hostilities was postponed until better times. And they came in 1940, when Nazi Germany carried out a lightning-fast occupation, first in Poland, and then in France.
"Barbossa"
In 1941 it was the turn of the USSR. Hitler rushed to the East with a very specific goal. He needed to neutralize the Soviet Union in order to consolidate his dominance in Europe. England continued to resist, counting on the support of the Red Army. This hindrance had to be eliminated.
The Barbarossa plan was developed to attack the USSR. It was based on the blitzkrieg theory. It was a very ambitious project. The German combat vehicle was about to unleash all its might on the Soviet Union. The main forces of the Russian troops considered it possible to destroy through an operational invasion of tank divisions. Four battle groups were created, combining tank, motorized and infantry divisions. They had to first penetrate far into the rear of the enemy, and then unite with each other. The ultimate goal of the new lightning-fast war assumed the seizure of the territory of the USSR up to the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line. Before the attack, Hitler's strategists were confident that the war with the Soviet Union would take them only three to four months.
Strategy
German troops were divided into three large groups: "North", "Center" and "South". The "North" was advancing on Leningrad. "Center" rushed to Moscow. "South" was supposed to conquer Kiev and Donbass. The main role in the attack was assigned to the tank groups. There were four of them, led by Guderian, Goth, Gopner and Kleist. It was they who were supposed to carry out the fleeting blitzkrieg. It wasn't all that impossible. However, the German generals miscalculated.
Start
On June 22, 1941, the Great Patriotic War began. The first to cross the border of the Soviet Union were German bombers. They bombed Russian cities and military airfields. It was a smart move. The destruction of Soviet aircraft gave the invaders a serious advantage. The damage was especially severe in Belarus. In the first hours of the war, 700 aircraft were destroyed.
Then the German ground divisions entered the lightning war. And if the Army Group "North" managed to successfully cross the Neman and approach Vilnius, then the "Center" met unexpected resistance in Brest. Of course, this did not stop the elite Nazi units. However, it made an impression on the German soldiers. For the first time, they realized who they had to deal with. The Russians were dying but not giving up.
Tank battles
The blitzkrieg of Germany in the Soviet Union failed. But Hitler had a huge chance of success. In 1941, the Germans possessed the most advanced military equipment in the world. Therefore, the very first tank battle between the Russians and the Nazis turned into a massacre. The fact is that Soviet combat vehicles of the 1932 model were defenseless against enemy weapons. They did not meet modern requirements. More than 300 light tanks T-26 and BT-7 were destroyed in the first days of the war. However, in some places the Nazis met with serious resistance. The meeting with the brand new T-34 and KV-1 was a big shock for them. German shells flew off the tanks, which seemed to the invaders to be unprecedented monsters. But the general situation at the front was still disastrous. The Soviet Union did not have time to deploy its main forces. The Red Army suffered huge losses.
Chronicle of events
The period from June 22, 1941 to November 18, 1942 historians call the first stage of the Great Patriotic War. At this time, the initiative belonged entirely to the invaders. In a relatively short period of time, the Nazis occupied Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraine, Estonia, Belarus and Moldova. Then enemy divisions began a siege of Leningrad, captured Novgorod and Rostov-on-Don. However, the main target of the Nazis was Moscow. This would allow a blow to the heart of the Soviet Union. However, the lightning attack quickly got out of the approved schedule. On September 8, 1941, the military blockade of Leningrad began. The Wehrmacht troops stood under it for 872 days, but were never able to conquer the city. The largest defeat of the Red Army is considered to be the Kiev cauldron. More than 600,000 people died in it. The Germans seized a huge amount of military equipment, opened their way to the Azov region and Donbass, but ... lost precious time. No wonder the commander of the second tank division, Guderian, left the front line, appeared at Hitler's headquarters and tried to convince him that the main task of Germany in this moment- the occupation of Moscow. Blitzkrieg is a powerful breakthrough into the interior of the country, which turns out to be a complete defeat for the enemy. However, Hitler did not listen to anyone. He preferred to send military units of the "Center" to the South to seize territories where valuable natural resources are concentrated.
Blitzkrieg failure
This is a turning point in the history of Nazi Germany. Now the Nazis had no chance. They say that Field Marshal Keitel, when asked when he first realized that the blitzkrieg had failed, answered only one word: "Moscow." The defense of the capital turned the tide of the Second World War. On December 6, 1941, the Red Army launched a counteroffensive. After that, the "lightning" war turned into a battle of attrition. How could enemy strategists have miscalculated so? Among the reasons, some historians call the total Russian off-road and severe frost. However, the invaders themselves pointed to two main reasons:
- fierce enemy resistance;
- biased assessment of the defense capability of the Red Army.
Of course, the fact that Russian soldiers defended their homeland also played a role. And they managed to defend every inch of their native land. The failure of Nazi Germany's blitzkrieg against the USSR is a great feat that arouses sincere admiration. And this feat was accomplished by the soldiers of the multinational Red Army.
A catastrophic start. On June 22, 1941, without declaring war, the troops of fascist Germany invaded Soviet territory. The most difficult and bloody war in the history of our Fatherland began. At 4 o'clock in the morning, German aircraft began bombing Soviet cities - Smolensk, Kiev, Zhitomir, Murmansk, Riga, Kaunas, Liepaja, military bases (Kronstadt, Sevastopol, Izmail), railway tracks and bridges. On the first day of the war, 66 airfields and 1200 aircraft were destroyed, 800 of them on the ground. By the end of June 22, the enemy groupings had advanced to a depth of 50-60 km.
Stalin's mistakes and miscalculations regarding the timing and place of the German invasion allowed the aggressor to gain significant advantages. In accordance with the plan for the defense of the state border of the USSR, developed and approved by the government in February 1941, mobilization measures were launched during May-June. In the border areas, about 2,500 reinforced concrete structures were built, and the network of military airfields was expanded. In the second half of May - early June, troops began moving out of the internal military districts in order to bring them closer to the western border. However, by the time the Germans attacked, the strategic deployment of the troops had not been completed. Stalin stubbornly refused to GK Zhukov's repeated proposals to bring the border troops to a state of combat readiness. Only in the evening of June 21, having received a message from a defector that at dawn, German troops would begin an attack on the USSR, the High Command sent directive No. l to the border districts to bring the troops to a state of combat readiness. As the analysis of this directive shows, it was drawn up unprofessionally, did not give specific instructions to the troops and allowed an ambiguous interpretation of certain points, which was unacceptable in combat conditions. In addition, the directive was delivered to the troops with a great delay: some border districts, which took on the first blows of the enemy, did not receive it.
On the eve of the attack, Hitlerite Germany and its allies concentrated 190 divisions (5.5 million people), almost 4 thousand tanks, 5 thousand combat aircraft, over 47 thousand guns and mortars along the borders of the Soviet Union.
The military potential of the Red Army, in principle, was not much lower than the German one. 170 divisions (2.9 million people) were concentrated in the western border military districts. In terms of the number of military equipment, armored vehicles and aviation, the Soviet troops were not inferior to the German ones, but a significant part of the tanks, and especially aircraft, were of outdated types, new weapons were just being mastered by the personnel, many tank and aviation formations were in the stage of formation. The misunderstanding of the scale of the German invasion by the Soviet command, and first of all by Stalin, is evidenced by the second directive sent to the troops at 7 am on June 22: ". Stalin's postscript "From now on, until a special order for the ground troops to cross the border" testified to the fact that Stalin still thought that the war could be avoided. This directive, like directive No. 1, was drawn up unprofessionally, hastily, which once again speaks of the lack of clear plans for the Soviet command in the event of a forced defense.
On June 22, Molotov made a call to repulse the aggressor. Stalin's speech took place only on July 3.
Resistance to the aggressor. The fascist command organized an offensive in three strategic directions: Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. The Soviet command was waiting for the main blow in the southwest, but Hitler struck it in the center, in the west. The advance of the Germans in all directions, contrary to their expectations, was accompanied by fierce battles. From the very beginning of the war, Soviet troops put up serious resistance to the enemy. For the first time since 1939, the Germans began to suffer significant losses.
The defense of the Brest Fortress was a striking manifestation of the heroism and courage of our soldiers and officers at the initial stage of the war. Its garrison under the command of Major P. M. Gavrilov held back the attacks of superior enemy forces for more than a month.
June 23, fighters of the 99th rifle division with a counterattack, they drove the Germans out of Przemysl and held the city for 5 days. In the very first battles, the 1st Artillery Anti-Tank Brigade, which consisted mainly of young Muscovites, destroyed 42 tanks of General Kleist's group. On June 23, the division of Colonel I. D. Chernyakhovsky completely destroyed the motorized regiment of the 4th Panzer Group of General Hepner. There were many such examples.
But despite the massive heroism and self-sacrifice of Soviet soldiers, the results of the initial stage of the war were disastrous for the Red Army. By mid-July 1941, fascist troops captured Latvia, Lithuania, a significant part of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, the city of Pskov, Lvov, a huge number of servicemen were captured.
A terrible tragedy broke out near Minsk. Here, by July 9, the Germans managed to encircle almost 30 Soviet divisions. Minsk was left with battles, 323 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, the losses of the Western Front amounted to 418 thousand people. Stalin blamed the commander of the Western Front, D. G. Pavlov, and a number of other military leaders for this defeat. They were all shot by sentence The Supreme Court dated July 22, 1941 on charges of cowardice (rehabilitated in 1956). The flywheel of repression did not stop even with the outbreak of the war. On August 16, 1941, during the retreat of Soviet troops, Stalin issued Order No. 270, according to which deserters from command personnel should be “shot on the spot”, and those who were surrounded should not surrender, fight to the last bullet. Stalin's accusations of desertion of military leaders were largely unfounded, nevertheless, only from July 1941 to March 1942, 30 generals were shot (all were also rehabilitated).
The repressive policy also affected the civilian population. In August 1941, Soviet Germans (about 1.5 million people) were deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan, and most of them were sent to the labor army. In September 1941, 170 political prisoners were shot in the Oryol prison, among whom were the famous revolutionaries H. Rakovsky and M. Spiridonova. A special meeting of the NKVD continued to pass sentences in mass numbers without trial or investigation. Spreading false rumors was punishable by 2 to 5 years in prison.
In these difficult conditions, the Soviet people managed to rally against the common enemy - fascism - and showed their heroic character.
The occupation of a significant part of Soviet territory was assessed by the Nazi command as a decisive success in the war, but the Red Army turned out to be much stronger than the fascist strategists had hoped. Soviet troops not only defended themselves, but also retaliated against the enemy.
Moving towards Moscow, the enemy met fierce resistance in the capture of Smolensk. The Smolensk battle lasted two months (from July 10 to September 10, 1941). During the battle, the Soviet command used the famous Katyushas for the first time. Rocket launchers under the command of Captain I.A.Flerov struck at the enemy in the area of Orsha, and then Rudnya and Yelnya. In bloody battles, Soviet soldiers and commanders displayed genuine heroism. On July 30, the Germans were forced to go on the defensive for the first time. On September 5, 1941, the troops of the Reserve Front formed on July 30 under the command of G.K. Zhukov during the counteroffensive broke through the enemy's defenses and liberated Yelnya. The enemy lost several divisions (more than 50 thousand soldiers). For distinctions in the Yelninsky operation, the four best rifle divisions were the first in the Red Army to receive the rank of guards.
During the battles near Smolensk from August 9 to 10, 1941, the air division under the command of MV Vodopyanov on heavy Pe-8 aircraft, having made a heroic and dangerous flight, bombed Berlin for the first time.
The Battle of Smolensk allowed the Soviet command to gain time to prepare the defense of Moscow. On September 10, the enemy was stopped 300 km from Moscow. Hitler's "blitzkrieg" was dealt a serious blow.
Organizational activities. The beginning of the war is the most tragic chapter in the history of the Great Patriotic War. By mid-July 1941, out of 170 Soviet divisions, 28 were completely defeated, 70 divisions lost over 50% of their personnel and equipment. The troops of the Western Front suffered especially heavy losses.
German troops, having advanced in several weeks of fighting in different directions for 300-500 km inland, captured the territory on which almost 2/3 of industrial and agricultural products were produced before the war. About 23 million Soviet people fell into the occupation. By the end of 1941, the total number of prisoners of war reached 3.9 million.
In the very first days of the war, the country's leadership took a number of measures to organize a rebuff to the enemy: a general mobilization was declared, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the USSR Armed Forces was created. In a secret directive of June 29, 1941, the country's leadership told the party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions for the first time about the scale of military defeats. The directive contained a strict requirement to defend every inch of Soviet land, leave nothing to the enemy in the event of a forced retreat, destroy valuable property that cannot be taken out, organize partisan detachments and sabotage groups in the occupied territory, and create unbearable conditions for the enemy.
The Soviet totalitarian system, which was ineffective in conditions of peaceful life, turned out to be more effective in conditions of war. Its mobilization capabilities, multiplied during the Great Patriotic War by the patriotism and sacrifice of the Soviet people, played an important role in organizing the resistance to the enemy, especially at the initial stage of the war.
The call "Everything for the front, everything for the victory!" was accepted by all the people. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens voluntarily entered the army. More than 5 million people have been mobilized in the week since the beginning of the war.
On June 30, 1941, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was created - the extraordinary highest government agency USSR headed by J.V. Stalin. During the war years, the GKO concentrated all power in the country. Much attention was paid to military-economic work. A week after the outbreak of the war, the "Mobilization Plan" for the III quarter of 1941 was adopted. By the GKO decree of July 4, 1941, the development of a military-economic plan for the use of resources and the development of enterprises relocated to the eastern regions of the country was started. Throughout the war, quarterly and monthly plans of military-economic work were drawn up.
From the very first days of the war, all industrial and scientific institutions of the country began to restructure their work in accordance with the needs of defense. During the wartime, the entire able-bodied population of the cities was mobilized to work in production and construction. The decree "On the working hours of workers and employees in wartime" of June 26, 1941 established a working day of 11 hours, introduced mandatory overtime work, and canceled holidays. In the fall of 1941, a rationing system for distributing food among the population was reintroduced.
An important part of the creation of a military economy was the movement to the deep rear of industrial enterprises, equipment, material and cultural values. In just the first six months, over 1,500 large industrial enterprises were displaced from areas threatened by occupation, many educational institutions, research institutes, libraries, museums and theaters were evacuated. More than 10 million people were sent to the east of the country (according to some sources, 17 million people). The deployment of the military-industrial base in the eastern regions of the country took place in extremely difficult conditions. In the rear, people worked around the clock, often in the open air, in severe frosts.
By mid-1942, the military restructuring of the economy was largely completed. The eastern regions of the country became the main arsenal of the front and the main production base of the country.
Defensive battles in the summer-autumn of 1941 The outcome of the entire Great Patriotic War was seriously influenced by the defensive battles waged by the Red Army in the summer and autumn of 1941. Hitler's strategic failures near Smolensk forced him to change the direction of the main attack and direct it from the center to the south - to Kiev, Donbass, Rostov. Significant forces were concentrated near Kiev from both the German and Soviet sides. Together with the cadre units, the militias, the inhabitants of Kiev, heroically fought against the Nazis. However, the Germans managed to enter the rear of the 6th and 12th armies and surround them. For almost a whole week, Soviet soldiers and officers put up heroic resistance. Trying to save the armies, the commander of the Southwestern Front, Marshal S.M.Budyonny, asked the Headquarters for permission to leave Kiev, but Stalin was against it. Only on September 18, such permission was given, but the situation deteriorated so much that only a few managed to get out of the encirclement. In fact, both armies were lost. With the capture of Kiev by the enemy, the road to Moscow through Bryansk and Orel was opened.
In parallel, the Germans were attacking Odessa, an important base of the Black Sea Fleet. The legendary defense of Odessa lasted more than two months. The Red Army men, sailors and residents of the city became a single military garrison and successfully repulsed the onslaught of several Romanian divisions. Only on October 16, due to the threat of the seizure of Crimea, by order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the defenders of Odessa left the city. A significant part of the participants in the defense of Odessa was transferred to Sevastopol.
On its defensive lines, the soldiers of the Primorsky Army (commanded by General I.E. Petrov) and the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet, headed by Vice Admiral F.S. to the USSR. The enemy more than once tried to seize the city by storm, but Sevastopol stood unwavering.
Army Group North, having captured Pskov on July 9, advanced close to Leningrad. Its fall, according to the plans of the German command, was to precede the capture of Moscow. However, despite repeated attempts, the Germans and Finns acting together with them did not succeed in taking the city. On September 8, 1941, the 900-day siege of Leningrad began. For 611 days, the city was subjected to intense artillery shelling and bombing. The blockade put his defenders in an extremely difficult position. Daily rate grain in November-December 1941 was 250 workers, employees and dependents - 125. From hunger, cold, bombing and shelling killed about a million inhabitants of Leningrad. To connect the city with the mainland, an ice track was laid across Lake Ladoga, which the Leningraders called "Dear Life".
Despite the occupation of a large part western regions country, in none of the three main strategic directions of the offensive did the German army achieve decisive successes.
Disruption of Operation Typhoon. After the capture of Kiev, the Hitlerite General Staff began to develop a new operation to seize Moscow, called the Typhoon. On September 30, 1941, after a certain lull that came on the Central Front after the Battle of Smolensk, a new offensive by the enemy began. The tank army of the German General Guderian directed an attack along the Orel-Tula-Moscow line and captured Oryol and Bryansk.
In accordance with the Typhoon plan, the enemy concentrated 1.8 million soldiers and officers and a significant amount of military equipment in the Moscow sector, creating a numerical superiority over the Soviet troops. Despite the heroic resistance of the Red Army, the Nazis during the offensive managed to capture the cities of Vyazma, Mozhaisk, Kalinin and Maloyaroslavets and approach Moscow at 80-100 km. Hitler's directive said: “The city must be surrounded so that not a single Russian soldier, not a single inhabitant - be it a man, woman or child - could leave it. Suppress any attempt to escape by force. To produce necessary preparations so that Moscow and its environs are flooded with water with the help of huge structures. Where Moscow stands today, a sea should arise that will forever hide the capital of the Russian people from the civilized world. "
In early October, the situation became critical: as a result of the encirclement of five Soviet armies, the way to Moscow was practically open. The Soviet command took a number of urgent measures. On October 12, the Western Front was created under the command of General G.K. Zhukov, and the armies of the Reserve Front were also transferred to him. Particularly fierce fighting in the Moscow sector erupted in mid-October. On October 15, 1941, the State Defense Committee decided to evacuate parts of government and party institutions, the diplomatic corps to Kuibyshev and prepare for the destruction of 1119 industrial enterprises and facilities in Moscow and the region. The evacuation of Stalin was supposed. Under the influence of rumors about the surrender of Moscow on October 16, panic arose in the capital. Subsequently, according to the testimony of contemporaries, the words "October 16 man" became synonymous with shameful behavior and cowardice. Three days later, the panic was stopped by order of Stalin, who remained in the Kremlin. Tough measures were applied to cowards, alarmists, marauders, up to execution. A state of siege was declared in Moscow.
The whole country rose to defend the capital. Echelons hurried to Moscow with replenishment, weapons, ammunition from Siberia, the Urals, Of the Far East, Central Asia. 50 thousand militia fighters came to the aid of the front.
The defenders of Tula made an invaluable contribution to the defense of Moscow. Guderian's army was unable to take the city and was stopped by the heroic actions of the defenders of Tula. Moscow was reliably covered from air attacks. Defending the Moscow sky, pilot V.V. Talalikhin was one of the first to use a night air ram.
As a result of the measures taken in late October and early November, the offensive of the Nazis was stopped. Operation Typhoon failed. On November 6, in Moscow, in the hall of the Mayakovskaya metro station, a ceremonial meeting dedicated to the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution was held, at which JV Stalin delivered a speech. On November 7, 1941, a traditional military parade took place on Red Square, after which the troops immediately went to the front. All these events were of great importance for maintaining the morale of Soviet soldiers.
By mid-November, German troops launched a new offensive against Moscow. It was attended by 51 divisions, including 13 tank and 7 motorized, armed with 1.5 thousand tanks, 3 thousand guns. They were supported by 700 aircraft. The Western Front, which was holding back the offensive, already had more divisions than the enemy at that time, and outnumbered German aviation by 1.5 times in the number of aircraft.
As a result of the offensive, the Germans managed to capture Klin, Solnechnogorsk, Kryukovo, Yakhroma, Istra and approach Moscow at 25-30 km. The battles were especially stubborn in the defense zone of the 16th Army (commanded by General K. K. Rokossovsky) in the Istra region. A group of tank destroyers from the 316th Infantry Division of General IV Panfilov stood to death. He himself died in battle on November 18. By heroic efforts the fascist German troops were stopped practically at the walls of the capital.
Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow. In early December 1941, the Soviet command, in secrecy, was preparing a counteroffensive near Moscow. Such an operation became possible after the formation of ten reserve armies in the rear and a change in the balance of forces. The enemy retained superiority in the number of troops, the number of artillery and tanks, but it was no longer overwhelming.
In early December, the Germans launched another offensive against Moscow, but during this, on 5-6 December, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive along the entire front - from Kalinin to Yelets. It was attended by the troops of three fronts - the Western (under the command of G.K. Zhukov), Kalininsky (under the command of I.S.Konev) and the South-West (under the command of S.K. Timoshenko). This offensive came as a complete surprise to the German command. It proved unable to reflect powerful blows Red Army. By the beginning of January 1942, Soviet troops threw the Nazis back from Moscow by 100–250 km. The winter offensive of the Red Army continued until April 1942. As a result, the Moscow and Tula regions, many areas of the Smolensk, Kalinin, Ryazan and Oryol regions were completely liberated.
The blitzkrieg strategy finally collapsed near Moscow. The failure of the offensive on Moscow prevented Japan and Turkey from entering the war on the side of Germany. The victory of the Red Army pushed the United States and Britain to create an anti-Hitler coalition.
