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April Revolution Day in Afghanistan. April Revolution. An excerpt characterizing the April Revolution

April 27 marks 30 years since the victory in Afghanistan of the military coup, better known to the citizens of the former Soviet Union as the "April Revolution" or "Saur Revolution". As a result of the coup, organized by the leaders of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) with the support of the military, power in the country passed into the hands of the Military Revolutionary Council, chaired by Nur Mohammad Taraki, one of the founders of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

The "Saur Revolution" still remains one of the most mysterious events in recent Afghan history. Some historians and political experts believe that one of the reasons for the overthrow of the then head of the Afghan state, the representative of the royal house, Mohammad Daud, was his desire to distance himself from the USSR. After the last talks in Moscow with Leonid Brezhnev in 1977, Daoud made a series of visits to the countries of the region considered Western allies, and upon his return from Iran, during his speech in Herat, he condemned "ideology imposed from outside". In the same year, he began to purge the army and state apparatuses of members of the PDPA.

The military coup in Kabul under communist slogans was perceived by many foreign states as the coming to power of a regime that threatened to turn Afghanistan into a new military base of the Soviet bloc in Asia.

It is known, however, that in the late 1970s, radical Islamic groups were also preparing their own "revolution" in Kabul. Until 1978, the Islamists made several attempts to seize power by force in certain provinces of Afghanistan. So, in 1975, Ahmad Shah Massoud, an activist of the Muslim Youth organization, organized an uprising in Panjshir. However, due to the lack of support from the local population, the "youth revolution" was quickly suppressed. Afghan analyst Sanjar Ghafari believes that the PDPA, with its armed breakthrough to power in 1978, only got ahead of its opponents - the Islamists, who were preparing their own putsch. Ghafari is sure that Mohammad Daoud has become a victim of the next stage " big game". According to him, "the leaders of the then Iran and Saudi Arabia personally played the main role in distancing Daoud from the Soviet Union."

Most Western authors saw the change of power in Kabul in April 1978 as the "hand of Moscow." However, Russian experts do not share this opinion. Viktor Merimsky, who was the representative of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan 30 years ago, cites in his memoirs the story of one of the workers of the Soviet embassy, ​​who claimed that he and his colleagues “understood the situation” in Kabul too late: for this reason, about the coup in the Afghan capital in Moscow learned already from media reports. “We had a great relationship with Daud. Military-technical relations with Afghanistan became even better under him,” says Army General Valentin Varennikov. He also claims that the April 1978 coup was "a bolt from the blue" for the Soviet leadership.

Of course, the political detonator, the reason for the military coup on April 27, was the mysterious murder of one of the leaders of the PDPA, Mir Akbar Khaibar. Who committed the crime, what forces were behind the murder - this still remains a mystery. It should be noted that over the past 30 years, not a single weighty evidence of Daoud's involvement in the murder of Mir Akbar Khaybar has been presented. However, the comrades-in-arms of the deceased leader of the PDPA were not tormented then: they immediately declared the head of the Afghan state, Daud Khan, guilty of the death of Khaibar.

Khaybar's funeral ceremony turned into a protest against the ruling regime, as well as a demonstration of the strength of PDPA supporters. According to eyewitnesses, about 15 thousand "Afghan communists" took part in the mourning ceremony, who marched through the whole of Kabul. The leaders of the PDPA, in their speeches at the funeral, talked about declaring war on the current president of the country. According to the Afghan publicist Ramin Anvari, Khalqist Nur Mohammad Taraki and Parchamist Babrak Karmal threatened the Arg Palace with revenge "for every drop of spilled blood" of their comrade.

The threats of "mourning communists" irritated Daoud Khan. On April 25, Kabul radio broadcast a message about the arrest of two PDPA leaders, Taraki and Karmal. Other party leaders, such as the Khalqist Hafizullah Amin, were placed under house arrest. The sanctions of the country's leadership against the top of the PDPA, in fact, became a signal for the start of a communist uprising.

According to one of the participants in those events, Said Mohammad Gulabzoy, he received the order to start speaking out against the government through Amin's son, Abdul Rahman. Already by the morning of April 26, this information was brought to Abdul Qadir and Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, who were responsible, respectively, for the air and ground armed forces of the rebels.

In the early morning of April 27, 1978, tanks of the 4th tank brigade under the command of Watanjar advanced from the eastern regions of Kabul to the center of the Afghan capital. According to the Afghan publicist Razak Mamun, in the middle of the day the first shell fired from the coup's tank guns hit the building of the country's Ministry of Defense. With this one shot, the connection between the Ministry of War and the presidential palace "Arg" was destroyed.

The rebellious army units quickly disarmed the city police forces and captured the strategic facilities of Kabul. Putschist tanks surrounded the presidential palace, shelling it with their guns. The decisive role in the battle for Arg was played by Afghan military pilots under the command of Abdul Kadir: their combat aircraft, taking off from the airfield in Bagram, bombarded the presidential palace from the air.

The siege of Arga lasted all night. Only in the morning the rebel "communists" broke into the palace, killing President Mohammad Daoud and his entire family. In the evening of the same day, Hafizullah Amin, through the Kabul radio, informed the Afghan people about "the end of the period of the reign of the royal family" and "the victory of the military revolutionary council." The direct participants in the military coup received high government ranks and posts and sat in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PDPA for many more years. Some "heroes of the April Revolution" still sit in the Afghan parliament today.

At first, the change of power in the country was perceived positively by the majority of the people. Soon, however, dissatisfaction with the new regime began to grow rapidly. Some historians believe that this was due to the numerous mistakes made by the Afghan "communists" during the reforms. The PDPA leaders themselves blame foreign states for everything, which, in their opinion, contributed to the formation of an armed opposition against the new regime. A year after the victory of the April Revolution, in 1979, US President Jimmy Carter signed a directive to support the Mujahideen movement: large-scale work began on the creation and training of anti-Kabul formations in neighboring countries, in Iran and Pakistan.

After the military coup in 1978, Afghanistan entered a new period of its modern history. The change of power on April 27 and the socio-economic and political changes that followed it affected not only the life of the Afghans and Afghanistan. They became the beginning of a new era, both for the Central Asian region and for the whole world: it was after the "Saur Revolution" that the cold war between the two superpowers - the USSR and the USA, entered its final phase.

The "Saur era" ended with the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. However, in Afghanistan itself, the war is still going on. Over the past 30 years, the Afghans have seen and felt the “charms” of various political regimes- starting from the communists of the PDPA and ending with the fundamentalists, those who are commonly called "extremists" today. Perhaps no one can give an unambiguous assessment of this "troubled time" of the latest Afghan history. However, many Afghans who have survived the past 30 years seem to be united in one thing - in the desire to return back to those years when the country was stable and peaceful. Something without which a new revival of Afghanistan is impossible even today.

April Revolution - events in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978, which resulted in the establishment of a Marxist pro-Soviet government in the country.

On April 17, 1978, a prominent figure in the PDPA, a member of the Parcham faction, Mir Akbar Khaibar, the former editor-in-chief of the opposition government of the Parchamist newspaper, was shot dead. On 19 April, his funeral turned into a demonstration against the regime of President Mohammed Daoud, as there were rumors that Daoud's secret police had been involved in the assassination, and led demonstrators to clash with police.

Daoud ordered the arrest of PDPA leaders. On the night of April 26, Nur Mohammed Taraki and B. Karmal were arrested. Four hours later, H. Amin, who was already under house arrest, was also sent to prison. On the morning of April 26, all four Kabul newspapers came out with a government report stating: “Having considered the statements, speeches, slogans, appeals, actions and arbitrariness that took place during the funeral of Mir Akbar Haidar, the government regarded them as provocative and unconstitutional ... By the persons accused in the commission of a criminal offense and arrested by the security forces are Nur Mohammed Taraki, Babrak Karmal, Dr. Shah Wali, Dastagir Panjshiri, Abdul Hakim Sharayi, Hafizullah Amin, Dr. Zamir Safi. During the arrest of these persons, documents of interest were confiscated in their apartments. An active search for a number of other individuals continues.”

However, Amin, with the help of his son, handed over to the military units loyal to the PDPA the order prepared back in March to start an armed uprising. After that, supporters of the PDPA among the armed forces carried out an armed action to change the government.

On April 27, 1978, at about 10 am, tanks appeared on the streets of Kabul. Tanks surrounded the presidential palace of Arg.

Tank units under the command of Aslam Watanjar fired on Royal Palace Arg, where Daud was with his whole family, the main ministries, the buildings of law enforcement agencies. According to Afghan publicist Razak Mamun, in the middle of the day the first shell fired from a tank gun hit the building of the country's Ministry of Defense. Thus, this shot destroyed the connection between the Ministry of War and the presidential palace "Ark".

Aircraft, one of which was piloted by the future prominent political figure, then senior sergeant S. Gulyabzoy, delivered an "acrobatic" blow to the main building of the palace. The 7th division, loyal to Daoud, tried to break through to the capital with a fight, but was dispersed by air attacks of the rebels. The siege of Arg went on all night. The palace, subjected to bombardment and shelling, fell on the morning of the next day. A group of military men led by Imamuddin broke into the building where the head of state was, the president and his entire family were killed; around the same time, the resistance of troops loyal to the government was suppressed. A. Kadyr and M. Vatanjar on the evening of April 27 announced the “Saur Revolution” on the radio. PDPA leaders Taraki and Karmal and others were released from prison. Afghanistan was declared the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Nur Mohammad Taraki became head of state and prime minister, Babrak Karmal became his deputy, and Hafizullah Amin became first deputy prime minister and foreign minister.

Republic of Afghanistan(Arabic داود جمهورية أفغانستان‎) is the name of the first republic in Afghanistan proclaimed after the coup d'état and the abolition of the monarchy in 1973.

Story

coup

In 1973, while King Mohammed Zahir Shah was visiting Italy, his cousin and former Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud organized a coup d'état and installed a republican government in the country. Daoud had previously served as prime minister, but was forced to resign from Zahir Shah's government in 1963. The king decided to abdicate in order to avoid civil war.

First reforms

That same year, former Afghan Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal was arrested for conspiring against President Daoud. Although he is believed to have committed suicide in prison prior to his trial, it is widely believed that he was tortured to death by Daoud's henchmen. A new republican government was created.

After coming to power, Mohammed Daoud founded his own political party called the National Revolutionary Party. This party became the only political party in the country. The Loya Jirga approved a new constitution as well as the creation of a presidential republic in January 1977. All uprisings against the new regime were crushed by government troops.

The regime created by Mohammed Daoud was of a pronounced authoritarian nature - immediately after the coup, parliament was dissolved and Supreme Court, the activities of opposition political parties are prohibited. The official ideology of the Daoud regime was the "people's and national theory of revolution."

Presidency of M. Daud

During Daoud's presidency, relations with socialist countries, especially with the Soviet Union, deteriorated sharply, but at the same time, he managed to normalize relations with conservative Islamic countries, in particular, with Pakistan and Shah's Iran. The Soviet Union saw in the new president a shift in orientation towards Western countries, an attempt to distance themselves from the USSR.

In 1976, Dowd created a seven-year economic development plan.

He removes Soviet military and economic advisers, begins re-equipping the army, and is engaged in economic development. Daoud also requested oil-rich Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait to provide financial assistance. Mohammed Daoud was known as a reformer who tried to modernize Afghanistan.

But Daoud achieved little from the reform plan he outlined in 1976. There has been no real progress in the Afghan economy and the standard of living in Afghanistan has not improved.

Saur Revolution in Afghanistan

Daud was often criticized for his one-party dictatorship, which was legislated in the 1977 Constitution. By this time, the two factions of the opposition PDPA party, Khalq and Parcham, had entered into a fragile cooperation agreement. This time, members of the Communist Party planned a military coup against Daoud's government. According to the second President of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin, the PDPA began to develop a conspiracy plan as early as 1976, two years before the Saur Revolution.

April (Saur) revolution

On April 27, 1978, a military coup began in the country. Soldiers from the military base at Kabul International Airport began to move towards the city center. They managed to seize power in the capital. The next day, Daoud and most of his family were executed at the presidential palace in Kabul.

As a result of the coup, the Secretary General of the PDPA Nur Mohammed Taraki comes to power, who became the chairman of the Revolutionary Council and the prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan created by the communists. After the military coup, Taraki assumed the presidency of Afghanistan. Hafizullah Amin took office as Deputy Prime Minister of Afghanistan.

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Biography

Youth

Nur Mohammed Taraki was born on July 15, 1917 in the village of Kalai, Nawa district in the province of Ghazni in the family of a cattle breeder. By nationality - Pashtun-Ghilzai from the Tarak clan, Buran branches. According to the official biography, Nur Muhammad, at the age of five, entered the service of a certain widow in order to look after her household and, if necessary, carry out the orders of the mistress. The service turned out to be short-lived, because the father wanted his son to learn to read and write, and later became a scribe. Taraki received his primary education in Mukura and also completed a 10-grade English night school in Bombay where he learned English. Almost nothing is known about the Bombay period of his life. There is an opinion that it was there that young Taraki first got acquainted with socialist ideas and, possibly, with some kind of Soviet agent. In 1932, Taraki became a messenger for the fruit export company Pashtun Trading K in Kandahar.

APRIL (SAUR) REVOLUTION 1978

Per Good work he was promoted to clerk's apprentice and sent as clerk to the company's office in Bombay.

Writer and politician

Taraki began his career not as a politician and clerk, but as a writer and translator. Returning in 1937 from Bombay, he began to publish in various newspapers with journalistic articles, translated from English and published a number of detailed and laudatory articles on Soviet literature. His work was known for social and everyday essays in pashto and stories about the life of the poorest strata - the peasantry, artisans and workers - stories The Wanderings of Banga (1958), Spin (1958), lonely(1962). His works contributed to the development of realistic tendencies in Afghan literature.

In 1945, Nur Mohammed became the personal secretary of a major entrepreneur and Minister of Economy Abdel-Mejid Zaboli, then worked in various positions in the Kabul Press Department, director of courses for the study of pashto in the capital of the country, and also, according to some reports, headed the Bakhtar Telegraph Agency. In 1952, he was sent as press attache to the Afghan embassy in the United States, where he criticized the ruling regime at a press conference in New York the following year. Taraki, in particular, stated that the existing order in Afghanistan " oppressive and autocratic, which will not change as a result of the replacement of one relative of the king with another”, referring to the king's cousin Mohammed Daoud, who was appointed to the post of prime minister. While in the United States, Noor Mohammed Taraki tried to seek political asylum, but after being refused, he decided to return to Afghanistan. According to the official biography, he " Once in Kabul, I went to the cinema, called the despotic Daoud, and directly told him: “I am Nur Mohammed Taraki. I just arrived. Should I go home now or go straight to jail?» For some reason, Daoud allowed him to return home. After returning to his homeland, Taraki could not find a job and was unemployed for some time.

revolutionary activity. Saur Revolution

In 1965, Nur Mohammed Taraki organized the pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which soon led the progressive forces. In January, the first congress of the PDPA was held. In autumn, the PDPA took part in the parliamentary elections. Taraki ran for the lower house (Wolesi Jirga) from his native district of Ghazni, however, he was defeated, according to the official biography, this happened " due to government fraud and shameless interference in the voting process". In 1966, the party began to publish the newspaper "Khalk" - translated as "People", - but after the release of the sixth issue, the authorities closed it. Later, during the years of the rise of the democratic movement, disagreements arose within the PDPA. V Everyday life party, clan, tribal, religious, nationalist prejudices began to manifest themselves more and more clearly. Two factions formed. One of them, the Khalqist faction, was headed by Nur Mohammed Taraki, and the other - by the Parchamists - under the name of the newspaper "Parcha?m" (in translation - "Banner") - Babra?k Karma?l. It was not until March 1977 that an agreement was reached between the warring factions, and a unifying conference took place in July.

Plan
Introduction
1 The creation of the party and the first years of activity
1.1 Party organization and factional struggle. Khalq and Parcham
1.2 Reconciliation

2 Period of leadership "Khalq"
2.1 April Revolution
2.2 First reforms

3 Parcham leadership period
3.1 National reconciliation
3.2 Popular Front

4 Party reform and loss of power
Bibliography

Introduction

People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (NDPA; PERS. حزب دموکراتیک خلق افغانستان, Pushtu افغانستان دلق دموکراټیک ګوند) - Marxist Party, existing in Afghanistan in 1965-1992 (in the last 2 years of its existence, it was called "Vathan" (PERS. وطن - "Fatherland")).

Founded on January 1, 1965 by journalist N. M. Taraki. In 1967, the party split into the radical Khalq faction (Persian خلق‎ - "People") and the more moderate Parcham (Persian پرچم‎ - "Banner"), which was headed by B. Karmal.

In 1978, officers - members of the PDPA made the April Revolution and brought the party to power. At this point, the party had 18,000 members. Mistakes in the implementation of the PDPA socio-economic reforms caused massive discontent in the country and the growth of armed resistance. The factional struggle in the party intensified, as a result of which, on July 1, 1978, the leader of the Parchamists, B. Karmal, was removed from his post and was sent as ambassador to Czechoslovakia. In addition, as a result of internal party intrigues in September 1979, N. M. Taraki was removed from power and soon killed by order of the new party leader Hafizullah Amin. Due to political instability in the state, the PDPA called in Soviet troops, which led to the Afghan war (1979-1989). During the operation carried out by the Soviet special forces on December 27, 1979, H. Amin was killed, and pro-Moscow-oriented B. Karmal was brought to the leadership of the party.

Under the influence of Perestroika in the USSR, the party abandoned a number of basic points of ideology and made a compromise with the armed opposition. In 1990, at the Second Party Congress (18th plenum), the PDPA changed its theoretical base, adopted a new manifesto and changed its name to "Vatan" ("Fatherland"). The Watan party was the ruling party in Afghanistan until 1992. After the collapse of the USSR and the loss of Soviet assistance, the party lost power and dissolved itself. Part of the supporters of the Parcham faction (mainly non-Pashtuns) joined the detachments of Ahmad Shah Masud, and the former Khalqists and pro-Najib Parchamists entered into an alliance with G. Hekmatyar.

In 2002, the Afghan Democratic Party Watan was created on the basis of the Watan Party.

1. Creation of the party and the first years of activity

1.1. Party organization and factional struggle. Khalq and Parcham

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan held its first (constituent) congress in Kabul on January 1, 1965, at the home of journalist N. M. Taraki. N. M. Taraki was elected General Secretary of the PDPA, Babrak Karmal - Deputy Secretary General, was also elected to the Central Committee of five members. Later, N. M. Taraki created the Khalq newspaper (an organ of the PDPA), which was closed on May 23, 1966 by the government of Zahir Shah as anti-Islamic, anti-constitutional and anti-monarchist.

Two years after its creation, in May 1967, the PDPA split into two factions - "Khalk" ("People"), headed by H.M. Taraki and "Parcham" ("Banner"), headed by B. Karmal. Of the members of the Central Committee of the PDPA elected at the 1st Party Congress, Saleh Muhammad Zeray and Taher Badakhshi joined N. M. Taraki, and Ghulam Dastagir Panjsheri, Shahrulla Shahpar and Sultan Ali Keshtmand joined B. Karmal.

The differences between the factions concerned ideological and economic issues and, in addition, differed in ethnic and social composition. The Khalq (People) faction consisted mostly of Pashtuns and representatives of the rural population, while the Parcham faction was dominated by the urban population and the middle and upper classes. The Khalq leader N. M. Taraki held radical views on building socialism in Afghanistan, while the Parcham leader B. Karmal considered Afghan society too underdeveloped to be guided by the ideas of Leninism about socialist construction and proposed to focus on the party work on national liberation, anti-imperialist principles. From March 1968 to July 1969, the B. Karmal faction published its own newspaper, Parcham, which was more loyal to Zahir Shah than Khalq, for which it was constantly attacked by the faction of N. M. Taraki.

In 1969, the PDPA participated in the parliamentary elections, while none of the Parcham representatives entered the parliament, H. Amin became the only member of parliament from the PDPA.

Western researchers often refer to members of the PDPA as communists, which does not correspond to the real political and ideological guidelines of the PDPA. The party's program was developed to solve the specific urgent problems of Afghanistan for the complete defeudalization of the state and was not and could not be the program of the communist party.

April Revolution in Afghanistan

In 1973, the PDPA supported M. Daoud's coming to power in Kabul and the establishment of a republic in Afghanistan. The lack of a mass base in the regime of M. Daoud, as well as the weakness and fragmentation of the political groups of the local bourgeoisie, forced M. Daoud to seek cooperation with PDPA organizations, especially with the Parcham faction. For the first time in Afghan history, representatives of non-traditional class forces received some access to the affairs of government. As part of the Central Committee of the Revolution, 4 members of the Central Committee were members of the PDPA (3 "parchamists" and 1 "khalkist"). The members of the Parcham faction were also 6 governors out of 26 and 64 district chiefs out of 140.

1.2. Reconciliation

The leadership of the CPSU played the role of an arbitrator in relations between the factions. At the same time, the CPSU did not consider the PDPA a fraternal party. The leaders of the PDPA, in turn, recognized the leading role of the CPSU in the world revolutionary movement, but at the same time, the PDPA did not participate in the discussion of the "Maoist" communist parties with the "revisionists" (Khrushchevites, Brezhnevists, Eurocommunists, Hoxhaists). The main foreign policy partner for the PDPA was the international department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, as well as the pro-Soviet communist parties in Iran, Pakistan and India.

Thanks to the mediation of the Soviet leadership in March 1977, an agreement was reached on restoring the unity of the PDPA, and in July of the same year, both factions held a joint meeting for the first time after a 10-year gap. The newly elected Politburo of the Central Committee of the PDPA included five representatives of Khalq and five from Parcham. But, despite the formal reconciliation, the armed and financial bodies of the factions continued to operate independently of each other.

At the end of 1977, the leadership of the PDPA adopted a policy of overthrowing the regime of M. Daoud. The uprising was planned to start in the autumn of 1978, but serious factional disagreements began again on questions of strategy and tactics. The "Khalkists" proposed to prepare an armed coup with the help of officers of the Afghan army loyal to the PDPA and to kill M. Daoud at the right moment. B. Karmal and his supporters, on the contrary, put forward the "idea of ​​a nationwide strike." But in reality, events began to develop ahead of the dates set by the PDPA.

2. Period of leadership "Khalq"

On the eve of the April events of 1978, about 18 thousand people were in the ranks of the PDPA, of which 5 thousand were in the armed forces, of which 94% were "Khalkists" and supported the course for the speedy overthrow of the Daoud regime and fundamental economic and political changes in the country. In April 1978, by order of the Minister of Internal Affairs, General Abdullah Nuristani, a prominent member of the Parcham faction, Mir Akbar Khyber, was killed. The opposition responded with a demonstration of 15,000 supporters who carried red flags and shouted anti-government slogans. N. M. Taraki spoke at a rally in front of the US Embassy and accused the CIA of being involved in the events. On April 26, Daoud arrested PDPA leaders and also fired 200 unreliable army officers. Hafizullah Amin, who was under house arrest, gave the signal through his liaison to start an armed uprising. At 6 am on April 27, in the vicinity of the Kabul Zoo, a meeting of the coordinating group to lead the military coup was held, consisting of Said Mohammed Gulyabzoy (responsible for the Air Force and Air Defense), Asadullah Nayyam (responsible for the 4th tank brigade), Amin Naimaan (responsible for anti-aircraft missile brigade) and Mohammed Doust (responsible for the 32nd commando regiment). It was decided to block the parts of the presidential guard in their places of deployment, as well as to seize the presidential palace and kill M. Daud. During April 27, the presidential palace was captured, and M. Daoud, who refused to surrender, was killed along with his family. The Military Revolutionary Council (VRC) was created. On April 30, 1978, the VRS announced Decree No. 1, which transferred its powers to the Revolutionary Council, which was declared the highest body state power in Afghanistan and joined it. The creation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was proclaimed. Nur Mohammed Taraki became the head of state, Babrak Karmal became his deputy, and Hafizullah Amin was appointed minister of foreign affairs and first deputy prime minister, at the suggestion of Taraki. A new government and judiciary were formed, and new governors and commanders of corps and divisions were appointed.

2.2. First reforms

After coming to power, the party carried out a number of socio-economic reforms. The government promoted state atheism. Men were forced to cut their beards, women were not allowed to wear the veil anymore, and most mosques were placed closed at the beginning of the regime. The mosques reopened in the 80s because the party was trying to win over more supporters. The government also carried out a new land reform and others. The new government also launched a campaign of violent suppression, killing about 10,000 to 27,000 people and jailing 14,000 to 20,000 more, mostly in Pul-i-Charkhi prison. The program of the PDPA "The main directions of revolutionary tasks" provided for the implementation of anti-feudal and democratic reforms in the country. The most important component of the transformations was the land and water reform. The government freed more than 11 million peasants from debts to usurers and landlords, and 335,000 peasant families were granted the right to free land ownership. A course was taken to create a public sector in the economy. The reforms included the creation of a democratic secular state and the removal of the church from political activity. In the cultural sphere, a campaign was launched to eradicate illiteracy and develop education. All these and other undertakings soon ran into the general backwardness of the country, came into conflict with religious and national postulates and traditions.

Many studies have been devoted to this issue.

In today's Afghanistan, politicians have given themselves an unambiguous answer to these questions. The fall of the PDPA regime is celebrated as a national holiday (“Jihad Victory Day”), and accusations of treason against Afghan communists are increasingly being leveled. Not so long ago, a group of deputies to the Mishran Jirga (the upper house of the Afghan parliament) proposed organizing a trial of the participants in the coup on April 27, 1978. This activity to a greater extent reflects the internal Afghan political struggle and the fear of the return of the "old communists" to active political life and a new redistribution of power in the country. But such accusations are increasingly hitting back at Russia, as an example is the recent initiative of the deputies of the Afghan parliament to recover compensation from Russia for the "occupation of the country" in 1979-1989.

The author would like to present readers with a different view of the causes of the crisis in the state neighboring the USSR and the role of the Soviet Union in the unfolding events. I do not pretend to discover fundamentally new facts, but only want to show the logic of the development of events, which, in my opinion, made a different outcome impossible.

By the time of independence in 1919, Afghanistan was a developing country with conservative social institutions and an agrarian economy. With the expansion of the production of commercial crops, the country entered the path of capitalist development, not yet completely done away with the remnants of the feudal and even tribal system. In the cities, the manufacturing industry began to develop, primarily weaving workshops, the first private joint-stock companies (“shikrets”) arose, and the banking sector appeared.

But the beginning processes of globalization dealt a painful blow to the national economy. After the Second World War, the national market was flooded with cheap imported goods, which "crushed" national manufacturers, workshop owners, and national factories. This coincided with a land crisis in the countryside. The country's population grew, meanwhile, the climate and three-quarters of the mountainous landscape created objective obstacles to the development of new lands suitable for cultivation. There was an effect, aptly named by one of the UN experts "Malthusian scissors": the average land plot per rural resident was steadily decreasing, leaving a significant part of the rural population without a livelihood. In addition, the country was experiencing a characteristic of the wounded stage of development. market economy the concentration of agricultural land in the hands of large owners, merchants, usurers and wealthy peasants, which further exacerbated socio-economic problems.

In theory, the concentration of land and the consolidation of agricultural production should increase the efficiency of management and the outflow of workers to industry. However, in the conditions of the national crisis of industry, the peasants simply had nowhere to go: labor migration to neighboring states (Pakistan and India) was growing, in the early 1970s more than 1 million people left the country, becoming guest workers (about 7% of the country's population). Labor emigration from Afghanistan had a significant historical tradition behind it, but in this case it took on a scale that was simply dangerous for the state, and there were no prospects for improvement.

The only way out was the accelerated development of national industry. However, foreign companies that supplied their goods to the country were often not interested in developing local production. The low qualification of the labor force also affected. Therefore, Afghanistan could only rely on its own funds or gratuitous support. The country received some funding from international organizations: The World Bank transferred $225 million to the Afghan government from 1946 to 1980, and another $95 came from the Asian Development Bank. But these donations were clearly insufficient to solve internal and external difficulties.

Along with leaving economic crisis the Afghan elite sought to restore national borders. It should be clarified here that the dominant position in Afghanistan is traditionally occupied by the Pashtun ethnic group, which in the late 1960s was not much more than half of the population. Most of the political elite of the country, including the royal dynasty, traditionally belonged to him, it was his preferences that determined the dominance of the Sunni version of Islam and the Sunni clergy in the country. However, at the same time, the Pashtun ethnic group was divided by borders: most of the ethnic Pashtuns (more than 10 million) lived south of the Afghan-Pakistani border - the so-called. "Durand Line" imposed by the British colonial administration in 1893. These disputed lands remained a source of enmity between neighboring states after Pakistan gained independence, which resulted in a break in diplomatic relations in 1961-1963. At the same time, Afghan intelligence threw sabotage groups into Pakistani territory, which, under the guise of "national mujahideen", tried to unleash a guerrilla war in the country.

Afghan leaders tried to find support from the world superpowers of the USA and the USSR, taking advantage of the Cold War situation. Foreign leaders responded to requests for help: as of 1978, the United States had allocated developing country more than 532 million dollars, the Soviet Union - about 1.2 billion. These loans were largely motivated not even by the desire to draw Afghanistan into one of the political blocs, but simply by supporting the country's image abroad, by demonstrating its readiness to solve world problems. In the 1970-1980s, the USSR and the USA carried out similar programs in Africa, and they made a certain contribution to the progress of a number of countries on the continent.

I am aware that from the “isolationist” positions that came into vogue in the 1990s, this is a waste of money. However, the same can be called the landing of a human crew on the moon, in which the main role was played by the political, not the scientific aspect. The United States spent $19 billion to finance the Apollo program, but at that time, neither in America nor in the Soviet Union, this seemed like a waste of money to anyone. Meanwhile, the cost of supporting the same Afghanistan was not so burdensome for national budgets. By the 2000s, Afghanistan's debt to Russia amounted to slightly more than $11 billion, which includes all directly unreimbursed expenses to support the Kabul regime, except for the maintenance of the Soviet army group in 1979-1989. Approximately the same amount the USSR annually spent on grain imports. The refusal of the country from foreign policy expenditures would have been perceived in those years as an attempt to "save on matches", indicating financial trouble. This would naturally be followed by an increase in the pressure of the enemies and a drop in the confidence of the allies.

In addition, in addition to general humanitarian, the Soviet Union had its own political interests in Afghanistan, which had to be defended. The close ethnic and family composition of the population in many border areas made the Soviet border "transparent" to a certain extent, which created every opportunity for the penetration of foreign agents and criminal elements. Given that the republics of Central Asia, due to Islamic traditions, to a lesser extent, as many believed, accepted the Soviet model of society, the threat of foreign influence posed a significant danger. Secondly, the appearance of military bases in China or NATO endangered a number of strategic facilities, including Baikonur, which the Soviet leadership was concerned about during all the aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan. To protect its borders, the USSR consistently demanded the transformation of the northern provinces into a zone of its geopolitical interests, in particular, the exclusion of the presence of citizens of NATO countries there. There are cases when even UN specialists, who carried out mineral exploration and mapping, were not allowed into these areas.

On the other hand, relations with Afghanistan were of some economic interest to the USSR. In particular, the shortage of natural gas necessary for the industrial needs of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which emerged in the late 1960s, was covered for many years by gas imports from Afghanistan. According to available data, Afghanistan supplied the USSR with 2.1–2.7 billion cubic meters per year, which accounted for most of the annual gas production in the DRA. There is an opinion that for a long time these deliveries occurred at low prices. Gas was not the only valuable resource that Soviet geologists discovered in the country: back in the 1970s, they discovered the Ainak copper deposit, which is now the largest of the undeveloped in the world.

Afghanistan of the 20th century was not ready for the independent development of natural resources and economic development. 44.8% of the costs of the implementation of the seven-year plan for the development of the economy 1969-1975 came from foreign sources.

However, external and internal problems were insoluble within the framework of the monarchical paradigm of Afghanistan's development. The development of industry with foreign funds did not completely eliminate the land hunger. In 1955–1975, according to UN data published for 2008, the average per capita allotment of land decreased by 23%. The situation was still aggravated by the high concentration of land in the hands of the rural elite. By the end of the 1970s, 31.7% of the land was concentrated in large plots owned by usurers or tribal aristocracy (the total number of this group of landowners is 54 thousand people), and about 20% of the rural population remained landless.

The elite close to the throne was not able to go beyond the templates and start the process of political and economic reforms. The military elite saw a way out of the impasse in the coup and regime change that took place in 1973. The country was led by a popular nationalist politician, former Prime Minister Muhammad Daoud.

Agrarian reform proclaimed by the new regime, including the redistribution of surplus land and the displacement of moneylenders by the cooperative trading system. However, the new agrarian legislation remained on paper: Muhammad Daoud did not dare to make large-scale confiscations and continued to try to deal with the problem of "Malthusian scissors" by expanding irrigated areas, which made it possible to provide land for only a very limited number of families. At the same time, attempts to modernize domestic institutions and public life met with fierce resistance from the clerical opposition.

Relations with her were spoiled even during the premiership of Daoud, when in 1959 a conflict erupted over the abolition by the government of the obligatory wearing of the veil by women. The clergy and clerics took actions against the government, but they were brutally suppressed: a number of mullahs were hanged, others were thrown into prison, the Ulema Council was dissolved. But the clerical conservatives were not defeated, in the late 1960s they resumed their actions, and in the early 1970s they switched to terror. In fact, that guerrilla war had already begun at that time, which is now often being “tied” to the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan: according to some reports, at least 600 fundamentalists died during these battles between clerics and Daud’s security forces, and at least 1,000 people were arrested .

Failures on the domestic front, Daoud tried to compensate in foreign policy. The international situation made it possible to hope for a solution to the problem of the Pashtun territories that were part of Pakistan. This would allow not only to restore the unity of the Pashtuns, but also to liquidate the bases of clerical militants and put an end to terror on their own territory. Pakistan at that moment was in a rather difficult international situation: its relations with the United States were not easy due to attempts to create its own nuclear bomb, and the USSR staked in the region on India, which was traditionally in confrontation with Pakistan. In addition, the country experienced certain internal difficulties, due to which in 1971 it lost East Pakistan (Bangladesh). Daud had every reason to expect that the next in line would be the abolition of the "Durand line" and, if not the transfer of the Pashtun regions under the jurisdiction of Afghanistan, then at least the declaration of their nominal independence.

However, such a plan remained unrealizable without the participation of the USSR, which was very wary of Daoud's political ambitions. While still prime minister, M. Daud appealed to Soviet representatives with a request for military assistance in the fight against Pakistan through the training of officers and the supply of weapons, but was officially refused. He was told that " his stake on a forceful solution to the Pashtun problem is futile”and that attempts to provoke a guerrilla war on the territory of Pakistan, a member of the SEATO military-political bloc, will inevitably lead to the Soviet Union being drawn into a large-scale war in the region, which could escalate into a third world war.

It should be understood that the Soviet leaders did not at all dream of access to the Indian Ocean, which was primarily of military importance. In that historical period, the conservative Politburo was completely satisfied with the existing state of affairs, internal material and political resources, in general, were enough to implement social and economic programs, and external expansion in Asia meant only a new round of confrontation and an arms race, new spending on military spending and confrontation with the USA. No one wanted to risk being drawn into a major war, even if only a probable one, for the sake of the interests of a “friendly” regime. Psychology also had an effect: the majority of the Soviet leadership personal experience she remembered the Great Patriotic War, the most difficult in terms of human and material losses, the experience of which she subconsciously transferred to any major military conflict. Any possibility of a repetition of "like" justifiably frightened and repulsed.

The Afghan elite thought completely differently, which could not be satisfied with the situation of the country. The restoration of the borders could give the country a historical impetus for the industrial transition, because the Pashtun territories of Pakistan were technologically more developed than many Afghan regions, and the very fact of the restoration of the ancient borders could cause a patriotic upsurge among the population. Figuratively speaking, the Afghans had nothing to lose except their troubles, and any risk for the sake of the set goal seemed justified to the Afghan observer. In addition, Daoud, as a Third World politician, probably thought more locally than his Soviet counterparts, excluding countries outside the region from his field of vision. After all, if he were the American president, what would he care about Pakistan? (Like many of our contemporaries, he may well not have realized that participation in all major world processes for a superpower is a matter of its own survival). After all, has anyone started a global war over Bangladesh? So what are these "Soviet old men" afraid of? So, most likely, reasoned in Kabul.

Pakistan was well aware of the danger emanating from Afghanistan and tried to use internal Afghan contradictions to weaken the neighbor and distract him from external expansion. Searches of fundamentalist militants often resulted in the seizure of large sums of money and materials showing ties to Pakistan, where many of the hiding clerical leaders found refuge. Simultaneously with the support of the opposition, Pakistan tried to achieve a break between Daoud and leftist parties, including the PDPA: Pakistani intelligence ISI gave Daoud a number of photographic materials indicating contacts between Afghan communists and the KGB residency.

It is important to emphasize here that in Afghanistan in the 1960s and 1970s we cannot always find the traditional confrontation between the "right" and the "left" in matters of state regulation of the economy. The ideas of a “managed economy” and the need for social guarantees were accepted by all political groups, and many did not consider it shameful to use socialist phraseology. M. Daud himself, in his first radio address as president of the country, called socialism " as our economic foundation for the new Afghan society and stressed that he is a means of achieving social justice, eliminating class inequality and antagonism in a positive, progressive and peaceful way". The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan took only more radical positions on a number of issues.

Now open archival data confirms that the leadership of the CPSU maintained contacts with the leaders of the PDPA and, after it went into opposition, called on the main factions for party unity and even informed the party leadership about the progress of their negotiations with Daoud, but there is no reason to believe that the Afghan communists acted as agents obeying the will of Moscow.

A number of members of the moderate Parcham (Banner) faction of the PDPA were part of the first government of Daoud, but in 1976 the president refused this cooperation. Most of the communists, even those who took part in the 1973 coup, were either dismissed or appointed to unimportant posts where they were deprived of real power. At the same time, the government was cracking down on legal political opposition. In Afghanistan, a one-party system was established, in which all parties except the Daoud National Revolution Party were banned.

It is difficult to say whether "Pakistani compromising evidence" played a role here, the desire to compromise with the clerics who were opposed to the PDPA, or the provision of a new foreign policy towards rapprochement with the United States and Western countries. By 1977, there was a clear aggravation of relations with the USSR. Daud's next visit to Moscow turned into a scandal. In response to Brezhnev's remark about the alarm in connection with the appearance of a number of Western "advisors" in the Afghan army, the President told him, " that his government hires whoever it wants and no one can tell it what to do". Then he left the room, thus interrupting the negotiations.

Meanwhile, the situation in Afghanistan itself was heating up. The land crisis continued: the average per capita allotment, which after 1970 fell below the level of 0.4 hectares per capita, was shrinking. By the end of the 1970s, 31.7% of the land was concentrated in large allotments owned by usurers or tribal aristocracy (54 thousand people), and about 20% of the rural population remained landless. The ban on opposition parties did not add stability to the political system: the right-wing clerics continued to resist supported from Pakistan, and the communists from the PDPA moved on to developing plans for a coup d'état, which was scheduled for August 1978.

Daoud, knowing or not knowing about the plans of the communists, decided once and for all to put an end to the left opposition in the country and ordered the arrests of prominent leaders of the PDPA. Meanwhile, for the leaders of the PDPA, the coup was already a way of self-defense. Even the day before, on April 25-26, many leaders of the PDPA were arrested, including Taraki, Amin (leaders of the radical wing of the PDPA "Khalq" - "People") and Karmal ("Parcham"). On the morning of April 27, the party officers who remained at large met in the area of ​​the Kabul Zoo and decided to start a coup and release their comrades-in-arms. Delay could lead to their own arrest and the complete failure of the PDPA, but the chances of success were quite real: the middle rank of Afghan employees, including army officers, sympathized with the communists and were disappointed with the Daoud regime. Even the officer who searched Amin's apartment was a secret member of the PDPA.

What is the role of the USSR in these events? The available testimonies of the participants indicate that the coup was not only not inspired by the USSR, but the Soviet leadership was not even aware of it. For example, according to the testimony of V. Merimsky, a representative of the Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan, the PDPA functionaries later admitted that they intentionally concealed information about the upcoming coup from the Soviet allies, citing the fact that “ Moscow could dissuade them from this action due to the absence of a revolutionary situation in the country". Apparently, the embassy learned about the coup only from the reports of Soviet military consultants that the troops received an order to advance to the capital, later a representative of the PDPA A. Kadyr arrived at the embassy and notified the Soviet diplomats about the coup, and also asked for consultations.

Apparently, the Soviet Union at that time did not have a real opportunity to control the situation in the country: the case of the "Pakistani compromising evidence" showed the weakness of the local intelligence network, and the Soviet representatives were rather forced to "go with the flow." But it must be admitted that even the most effective intelligence apparatus would hardly have made it possible to change the course of the country's history. The authorities turned out to be unable to cope with the growing agrarian overpopulation and economic lagging behind neighboring countries, and society was forced to change the ruling regimes with the help of various mechanisms until one was chosen that would solve the problems facing the country.

Therefore, it would be a mistake to assume that the Saur (April) revolution was part of the "plan" of the Soviet leadership. The USSR, to one degree or another, supported every regime that ruled in Afghanistan, trying to control the situation in the border developing country and influence it in its own interests. However, support for the PDPA regime, due to internal and external factors, became crucial for the geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union in the region and required more and more involvement in Afghan political life.

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A detailed review of Russian-language literature on the Afghan war of 1979-1989. and previous events is presented in A. A. Kostyr Historiography, source study, bibliography of the USSR special operation in Afghanistan (1979–1989). Donetsk: IPP Promin LLC, 2009. In a somewhat arbitrary way, I would like to highlight here the following works on this topic M. F. Slinkin The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan is in power. Taraki–Amin time (1978–1979). Simferopol, 1999. A. A. Lyakhovsky The tragedy and valor of Afghanistan. 2nd edition revised and enlarged. Yaroslavl: LLC TF "NORD", 2004. VG Korgun History of Afghanistan. XX century. M.: Kraft +, 2004.

The causes and mechanisms of the economic crisis in Afghanistan are analyzed in detail in my articles NA Mendkovich History of the modernization of Afghanistan. Part 1 , Part 2 .

MF Slinkin The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan is in power. S. 118.

J. B. Amstutz Afghanistan. The First Five Ears of Soviet Occupation. Washington D.C., 1986. P. 25.

Great Soviet Encyclopedia. Volume 2. M., 1970. S. 422. Pashtuns in old Russian-language sources are often referred to as "Afghans", and their Pashto language is called "Afghan", but this approach seems to me incorrect and outdated.

M. F. Slinkin. Muhammad Daud. Political portrait // Culture of the peoples of the Black Sea region, No. 24, 2001. P. 247.

J. B. Amstutz Afghanistan. The First Five Ears of Soviet Occupation. Washington D.C., 1986. P.24-25

The debt was written off free of charge by Russia as part of the Paris Club's policy of supporting Afghanistan.

J. B. Amstutz Afghanistan. The First Five Ears of Soviet Occupation. Washington D.C., 1986.. P. 27

M. H. Kakar Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982. Berkeley, 1995. . I find it difficult to confirm or deny this statement: in March 1979, the purchase price was five times higher than the level of natural gas prices in the US domestic market, but at that time the energy market was less globalized than it is now and these values ​​are not comparable.

S. Akimbekov The Afghan Knot and Security Problems in Central Asia. Almaty, 2003, p. 89.

A. D. Davydov Afghanistan: there might not have been a war. Peasantry and reforms. M., 1993. S. 25, 79.

A. D. Davydov Afghanistan: there might not have been a war. Peasantry and reforms. M., 1993. P.144

M. F. Slinkin. Muhammad Daud. C. 248.

M.F. Slinkin. Clerical opposition in Afghanistan in the 60-70s of the XX century // Culture of the peoples of the Black Sea region, N 22, 2001. P. 225.

M. F. Slinkin Muhammad Daoud. S. 246.

K. Iskandarov Socio-political movements in Afghanistan: 1945–2001. Dissertation of Doctor of Historical Sciences. Dushanbe, 2004, p. 196.

M. F. Slinkin Muhammad Daoud. pp.247–248.

About information for the leaders of the progressive political organizations "Parcham" and "Khalk" about the results of M. Daud's visit to the USSR. Decree of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Special folder. .

K. Iskandarov Socio-political movements in Afghanistan. S. 194.

M. Ewans Afghanistan: A New History. London-New York, 2002. P. 133.

A. D. Davydov Afghanistan: there might not have been a war. S. 25, 79.

A. A. Lyakhovsky Tragedy and valor of Afghanistan. S. 61.

V. A. Merimsky Riddles of the Afghan War. M., 2006. S. 34.

Until the early 1970s, Afghanistan was a state whose life was of little concern to the international community. Interest in this country appeared after the coup d'etat in 1973, when the monarchical regime was replaced by a republican form of government. Moreover, for the two centers of the bipolar world, which were the Soviet Union and the United States, relations with the Republic of Afghanistan remained good neighborly, and this Central Asian country was not a territory of rivalry between the USSR and the United States.

During this period, the Soviet Union provided assistance mainly to the border provinces in the north of the country, and the United States to the provinces in the south. According to Graham Fuller, who headed the CIA station in Kabul from 1975-1978, “The United States had practically no interests in Afghanistan”. A very accurate picture of Afghanistan's relationship with the two countries comes from a secret report by US Ambassador to Afghanistan Eliot addressed to the US Secretary of State:

“US-Afghan relations during 1977 were excellent... Afghanistan's most important bilateral relationship with its northern neighbor continued to be tangible and profitable. The Soviets avoided any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan."

A radical change in relations in the triangle occurred after the April coup. And although in his December 1978 speech, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, called the events of April 1978 "True People's Revolution", for the Soviet government, it came as a surprise. It turned out to be the same surprise for the United States, however, very soon the Americans called the April Revolution "offensive of the Soviets".

The revolution brought to the political arena not only the communists - the People's Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), it gave strength and impetus to the formation of organizations, which are generally described as "Islamic opposition". After the PDPA came to power, the situation changed not only in this country, but throughout the region, as well as in relations between the USA and the USSR. Afghanistan became a hot spot for many years and remains so to this day.

Omar Nessar, director of the Center for the Study of Modern Afghanistan, spoke to Russian Planet about the causes of the April Revolution, whether it is possible to detect a Soviet trace in it, and how modern Afghan society relates to the events of 1978.

Russian Planet (RP): In your opinion, what caused the April Revolution?

Omar Nessar (OH): The April Revolution was not only the result of internal problems Afghanistan and the dissatisfaction of the Afghan society, but also in general the situation that developed in Central Asia and the world. As long as the geopolitical rivalry between East and West in the region did not reach a high level, Afghanistan could maintain a neutral status. When the level became critical, Afghanistan could not resist it, it was necessary either to join the East or the West.

Therefore, the so-called "white" coup in 1973, as a result of which King Zahir Shah was removed and his cousin Daoud Khan came to power, should be considered in a general context. I believe that Zahir Shah, having felt the intensification of the geopolitical confrontation between the West and the East, simply left his post to a person who was more prepared and ready to take responsibility for tough decisions. However, Daoud Khan could not balance between the two forces - West and East, as a result, all this led to a regime change, and the coming to power in 1978 of the PDPA.

Of course, internal discontent also played a certain role in the April Revolution. During the reign of Daud Khan, discontent grew, and part of the population supported the revolution. At first, the revolution was accepted with some optimism, many thought that the situation would change for the better, and, indeed, great changes took place in the country. Great changes have taken place in inter-ethnic politics, the inter-ethnic equality in Afghanistan, which we are seeing today, has its origins in the April Revolution. A striking example: the Khazarites in Afghan society today occupy a fairly significant position, and before the April Revolution they were in a discriminatory position. After the revolution, their status rose, and, surprisingly, a Hazarite was elected prime minister of Afghanistan. If we talk about the position of women in Afghan society, then it is the April Revolution that women owe their equality with men. Although it cannot be said that earlier women were in an oppressed position.

The reforms made education accessible to representatives of all peoples and all strata of society. The leaders of the PDPA understood that an educated society is the key to the successful development of the country, so from the very beginning they began to fight illiteracy in the most serious way.

RP: I.e. Did the PDPA manage to do what the Daoud government failed to do?

HE: In any case, serious measures have been taken in this regard. Another thing is that the situation developing in the coming years after the April Revolution did not allow the full implementation of the outlined plans for establishing social justice, reforming education and, in general, modernizing society. Some time after the revolution, the leaders of the PDPA began to make serious, in my opinion, mistakes. This is land reform and oppression of religion. Afghan society was not ready for such reforms. An artificial attempt to reduce the role of religion and traditional Afghan institutions in the life of society led to a backlash.

Again, the confrontation between the West and the East played a big role. The United States began to support the opposition and anti-Soviet forces, and the introduction of Soviet troops aggravated the situation, many countries of the Islamic world had a serious reason to be included in the outbreak of war. The confrontation between the West and the East has become very serious, has moved to a new stage, Afghanistan has become a serious field of rivalry between the West and the East.

RP: Do you think the USSR had a hand in the revolution?

HE: In science, this issue remains debatable, in Western and Afghan sources one can come across statements that the Soviet Union played a certain role in the April Revolution, but when you start to study this issue in depth, you see that the authors who claim that the USSR was involved in the revolution do not show no evidence. Their only argument is that the PDPA was a pro-Soviet party.

The Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan, Alexander Puzanov, later said that he was not aware of the impending change of power, he was only informed about the coup the next day. Major General Alexander Lyakhovsky called the news of the coup for the Soviet side "a bolt from the blue."

If we discard all the statements of politicians and take up the study of the facts, then there is no evidence that the Soviet Union had anything to do with this. And I myself, studying this issue, came to the conclusion that the leadership of the Soviet Union was put before the fact by the Afghan communists. And already after the completed revolution, the Soviet government was forced to support it, which was in line with the policy pursued by the USSR.

RP: What is the significance of the April Revolution in modern Afghanistan?

HE: The 1978 revolution has ambiguous assessments, but it can be noted that attitudes towards it are changing. About ten years ago, the attitude was quite negative. Now we can say that if the assessment did not become unambiguously positive, but the share of positive increased. People can already compare those years and today, was it safer then, or now? Was there social justice then, or now? And a positive assessment of those events is given rather by ordinary, ordinary people than by the modern political elite of the country.

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