Scharnhorst battleship. The Fuhrer's Pirates. The death of the battleship Scharnhorst. The last battle of the battleship "Scharnhorst"
Some of the most famous ships of the Second World War, took part in the hostilities in the Atlantic on the trade communications of Britain, Operation Weserubung (invasion of Norway), Operation Cerberus (the breakthrough of German ships from French Brest to Wilhelmshaven). "Gneisenau" soon after the operation was hit by an aerial bomb, was heavily damaged and did not enter service until the end of the war. The Scharnhorst was killed on December 26 in the Battle of the North Cape.
| Scharnhorst-class battleships | |
|---|---|
Performance characteristics and identification parameters of the battleship "Scharnhorst", published by the Department of Naval Intelligence of the US Navy Department |
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| Project | |
| The country | |
| Manufacturers |
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| Operators | |
| Subsequent type | "Bismarck" |
| Built by | 2 |
| Losses | 2 |
| Main characteristics | |
| Displacement | 32 100 standard, 38 100 full |
| Length | 235.4 (the largest, "Scharnhorst"), 234.9 m (maximum, "Gneisenau"), 226 m (between perpendiculars) |
| Width | 30 |
| Draft | 8.2 - 9.9 m |
| Reservation | (values in mm) chord 350-170 upper chord 45 traverses 150 turrets GK 360 - 90 barbets GK 350-200 turrets SK 140 - 50 gun shields SK 25 deck 50 + (80 - 95, slopes 105) wheelhouse 350-220 anti-torpedo bulkhead - 45 |
| Engines | 3 TZA type "Parsons" (on "Scharnhorst" "Brown Boveri", on "Gneisenau" - "Deshymag", 12 PK Bauer-Wagner |
| Power | 138,000 l. With. , 160,000 l. With. for a short period when forcing |
| Mover | 3 screws |
| Travel speed | 31.5 knots |
| Sailing range | 7100 miles at 19 knots |
| Crew | 1968 people |
| Armament | |
| Artillery | 9 (3 × 3) - 283 mm / 54.5 4 × 2 and 4 × 1 - 150 mm / 55 |
| Flak | 7 × 2 - 105 mm / 65, 8 × 2 - 37 mm / 83, 8 × 1 - 20mm / 65 |
| Aviation group | 1 catapult, 3 seaplanes |
| Images at Wikimedia Commons | |
History of creation, construction, modernization
The armored ships "D - Ersatz Elsass" (replacement of the battleship "Alsace") and "E - Ersatz Hessen" (replacement of the battleship "Hesse") were laid down at the Wilhelmshaven military shipyard and at the Deutsche Werke shipyard in Kiel on February 14, 1934. On July 5, construction was suspended in connection with the decision to build battle cruisers significantly large sizes... The re-bookmark took place on June 15 and May 6, 1935, respectively. The Scharnhorst was launched on October 3, and the Gneisenau was launched on December 8, 1936. The ships entered service on January 7, 1939 and May 21, 1938, respectively. Voyages "Gneisenau" in stormy weather showed that the depth in the bow is insufficient. As a result, during the planned repairs, the bow was altered, increasing the camber of the frames, the inclination and lifting up of the stem. Further sailing practice revealed the shortcomings of the power plant, in particular, boiler tubes, a number of problems in the turbines. Further improvements in the course of the service included the installation of aviation equipment, radars, and the addition of anti-aircraft weapons.
Armament
The main caliber guns of the C / 34 model had a caliber of 283 mm (28 cm) and were an improved version of those mounted on the "Deutschland" type. The difference was a large mass of shells (armor-piercing - 330 kg, high-explosive - 315 kg), an increased firing range (over 40 km), but the design of the towers themselves remained the same, only their armor was reinforced. For the 4th and 5th "pocket" battleships originally planned for construction, there were single shield mounts of 150-mm guns. They decided to install them on new battleships. They were not a very good addition to the twin turrets (although all the guns belonged to the same C / 28 model). The anti-aircraft armament was very powerful: twin mounts of 105-mm / 65 and 37-mm / 83 guns (stabilized in three planes). Fire control was carried out by three posts of main and medium caliber and four posts of anti-aircraft artillery.
Housing and booking
The hull of the Scharnhorst-class battleships was smooth-deck, the main armor belt was external and had no slope. The belt ran from the bow to the stern turrets of the main caliber. Its thickness was 350 mm, decreasing to 170 mm towards the lower edge. Above the main one there was an upper belt with a thickness of 45 mm, reaching the upper deck. Deck armor was represented by 50-mm upper and 80-mm (95-mm above the cellars) main armored decks with 105-mm bevels that did not reach the lower edge of the belt; in the KO area there was an 80-mm glacis. The main turrets were also heavily booked: forehead 360 mm, roof 180 mm. Reservation of barbets was differentiated - from 350 mm along the sides to 200 mm in the center plane. The conning tower walls were made of 350 mm thick KS slabs. Roof thickness 200 mm. The floor was 70 mm thick. The communication pipe 1 m in diameter had walls 220 mm thick. The anti-torpedo protection had a depth in the middle of the draft at the midsection of 4.5 m, at the towers "A", "B" and "C" - respectively 2.58, 3.35 and 3.74 m. She was separated from the vital parts of the ship by a 45 mm bulkhead. The total weight of the reservation was 14,245 tons (44% of the displacement).
Power plant
Unlike their predecessors - armored ships of the "Deutschland" type, equipped with a diesel propulsion system, the new battleships received a more traditional steam turbine, but with a couple of high parameters. The composition of the power plant included twelve three-collector boilers with a superheater and an economizer of the Bauer-Wagner type (pressure 58 atmospheres, temperature 450 ° C) and three turbo-gear units by Brown-Boveri at Scharnhorst and Deschimag at Gneisenau ... The cruising range was below the design 8200 (19) miles
The author of the book tells about the little-known facts of the death of the pride of the German navy, the battleship Scharnhorst, in a strategically important battle during the Second World War. Trying to attack the Arctic convoy and cut the sea route vital for the USSR, the powerful warship suffered a crushing defeat. Based on factual material, the book recreates a real-life picture of what happened on Christmas night in 1943.
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The given introductory fragment of the book The tragedy of the battleship Scharnhorst. Chronicle of the last campaign (Fritz-Otto Busch) provided by our book partner - Liters company.
The tragedy of the battleship "Scharnhorst"
Chronicle of the last campaign
In memory of the heroically lost sailors of the battleship "Scharnhorst"
Introduction
Today the sinking of the Scharnhorst for many is no more than a distant event in a half-forgotten history. Few know what actually happened today, since the severe censorship restrictions of wartime did not allow all the details to be provided in due time. But since the events of that Arctic Christmas night in 1943 occupy an important place in the history of wars at sea, and since the importance of this event is finally appreciated in our time, I consider it necessary to tell the complete and accurate story of the sinking of this brave ship.
In 1940, the names of the German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau appeared in the British press quite often. The Scharnhorst was first mentioned in connection with the sinking of the auxiliary cruiser Rawalpindi; then this name flashed in the reports of the German press in connection with the death of the aircraft carrier "Glories". Unfortunately, not a single sailor escaped either from the aircraft carrier or from the escort destroyers Ekasta and Ardenta. Then, for a while, nothing was heard of the Scharnhorst.
And suddenly, in the spring of 1941, the name of the battleship appeared in the news again. Several merchant ships were lost in the Atlantic, and therefore the British naval and air forces were sent in search of the ship. This operation lasted for several months, but the Scharnhorst disappeared without a trace somewhere in the vast expanses of the Atlantic, swallowed by ocean fogs or hidden by the violent storms raging in the Atlantic at this time of year.
Then the news came that the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been brought to Brest. Finally they are cornered! The British were confident that their aircraft would find the battleships and destroy them. British reconnaissance aircraft and bombers sailed to this French port in the hopes of destroying the battleships. But this did not happen. The Scharnhorst was very well hidden. Its deck was covered in trees and bushes, and its camouflage netting was covered in leaves, making it difficult to observe from the air. True, the ship was still noticed in La Palis, but the blows that the British planes could inflict did not cause serious damage to the battleship. British aircraft continued to pursue the ship for several months - but in vain. The Scharnhorst hid, preparing for future action and waiting for an opportunity to strike.
On February 12, 1942, the message spread: "The German naval units: Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prince Eugen are in the English Channel!" The Admiralty received this news with disbelief and amazement.
No one believed how the ships could come unnoticed. All available British forces were immediately thrown to meet the enemy - but this was not enough, since the most necessary naval formations were located far to the north and could not intervene in time. One or two torpedo boats, several obsolete torpedo bombers and bombers got involved in the battle with the German formations. Coastal artillery opened fire. But in vain. The breakthrough was made. Again, accompanied by destroyers, torpedo bombers, torpedo boats, minesweepers and patrol ships, with the help of the Luftwaffe, the almost legendary Scharnhorst slipped out of the enemy trap.
A little less than two years later, the BBC broadcast the news that the Scharnhorst had been sunk by British naval forces 60 miles northwest of the North Cape. It happened at a quarter past seven on the evening of December 26, 1943, Boxing Day.
Battleship biography
For sailors, a ship is something animated, with a life of its own and a character of its own. There are ships that seem gloomy and even vicious, they, like some people, lack liveliness and warmth. The Scharnhorst definitely had a soul. Moreover, this ship was beautiful. The wake behind him trembled with that surprising soft swaying motion, which is characteristic only of the wake of a battleship. The ship seemed to radiate happiness, and this spirit of it spread throughout the crew, giving rise to the pride that felt all the sailors of the Scharnhorst - from the captain to the youngest in rank.
With its grace, elegance, harmony of lines, the Scharnhorst was, in the eyes of any sailor, very handsome. Together with the battleship Gneisenau of the same type, from the very first days of the war, she participated in such a large number of military campaigns and victorious battles that she became the most famous ship in Germany. Its name was known in every German home. It became legendary back in World War I, when another Scharnhorst, an armored cruiser, took part in the Battle of Coronel and was later sunk by superior forces off the Falkland Islands. During the four years of his military career, full of events, the second Scharnhorst has become a true symbol of good luck and success. Against the ever-changing backdrop of war, this ship did seem to have a rare favor of fortune - and this impression is confirmed by the war diary of Captain Giessler, who served on the Scharnhorst from the day it first set sail until almost the day the battleship sank.
The outbreak of the war found the ship between Helgoland Island and the Yade River, where it was tested after a long period at the dock. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were the first battleships built after the Versailles peace restrictions were lifted. The ship was laid down at Wilhelmshaven in 1935, launched on October 3, 1936, and embarked on its maiden voyage with a crew on January 7, 1939. Its first commanding officer was Captain Tsiliax. At that time, the Scharnhorst was not yet ready for combat duty, much less for military operations; in addition, it was distinguished from other ships launched on the voyage by the fact that its crew was recruited from various coastal units. Experimental superheated high-pressure steam boilers were installed on the battleship. The time to test this new equipment and other devices used for the first time and not yet tested in practice was drastically reduced by the outbreak of the war. The same reason did not give the sailors the opportunity to practice enough firing from guns. In addition, due to Ciliax's illness, he had to be replaced by another captain - Kurt Caesar Hoffmann, who calculatedly and successfully commanded the ship in many operations until 1942.
"Big" ships, in the First World War called "guard dogs on a chain" for inaction, will now not rest in their bases, doing nothing - they will have to go to sea to attack British merchant ships. Shooting from naval anti-aircraft artillery at British aircraft is no longer the only reason these new, powerful ships were built. Unfortunately (for the Germans), the heaviest guns had not yet been installed, and the main armament of the battleships consisted of only 11-inch guns mounted in three turrets with three guns each.
At the beginning of September 1939, after passing through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal (work on deepening the canal had just been completed, for the first time a ship with a displacement of 26,000 tons passed through it), the Scharnhorst moved to Kiel. New classified equipment was housed here, known at the time as "Dete" or "E.M. 2 ". They were radars. The paradox is that it was precisely the radars improved by the British that played an important role in the final sinking of the Scharnhorst.
On November 21, 1939, both battleships, transferred at the beginning of the month to Wilhelmshaven, moved down the Yade River. The fleet commander, Vice Admiral Marshall, raised his flag over the Gneisenau. On board the Scharnhorst, Captain Hoffmann announced via intra-ship communications the goal of the operation - the destruction of enemy forces patrolling between Iceland and the Faroe Islands. The officers and sailors were surprised - in the First World War, none of the warships went so far beyond the territorial waters.
“We are like rats crawling out of their holes,” the junior lieutenant remarked happily. - And we will show them that we can bite.
The battleship formation first headed north, passing first behind the so-called "Western Wall", a mine belt designed to protect the North Frisian Islands from attacks. Orders were given to install observers at the posts. To protect the battleships from enemy submarines, the ships were surrounded by destroyers. On the mast the radar antenna rotated menacingly - but could not catch anything. On November 22, at 2 am, the mine belt was behind and the destroyers were released. Now the battleships set off on an independent voyage through the impenetrable darkness, without lighting any lights, at a speed of about 27 knots. At about noon, the battleships passed through the narrowest passage between the Shetland Islands and the coast of Norway, covered by the Luftwaffe.
Soon the weather began to deteriorate. Southwest wind of 7-8, long and high waves caused the ship to swing violently, which led to the first cases of seasickness. Due to the huge waves hitting the sides, the guns were damaged. For the sailors, this was a new, previously unfamiliar experience, but it helped establish closer contact between the ship and the crew. Changing course to the northwest, the battleships continued to move. On the night of November 22-23, they passed the Faroe Islands thirty nautical miles away and headed for Iceland. Although visibility was excellent on the following day, the battleship did not notice a single ship in the vicinity. Intercepted radio communications also did not give anything encouraging, although it was possible to detect signals from British ships moving in large squadrons. At 16.07 a message came from the mast, which immediately put the captain's bridge on alert:
- Light on the starboard side, big steamer! But very far away. Details are not yet visible.
“It must be a merchant ship,” Captain Hoffmann suggested, “or perhaps an auxiliary cruiser, an export one. I have to look at it myself.
The captain climbed onto the formars. After some time, his voice was heard through the intercom:
- The ship is constantly changing course, it has no flag.
An order was given for a rapprochement with the steamer. Half an hour later, the captain announced a combat alert and returned to the bridge. He informed the admiral on board the Gneisenau of his observations. When the ship did not respond to the order to stop, the Scharnhorst opened fire. The first shells began to explode. The ship responded bravely to fire, but without success. Starting to burn, he set up a smoke screen and tried to retreat. At this time, "Gneisenau", hurrying from the south, also opened fire. When it began to get dark quickly, the ship had already turned into a torch, defenselessly standing in place. Morse code signals flashed through a curtain of smoke and flame. From the signal bridge of the Scharnhorst it was reported that the ship was asking for help.
Lifeboats floated around the steamer. The Scharnhorst slowed down so that they could approach the side and the survivors could board the battleship. But as soon as the second of the lifeboats approached the Scharnhorst, an order was received from the Gneisenau: “Stop the rescue operation immediately. Follow me". The captain looked inquiringly at the first mate who had appeared on the bridge to report on the rescue operation; then a message came from one of the observers: "Straight behind the pursuer."
Captain Hoffmann rushed to the intercom.
- Give the falin! All cars full speed ahead!
The battleship headed east at high speed. The British cruiser "Newcastle", approaching from behind, tried to catch up with the battleships - but he failed. He recruited the survivors of the ship, a 16,000-ton R&O auxiliary cruiser converted from the R&O liner Rawalpindi, whose brave commander, Captain Kennedy, had so heroically entered the battle with no chance of victory. Now the entire fleet of the British mother country tried to intercept two German battleships near the British Isles - but to no avail. Meteorologists aboard the Scharnhorst predicted poor visibility and strong northerly winds off the Norwegian coast. For two whole days, the battleships stood in place, waiting for the south wind. Then, suddenly, the barograph readings plummeted. The ships moved south. On the night of 25/26 November, with the help of a strong wind, they were able to reach a speed of 27 knots on the way to Cape Stadlandet in Norway. The return to base took place in a fierce hurricane. Waves lashed across the deck, spray fell on the bow of the ship, both heavy ships were half in the water almost all the time. For the entire twenty-four hours, Hoffmann commanded the ship from the conning tower, since the bridges were completely covered with water. Not far from Bergen, a lone trawler was seen, desperately resisting the waves, moving across the battleships. The wind began to take a southerly direction, and because of this, the front towers began to flood. Not far from Jutland, German destroyers joined the battleships, and on November 27 the ships again anchored in the Yade River.
The first operation was completed successfully. Battleships have proven their worth. With their high speed and long range - the bunkers held 6,000 tons of fuel - they were perfect for surprise attacks on British merchant ships. But, and this was much more important, a successful operation in stormy conditions firmly rallied the team, which acquired sea hardening, learned its ship and its capabilities. With the thunder of guns, the roar of the wind, and the sound of the sea, the foundation was laid for that unique and lasting partnership that would later manifest itself so vividly.
In January 1940, tests were carried out in the Baltic, which remained incomplete. The winter was extremely cold and there was a severe frost. The ships, moored to their buoys in Kiel, were frozen in the ice, so that on leave the sailors reached the coast on dry land; the sight of the wandering sailors seemed outlandish. In March, one of the patrol ships broke the ice, and the ships were ordered to return to the North Sea for a new mission. To do it, it took some time to wait - like the troops at the Siegfried Line, which had to be inactive during the "strange war". Soon it became almost unbearable for the sailors to watch how from day to day the ice floes, strewn with seagulls, were carried out to sea with the morning tide, only to return in the afternoon with the tide. A short exit to Stavanger, during which nothing happened, slightly dispelled the monotony of expectation. The weather gradually grew warmer. The number of British air raids increased, which forced the anti-aircraft gunners to work quite seriously during the day.
The Scharnhorst entered the port for a short time. All were sure that the ship had an important mission; however, no one could definitely say anything, and the team was seized with feverish impatience. Indeed, the order for the operation was kept in the secret compartment of the first mate's desk. This document was called "Weserubung" - the code name for the mission to occupy Norway and Denmark.
This audacious endeavor was entrusted to the navy, and its implementation depended entirely on the observance of absolute secrecy. On April 6, when the Scharnhorst was again on the roads, the fleet commander boarded and informed the ship's crew of the upcoming operation. The team reacted with joy and pride to the confidence shown by the high command.
On the night of April 6-7, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau set out to sea. Before the island of Vangerooge, they were to be joined by the heavy cruiser "Admiral Hipper" with four escort destroyers and a flotilla of ten destroyers - the so-called "Narvik group", which later became famous off the coast of Northern Norway. As soon as the whole group connected, British planes suddenly moved towards it at a low altitude. An alarming moment came, but fire from the Scharnhorst's anti-aircraft guns forced the British to turn, and they disappeared before they could see the other ships in the darkness. The compound moved northward at high speed. At dawn, aircraft rose from the decks to provide air cover during the day, while the destroyers surrounded the battleships, protecting them from submarines. At noon on April 7, not far from Skagerrak, an alarm was raised on ships:
- Enemy planes!
As soon as the reconnaissance aircraft approached the ships, anti-aircraft guns entered the battle. On all the bridges, the same disturbing question was discussed - is the purpose of the operation known to the enemy? Why did the British come? Despite doubts and fears, the ships continued to move. The weather was still good. An extremely dark night from April 7 to 8 covered the compound with an impenetrable blanket. As the ships passed the North Sea between the Shetland Islands and Norway, the lookouts began to peer into the darkness of the night with redoubled attention, but to no avail. On the morning of April 8, the weather deteriorated sharply. The restless sea rocked the ships, the wind intensified and became significantly colder. The escort ships had the hardest time, they more and more often transmitted the signal: "Several units of enemy aircraft are pursuing us!"
The speed of the battleships was reduced so that the destroyers could catch up with them. Several escort ships sailing closer to the Norwegian coast entered the battle with the British ships on the same morning. The Admiral Hipper was ordered to turn and approach one of the German destroyers, Bernd von Armin. On board the Scharnhorst, the captain discussed the situation with his second mate:
- I do not understand. British destroyers went to sea? But we weren't reported on British forces here, were we?
Corvette Captain Giessler shook his head.
- No, Herr Captain, not yet ...
“An important radio message, Herr Captain,” the radio communications officer interrupted. “A British mine warning has just been intercepted in a large area off the Norwegian coast. Apparently, they have established a new minefield here.
Captain Hoffmann studied the text carefully:
- What does it mean? Maybe they got the same idea as us? Do they want to hide behind a screen from us in order to occupy Norway with their naval forces? Come on, Gissler, let's look at the cards.
As they left for the navigator's room, the officers on the bridge began to discuss the unexpected turn of events. Meanwhile, the ships continued to follow their course. Later, the Admiral Hipper, with her four escort destroyers, left the Narvik Group and headed for the Trondheims Fjord. When the battleships reached the Westfjord in total darkness at nine o'clock in the evening, they, in full accordance with the plan, freed all ten destroyers of the "Narvik group" (the flotilla intended to capture Narvik). The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau remained near the Lofoten Islands overnight in order to cover the destroyer flotilla from the rear. A violent storm began, and the battleships struggled to overcome the waves, moving at low speed to save fuel. It was snowing on the morning of April 8th, but overall the weather improved and visibility was excellent at times. Taking advantage of this, the navigator of the Scharnhorst decided to determine the coordinates of the vessel using a sextant. He raised his instrument - and instead of the star he expected he saw in the mirror the red reflection of a shot from heavy weapons!
- Anxiety!
The bell rang, the lookouts scattered to their battle posts; commands from the bridge were quickly sounded, signals from the flagship were given, the first targets for shooting were indicated. A few minutes later, the barrels of 11-inch guns fired with a crash at the enemy - a ship whose silhouette loomed faintly in the west against the dark sky. In a thick snowstorm, two battleships hurried to the north at high speed. The quick fire continued from 5.10 to 6.59; on the Scharnhorst they fired from the stern. Heavy 15-inch shells exploded close to the battleship, but the captain constantly changed course, which made it possible to dodge each new volley.
But the British enemy could not compete with the German ships in speed; soon he remained far astern, and then completely lost in a snowstorm.
The Scharnhorst, thanks to its inherent luck, suffered no damage. Minor difficulties arose with the machine setup, but given the loads and the fact that the machines were experimental, these problems were to be expected; overcoming them was not worth a lot of work.
For several hours the connection of ships went north, after which they changed direction to the west, almost reaching the longitude of the single rocky island of Jan Mayen.
In the meantime, a radio message about the occupation of Norway and Denmark was received on board. Reports began to arrive that the British fleet had gone to sea, of fierce air battles in the air, and pockets of resistance on the ground. The battleships themselves did not transmit information, since this could reveal their position; the German high command still knew nothing of the artillery battle that had taken place. Only on April 10 a plane took off from the Scharnhorst with the help of a catapult with the task of transmitting a radio message from the commander of the formation; this report was to be taken to Trondheim and transmitted from there. The plane was to fly to the maximum range. With full tanks, Arado-196, piloted by Senior Lieutenant Shrek, took off; Senior Lieutenant Shreve was designated as an observer on this aircraft. All they had on board was the Trondheims Fjord map - and not a single nautical chart. Could they get to Trondheim and sit next to Admiral Hipper? Several hours passed in tense anticipation - until finally the message came from the "Admiral Hipper" that the plane had landed. It was an outstanding feat of the Arado crew. Later, the Scharnhorst learned that the commander of the heavy cruiser was very perplexed when an observer from an aircraft appeared on its deck.
The battleships were supposed to meet the "Narvik group" destroyer flotilla on the way back - but all of these ten ships were lost. The fuel situation now forced the battleships to return to base. Reports came from Germany that the British aircraft carrier Fewares went to sea along with many other ships; he was most likely tasked with using aircraft against battleships. Therefore, the commander of the group gave the order to turn west, so that later, in the darkness of the night, being only 60 miles from the Shetland Islands, heading south. Once again, bad weather came to the rescue of the lucky ships. Unnoticed by the enemy, they arrived at the appointed rendezvous point at noon to join the Admiral Hipper and the destroyers protecting her. The ships stopped to allow the aircraft on board to take off in search of enemy submarines. Later, a British reconnaissance aircraft spotted the ships, after which bombers were sent several times to the area, which, however, did not find the target in poor visibility.
On April 12, the convoy dropped anchors at Wilhelmshaven. An important operation has been completed successfully; sailors went through a good school of war and could consider themselves real sea wolves. Now their faith in themselves, their officers and their ship became unshakable. It took six weeks at the dock to thoroughly inspect and repair equipment and weapons. After that, the battleships and destroyers were again ready for action. In the meantime, the situation for conducting operations has changed dramatically in Germany's favor. The campaign in France was drawing to a close. Bases in the west and in Norway are now available. The way through the Skagerrak and Danish waters was opened, so that now it was not necessary to bypass Denmark through the North Sea, being attacked by submarines and aircraft. But the battle for Narvik was still ongoing, and its outcome was in question. And it was the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Admiral Hipper, as well as a small number of destroyers, that were supposed to tip the scales in Germany's favor.
On June 4, 1940, the ships, again under the command of Vice Admiral Marshall, sailed from Keele. They passed the German mine barrier near Skagen and proceeded further north. There was no definite information about the location of the British naval forces; the possible presence of battleships in the Narvik area was assumed, as well as the exits of ships from Scapa Flow. Often it was necessary to notice periscopes in the sea - but the submarines were not provided with the conditions for an attack. Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft, which could now fly out of Trondheim, were able to survey a much larger area. The weather was mostly clear; in rare rains, severely restricting visibility, radars were turned on to protect themselves from unpleasant surprises. The destroyers, fueled with fuel from battleships, went this time all the way with them. For the first time, the compound included a fuel vessel, the Dithmarshen, from which the Admiral Hipper could refuel. At the longitude reached at that time, the sun was shining for almost all twenty-four hours, so that refueling could be done without hindrance at any time.
While there were no battles, the group commander ordered the captains to assemble aboard the flagship. Air reconnaissance of Harstad and Narvik was canceled due to bad weather near the coast, and therefore the admiral had no information about the British ships operating in these areas. However, in the immediate vicinity of the group, several small convoys were seen moving southwest. On the morning of June 8, all three heavy ships, accompanied by four destroyers, undertook a reconnaissance raid along a wide front and approached the convoys. Reconnaissance aircraft were launched from the battleships using catapults. Soon one of the German destroyers caught up with the tanker and through a short time sent him to the bottom. Several more ships were sighted from ships and aircraft - and they were also sunk by the "Admiral Hipper" and the destroyers. The hospital ship was not touched by the German ships or even searched; as it turned out later, it carried many German prisoners from Narvik. At noon, Admiral Hipper and the destroyers were ordered to return to Trondheim to replenish supplies. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau continued their operations in the Northern Norway area. Since there was little information from aerial reconnaissance, the group commander decided not to follow the order to move to Harstad, limiting himself to actions against the convoys. He moved his battle group forward at a speed of 18 knots into the area between Harstad and Tromsø. On June 8, at 4.45 pm, a message came from the Scharnhorst Formars that a cloud of smoke had been visible for some time far ahead.
When the captain asked for details, lookout Goss explained:
- It was a short burst of smoke, similar to a jellyfish, such as happens when there are some problems with steam boilers. I definitely noticed his bearing.
- Battle alarm! Captain Hoffmann commanded. He ordered to go at full speed in the direction indicated by the lookout.
The Gneisenau repeated this maneuver. The distance to the unknown ship was rapidly decreasing, and soon the mast, then the squat pipe, and then the ship's superstructures became visible above the horizon. When the range was first estimated, it was 40 kilometers; after that, the senior artilleryman reported:
“Herr Captain, the ship is undoubtedly an aircraft carrier, it could be the Glories with two escort destroyers!
The battleship's heavy guns opened fire from 25 kilometers; soon after, the destroyers began to shoot. The captain, standing with the first mate at the periscope, peered carefully at the aircraft carrier.
- Poor old devil! He said. - We're lucky again. Two battleships against one aircraft carrier!
The very first salvo covered the deck of the ship, on which the planes were crowded. The flames soon turned the runway into a continuous zone of fire. A cloud of smoke covered the unlucky aircraft carrier.
“The destroyers conceived a cunning plan,” the first mate later recalled. "They used the same tactics that the British cruisers used against the Count Spee on the Plate River."
The destroyers were called Ardent and Ekasta; they tried in vain to cover their aircraft carrier Glories while trying to attack the battleships at the same time. Direct hits damaged the superstructures of these brave ships; despite the hopeless situation, the destroyers went towards the battleships, hoping to fire torpedoes at close range. Meanwhile, the damaged "Glories" stood motionless in the middle of the columns of water rising from the shells, in a thick cloud of smoke, from which bursts of explosions were constantly escaping. Both battleships had to constantly maneuver due to torpedoes launched from destroyers. The battle had been going on for almost two hours, but the British destroyers did not leave the heroic, but hopeless battle for them. Forcing the battleships to maneuver, they shot down the sight of the German gunners. At 18.39, a message was received from the Scharnhorst bridge:
- Strong explosion at the stern!
Individual reports began to arrive quickly, as if on an exercise:
- Tower "C" is being evacuated. Ammunition filled with water.
The Scharnhorst lost speed.
The rapidly increasing list to starboard soon became noticeable. After that, a report came from the engine room:
- One machine is still working. Regarding the other two accurate information have not been reported. Possibly hit by a torpedo.
The speed dropped to 20 knots. One of the British destroyers sank, but the other was still firing, and its well-aimed hit disabled the gun in tower B. The Scharnhorst approached the Gneisenau again. At about 19.00 the second destroyer also sank.
- Clearing the combat alarm. Check the injured.
The crew set to work feverishly; the damage remediation teams were struggling with water, which the ship had already collected at least 2,000 tons. In the engine room, Chief Engineer Liebhardt was trying to assess the damage to the center and starboard engines. The port engine was still running. Forty sailors were killed, one tower was disabled. At a speed of 20 knots, the connection of ships headed for Trondheim, where they arrived on 6 June. The damaged ship was docked here, and a group of specialist mechanics immediately began work on the restoration of the battleship. After ten days of continuous operation, the central engine started up again. This was an excellent achievement of the chief engineer and his subordinates, who, together with the crew of the ship under repair "Huascaran", had to work under regular enemy air raids. One bomb even hit the upper deck, but did not explode. The battleship's own planes were completely busy tracking down the submarines so that they could not get close to the Trondheims Fjord. On June 20, the Scharnhorst already had two engines working, and the ship was able to make the return passage. The starboard screw had to be fixed tightly, as there was a suspicion that the shaft cracked when hit by a torpedo.
At a speed of 24 knots, the battleship, protected by fighters, left the port and moved along the coast to the rocky Charen Islands. On the afternoon of June 21, with strong winds, the Scharnhorst, accompanied by two destroyers and two torpedo boats, will leave the islands and move south. Soon the battleship spotted a British reconnaissance aircraft nearby. Could this scout have guided the British bombers to the formation? The answer to this question was not long in coming. Near the island of Utsir, British aircraft continuously carried out raids for about two hours, dropping bombs and torpedoes. But the thick cover from the explosions of anti-aircraft guns made all these attempts unsuccessful. Several downed British bombers fell into the sea, leaving long plumes of smoke in their wake. On the Scharnhorst alone, these defensive measures led to the consumption of 900 4.1-inch rounds, 1200 37-mm rounds and 2,400 20-mm rounds! At 18.15 the captain received a radio message from the Western Group:
- Go to Stavanger! Captain Hoffmann read the order in bewilderment.
“Incomprehensible,” he said. - What is the point in anchoring in this port? However, they must have some reason to order us to go there ...
A few hours later the ships anchored in the narrow harbor of Stavanger. As it turned out, the Western Group really had serious reasons to give such an order - the command of the naval forces discovered from radio intercepts that practically the entire fleet of the metropolis went to sea in search of the Scharnhorst. But just an hour later, as it turned out, the battleship was already heading for the fjord. He got lucky. The next morning, aerial reconnaissance was able to report that a British fleet of at least four battleships, four cruisers and several destroyers was returning to Scapa Flow.
Unnoticed by the enemy, the Scharnhorst, accompanied by an escort, went out to sea again to slip into Kiel, where work on her repair began immediately.
This operation, in which the crew suffered the first losses, reinforced the belief among the sailors that the entire crew of a ship, from captain to sailors, constituted a cohesive alliance capable of overcoming any difficulties. The victorious battle, the dangerous return on the damaged ship, and the successful repelling of numerous air raids have reinforced the general belief that the Scharnhorst is sailing under a lucky star.
The repairs at the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau docks took almost six months, and only in the fall did the battleships, ready for action, move to Gotenhafen.
As it was now possible to operate from newly established bases on the west coast of France, the High Command began to pay more and more attention to operations in the Atlantic. And therefore, at the end of 1940, both battleships, led by the new commander, Admiral Lutyens, left Kiel. In the northern part of the North Sea, a severe storm caused significant damage to the Gneisenau, and the entire unit was forced to turn back. But on January 22, 1941, both ships were ready to leave the harbor again. The order delivered by Admiral Lutyens was unprecedented for a German battleship to wage war against merchant ships in the North Atlantic. It was clear that with such a method of hostilities, clashes with British combat units should be avoided.
This operation was carefully planned and prepared. Many tankers were sent to the Atlantic with fuel, ammunition and other things that were required to resupply. At that time, other German warships were already operating in the Atlantic - the "pocket battleship" "Admiral Speer", the heavy cruiser "Admiral Hipper", a large number of auxiliary cruisers and submarines. This was a rather daring undertaking for the fleet, which had not yet gained strength before the outbreak of the war and was not fully provided with ships.
On a dark night of the new moon, the battleship formation headed for the southern part of Iceland, and on such a short winter day of light, January 28, entered the British trade route. Under cover of darkness, the unit turned around and headed north, unnoticed by the British. From the plane that got off the ship, a message was transmitted to the Northern Group about the planned actions - first, refuel from the tanker Adria, located east of Jan Mayen, and then penetrate into the Atlantic north of Iceland along the edge of the pack ice. Both tasks were completed successfully. On February 4, the commander was able to transmit a signal to his unit:
- For the first time in history, German battleships successfully penetrated the Atlantic. Now - let's get down to the operation!
Having refueled again from a tanker south of Greenland, the ships began to look for convoys. Finally, on 8 February, masts were spotted on the battleships. However, soon the Scharnhorst realized that the convoy was covered by the battleship Ramillies, and, in accordance with the instructions, did not attack. Further searches along the northern route of the convoys were interrupted by severe storms, and Admiral Lutyens decided to move south, where, as it became obvious, the route of the convoys had shifted. It was getting warmer, and the sailors were glad, after a long stay in cold latitudes, to take off their fur and woolen clothes in order to put on something lighter. But the search again came to nothing, even on the usually crowded highway between Freetown and Britain. Only one Greek ship was sunk. Refueling took place approximately every eight days. The weather is fine; visibility was consistently acceptable. The battleships constantly took off for reconnaissance flights, but they could not see anything until March 7, when another convoy was spotted. For the first time, battleships operated together with submarines; the battleships interacted effectively with them during attacks on the convoy, again defended by the battleship, this time by the Malaya. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau have a share in the success of the submarine operations, which sank ships with a total tonnage of 43,000 in two nights. The operations then moved back north, on the route between North America and Great Britain. Two escort tankers allowed to increase the search area. Successful actions against individual ships - these goals were approved by the commander of the formation - gradually increased the score; one ship after another went to the bottom. In less than two days, sixteen ships, with a total tonnage of 75,000, became victims of battleships. After a long tedious search, luck finally smiled. It was possible to organize the calculations in such a way that it turned out to sink the ships, as if hitting them at the very waterline. The raging sea and strong winds often made it impossible to lift on board those fleeing in lifeboats. All operations needed to be carried out as quickly as possible, since the possibility of a sudden appearance of the British naval forces had to be reckoned with. And so it happened on March 16. Only the Scharnhorst sank the ship, when in the descending twilight a radio message came from one of the escorting tankers:
- I see the battleship!
Fire was opened at the Gneisenau, which was close to the tanker. But the twilight and the beginning of the rain, which surprisingly often helped the battleships in such moments, again allowed them to safely retreat.
Since there were already few prospects for any further success on this route, the operation was completed, and on March 22, 1941, exactly two months after leaving Kiel, both ships entered a new base on the Atlantic, at Brest. Never before have German battleships carried out operations of such lengthy duration. Although none of the convoys were able to sink, they managed to confuse British maritime navigation and disorganize the position of the British navy, a remarkable success from a German point of view. In addition, there was hope that the experience gained in the operation could be seriously useful in the next operations, which should be carried out together with the recently built battleship Bismarck. The behavior of the sailors again proved to be beyond praise - especially for the staff of the engine room, who always did their job at the required high level, despite frequent technical problems. Fortune smiled again at the ship brothers.
The French shipyard in Brest, which took over the duties of the shipyard in Wilhelmshaven, quickly carried out all the necessary repairs. However, British planes soon intervened; their raids grew heavier from time to time. During one of the bombings, which caused great damage to the city, a shell hit the Gneisenau, as a result of which the repair had to be extended. The Scharnhorst, the "lucky ship", remained intact and by July 1941 was ready for action again. By then, however, the British were able to corner and sink the Bismarck when it attempted to break into the Atlantic. "Prince Eugen", accompanying this battleship, was able to safely retreat and also found refuge in Brest. The Scharnhorst was now transferred to La Pallis, a port south of Brest. To test the superheater and other items of equipment, he had to leave the harbor. Despite careful camouflage, the battleship was discovered by British aircraft. On the afternoon of July 24, the Scharnhorst was attacked by bombers flying at high altitude in a cloudless sky. Anti-aircraft fire and fighters could not thwart the attacks. A row of five bombs hit the ship from bow to stern. Three heavy, armor-piercing bombs penetrated the upper deck but did not detonate. Two smaller bombs exploded on the artillery deck, but caused only minor damage. The ship took in 3000 tons of water, but the roll caused by this could be compensated; the broken cables were quickly repaired. But even now, the Scharnhorst's luck has not left, because miraculously, no one was hurt on the ship. The battleship returned to Brest at a speed of 27 knots - and, despite constant air raids and frequent changes of docks, in which repairs were carried out, both battleships were repaired by the end of 1941.
Meanwhile, the superiority of the British and American forces was established in the Atlantic, and no one wanted to risk two battleships in the North Atlantic. The only opportunity to fight against the cargo ships was provided by the Arctic convoys moving north of Norway to Murmansk. But how can three large ships be safely transferred from Brest to German waters? After much deliberation, the High Command decided to make a breakthrough across the English Channel. This, undoubtedly, was very dangerous, but provided the absolute secrecy and surprise of the operation were maintained, there were serious chances of success.
Detailed planning began immediately. Vice Admiral Tsiliax, who took command, was in charge of the initial preparations. Even before the completion of the repair of the ships, flotillas of minesweepers were sent to clear the passage of mines. Permanent cover for the Luftwaffe was organized and provided. Two hundred and fifty aircraft could serve as a permanent "umbrella" over ships. Enormous supplies of fuel were prepared in suitable places. New airfields were built, communication was established between ships and fighters. The dense network of powerful British radars along the coast of the English Channel had to be paralyzed by interference - this also required detailed planning and many preparations. Finally, all seagoing destroyers and torpedo boats were to be assembled in Brest, which meant that they had to be moved west across the English Channel. Even these obvious preparations remained, apparently, unnoticed by the British and did not arouse their suspicions. Rumors of an impending operation in the Atlantic were deliberately spread. The commander of the Luftwaffe regiment invited the admirals and captains on a grand hunt; elegant invitation cards were sent out by mail. Various kinds of entertainment were organized in Brest and its environs - all methods of camouflage were put into operation. The sailing time depended on the coincidence of several optimal weather conditions: low clouds and fog over the English Channel, a new moon and a strong tidal current in the direction of the ships' movement. Finally, the meteorologists were able to report the onset of the desired conditions. The minesweepers reported that the route of movement had been cleared, the destroyers had been assembled in Brest, and the planes had stood in readiness to create a protective "umbrella" if necessary.
On the evening of February 11, 1942, a night battle exercise was announced aboard the Scharnhorst. This made it possible to justify the breeding of vapors, which, of course, is necessary for such exercises. The vapor breeding was scheduled for 20.30. Most of the ends had already been given away when ordinary British reconnaissance planes appeared over the port and snatched flares from the darkness of the ships. The port and ships had to be quickly covered with a smoke screen, and the unit was able to leave the harbor only two hours later than schedule. The admiral sailed in the Scharnhorst. However, the concentration of escort ships, which was supposed to create a protective shield for the battleship, happened faster than expected, and one hour was able to catch up. Until then, still only a few officers knew what was really going on. The officer in charge of the Scharnhorst, somewhat worried about the lack of clear orders, asked the navigator:
- We have a new course?
Captain Giessler smiled.
- The next course is 20 °. Tomorrow you will kiss your mother, wishing her Good night in Wilhelmshaven!
The joy on the bridge, which was soon shared by the entire crew, was indescribable.
Protected by a screen of destroyers, the battleship formation was moving east at a speed of 27 knots. At 7:00 Cherbourg was passed, and at dawn an air cover of fighters and light bombers appeared. During the night, the minesweepers flotilla found the mines just laid at the mouth of the Seine, but the formation passed through the minefield at a reduced speed after the minesweepers, after the admiral gave the signal "The passage is marked with floating booms!" Soon, the gleaming white cliffs of Dover peered out through the fog that the meteorologists had predicted would descend on the English Channel. Single English planes appeared near the coast, however, all of them immediately got lost and fell into the English Channel, engulfed in flames. At noon, strictly in accordance with the schedule, the narrowest part of the channel between Dover and Cape Gris-Ne was passed. Until now, there have been no noticeable countermeasures on the part of the British. Why do enemy heavy coastal batteries remain silent? The silence was disturbing. And finally, the flashes of shots appeared from the fog. A single battery opened fire - its shells fell far on the port side, without causing any harm. The torpedo boats hastily set up a smoke screen. On the Scharnhorst, a star navigator remarked to the navigator:
- It looks like a training voyage for navigation practice.
As the route passes through the many sandbanks at the Thames estuary, the English defenses have finally become active.
One squadron of Swordfish torpedo bombers and another of the Beaufighters attacked the unit, but both were shot down. Later, one by one, bombers began to raid the ships, but cover aircraft and the constant fire of naval anti-aircraft guns made accurate aiming impossible. The onset of rain reduced visibility. The Scharnhorst had to change course frequently to avoid being hit by bombs; while the minesweepers continued their work. At 15.30, as soon as the compound passed the buoy, a strong explosion shook the entire ship so that it rose from the water for a while. All the engines stopped, the electricity flow was cut off, and the ship was suddenly plunged into complete darkness. Reports began to arrive from different posts: for example, the engine room reported a slight penetration of water and that the engines would have to be stopped for a while.
The admiral quickly gave the order to the destroyer to stand by and went aboard. Whatever happens, he must fulfill the duties of the squadron commander.
While the Gneisenau and Prince Eugen continued on their course, covered by the screen of the escort ships, the Scharnhorst was doomed to remain in place for half an hour. But luck again smiled at the ship, since all this time not a single plane was seen in the sky. Finally, a report arrived, freeing the ship from forced confinement:
- The left engine is running.
The Scharnhorst was on its way again. Soon all three engines were in order, and at 16.04 the battleship was sailing again at a speed of 27 knots. The ship was protected by several torpedo boats. The other ships were already far ahead. On the radio, the Scharnhorst learned that the formation had entered into battle with an enemy cruiser and destroyers. Attacks began on six hundred aircraft thrown by the British into battle. One torpedo boat received a direct hit; he, accompanied by another boat, had to be sent to Hoek van Holland. The clouds dropped lower, but despite the rapidly deteriorating visibility, the cover of the battleship by the escort ships remained generally excellent. The air raids did not stop until nightfall, but these raids did not bring any results. The narrow sea passage along the Dutch coast, known as the "easy street", this time turned out to be not at all easy - there were sand banks on the starboard side, and mines on the left. In addition, it suddenly turned out that the battleship's echo sounder and radio direction finder had been disabled by a mine explosion. Diagonally from the ship, two destroyers were visible through the fog, between which a boat was going.
- Admiral on the boat! - exclaimed the boatswain.
Admiral Tsiliax was forced to leave the destroyer due to engine damage and move to another ship. The Scharnhorst had to slow down to prevent the boat capsizing from the wake. Later, the admiral said that for him the moment when the Scharnhorst, with the mighty waves coming from it, emerged from the fog, was especially exciting. At first he thought that the ship wanted to find refuge in some Dutch port, where it was ordered to go in case of emergency. Night fell, moonless and foggy. The Scharnhorst, on schedule, passed the buoy, anchored firmly off Terschelling Island, when another explosion shook the ship to its foundations. Fortunately, the vessel again took in only a small amount of water, and again the engines quickly recovered their functionality. When the Scharnhorst entered Wilhelmshaven on February 13, 1942, the second battleship had already reached the Elbe. What seemed impossible has happened. Having passed an area fired by heavy artillery from the English coast, the German unit, covered by escort ships and the Luftwaffe, slipped under the very nose of the British coastal defense with almost no casualties.
"Britain's biggest blunder," one newspaper commented; The Times, however, bitterly admitted that since the 17th century, the British navy has not experienced such humiliation in its waters.
And what did the sailors of the Scharnhorst say, whose crew had already passed a severe test in which they showed what they were capable of?
“Nothing happened to us,” they said. - We have a lucky ship.
For some time, the Scharnhorst was docked in Wilhelmshaven to assess the damage to the underwater part of the ship. The battleship then sailed to Kiel for repair work. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were now docked side by side, and the British Air Force did everything in their power to incapacitate these formidable foes. The Gneisenau was hit by a precision bomb; this led to the detonation of the ammunition of the front turret, which caused almost the entire bow of the ship to be turned. The battleship Gneisenau was out of action, while the Scharnhorst remained completely unharmed.
On April 1, 1942, Captain Hoffmann, who commanded the battleship for three years, was promoted to Rear Admiral and awarded the Knight's Cross, transferred command to Captain Huffmeier. In October of the same year, the ship was again ready to go to sea, and in January a message was sent from Gotenhafen that it was ready to serve in the line of fire. The long-conceived plan to transfer the ship to Norway was carried out in March 1943. Without hanging the flag of the admiral on board and accompanied by only two destroyers, the ship sailed to the Westfjord. The entire battle group of Northern Norway was assembled there - "Tirpitz", "Admiral Speer", "Scharnhorst" and many cruisers and destroyers. Soon "Tirpitz" and "Scharnhorst" were relocated to the Alta Fjord and Langfjord in the very north, near the route along which the Arctic convoys moved to Russia. In the summer of 1943, Tirpitz and Scharnhorst launched a raid on Svalbard, where the Germans destroyed important facilities and flooded coal mines. During this raid, however, not a single attack was made on the convoys, since the necessary conditions for this - well-conducted aerial reconnaissance and favorable weather - were not available.
During operations "Scharnhorst" in the summer of 1943 was blown up by a mine, was hit by bombs, torpedoes and shells - but, despite this, he remained a successful, "happy" ship. With selfless comradeship, dedication and love for their ship, his crew welded into a close, battle-hardened community, and the ship's luck lasted until the fateful day in December 1943, when the ship came to an end.
Martial law and the situation at sea in 1943
It is difficult to accurately imagine the last Scharnhorst operation, since, as follows from German sources, most of the crew died, out of 1900 people only 36 survived, and none of these survivors had an officer's rank. Therefore, the author has to use the testimonies and descriptions of both German and English eyewitnesses in reconstruction, as accurate and objective as possible.
A study of the circumstances surrounding the Scharnhorst's last combat exit - for example, the actions of the commander and the limited capabilities of the ship itself compared to the resources of the British side - shows that the outcome of the battle was a foregone conclusion long before the operation began.
In order to better understand the motives that prompted the command to conceive this last operation for the battleship, it is necessary to recall the military situation in Germany, which sharply deteriorated at the beginning of 1943.
In February, one of the most fateful events of the war took place - the battle for Stalingrad. Despite the attacks of German submarines and the activity of the Luftwaffe, the Allies successfully supplied the Russians in huge quantities of military materials. Less than two weeks after the unloading of another heavily laden Arctic convoy in Murmansk, the German forces of the Eastern Front began to feel the increase in the power of their enemy. The use of heavy naval forces against these convoys became the subject of lively discussion both for the main command and for the soldiers at the front.
Gross Admiral Dönitz himself, after being appointed commander of the fleet on November 30, 1943, emphasized the need to use heavy sea formations at every opportunity. His position deliberately ignored the potential risk to the few remaining heavy ships. The opponents of this course had no shortage of weighty arguments.
The British probably knew about the weakness of the German naval forces in the High North. They perfectly understood the reason why German forces, including heavy units, were stationed in the waters of Northern Norway. The Germans, for their part, knew that the British were trying to deprive them of all hopes of the slightest success, because the Arctic convoys were of the most strategic importance. They had to reckon with the absolute superiority of the enemy, that is, with the formations of British heavy ships operating in the same waters as the convoys. But even in these conditions, there were some chances of success. If it was possible to avoid collision with heavy British formations and pass by the covering ships or disable them, then the risk could be justified.
However, there were objections, since the heavy German formations would be at too great a risk. German aerial reconnaissance was not strong enough, moreover, there were practically no fighters and bombers in the area. This foreshadowed a variety of unpleasant surprises, moreover, the absence of aircraft left battleships without the support of the Luftwaffe, even in case of emergency. Very few ships could be used for reconnaissance operations, and there was no naval aviation at all. The situation was worsened by the frequent change of personnel on some ships, since the level of training of the crews could not be increased. Many of the sailors in service had no experience at sea, and sometimes it was completely impossible to give them the necessary training.
The next and main objection was that winter is the least convenient time to participate in the operations of heavy formations in the Far North. In the polar night conditions, large ships are at risk of night combat with all its dangers. In subpolar latitudes, a day lasts only two hours, and the sun does not fully rise above the horizon. All previous experience said that it was hardly possible to have time to sink the escort of the convoy, and then deal with the merchant ships before darkness descended. The available insignificant forces were completely unable to perform both tasks - to bind or destroy the escort ships and at the same time sink the convoy itself. In these circumstances, a battle with enemy forces would inevitably turn into a night battle, and experts constantly reminded that the battleship should not get involved in battles of this type, since at night the escort ships carrying torpedoes had the advantage, that is, the night battle is definitely beneficial to the British.
A less significant factor affecting both sides was the climatic factor. Arctic weather is characterized by rapid changes; sudden and severe storms bring heavy snowfalls, intense cold and especially large waves.
The last, most powerful argument against the use of large ships in the fight against convoys was known to only a few. It belonged to English radar equipment. Intelligence reports indicated that the British were already conducting radar fire control. Since the German guns could fire with radar at a very limited distance, a night battle, if the alarming intelligence reports were true, the German formations would have to conduct almost blindly under accurate enemy fire.
Nevertheless, despite all these carefully weighed considerations, Grand Admiral Dönitz continued to believe that heavy forces should be used. This difficult decision was caused by the overall strategic picture, and primarily the situation on the Eastern Front.
By the end of the year, the military situation in Germany was constantly deteriorating, and by December 1943 it had become completely hopeless. The army was forced to constantly retreat, which forced it to abandon the front-line fortifications and cost a lot of money. In addition, in many places the Russians made huge breakthroughs, and there their advance went forward without encountering resistance. The ranks of the battle-battered infantry dangerously weakened, only the skeletons of the former divisions remained - groups of soldiers desperately fighting in the vast expanses of Russia.
The high command at the headquarters of the Fuhrer realized that something needed to be done to ease the overwhelming pressure on the Eastern Front. Having suffered heavy losses, the Luftwaffe was almost incapable of anything. Submarine successes also declined sharply from February 1943. Only the 1st battle group remained high in the latitudes of Northern Norway - the battleship Scharnhorst!
None of the other large ships were suitable for operations against Arctic convoys. The Tirpitz was at anchor in the Kaafjord inside the Altafjord after being attacked by one of the British submarines. "Gneisenau" was seriously damaged by mines and bombs and was unfit for action in Gothenhafen. The remaining ships - "Prince Eugen", "Hipper", "Lutzow" and "Speer" - were occupied in the Baltic. Only the Scharnhorst, with its five escort destroyers, was able to attack the Arctic convoys.
At this time, the commander of the 1st battle group, Admiral Kummertz, was on leave in Germany; instead, Rear Admiral Bey, who had previously led the destroyer flotilla, was acting commander. He had never been in command of a heavy ship before, but since destroyers have always operated successfully under his command, he has earned complete trust and universal respect.
In the meantime, the idea of using the 1st battle group gained support. During one of the meetings with the Fuehrer (held on December 19 and 20, 1943 at the Wolfsschantz in East Prussia), the Grand Admiral took the lead. Dönitz, fully aware of the desperate need to support the Eastern Front and desperately wanting the navy to make any decisive effort to help the front, made a statement that amazed everyone present. He announced that, given the opportunity, the Scharnhorst and several escort destroyers would attack the next convoy on the northern route from Halifax to Russia. He added that in the event of the resumption of regular flights along the northern route, it is worth increasing the number of submarines operating in the northern region. In the summer of 1943, not a single Arctic convoy was sent to Murmansk. Dönitz said that he had already given the order to move more submarines into Arctic waters.
Convoy J.W. on the way to Murmansk
On December 24, 1943, on Christmas Eve, the Naval High Command received word that the long-awaited J.W. to Murmansk.
Aerial reconnaissance spotted the ships on December 22, but the information received was not detailed enough to say that the discovered cargo ships represent an Arctic convoy. It was only after the Christmas report that all doubts about the convoy disappeared.
J.W. track ran along the so-called northern route past Greenland, Iceland, Svalbard and around the North Cape to Murmansk. The British navy covered the caravan. Small vessels - frigates, corvettes, destroyers and patrol ships - served as cover from submarine attacks. Large ships, heavy and light cruisers, went without cover, parallel to the convoy and somewhat to the south, that is, in the direction in which the German enemy was expected. The cruisers covered the convoy from attacks by surface ships; they walked separately from the formation and were ready to join the battle if necessary. The number of cargo ships in the Arctic convoy ranged from twenty-five to thirty - sometimes even more. They carried military supplies, mainly armored vehicles and heavy weapons and ammunition. On average, the convoy carried about half a million gross register tons of cargo - this was a huge figure.
End of introductory snippet.
The German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are rightfully considered one of the most famous warships of the Second World War. Few of their contemporaries managed to take part in so many operations in coastal European waters, the Atlantic and the Arctic. The Royal Navy of Great Britain, which was greatly annoyed by this pair of battleships, more than once arranged a real hunt for "Salmon" and "Galstein", as the English sailors called them.
"Scharnhorst "was destined to become one of the most famous ships of the Second World War. Wilhelmshaven February 14, 1934, re-laying as a battle cruiser took place on June 15 the next, and the descent - October 3, 1936. The launching ceremony was very solemn, it was attended by Adolf Hitler himself.
The shipyard's extensive renovation work and delays in the delivery of some equipment, such as turbine generators, affected the construction time. The new ship was completed on January 7, 1939. Preliminary tests of the Scharnhorst revealed a number of shortcomings in various systems and equipment of the ship, including new boilers, and this required significant alterations and refinements. Insufficient headroom in the bow and trim to the bow were found.
In August, the bow was redesigned, and an aircraft hangar was added to the ship. On September 2, the Scharnhorst made a short test run, after which a number of work had to be done with the boiler superheater tubes. Having crossed with Tneisenau "to the Baltic, during training firing, he received damage to the hangar and seaplane on a medium catapult (from muzzle gases), and also experienced difficulties with the central turbine. After a 2-week repair at the shipyard (at the same time a radar was installed)" Scharnhorst "returned to the North Sea. The promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral Otto Tsiliax as commander of the ship was replaced by Captain Zursee Kurt Hoffmann.
Baptism of fire
The ship was ready for combat only in October, and on November 21, together with Tneisenau, "went out to the passage Iceland-Faroese islands. In this operation, due to an eight-point storm on the Scharnhorst, several gun mounts and searchlights were out of order. During the battle with the auxiliary cruiser Rawalpindi on November 23, the Scharnhorst, whose fire was controlled corvette captain Dominik fired 89 283 mm and 109 150 mm shells, but he himself was hit by a 152 mm shell in the stern. There were wounded and minor damage from shrapnel.
Taking advantage of bad weather, the German ships broke away from the superior forces of the Metropolitan Fleet sent in pursuit and returned to repair combat and storm damage. At the same time, boilers were repaired at Scharnhorst.
The British did not want to come to terms with the fact that the German raiders missed with impunity and on December 17 launched a raid on Wilhelmshaven... The Scharnhorst stationed there for 8 minutes fired ineffectively with its anti-aircraft guns (cranes and shipyard buildings interfered), but the Messerschmitts shot down 10 Wellingtons out of 24.
On January 11, 1940, the Scharnhorst moved to Kiel, where it linked up with Tneisenau "for exercises and artillery practice, but a too cold winter forced the ships to return to the main base. Breaking through the ice in the Kiel Canal, the Scharnhorst left for Wilhelmshaven February 5, a day later than Sister Spike. After an ineffectual exit to sea on February 18-20, both main combat units of the Kriegsmarine stood at anchor for a month and a half. Wilhelmshaven... On March 6, one of the Scharnhorst aircraft crashed and, although the damage was repaired, both pilots were killed.
Operations in Norway
On April 7, almost all of them went to sea in several detachments, covering the forces of the invasion of Norway. As soon as they tried to increase the stroke to 27 knots, the steam valve on the Scharnhorst failed, which led to a 15-minute stop of the left shaft. A couple of hours later, the German squadron heading for Narvik and Trondheim was attacked by 12 Blenheim bombers of the 107th Royal Air Force Squadron. Both battleships and the heavy cruiser, marching in front, opened anti-aircraft fire from all their barrels.
There was a lot of noise and smoke, which cannot be said about hitting airplanes. They responded with the same coin - all 40 bombs fell by. Three more squadrons were prevented from attacking by German cover fighters Bf-110, which managed to shoot down two Wellingtons. By the evening the weather turned bad, an 8-point storm broke out and the radars had to be turned on. Again the German ships began to suffer from the ocean waves, with difficulty holding 9 knots. April 8 at the "Scharnhorst" water through air intake hit KO # 2 and the speed had to decrease by 2 more nodes.
On the night of the 9th, water entered the fuel tanks through the ventilation shafts, making 470 cubic meters of oil unusable. Low clouds, frequent rain and snow charges severely limited visibility, especially in the westerly direction, from where the enemy could appear. Lutyens' ships were 50 miles west of the southern tip of the Lofoten Islands, heading 310 °, speed 12 knots. At 04.30 on April 9, the Tneisenau radar " found a target 25 km aft and the ships announced combat alarm.
Radars "Scharnhorst" still did not give contact, but at about 05.00, its navigator in the mirror of the sextant discovered a flash from the fire of heavy guns, and after 5 minutes the signalmen saw the silhouette of a large ship. In the ensuing battle with the battlecruiser Rhinaun and the destroyers, the Scharnhorst's radar went out of action, and she could not find a target in any way. After 05.18 the ship was briefly under fire from "Rhinaun", but the frequent change of course made it possible to avoid hits.
By 07.15 the German ships managed to break away from the pursuit, but the bow tower of the Scharnhorst was out of order due to the heavy impacts of the waves. Water entered the turret through holes for ejection of spent cartridges, rangefinder casings and gun embrasures. A short circuit occurred in the circuits of the electric motors for supplying ammunition due to the ingress of salt water. When the Scharnhorst tried to increase the speed to the fullest, the right turbine had to be stopped, due to which the speed dropped to 25 knots. For the entire battle, he fired 195 283-mm shells (almost all armor-piercing) and several 150-mm. On April 12, along with the joined Hipper, the battlecruisers came to Wilhelmshaven.
"Scharnhorst "had to seriously repair the bow tower and the power plant. But all the hopes of his commander about docking were buried by the order of the OKM (Oberkomando Marine), which forbade starting any repairs that required more than 6 hours. On May 1, the ship moved to Wesermunde, and after 9 days - to the Baltic to undergo a combat training course required for 87 newly arrived officers and foremen in a calm atmosphere. After a week in the Gotenhaven (Gdynia) region, the Scharnhorst was recalled to Kiel for a long-awaited repair. The Deutsche Werke shipyard requested 12 days to work, but the fleet commander demanded that everything be completed by May 31. The fact is that by that time, of the heavy German ships, only the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau remained in service (the Luttsov repaired the torpedo damage, the Admiral Scheer was undergoing scheduled repairs), and the events in Norway required the presence of the ships of the Kriegsmarine off its coast.
Battle cruiser Rinaun. 1916, mod. 1934-36, 31990 tons, 32 knots, 6 381/42, 20 114/45 oz., 8 TA, side up to 229 mm, barbets 178 mm, turrets up to 279 mm. June 4 accompanied by Hipper and four destroyers, both battlecruisers went to sea for operations against shipping. In the battle with the aircraft carrier Tlories described above, the Scharnhorst fired 212 rounds. One of the two destroyers accompanying the aircraft carrier - Akasta - slipped from left to right in front of the Scharnhorst's nose and fired a volley of four torpedoes. The distance was too close, so, in spite of the sharp lapel, in 1839 one torpedo struck at an angle of 15 degrees on the starboard side of the Caesar tower three meters under the main belt - in the most vulnerable place.
The damage turned out to be very serious. The fighting compartment and cellars were filled with smoke, and the turret servants had to be evacuated. The commander of the ship, Captain Zur See Kurt Hoffmann, gave the order to flood the cellars, but after reporting that there was no danger of fire, he canceled it. The side skin, which took the blow, was destroyed in an area of 6x14 meters. But the explosion turned out to be so powerful that most of its energy fell on the internal structure, tearing apart the anti-torpedo bulkhead and bending its upper part inward by 1.7 m. The bulkhead was damaged by 10 m, counting from the side armor at the platform level above the propeller shaft corridor. Two traverse bulkheads, the battery deck and the deck of the first platform were damaged. The shelf under the armor and adjacent elements of the hull structure were slightly less damaged. The hit happened to the place where the propeller shaft passed through the anti-torpedo bulkhead, where its elasticity was insufficient due to additional reinforcements. The insufficiently reliable connection of the bulkhead with the armored deck also affected, which did not allow the stresses from the explosion to spread over a large area of the rigid elements of the hull structure. The bulkhead began to bend elastically, but its upper attachment could not withstand, which led to large flooding of the internal volume: water partially filled 22 main watertight compartments, and only 30 compartments in the area of the explosion took 2500 tons. and the donkey stern by 3 meters. The explosion killed 48 crew members.
Large flooding and damage affected the power plant. A part of the right propeller shaft, which passed through the lower compartments of the anti-torpedo defense near the Caesar tower, was destroyed, and the entire corridor was quickly filled with water. One of the sailors remained there, and when the other, trying to save him, opened the watertight door, the aft engine room, which supplied energy to the middle propeller shaft, began to flood so quickly that it was impossible to keep it in the ranks by instantly stopping the turbines. The casing of one of the turbines rotating on full power, cooled down so quickly that the rotor blades crashed into its inner surface. It was necessary to shut off all the steam lines in this department. The ship was left with only one working left shaft.
On the way to Trondheim, the ship could barely hold 20 knots. To prevent further damage to the hull, they began to use fender mats, but this is not much. gave and the order was canceled... Both ships reached Trondheim around midnight on 9 June. The repair ship Huascaran was moored there, the crew of which began the temporary repair of the Scharnhorst. On June 10, a Royal Air Force Coastal Command reconnaissance aircraft spotted German ships and the next day a dozen Hudson (Hudson) bombers dropped 36,227 kg armor-piercing bombs at the Scharnhorst from a height of 4,570 meters, none of which hit. The Germans shot down two planes. Then came the turn of the British formation of the battleship "Nelson" and the aircraft carrier "Arc Royal", which on June 13 were 170 miles from Trondheim. Fifteen Skua bombers taken into the air were intercepted by German fighters and lost eight aircraft. The rest broke through to the target, but only one bomb hit the Scharnhorst, which, moreover, did not explode, although it pierced the upper deck.
The repair of the middle shaft turbines took 10 days. The right shaft could only be repaired in dry dock, since there was a fear that it was bent and that the propeller would touch the housing during rotation. On the tests on June 18, at a speed of over 13 knots, such a vibration was observed that they could only hope for two shafts and maximum speed 24 knots. On June 20, the ship left for Germany, accompanied by an escort. The next day, the connection at o .U tsir found British Coastal Command aircraft and about 1,500 six Suordfish torpedo bombers from the 821st and 823rd Royal Navy Squadrons launched an attack, which the Germans easily repelled with anti-aircraft fire. The British pilots had no practice and this attack by a large ship was their first in their life. All torpedoes went almost parallel to the course of the ships, which did not cost anything to evade them, while shooting down two torpedo bombers with anti-aircraft guns. Almost immediately 4 "Hudson" from a great height with the same great inaccuracy dropped 227-kg bombs. Two cars were killed, two barely returned to the base, having been seriously damaged. An hour and a half later, nine Beaufort ships appeared over the compound, armed with 227-kg armor-piercing bombs, but they were also repulsed by anti-aircraft fire and fighters, having lost 3 aircraft. And the last attack with the same result was carried out by six more "Hudson". Reflecting attacks, "Scharnhorst" fired 900 105-mm shells and 3600 small ones. By evening, the air cover consisted of 10 Messerschmitts (Bf-109), 2 Heinkel-111, a Do-18 flying boat and two Arado-196 airborne boats. Soon the Germans intercepted a British message, from which they realized that large forces of the Metropolitan Fleet were at sea, and the Scharnhorst was ordered to take refuge in the port of Stavanger. At this point, some British ships were only 35 miles away. On June 22, the Scharnhorst left Stavanger for Kiel, where the floating dock C underwent repairs for the next six months, often interrupted by British air raids. On November 21, the ship set out on a test voyage in the Baltic, but on December 19 returned to Kiel in order to complete repair work for another four days in the floating dock "B".
After returning to Kiel, Gneisenau and Scharnhorst began preparations for a breakthrough into the North Atlantic. The operation, dubbed Berlin, was delayed by bad weather. Only on January 22, 1941, both ships went to sea. First, they went far to the north, where they refueled from the tanker "Adria" ("Scharnhorst" took 1700 m3), and then headed towards the strait between Iceland and Greenland. Although they were discovered by the cruiser Nayyad, they managed to get past the British patrols and enter the operational space. On February 8, the Germans met the first koiva, but the presence of the battleship Ramillies in his escort forced them to abandon the attack.
On February 16, both ships refueled south of Greenland, and on the 22nd they found a new convoy, from which the Scharnhorst sank the 6,000-ton tanker Lastres. The battlecruisers refueled off the Azores again and then headed for Cape Verde Islands. On March 7, the Scharnhorst discovered the British battleship Malaya, and two hours later - 12 merchant ships, the attack of which had to be abandoned again. Two days later, after refueling and receiving supplies from the Ukkermark and Ermland ships, the German ships sailed north. On the way to the refueling site on March 9, the Scharnhorst sank the 8000-ton Greek ship Marathon with a cargo of coal for Alexandria.
On March 15, they found a scattered convoy and sank 16 ships from its composition in two days (the Scharnhorst sank 6). On March 22, both ships arrived at Brest.
The team of authors: DAY1923 and lenka
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May 18, 1941 "Bismarck" (commander - captain 1st rank Lindemann) and "Prince Eugen" (commander - captain 1st rank Brinkmann) left Gdynia. Admiral Lutyens was holding his flag ...
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Battle cruiser (or is it a battleship?) Shanhorst.
Full displacement is 39 thousand tons. GBP-350mm, deck-95mm. Max speed - 31.7 knots.
AGK-3х3х280mm,
anti-mine caliber 4x2x150mm, 4x1-150mm.
Air defense artillery:
14-105mm; 16-37mm; 10-20mm.
TA-2х3х533mm
Air group - 3 Arado Ar 196 A-3, one catapult.
There were 2 Gneisenau and Scharnhorst battleships or battle cruisers. For a battleship, they have a rather weak AGK-280mm (there were plans to change the AGK to 3x2x380mm). For a battle cruiser, they are too well protected and do not have an overwhelming speed advantage over new battleships, as was the case during WWI (there the difference in speed reached 8 knots).
Scharnhorst at sea.
Prince of Wales. Duke of York-Sister Ship One project.
Full displacement 45 thousand tons. GBP varied not only in length, but also in height, amounting to 152 mm along the lower edge, 356 mm along the waterline and 330 mm along the upper edge in the area of the main caliber (GK) cellars, and 127, 330 and 305 mm in the EI region, respectively.
AGK-2x4x356mm. 1x2x356mm. Mine artillery-8x2x133mm. Air defense Oerlikon-1x18, Bofors-20x2x.
KRL Belfast. Standard English light cruiser.
AGK4х3х152 mm. speed 33 knots, displacement - 13 thousand tons.
The light cruiser Jamaica (crown colony series) is, in principle, a smaller version of Belfast. Full displacement - 11 thousand. tons with the same AGK and speed.
In the second half of 1943, the position of the German army in Russia became critical. As the threat from the German squadron was significantly reduced, the British Admiralty, yielding to the insistent demands of its Russian allies, agreed to resume escorting convoys to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. Remembering the sad experience of 1942, the British abandoned large convoys of 40 ships, and began to divide them in two. The new cycle began on November 1 with the dispatch from Arkhangelsk of 13 empty ships (RA-54 A), and in a month and a half, three eastern convoys (JW-54 A, JW-54 B, JW-55 A) and two western ( RA-54 A and RA-54 B). The convoys were accompanied by a marching escort of destroyers, frigates and corvettes, which was joined by a local escort at the end of the route. In the most dangerous area - south of Bear Island - they were accompanied by a short cover of cruisers, and a long-range cover, including a battleship, patrolled from 10 miles east to 200 miles northwest of the island, covering both convoys at once, which met as times in the area.
Convoy JW-55 Athe Germans discovered, but did not attack, and all 19 ships safely reached the Kola Bay and Arkhangelsk. However, on December 19-20, at a meeting with Hitler, the commander-in-chief of the fleet, Admiral Dönitz, announced that the Scharnhorst and the 4th flotilla were attacking the next convoy. After two days of discussion, Hitler authorized the operation, giving the surface ships one last chance to prove themselves. The temporary commander of the strike force, Rear Admiral Erich Bey (in fact, he commanded the destroyers and in this operation replaced the absent Admiral Kummetz), on December 22, he received an order from Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz to switch to a three-hour readiness. For the commander of the Scharnhorst, Captain Zursee Fritz Hintze, this was the first time he went to sea in his new position.
Convoy JW-55 Bout of nineteen transports and tankers left Loch Yu on December 20, guarded by 10 destroyers, 4 corvettes and 3 minesweepers. A convoy came out to meet him RA-55 A, which was escorted by 10 destroyers, 3 corvettes and a minesweeper. In the Barents Sea, both convoys were covered by Compound 1 as part of the cruisers of the 10th squadron of Vice Admiral R. Bernett: the flagship Belfast, Sheffield and the heavy Norfolk. Formation 2 as part of the battleship Duke of York (flag of the Commander of the Metropolitan Fleet Admiral Bruce Fraser), the cruiser Jamaica and 4 destroyers were supposed to coverJW-55 Bfrom 27 ° to 38 ° E, then return to Scapa Flow, covering RA-55 A... December 22, 400 miles west of the Norwegian port of Tromsø, a convoy JW-55 Bdiscovered by German aircraft. The commander of the "North" group, Admiral Schnyvindt, at first decided that a landing in Norway was being prepared, but the panic soon subsided. Two days later, the convoy was again found north of Norway and determined that it was heading for the USSR. On Christmas Day, December 25, at about 9.00 a German submarineU-601 reported the exact coordinates of the convoy and Admiral Dönitz ordered to intercept. His order to Admiral Bey contained the following:
“The operation can be interrupted at your discretion. Basically, you should interrupt the battle in the event of the appearance of superior enemy forces. The tactical situation should be used with skill and audacity. The fight must not end with a stalemate. Every opportunity to attack should be used. The Scharnhorst's superiority in gun power gives the best chance of success, and it must be exploited. Destroyers should be used later. Inform crews accordingly. I am fully confident in your offensive spirit. "
The order was contradictory, as he urged Bey to attack in any case, but also demanded to interrupt the battle when the strongest enemy appeared. Admiral Bey planned to attack the convoy at around 10:00 on December 26, if the weather and visibility were favorable and the information on enemy forces was correct. With only six hours of twilight and only 45 minutes of daylight, the battle had to be fought very quickly.
German connection ("Scharnhorst", destroyers Z-29, Z-30, Z-33, Z-34, Z-38) went out to sea at about 19:00, and at 23:00 the Norwegian coast disappeared over the horizon. Admiral Bey maintained constant contact with the headquarters of the naval group "North" and at 3.19 the command of the fleet conveyed to him the decision of the German Admiralty to return the destroyers in case of worsening weather and to act on the Scharnhorst alone. The British were able to intercept and decipher this message, and by the time Bey read the new order, the British admirals Burnet and Fraser were already holding the English translation in their hands. At 07.03 on December 26, the German unit, located 40 miles south-west of about. Bearish, turned to the point where in the morning twilight - about 10 o'clock - according to calculations, a meeting with the convoy was to take place. The destroyers searched 10 miles south-west of the Scharnhorst, the crews were on full alert from 0300. In the stormy sea, the destroyers had a hard time and their speed had to be reduced to 10 knots.
On a long-range cover formation that left Iceland on December 23, located 270 miles west of Cape Nord-Kap, Admiral Fraser received an intercept from Ultra that the Scharnhorst rushed towards the convoy. British intelligence was able to decipher the order - “Ostfront (17.00). "Scharnhorst" to go to sea on the 25th at 17 o'clock "- and Admiral Fraser was asked to prepare for action to cut off the German battleship's way back to Norway. By 9:25 am, Fraser's ships were 125 miles southwest of the Scharnhorst, and Admiral Burnet was informed of Fraser's plans and the contents of the Ultra's transcript. Admiral Fraser ordered the 36th destroyer battalion from the escort of the convoy RA-55 A, who was prudently sent north of the intended battle area, to join the convoyJW-55 B(the main goal of "Scharnhorst"). Vice Admiral Burnet positioned his formation between the convoy and the possible direction of the Scharnhorst's arrival. The commander of the Soviet Northern Fleet, Admiral A. Golovko, ordered the L-20, K-21 and S-102 submarines to enter the area of the North Cape and intercept the German raider. At the same time, the destroyers warmed up the turbines at the base, and the aircraft at the airfields were armed with torpedoes and bombs.
When the Belfast radar at 8.40 on 26 December detected the Scharnhorst from a distance of 33,000 m and a bearing of 295 °, a combat alert was played on the ships of the close cover. The German raider at that moment was about 32 miles from the convoy, and three British cruisers began to approach the enemy. The Scharnhorst was not yet aware of the presence of British ships, since for greater stealth it did not turn on its radar. At 09.21 the signalmen of the cruiser "Sheffield" from a distance of 11,000 m along a bearing of 222 ° noticed a German ship, and three minutes later Belfast opened fire from a distance of 8600 m with lighting shells. At 09.25 the first salvo from the Norfolk cruiser landed just 500 meters from the Scharnhorst, which responded with a salvo from the Caesar tower, and then began to retreat at a 30-knot speed. Belfast and Sheffield used flameless gunpowder, and Norfolk used the older one, which gave strong unmasking flashes. The British used artillery radars and in this they were superior to the enemy, who had an advantage in speed and weapon power. During the 20-minute skirmish, the Scharnhorst was hit by three 203-mm shells. The first one hit the upper deck from the port side between the deck 150-mm installation and the torpedo tube and, without exploding, went into the cockpit of the watertight compartmentIX... A small fire that had started there was quickly extinguished. Another shell a few minutes later hit the nasal rangefinders and bombarded the anti-aircraft artillery servants with shrapnel. Destroyed the antenna of the bow radar, and the debris entered the cabin of the receiving radar station, killing all the personnel there. The ship was "blind" from the bow angles, approximately 69-80 °, since the stern radar, located below the bow, had a limited forward angle of action. The third shell hit the forecastle and exploded in the cockpit.
Trying to get out of the battle, the Scharnhorst changed course several times. At 9.55 Admiral Bay radioed about the battle with the British cruisers, but after a few minutes he was able to break away from the enemy, which in a stormy sea could not give more than 24 knots. With an advantage of 4-6 knots, the Scharnhorst quickly increased its distance from its pursuers. At 1030 hours, the 36th Division joined the cruisers of Burnet, forming a wake column to the left and in front of the Belfast.
Breaking away from the cruisers, "Scharnhorst" again began to search for the convoy and by 12 o'clock left to the northeast of it. Five minutes later, "Belfast" restored radar contact with the Germans, but only at 12.21 the British cruisers were able to close the distance. At that moment, the Scharnhorst detected them with its stern radar, and then visually. The British fired flares, but the battlecruiser quickly opened fire from the bow towers and again changed course to the northwest, bringing the aft tower into action. This lapel prevented the British destroyers from launching a torpedo attack. Three volleys covered the terminal ship of the 36th battalion "Virago", which had just slipped under the noses of the cruisers.
At 12.23 the Norfolk was hit in the area of the stern tube. A few seconds later, the second 283-mm shell hit the barbet of his turret “X", Taking her out of action. To prevent an explosion, the tower's cellar had to be flooded. The first hit was more serious. The projectile pierced the superstructure from the starboard side and exploded at the very skin of the left side, tearing it apart over a large area. Shrapnel completely disabled the radar installation, after which the cruiser could not maintain accurate fire. It turned out to be 7 killed (1 officer) and 5 wounded. Tower B fired 4 more volleys using old data, and then the Norfolk temporarily ceased fire. A few minutes later, the Sheffield was covered with a hail of large debris. The erroneous order of his artillery officer sharply reduced the intensity of the fire - instead of firing with the whole side, the cruiser switched to the turret. At 12.41, when the situation began to develop badly for the British - after all, the Scharnhorst was much stronger than the three cruisers, Admiral Bay changed course and increased speed. He did not want to continue the unpleasant battle with the cruisers, his target was the convoy. After the end of this phase of the battle, the ships of Admiral Fraser approached from the southwest, and the cruiser Burnet continued to keep out of the Scharnhorst's fire, maintaining radar contact and reporting the enemy's coordinates to their battleship.
From the German destroyers they saw the lighting shells that the British cruisers fired in the morning battle, but they were far from the Scharnhorst. Admiral Bey ordered them to march northeast to join the flagship, but at 11.58 sent them west again to search for a convoy. After that, there was no longer any tactical interaction between the Scharnhorst and the German destroyers. At about 13:00, the destroyers, without knowing it, passed only 15,000 m south of the convoy. Finally, at 13.43, Admiral Bey ordered them to stop searching and return to base. The next day, at about 10.00, they returned to the Kaa fiord. Their absence in the final phase of the battle at Cape North Cape proved fatal for the Scharnhorst. Indeed, if its nasal radar failed, the destroyers could timely detect the enemy, help the flagship repel torpedo attacks, and they themselves would pose a serious danger to British ships, having 150-mm guns and 8 torpedo tubes.
The eldest of the surviving members of the Scharnhorst crew, NCO Willie Godde, who was on the bridge according to the combat schedule, described the battle with the cruisers as follows: “Soon after 12.30, I and some others noticed the shadows of three ships ahead, which we immediately reported to the commander. The alarm has already been announced, since a little earlier the enemy was detected by the radar. However, before our guns opened fire, lighting shells exploded over the Scharnhorst. The enemy's volley fell very close. But our first volley from 28-cm guns took the enemy into the fork. I saw that after three or four volleys on one of the cruisers in the area of the stern tube, a strong fire began, the other cruiser blazed strongly in the bow and stern and was enveloped in thick smoke. After the next volleys, I saw hits in the bow of the third cruiser. At one point, a huge tongue of flame shot up into the sky, which then disappeared. Observing thick smoke around the cruiser, I assumed that it was on fire. The enemy's fire began to weaken, and when we changed course, the enemy cruisers turned away and hid behind the rain and snow squalls. During this battle, the enemy was in front of both sides. These cruisers were fired on by our Anton and Bruno towers, which were occasionally joined by two bow 150-mm towers. I have not heard, either on the phone or in any other way, about any hits in us in this phase of the battle. Although the enemy was barely visible during the first contact, this time, in the twilight of the day, we were easily able to determine that they were cruisers. The distance was also shorter than in the morning battle. "
At about 1:15 pm, Admiral Bey decided to return to base without expecting any more skirmishes. The crew of the ship, not fed in the morning, proceeded to lunch, but combat readiness remained. The stern radar was turned off so as not to detect themselves with its work. At 15.25 Bey radioed to the headquarters of the "North" group the estimated time of his return. He didn’t know that he was going exactly to the intersection of the course of the Duke of York, Jamaica and four destroyers, which were aimed at him by cruisers on the radio. With the nasal radar destroyed and the stern radar turned off, and, moreover, unable to search directly along the course, the Scharnhorst went straight into a trap from which there was no way out. At 75 kbt from behind (with a visibility of 70), like a flock of hounds, the cruisers Burnet and the 36th division walked in front formation, closed so as not to clog their radar screens with unnecessary marks. This kind of "rut" lasted more than three hours. There was a moment at the beginning of the fifth hour in the afternoon when the situation could change. The Norfolk slowed down to put out the fire, and after 7 minutes the Sheffield dropped to 8 knots, where the left inner propeller shaft bracket broke. But already at 16:17 the search radar of the British battleship detected the enemy at a distance of 225 kbt. The death warrant for the Scharnhorst was signed. Fraser ordered to continue tracking until the ships were within effective range of fire.
At 4:32 pm, a Type 284 artillery radar on Duke of York groped a 147 kbt (27,200 m) target and 11 minutes later Fraser ordered Belfast, the only Burnet cruiser that could enter the battle, open fire with illuminating shells, and his destroyers - be ready for a torpedo attack at the signal of the admiral. Duke of York and Jamaica went on course 80 to use the aft towers. The German ship was sandwiched between Compounds 1 and 2.
When the shells of the first salvo exploded in the sky at 4:47 pm, the British were surprised to find that on the Scharnhorst the main battery turrets were deployed to the stowed position. A minute later, the Duke of York opened fire with 133-mm illuminating shells, and two more later began firing volleys from a distance of 11,000 m. ). Although the Scharnhorst was caught by surprise, after the bursting of the lighting shells, it quickly returned fire and, without a moment's hesitation, turned north. The duel between him and the battleship Duke of York was unequal - the German 283-mm shells could not penetrate the thick armor that protected the vital parts of the British battleship. At 16.55 a 356-mm shell from the first salvo hit the starboard side of the Scharnhorst opposite the Anton tower. The turret jammed with raised guns, the horizontal and vertical aiming drives were out of order. A fire started in the cellars from the red-hot shrapnel, and the shrapnel also broke through the flame-proof door to the cellar of the Bruno tower. The cellars of both towers had to be flooded, but under the Bruno tower they were drained so quickly that this had almost no effect on its rate of fire. The serving servant worked waist-deep in icy water, trying to save at least some of the ammunition. Despite the damage, the ship maintained a high speed. The second shell damaged the ventilation duct of the Bruno tower, which caused its fighting compartment to fill with gases and smoke after each opening of the gun lock. Another shell hit near the Caesar tower and punched a hole 0.5 m in diameter in the battery deck. The hole was quickly repaired, but the compartments where the shell exploded were flooded with water and not drained. Shrapnel riddled two aircraft, smashed several anti-aircraft guns, destroying most of their servants. After that, the captain zur see Hintze ordered the survivors to take cover.
These hits have not yet posed a threat to the Scharnhorst. The main thing is that he retained the advantage in speed and began to break away from the enemy. Only the destroyer "Savage" could follow him, which the Germans could not throw off "from the tail", although the shells fell from him only 20 meters. The destroyer came so close that he was forced to turn away without receiving the order for a torpedo attack. Having come under fire from "Belfast" and "Norfolk", "Scharnhorst" turned east and quickly increased the distance with a 30-knot speed. Fraser ordered the destroyers to attack, but they could not get close to the target. "Savage" and "Somarets" kept to the left behind, and "Stord" and "Scorpio" - to the right behind from the pursued enemy. At 17.42, due to the increased distance, the Jamaica ceased fire, and only Fraser's flagship continued to methodically fire volleys at the retreating Scharnhorst.
Fortunately for the British, the Duke of York's shooting was accurate. One after another, gun turrets came out on a German ship, fragments of heavy shells even penetrated the cellars, knocking out the servants who worked on the supply. And at about 18.00, a shell hit the starboard side, piercing the thin belt of the upper citadel (45 mm) and the battery deck, ricocheting along the 80-mm lower armored deck, piercing the glacis of the same thickness over boiler room No. 1, exploding in the latter. At first it seemed on the ship that it was a torpedo hit - the impact and explosion were so strong. Bursting many steam lines of four boilers located in this compartment. Shell fragments pierced the double bottom, which caused the compartment to flood to the level of the flooring. The ship's speed dropped to 8 knots. Emergency measures were taken quickly and efficiently, but when watertight doors and hatches were battened down
25 people were locked up in the boiler room. The steam pressure was increased, and the chief mechanic of the frigatten-captain Otto König reported to the bridge: "I can move 22 knots," to which the ship commander Hintze replied: "Bravo, hold him!" The Scharnhorst fired from a distance of 15,000 - 20,000 m and covered the Duke of York with several volleys, the side of which was covered with shrapnel, and a direct hit on the foremast blew one of its supports overboard and temporarily disabled an artillery radar of the type 284. Lieutenant Bates, who climbed onto the mast, managed to fix the broken cable between the antenna and the radar screen, and the fire was continued with the same efficiency. The rest of the damage on the English battleship turned out to be from its own fire: demolished ventilation fungi, damaged deck, broken boats.
The artillery duel had already lasted for almost 90 minutes, and the Scharnhorst suffered significant damage. Its superstructures were in many places pierced by shrapnel, and in some places destroyed by direct hits of 152-mm, 203-mm and 356-mm shells. Fires broke out, sometimes accompanied by explosions. Under these conditions, the crew continued to professionally and calmly do their job. The fire in the hangar, which destroyed two seaplanes, was extinguished after 10 minutes, but the attempt to launch the remaining aircraft from the catapult failed, as it destroyed the supply of compressed air. Destroyed or disabled almost all artillery installations and the port side torpedo tube. The surviving servants were ordered to take cover and fight the fires. At 17.30, 356-mm shells hit both bow 150-mm turrets: the right one was completely destroyed, and all the people in the turret and in the feed were killed, and the left one was jammed. But after 10 minutes she was completely out of order.
The torpedo officer, under a hurricane of fire, bravely rushed to the port side torpedo tube even before the latter was disabled. He was able to deploy the apparatus and fired two torpedoes, and the third was jammed in the tube. According to eyewitnesses, this officer was killed by shrapnel from a shell that exploded nearby or by a shell hitting a jammed torpedo, which detonated in the vehicle. A shell hitting the forecastle broke the chain of the right anchor, which fell into the sea with the remnants of the chain. Soon the same happened with the bow anchor.
Rear Admiral Bey now knew for sure that he had been cornered and at 18.24 ordered to send the last radiogram to Hitler: "We will fight until the last shell."
At 18.42, the Duke of York ceased fire, firing 52 volleys, of which 31 covered and gave at least 13 direct hits. These shells and shells from cruisers killed and wounded a large number of people on board the Scharnhorst, and disabled almost all of the 150-mm guns. However, the Scharnhorst was still at high speed, and Admiral Fraser, fearing that the enemy would be able to escape, ordered the destroyers to launch a torpedo attack.
Due to the drop in speed of the Scharnhorst, destroyers of theS”From Compound 2 managed to approach it by 60 cables. The German ship no longer had the means of repelling such attacks, which allowed the destroyers to approach the distance of a torpedo salvo with almost no opposition. At about 18.50 "Stord" and "Scorpion" on the right circulation, being on both cramps of their victim, fired 8 torpedoes each from a distance of 1650 and 1900 m. The Scharnhorst turned sharply to the right, but three torpedoes nevertheless reached the target. With this turn, he substituted the board for the destroyers "Savage" and "Somarets". The first fired eight torpedoes, and the second, approaching 1600 m, came under fire from the few surviving small guns on the starboard side and one turret of the main battery of the German ship. Shells pierced the director and rangefinder on the destroyer, fragments riddled the side and superstructures, its speed dropped to 10 knots. An officer and 10 sailors were killed on the ship, 11 people were wounded. Somehow they recruited people to calculate one torpedo tube, the second was still defeated. Having fired four torpedoes, the Somarets turned away, setting up a smoke screen. They even set fire to a smoke buoy at the stern, after which the team, deciding that the destroyer was on fire, flooded the stern cellars.
Torpedo damage ... The available information on torpedo damage is very sketchy. One torpedo exploded from the starboard side opposite the Bruno tower, jamming the horizontal and vertical guidance drives, as well as the main entrance hatch, so that the servants could not get out on deck for a long time. The flooding of the cellars began. Another torpedo hit the boiler room on the left side and caused some flooding behind the anti-torpedo bulkhead. The third struck in the stern from the port side in the place where several compartments had already been flooded, and damaged the propeller shaft. The fourth torpedo hit the nose from the same side. All torpedoes had a 340-kg charge.
Analyzing the damage to the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau from torpedoes in previous battles, we can confidently assume that in this case there were also significant flooding of internal volumes. Obviously, the torpedo hit in the area of the Bruno tower was very dangerous. It caused not only a powerful blow, but also destroyed the PTZ, leading to huge floods. The underwater protection system in this place was especially vulnerable, not having sufficient width due to the sharp contours of the hull. The 340-kg charge of the British torpedo was enough to destroy the protection in the area of the boiler room. Damage there would be more significant if the layer of empty compartments in the anti-torpedo protection system, which absorbed most of the flooding, turned out to be filled with water.
As a result of torpedo hits, the Scharnhorst's speed dropped to 12 knots, although the chief mechanic reported that he was ready to keep 22 knots. "Duke of York" was able to get close again, now at the "pistol" distance of 9100 m for 356-mm shells. The final execution of the German ship began, which could not even adequately respond: two of its bow towers jammed, and the third was experiencing a shortage of shells. All free crew members (probably servants of 105-mm guns) worked on transferring ammunition from the cellars of the Bruno tower to the Caesar tower, which resumed fire a few minutes later.
As the hull was filled with water, the Scharnhorst's speed dropped to 5 knots and he hardly obeyed the steering wheel. Even after the battle with the Bismarck, the British realized that it was impossible to sink a large German ship with artillery alone. Therefore, Admiral Fraser ordered the cruisers to finish off the Scharnhorst with torpedoes.
At 19.25 "Jamaica", which had previously fired 22 side salvos at the enemy, fired two torpedoes from the left vehicle (the third pipe turned out to be faulty). Two minutes later, Belfast released three more. Then "Jamaica" turned around and, approaching 3500 m, 10 minutes later fired three torpedoes from the other side. The hits were impossible to distinguish due to the smoke and fog. The cruisers left the battle arena, which was entered by the destroyers of the 36th division. “Masketir”, having passed 900 meters from the “Scharnhorst” crawling at 3-knot speed, fired 4 torpedoes on the starboard side at 19.33 and saw three explosions between the pipe and the mainmast. A minute later, Matchless tried to do this, but a huge wave, covering the ship, damaged the aiming mechanisms of the vehicles. The second wave, which flooded the bridge, disabled the in-ship communication devices, so that the order to turn the devices to the right did not reach the torpedo officer. Matchless had to return to attack with her port side. Opportunity discharged one of 19.31 from a distance of 1900m, the other two minutes later from 2300m, and its observers clearly saw one hit from each salvo on the starboard side of the battle cruiser between the mainmast and the chimney. The effect of their explosion was insignificant, since the Scharnhorst was already deep in the water, and the torpedoes hit the main armor belt. At 19.34 from a distance of 2500 m, seven torpedoes were fired by "Virago", also claiming two hits. After these attacks, the German ship practically stopped, enveloped in thick smoke and steam. From the British ships little could be made out - a dull glow could be seen, dull explosions could be heard. The veil of smoke was so dense that neither the beams of the searchlights nor the shells of light could pierce it.
At about 7 pm the commander of the Scharnhorst ordered to burn all secret documents. Since all the other guns were already silent, he said to the servants of the 150-mm turret No. 4: "... everything depends on you." The ship heeled to starboard and sank forward. The last turret of 150 mm guns fired until its ammunition lift jammed. The 20-mm gun on the roof of the Bruno tower continued to fire. By 19.40, the roll had increased greatly, and the bow was almost submerged. All hatches and watertight doors were reinforced to contain flooding and give the crew more time to escape. However, torpedo damage deprived the ship of most of its buoyancy. At 19.45, the Scharnhorst sank into the water with her nose, with slowly rotating propellers. For some time a strong roar was heard from under the water. The British recorded a strong explosion before the flooding, attributing it to the cellars. "Belfast" at 19.48 intended to carry out a second attack with torpedoes, but the target disappeared. Match-less also did not find the Scharnhorst and, together with the Scorpion, began to pick up people who were floundering in the icy water. Until 20.40 the destroyers "Belfast" and "Norfolk" were looking for survivors. "Scorpion" picked up 30 people, and at one time they saw the commander of the ship Hintze and the senior officer of the frigate-captain F. Dominik. But Hintze died before help arrived, and Dominik, although he managed to grab hold of the thrown line, could not climb it to the deck; he was raised already dead. Only 36 of the crew were saved in 1968.
During the sinking of the Scharnhorst, the British used up 446 356 mm shells, 161 203 mm, 974 152 mm, 531 133 mm (plus 155 lighting) and 83 102 mm, as well as 55 torpedoes, of which 11 hit the target: Jamaica and Virago scored 2 each, Masketir and Savage 3 each, and Scorpio 1 each. When firing a large caliber, there were some difficulties with the failure of the materiel. Because of this, for example, in the bow tower "Duke of York" with 77 of these volleys, one gun fired 71 shells, and the remaining 47, 6 (!) And 64.
Admiral Fraser was overwhelmed by the heroic actions of the German crew. On the way back to Scapa Flow from Murmansk, when the Duke of York was passing the site of the Scharnhorst's death, he ordered a wreath to be thrown into the water in memory of the German sailors who had fulfilled their military duty.
The Germans themselves attributed the death of the Scharnhorst to the absence of escort destroyers and the superiority of British radars. After the war, Admiral Karl Dönitz wrote: “... The operation undertaken by the battle cruiser Scharnhorst and a group of destroyers in December, after a successful covert start, seemed to have every chance of success, given the enemy's location and weather conditions. But it failed, apparently due to an underestimation of the local situation, and the Scharnhorst was lost ... "
As we now know, the operation did not have a hidden beginning, since the "Ultra" decrypted the German codes. The commanders of both British battle groups were reasonably well informed about the planned Scharnhorst movements and in such conditions could prepare their response.
Either way, the Scharnhorst was the last Kriegsmarine ship to take offensive action. His death put an end to the threat posed by the German surface fleet and seriously undermined Germany's position in Norway.
The end of Gneisenau is less sad, but still indicative.
On the night of February 27, 1942, the Gneisenau, which had just arrived in Kiel, was struck by a British 454-kg armor-piercing bomb in the area of the first tower. The explosion caused enormous destruction and fire (230 gunpowder charges of the main caliber burst out at once). 112 sailors were killed and 21 wounded. The battleship was towed to Gotenhafen (Gdynia) for repairs. In the course of the latter, by the way, it was supposed to replace the main artillery with six 380-mm guns. Alas, these plans remained on paper. In January 1943, all work was stopped.
Py.sy. The shameful death of the pride of the Reich, the death of 1,467 crew members pissed Hitler out of himself. Furiously, he blurted out: “There is no need for any funeral arrangements! This is the lot of traitors unworthy to be Aryans! "
All the same, Adolf Alozievich was a rare bitch.
Scharnhorst based
Searchlights brushed the angry December sea. Spills of oil spills, debris, pieces of ice and more debris. Rare heads of people floundering in the icy water. The explosions of the illuminating shells aided the floodlights, illuminating the surface with a deathly pale glow. The destroyers of His Royal Majesty "Scorpion" and "Matchless", earning money by machines, made their way to the recent battle site - the thrill of the battle, unlike the sea, subsided. Their formidable adversary had already rested at the bottom 70 miles northeast of North Cape. Now it was possible to pick up survivors - however, there weren't many of them. The long, persistent and already rather annoying migraine called "Scharnhorst", which tormented the Lords of the Admiralty, finally passed.
Difficult birth
Not saying “no” in time often means a silent “yes”. This was what was guided in Germany in the 30s, carefully, in small unhurried steps, when restoring its navy. The firstborns of its reviving core were battleships of the Deutschland class, ships in many ways unique and original for their time. The banks of the Thames were silent for the time being. The French neighbors, showing concern, responded by laying down the Dunkirk, a swift watchdog with 330mm guns, capable of catching up with and dealing with any of the German "pocket battleships". The concept of a highly autonomous diesel raider has increasingly begun to acquire vulnerabilities. The third battleship of the series "Admiral Graf Spee" was slightly modified in order to increase and strengthen its reservation, but this was a half measure. The German admirals already needed the next generation ship to work in the Atlantic - it had to maintain its speed and autonomy and at the same time not be afraid of meeting French hunters. Fleet Commander Admiral Raeder made a proposal to further change the project "Deutschlands", two of which (battleships "D" and "E") were being prepared for laying. The idea was to install an additional, third, main caliber turret with an increase in displacement to 15-18 thousand tons. At the beginning of 1933, the concept of the project put forward the conditions: the new ships should be able to withstand the French "Dunkirk". Consideration of options began - from a displacement of 18 thousand tons and nine 283-mm guns to 26 thousand tons with six promising 330-mm guns. The latter seemed more promising, and it was he who was taken as a basis for further development.
Hitler's rise to power unexpectedly made adjustments to the development of large-scale military shipbuilding. At the beginning of his official career, the newly-made Fuhrer did not want to once again frighten the British with the construction of as much as 26,000-ton ships, the size of which was already an open mockery for the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler called on the admirals to calm their ardor and appetites and build battleships "D" and "E" like the "Admiral Count Spee" with even more advanced armor (220 mm - belt, 70-80 mm - main armored deck). The ships "grew fat" to 19 thousand tons, but in Berlin they thought that the forbidden 19 are still more modest and invisible than those that are generally beyond the border of 26. On January 25, the shipyards in Wilhelmshaven and Kiel received orders for the construction of two battleships, the laying of which took place February 14 of the same year. In 1934, France, continuing to express concern, announced the laying of a second Dunkirk-class ship, the battle cruiser Strasbourg. The naval elite began to beg Hitler not to multiply ships that were obviously inferior to a potential enemy, but to give the go-ahead for the project to be reworked.
Given the silence that reigned on the island, the Fuhrer gave permission to increase the displacement of the new ships and add a third turret. On July 5, work on battleships "D" and "E" was suspended, and their redesign began. Initially, it was decided to install the main caliber turrets in a very interesting way: one in the bow, two in the stern, thus, according to the plan of the designers, a large concentration of fire was achieved back in the event of a possible chase. At the same time, the opinion was first expressed about the possibility of re-equipping the project with guns of a larger caliber - 330 or 380 mm. Soon the defensive position of the main caliber turrets was abandoned in favor of the traditional one: two at the bow, one at the stern. The ship's power plant has undergone major changes. Since diesel engines with the appropriate power, capable of accelerating a ship with a displacement of 26 thousand tons, existed only on paper, it was decided to use a steam turbine power plant with high-pressure boilers of the Wagner system. Only such installations could provide the new ships with a course of 30 knots. In March 1935, when the drawings and other documentation were ready, the question arose again about increasing the caliber of the guns and placing either nine 305 or 330 mm guns, or six paired 350 or 380 mm. The command of the fleet insisted on the maximum size, but here, still not sure of the reaction of the "peace-loving islanders", Hitler ordered to limit himself so far to the initial nine 283-mm cannons. Consolation, of course, was that these were new Krupp guns, more powerful and long-range than those that were installed on the Deutschlands.
In an effort to calm the British and give his actions at least some kind of legal and legal framework, Hitler agreed to sign a naval agreement with Britain, emphasizing that he considers France to be the main enemy and offender. The Germans promised the British a guaranteed triple superiority of the British linear fleet over the German: 477 thousand tons of displacement against 166 thousand for Germany. The British thought about it and agreed. The Versailles restrictions finally collapsed - the Germans were able to build their fleet quite legally.
In the spring and summer of 1935, new ships, which received the names Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, significant for the German fleet, were officially re-laid down: May 3 - Gneisenau, June 16 - Scharnhorst.
The new battleships (it was decided to abandon the archaic term "battleship") were not descendants of the well-designed and built German battlecruisers of the First World War. They bore little resemblance to the further evolution of the ships of the Mackensen or Erzats York type. The Scharnhorsts were, in fact, oversized Deutschlands, which felt the effects of various constraints and compromises. Already during the construction process, it became clear that within the allotted 26,000-ton displacement it would not work, and it would be significantly exceeded. This raised serious concerns about the seaworthiness, stability and survivability of the new ships. For example, the armored deck turned out to be below the waterline, and the freeboard was also insufficient. The ships were already on the stocks, and there was no way to radically change them. The stability problem could have been optimized by installing additional boules, but this solution would inevitably reduce the speed, which was considered unacceptable. Measures were taken to save weight: strict weight discipline was established, in addition, welding was widely used in construction - the hulls of both battleships, or rather battle cruisers, were welded. These efforts solved the problem of congestion only partially - both ships were quite "wet", inferior in seaworthiness to many classmates.
Descent of the battleship
On October 3, 1936, the Scharnhorst was launched in a solemn ceremony, the Gneisenau would only follow on December 8, 1938. Despite the excessive weight, the Germans paid great attention to the issues of unsinkability of ships - any waterproof compartment, with the exception of the narrowest at the ends, was, in turn, divided into additional waterproof spaces. In total, there were 21 main waterproof compartments, the flooding of two of which, regardless of location, guaranteed the ship's combat effectiveness. The main armor belt had a thickness of 350 mm, thinning to the lower edge up to 170 mm, and was intended primarily to protect against a potential enemy - 330-mm Dunker guns. The turret armor of the main caliber reached a maximum thickness of 360 mm. The auxiliary caliber of battleships was developed in terms of number: 8 paired 150-mm guns, located in turrets protected by 140 mm armor, and 4 single-gun mounts, covered with only 25 mm shields. The latter was a clear relic of the Deutschland heritage, and the overload no longer allowed placing all the guns in the turrets. The anti-torpedo protection was designed to counter a torpedo with a warhead of at least 250 kg. After the signing of the Anglo-German naval agreement, Hitler no longer objected to the rearmament of the Scharnhorst with new 380-mm guns, orders were even issued for the production of the barrels themselves - the rearmament was supposed to take place in the winter of 1940-1941, but with the outbreak of World War II it was postponed indefinitely.
On January 7, 1939, the Scharnhorst entered service, with Captain Zursee Otto Tsiliax becoming its first commander.
In Norway. Operation "Weserbyung"
New ships, which belonged to battle cruisers, required numerous refinements. The power plant was especially capricious. Training exits in the Baltic showed insufficient seaworthiness and freeboard. Both battleships have their nasal limbs modified, with clipper noses more suitable for sailing in the Atlantic. The situation in Europe became more and more tense, the new ships had no time for campaigns to demonstrate the flag, unlike their predecessors, the Deutschlands. Efforts were made to bring the Scharnhorst to a full-fledged combat state as soon as possible. In October, the command decided that the new battleship was already quite capable of going to sea. The fact is that by this moment the British had thrown significant forces to search for and destroy the "pocket battleship" "Admiral Count Spee" in the South Atlantic, the ring of beaters around which was already shrinking. In order to reduce the pressure on the raider, it was decided to authorize the exit of a pair of battleships "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" to the Atlantic in order to distract the British from their persistent hunting activities. Ironically, the tasks of the "pocket battleship" included disruption of communications and the diversion of part of the enemy's cruising forces. Now they had to attract their own heavy ships to bite the British by the tail.
On November 21, 1939, the Scharnhorst and her sister ship sailed from Wilhelmshaven for the North Atlantic. On November 23, the German ships collided with the British auxiliary cruiser Rawalpindi, a former passenger liner with eight obsolete 152mm guns. Despite the simply overwhelming difference in armament, the commander of the British cruiser E. Kennedy bravely accepted the battle. Half an hour later, "Rawalpindi" turned into a flaming wreck, its commander was killed, the crew lowered the boats. During the sinking of the old liner, the German battleships used up almost 120 rounds of the main caliber and more than 200 of the auxiliary. The appearance on the horizon of the cruiser Newcastle forced Vice Admiral Marshall, the commander of the operation, to issue the order to withdraw, setting up a smoke screen, as he feared the presence of larger ships. The commanders criticized Marshall for the enormous consumption of ammunition and indecision, but propaganda presented the sinking of the Rawalpindi as a great victory.
Both battleships spent the winter of 1939–1940 at the base and practicing shooting in the Baltic. At the same time, the propaganda department shot a special documentary called "Battleship in a Combat Campaign", where "Scharnhorst" starred as the main character. The viewers were shown a picture that the fleet allegedly operates almost off the island of Helgoland, conducting live fires at enemy aircraft and ships. In fact, the shooting took place in the rear Baltic.
The next significant milestone in the battleship's career was participation in Operation Weserbyung-Nord - the invasion of Norway. The Weserbyung was on the brink of critical risk and consisted of a combination of amphibious and airborne assault forces. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, together with the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and the destroyers, provided cover for the Narvik landing group that was seizing the important Norwegian port of Narvik. On the way, the German squadron was discovered and attacked by British bombers, which, however, did not achieve success. However, the alarmed Admiralty, which did not know the whole picture of what was happening, decided that the Germans were preparing a major raider operation in the North Atlantic, and on the evening of April 7, 1940, the Metropolitan Fleet went to sea. While the destroyers landed the rangers on the piers of Narvik, both battleships cruised to the west. At 4 hours 30 minutes on April 9, 1940, the Gneisenau radar detected a large target 25 km aft, and a combat alert was played on both ships. Rain and cloudiness severely limited visibility and did not allow full use of excellent optics. At 5 am the navigator of the Scharnhorst in the mirror of the sextant discovered a flash of large-caliber guns - the size of the fountains from the explosions confirmed the seriousness of the guest's intentions. After 5 minutes, the signalmen discovered the silhouette of a large ship - it was the battle cruiser Rhinaun, along with eight destroyers accompanying it. Initially, Vice Admiral Gunter Lutyens ordered to turn on the enemy - soon the sides exchanged hits: "Gneisenau" and "Rhinaun" received two shells each. The Germans, having fixed that Rhinaun was not alone, feared torpedo attacks from British destroyers, so Lutyens ordered to increase speed and break away from the enemy. In the end they succeeded, and on April 12, together with the "Admiral Hipper", the battleships returned to Wilhelmshaven. During the cruise, many design flaws of the ships were revealed. They suffered from frequent impacts of waves in the bow, because of this, frequent penetration of water into the turret of the main caliber "A" occurred, causing damage to the electrical circuits. The power plant was also unreliable. Nevertheless, immediately upon arrival at the base, both battleships began to prepare for a new campaign - there were few combat-ready units among the German heavy ships. After a quick repair, the battleships were supposed to again reach the shores of Norway, however, the 5 May detonation of the Gneisenau by a mine and the subsequent repairs postponed the group's active actions for almost a month.
On June 4, under the flag of Vice Admiral Marshal Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, together with the same Admiral Hipper and a group of destroyers, they went to sea as part of Operation Juneau, which was aimed at obstructing British shipping off the coast of Norway. After the "Hipper" destroyed several British ships, the Marshal sent him along with the destroyers to refuel in Trondheim, and he himself went to try his luck off the coast of Harstad. At 16 hours 48 minutes. an observer from the Scharnhorst foremars noticed smoke, and a little later the signalmen identified the large aircraft carrier. It was the British Glories, which, accompanied by the destroyers Ardent and Akasta, evacuated from Norway two squadrons of ground fighters - Gladiators and Hurricanes. For some reason, none of the Suordfish torpedo bombers, the only one effective against German battleships, was ready to take off. All the trump cards were in the hands of the Marshal. The Germans approached their victim and opened fire, first with the main, and then with the auxiliary caliber. They quickly took aim, and the aircraft carrier began to receive hit after hit. The escort destroyers have shown real heroism in trying to protect their ward in an almost hopeless situation. Soon the Glories turned into a huge bonfire, and Ardent and Akasta set up a smokescreen. Under her cover, the first went into a desperate torpedo attack, firing 4 torpedoes - the Germans noticed them in time and dodged. A barrage of shells hit Ardent and soon sank. "Akasta" maneuvered for a long time, knocking down the enemy's sight and avoiding hits. At 19 o'clock, enveloped in flames, "Glories" went to the bottom, the courageous "Akasta" did not survive it much. Going into the attack, he fired a volley of four torpedoes - the Gneisenau dodged them, but the Scharnhorst did not escape retaliation - one torpedo hit him in the area of the C tower. The battleship received serious damage, list to the left side and received 2500 tons of water. The Akasta, which sank to the bottom with its entire crew, sold its life dearly. Since throughout the entire battle the Glories' radio station drove one dispatch after one, the Marshal after the end of the battle decided to urgently return. In addition, the state of the Scharnhorst caused some concern. The battleship could not give a speed of more than 20 knots, and therefore the Germans went to the nearest Trondheim, where, with the help of a floating repair shop, they managed to make temporary repairs. Only at the end of June, the Scharnhorst reached Kiel and underwent a major overhaul, which continued until the end of 1940.
Raid to the Atlantic
At the end of 1940, the German command decided on a major operation in the Atlantic. "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" were to carry out a deep raid on enemy communications, attacking, whenever possible, single ships and convoys. The commander of the operation, Gunther Lutyens, was strictly forbidden to engage in battle with large ships. The operation received the meaningful name "Berlin". On December 28, 1940, the ships went to sea, but got into a violent storm, in which the hulls were damaged - huge masses of water hitting the places of old wounds turned out to be very dangerous. Had to return to try again on January 22, 1941. Already on February 3, the battleships managed to slip out into the Atlantic, where they began their activities. This generally successful campaign lasted until March 22, 1941 - the German battleships frolicked enough on the British shipping lanes. Twice they had contact with enemy battleships: on March 7 with the guarding convoy "Malaya", and on March 16 - with "Rodney". Both times, thanks to their superior speed, the raiders escaped with ease. During the campaign, the Gneisenau destroyed 14, and the Scharnhorst - 8 enemy ships with a total displacement of 115 thousand tons, causing a commotion in the Admiralty.
On March 22, both battleships arrived at the German-occupied French port of Brest, where they stood up for repairs. The presence of a gang of bandits from the main road near the English Channel - soon the heavy cruiser Prince Eugen, which had returned from the Atlantic, joined the battleships - greatly unnerved the British. In an effort to destroy or at least disable the German ships, the British command constantly organized air raids on the parking areas of the Brest group. The Germans pulled large air defense forces to the city, carefully camouflaging the ships, giving them the appearance of land. The decks of battleships and cruisers were tightly hung with camouflage nets; for greater reliability, real trees and bushes were mounted on the superstructures and towers. But British intelligence, using the agents of the French Resistance, each time found out the exact parking places. Transferred to La Pallis "Scharnhorst" on July 24, 1941, was subjected to another raid by British "Wellingtons" and received five direct hits from 227 to 454 kg bombs. The ship received 3000 tons of water, electrical equipment was seriously damaged. By the end of the year, after a series of repairs of varying degrees of complexity, both battleships were brought to a combat-ready state. During this period, the center of the German fleet's efforts shifted to the North, through which the Allies conducted caravans of ships to the Soviet Union. Hitler called this region a zone of fate, and now the main task of the German surface ships was to disrupt the communications of the Allies in the North. In addition, after the sinking of the Bismarck, the Atlantic ceased to be attractive as a hunting ground for large surface ships, the number of which was very limited in Germany. It was decided to transfer the Brest squadron first to Germany, then further north, to Norway.
Jump "Cerberus"
German ships in the English Channel. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are ahead. Photo from the board of "Prince Eugen"
By the beginning of 1942, the German ships were generally ready to leave. The British raids became more and more intense. At a meeting with Hitler in the presence of the highest leaders of the fleet and aviation, the final decision was made to break through from Brest by the most dangerous, but at the same time the shortest road - directly across the English Channel. Operations Commander Vice Admiral Otto Tsiliax received a detailed breakthrough plan called Operation Cerberus. On February 11, 1942, the Scharnhorst (flying the Tsiliax flag), the Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser Prince Eugen, accompanied by 6 destroyers and 11 destroyers, left Brest. During the breakthrough, the Germans managed to achieve very close cooperation with the Luftwaffe - there was a liaison officer on each of the three large ships. A powerful umbrella of fighters was deployed over the breakthrough detachment. The British frankly overslept the beginning of the movement of the compound and, realizing themselves from such impudence, threw everything that was at hand to interfere with the enemy. The German squadron was consistently attacked by torpedo bombers, torpedo boats and destroyers, each time successfully fighting back. The main enemy, after all, turned out to be undisturbed bottom mines that generously strewn the bottom of the English Channel. On February 12, on the second day of the crossing, the Scharnhorst was successively detonated off the Dutch coast by two bottom mines. The battleship received almost 1,500 tons of water, there was damage in the engine room, and the ship lost its speed. But soon the emergency parties managed to neutralize the consequences of the damage, and on February 13, the Scharnhorst followed the main forces to Wilhelmshaven. Operation Cerberus, bold and daring, was a brilliant success.
North again
Side diagram of the Scharnhorst in different years
Upon arrival, the Scharnhorst was transferred to Kiel for repairs. There was also "Gneisenau", which received its fatal bomb on the night of 27 February. A successful hit caused the charges in the cellar of the main caliber tower to ignite, followed by their explosion and violent fire. The detonation of the shells was avoided by flooding the cellars, but the battleship was completely out of order. Scharnhorst has lost its old partner. A more thorough examination of it by specialists led to the conclusion about the need for a more thorough and, consequently, long-term repair - primarily of boilers and turbines. The summer and autumn of 1942 were spent in exercises and repairs - problems with machines and boilers constantly haunted the ship. By the end of the year, Scharnhorst had finally begun preparations for a transfer to Norway. This decision was not canceled even in light of the hysterical order of the Fuehrer on January 1, 1943 to write off all heavy ships for scrap after an unsuccessful New Year's battle off the coast of Norway.
After several unsuccessful attempts, the Scharnhorst within the framework of Operation Paderborn reached Narvik on March 14, 1943, and on March 22 dropped anchor in the main operational base of the German fleet in northern Norway - Alten Fjord, where the largest German battleship Tirpitz had long been located and heavy cruiser (former battleship) "Luttsov". April 1943 was marked by a joint campaign of two battleships together with destroyers to Bear Island. The rest of the time the German squadron spent in inactivity with rare training exits near the base, driving the ship rats out of the gun barrels. The lack of fuel began to affect the fleet. In the summer of 1943, the Norwegians captured a German radio station on the island of Svalbard, and the Kriegsmarine command began to prepare a response operation with a raid on this Arctic island. At the same time, it was necessary to prove to the Fuehrer that the surface ships of the fleet are not in vain devouring such a scarce fuel with whole trains. On September 8, Tirpitz and Scharnhorst, together with 10 destroyers, approached Svalbard and fired on coal mines and a mining village. A thousand paratroopers landed on the shore. The battery of two old 76mm guns was destroyed by naval artillery fire. "Scharnhorst" showed such disgusting results in shooting that immediately upon returning to base was sent to the training. The response of the opposing side was more constructive and painful: on September 22, 1943, the Tirpitz stationed in the Kaa fiord was attacked by British dwarf submarines, which seriously damaged it - according to German estimates, the battleship was disabled until the spring of 1944. "Scharnhorst" escaped such an unenviable fate only because it was on anti-aircraft exercises. After the Luttsov, which had left for overhaul earlier, the Scharnhorst remained the only combat-ready German ship in the Arctic.
The last battle of the battleship "Scharnhorst"
Rear Admiral Erich Bey, Commander of the German Squadron
By the end of 1943, the situation on the Eastern Front, the main for Germany, became more and more threatening. The Allies, taking advantage of the weakening of German forces in the Arctic, resumed escorting caravans. Hitler constantly reproached the leadership of the fleet for the inactivity and uselessness of surface ships, which, according to him, could not influence the situation in any way. At a meeting with the Fuehrer on December 19–20, Karl Dönitz assured him that in the very near future the Scharnhorst and the most efficient 4 destroyers would go out to intercept the detected convoy. The temporary commander of the strike force, Rear Admiral Erich Bey (instead of the absent Kümetz), on December 22, received an order to switch to a three-hour readiness. The Scharnhorst accepted fuel and provisions for the last time. For the battleship commander Fritz Hinze, this was the first time he went to sea in his new position. There were two British convoys in the zone of relative reach. JW-55B of 19 tankers and transports guarded by 10 destroyers and 7 escort ships left Loch Yu on 20 December. Another convoy, RA-55 with security forces, was moving towards him. In the Barents Sea, both convoys were covered by the British Formation 1 of Admiral R. Burnett, which included the light cruisers Belfast, Sheffield and the heavy Norfolk, and by Formation 2, the battleship Duke of York (flag of the Commander of the Metropolitan Fleet, Admiral Bruce Fraser ), the cruiser "Jamaica" and 4 destroyers. British convoy JW-55B was first spotted by aircraft and then by a submarine. Dönitz gave the order to start the operation. At 19:00 on December 25, 1943, during the Christmas snowfall, the German squadron left the base. Operation Ostfront began. Bey constantly kept radio contact with the headquarters of the command of the German forces in Norway. On the hands, he had a very contradictory order: on the one hand, he was ordered to attack the convoy at the slightest opportunity and act energetically, on the other, he was required to immediately stop the battle when the strongest enemy appeared. The December sea was agitated, the Scharnhorst was at the head of the squadron, destroyers made their way through the waves to the side. Soon their speed had to be reduced to 10 knots. Bey had no idea that all his negotiations with the coast were read by the British Ultra - the British knew that the old enemy had left his lair and was at sea.
In the morning at 8 o'clock, Belfast's radar spotted a German battleship 32 km from the convoy; at 09.20, it was visually identified from Sheffield. The Scharnhorst did not turn on its radars to maintain stealth. At 9:23 am the British cruisers opened fire, first with lighting and then with armor-piercing shells - the Scharnhorst immediately responded. For 20 minutes, the opponents exchanged volleys - several shells hit the German ship, which did not cause severe damage, except for one that destroyed the radar nose antenna. The Scharnhorst went blind from the nasal angles by about 69-80 degrees. Bey decided to withdraw from the battle: the convoy was still the main goal. And he managed to throw the British off the tail. The Scharnhorst makes a roundabout maneuver and tries to approach the convoy from the other side, from the northeast. British cruisers again discover the enemy. In the ensuing skirmish, the Norfolk and Belfast are damaged, and the German battleship again withdraws from the battle. Destroyers do not participate in the battle, as they are too far away. They are running out of fuel, and Bey releases his escort to the base.
At the beginning of the second day, the German admiral decided to end the operation - it was not possible to get through to the convoy, the British knew about his presence. And most of all, Bay feared the presence of a British battleship nearby. The cruisers following the trail of the raider were aiming to intercept Admiral Fraser's Compound 2 - they had already played a combat alert on the Duke of York for a long time. The Scharnhorst went straight into the trap. The bow radar was destroyed, the stern radar was disabled. At 16.32 the radar of the British battleship detected the target, a few minutes later the raider was fired upon by lighting shells - its towers were located along the bow and stern - the Germans were taken by surprise. Nevertheless, the German ship increased its speed and began to respond. Its 283mm rounds could not penetrate the Duke of York's powerful armor. At 16.55, the first 356 mm British round reached its target. The German raider outnumbered his opponents in speed and began to increase the distance. Fortunately for the British, the shooting of Fraser's flagship was accurate that day - heavy British shells knocked out the vital components of the Scharnhorst. At 18 o'clock there was a hit in the engine room: the speed dropped to 10 knots. But after 20 minutes, the engine room reported that it was capable of producing 22 knots. All the surviving members of the battleship's crew testify to the high morale of the Scharnhorst team in its last battle - the fires were extinguished quickly, the emergency parties were filling up holes. The British battleship was constantly covered by German volleys, but there were few direct hits and they were not effective. At about 19:00, when the Scharnhorst's artillery had already stopped responding, Fraser ordered the destroyers to torpedo the enemy. The auxiliary caliber was no longer active, and torpedo hits followed one after the other. The British claim that there were only 10 or 11 torpedo hits. The battleship sank in the water, the deck was engulfed in fire - the situation became hopeless, and Bey gave the order to leave the ship, he himself decided to share his fate. At 19.45 the Scharnhorst sank with the machines still working. British destroyers embarked on a rescue operation, but only 36 people were rescued from the icy water. The British paid tribute to the bravely fighting enemy: on the way back from Murmansk to Scapa Flow, passing over the place of the sinking of the Scharnhorst, Fraser ordered to throw a wreath into the water in memory of the German sailors who had fulfilled their duty.
On October 3, 2000, a Norwegian Navy expedition discovered a German battleship at a depth of 300 meters, 130 kilometers northeast of North Cape. The Scharnhorst lies upside down with its keel, as if it is sheltering the crew that has found its last refuge.
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