Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Special Forces. The structure of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Who heads the GRU
Born in 1946. Graduated from the Military Diplomatic Academy under the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. For more than 20 years he worked in the bodies of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces. From 1992 to 1997 he was the first deputy head of the GRU of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. During the hostilities on the territory of the Chechen Republic, he repeatedly traveled to the combat zone. In May 1997, during a medical examination preceding the dismissal of Colonel-General Fyodor Ladygin, he was acting head of the GRU. In May 1997, he was appointed head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces. The former head of the GRU Fedor Ladygin, who held this position from 1992 to 1997, gave the following description of V. Korabelnikov: Intelligence well trained theoretically and having extensive experience in practical activities in various fields, including directly in operational work. As far as I can judge, my assessments turned out to be correct in relation to Colonel General Korabelnikov. It seems to me that he adequately leads the GRU and successfully copes with the tasks assigned to him." On August 20, 1997, he was introduced to the Coordinating Interdepartmental Council for Military-Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation with Foreign States. Since December 31, 1997 - Member of the Supervisory Board for the activities of the Rosvooruzhenie and Promexport companies. In July 1999, V. Korabelnikov received gratitude from President B. Yeltsin for his significant contribution to the process of resolving the conflict in the Yugoslav region of Kosovo. September 6, 1999 was included in the Commission under the President of the Russian Federation on military-technical cooperation with foreign states. Married.
In essence, there were none left in the army, because some of them were reduced and attached to other military formations, and some were disbanded. But they quickly realized that special forces groups- the most effective way to deal with the impending nuclear threat from NATO. Therefore, after a thorough study and generalization of the experience accumulated during the war, in 1950 it was decided to create the first units in the Soviet Union special forces. As of the beginning of May 1951, 46 companies were created, each of which had 120 people. All of them were subordinate to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Army General Staff.
Those who think that the idea of creation special forces- a matter of the recent past, is mistaken. Formations with similar goals arose in Russia a long time ago.
- Russian military leaders Pyotr Panin, Alexander Suvorov and Mikhail Kutuzov already in the 18th century raised the issue of creating special military units. They arose in 1764 and were called chasseurs.
- At the end of the 18th century, Catherine II initiated the rotation of the Zaporizhzhya Cossacks to the Bug and then to the Kuban, where the tactics of the “jaegers” came in handy - military operations in the highlands, ambushes, reconnaissance, raids. The motto of the divisions was the phrase "Fox tail, wolf mouth", and the training was reminiscent of modern combat operations, combinations of undercover and power intelligence.
- In 1797, Emperor Paul I introduced a new Charter, developed in the likeness of the charter of the Prussian army.
- 1811 was marked by the creation OKVS - Separate corps of the internal guard, which was engaged in the preservation or restoration of order within the state.
- Alexander I took care of the creation of mobile cavalry gendarmes of rapid reaction in 1817.
- In the war of 1812, the Russian army gained tremendous experience, which was widely used later.
- In 1826, the influence of the Imperial Chancellery increased.
- 1842 battalions are created from Cossack battalions scouts, on whose subsequent combat activities many generations of the future were trained special forces.
- In 1903, the Intelligence Department of the General Staff was created. A year later - in all military districts.
- In 1905, the influence of the tsarist Okhrana was growing, and formations were created on the basis of the police, the goals and objectives of which resemble the mission of today OMON.
- In 1917, the Bolsheviks created the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs - Main Directorate of the General Staff - GUGSH.
- In 1918, military intelligence was created. Created in the same year CHONs - special purpose parts with the subordination of the Cheka - to fight all kinds of rebels and Asian Basmachi.
- In the 1930s, the Red Army created airborne assault And sabotage divisions.
The tasks of the new formation were serious: organizing and conducting reconnaissance, destroying any means of nuclear attack, identifying military formations and conducting special missions behind enemy lines, organizing and conducting sabotage actions, creating insurgent (partisan) detachments behind enemy lines, combating terrorism, searching for and neutralization of saboteurs. Other tasks include interfering with communications, disrupting power supplies, eliminating transport hubs, and bringing chaos to the country's military and government administration. Most of the tasks sound at least fantastic, however GRU special forces he could well cope with them: he had at his disposal the appropriate technical means and weapons, including portable nuclear mines.
The training of special forces militants was characterized by high intensity and was carried out using individual programs. For every 3-4 soldiers, 1 officer was assigned, who watched his pupils day and night. And the officers themselves were trained according to such a rich program that after several years of training, each of them could independently replace an entire combined arms unit.
Needless to say, with special forces was classified more than the nuclear developments of the USSR. At least everyone knew about the presence of nuclear missiles, bombers with nuclear warheads and nuclear submarines, but about spetsnaz GRU- not every marshal and general.
Also, one of the tasks of the special forces was the elimination of prominent figures of the enemy countries, but then this task was canceled. (If not classified even deeper).
First aid for special forces - "Instructions for the combat use of special forces and subunits" wrote Pavel Golitsin - ex-head of intelligence of the Belarusian partisan brigade "Chekist".
But not everything was so good. Already in 1953, the Armed Forces began to be reduced and 35 companies were reduced. Only eleven left special companies for special purposes (ORSpN). It took four whole years army special forces in order to correct their shaken positions after such a blow, and only in 1957 were 5 separate battalions created special purpose, which in 1962, along with the remnants of the old companies, were joined by 10 brigades special forces. They were designed for peacetime and wartime. According to the peacetime states, the brigade did not have more than 200-300 fighters, in the military - in ObrSpNb consisted of no less than 1700 soldiers and officers. By early 1963 USSR special forces included: 10 cadre brigades, 5 separate battalions, 12 separate companies in the Leningrad, Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, Odessa, Transcaucasian, Moscow, Turkestan, Far Eastern military districts.
In the same year GRU conducted the first major exercises, but, despite the excellent results of the training of fighters, already in 1964 after a new reorganization Special Forces lost 3 battalions and 6 companies, and in army special forces 6 companies, 2 battalions and 10 brigades remained. Separately, it should be said about the units, which, in addition to standard training commando trained for special tasks. So, the soldiers of the 99th company, which was stationed in the Arkhangelsk military district, were oriented to operations in the cold conditions of the Arctic, and the soldiers 227th special forces, located in the North Caucasian Military District, trained for survival in mountainous terrain. Further intensification of work on the creation of shock groups of special forces began only at the end of the 60s.
In 1968, on the basis of the Ryazan Airborne School, they began to train professional intelligence officers. It was then that the legendary 9th company appeared. The 9th company held its last graduation in 1981, then it was disbanded. Also special forces officers they were trained at the Frunze Military Academy and at the intelligence department of the Kiev VOKU, but in their specialization they were more like military intelligence officers. In 1970, they formed a training company, then a battalion, and then a regiment stationed in the Pskov region.
When in 1985 (6 years after the start of the war!) it became clear that the soldiers before Afghanistan needed special training, a training regiment was also created in Uzbek Chirchik.
The first major foreign operation of special forces falls on 1968, after which he no longer had to prove his worth. It was in this year that the countries united by the Warsaw Pact sent their troops to Czechoslovakia. To begin with, our plane requested an emergency landing from the country's capital due to engine failure. Within a few minutes, our special forces captured the airport, to which they very soon transferred an airborne division. At this time, the units that had previously arrived in Prague took control railway stations, newspapers and telegraph, that is, all key positions. After the seizure of the government building, commandos took the country's leadership to Moscow.
Total, army special forces sent his troops to two dozen countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa. They also had to face the American commandos. Only many years later did the Americans find out who really defeated their elite units in 1970 in the Vietnamese Sean Tay, in 1978 in Angola. Often their special services did not even know about the operations carried out by our fighters. Here is a vivid illustration.
In 1968, 9 of our fighters made a classic raid on a top-secret helicopter camp in Cambodia, located 30 kilometers from the Vietnamese border. The American military threw their reconnaissance and sabotage groups, from here they flew out in search of their downed pilots. The camp was guarded by 2 light helicopters, 8-10 heavy transport and 4 helicopters "Super Cobra". fire support with the presence of guided missiles and the latest targeting systems on board was the goal of our paratroopers. It took only 25 minutes for our special forces to hijack one and destroy the three remaining helicopters under the noses of the American commandos.
About military operations Soviet special forces in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Cuba and Vietnam there is still very little free information.
Much more data on the ten-year Afghan war. Its beginning was laid by the most difficult special operation to eliminate the ruler Hafizuly Amin. Until now, historians consider the capture of the fortress of Amin and its destruction a pure adventure, however, it was a success. In addition to the then existing KGB special forces"Thunder" And "Zenith", And "Vympel", took part in the operation GRU special forces. About six months before the momentous assault, a Muslim battalion was created, the so-called "Musbat" or 154th separate special forces detachment, which included GRU fighters from among the Soviet Muslims. It was staffed by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens who had served in tank and motorized rifle units. Most of them spoke Farsi. Shortly before the assault, this detachment was secretly introduced into the palace guards. The assault itself lasted only 40 minutes. 7 special forces soldiers were killed in the palace. This unit, apart from a short respite after this operation, until 1984 fought on special forces tactics, arranged raids and ambushes, carried out reconnaissance in Afghanistan.
At the end of 1983, the army began to create a border zone "Veil", along the entire length of Jalalabad - Ghazni - Kandahar. With its help, it was planned to block two hundred caravan routes by which the rebels delivered ammunition and weapons from Pakistan. But for such a grandiose plan in Afghanistan there were not enough special forces, so in 1984 he was transferred here 177th Special Purpose Detachment, and behind it - 154th Special Forces. Total personnel of the troops special forces GRU GSh in Afghanistan was about 1400 people. Since this also seemed not enough, the formation of additional military special forces.
Among the memorable operations can be called many. For example, in January 1984, company 177, reinforced by a tank platoon and two companies of the Afghan army, was supposed to find and capture a caravan in the area of the village of Vakha, where, according to information, the weapons and ammunition of dushmans were supposed to arrive. However, the enemy was not detected, and in the afternoon our detachment was surrounded. And after a hard battle, with the support of aviation and artillery, the detachment left the danger zone.
In 1989, the structure of 15 and 22 brigades spn changed radically. Armored military equipment, grenade launchers, communications controls, including space ones, were withdrawn from the brigades as inappropriate for their tasks - that is, anti-sabotage and military intelligence. The 10-year confrontation of the special forces with the enemy was recognized as "atypical use case".
However, in 1990, when the 15th brigade arrived in Baku to fight the bandit formations of the Popular Front of the country, the equipment was returned to them. Then the special forces made 37 flights by Il-76 VTA aircraft and delivered more than 20 units of armored military equipment, vehicles, and communications equipment from Tashkent. The presence of soldiers and officers who did not know in words about the fight against saboteurs, allowed the brigade, which at that time was in the department KGB USSR complete all assigned tasks. And upon returning home, despite numerous requests from the command of the unit, all military equipment and means of communication were simply confiscated.
In the first Chechen 1994-1996. Russian special forces was present in Chechnya since the introduction of troops by separate and consolidated detachments. At first, it was used only in intelligence. Due to the poor preparation of the composition of the ground units special forces soldiers they took part in assault groups, as happened in Grozny. 1995 brought very high losses in special forces units - this year's battles are the most tragic in all history special forces of Russia and the USSR.
But in spite of everything, the special forces began to work according to their traditional tactics, especially standing out in ambush actions. After the signing of the Khasavyurt agreement, after which the North Caucasus temporarily entered a period of shaky peace, it was clear that the conflict had not yet been resolved. Therefore, with the start of fighting in Dagestan in confrontations with armed groups of militants, international and Chechen terrorists, the task of the special forces was to provide the troops with intelligence data regarding the fortifications and positions of the Wahhabis. I had to fight with "old friends" in the Afghan company from among the Arab, Pakistani and Turkish mercenaries and instructors. Ours could recognize many of them by their inherent features of mining, avoiding persecution, radio exchange, and choosing places for an ambush. Spetsnaz GRU was in first place among other units in combat training and the implementation of assigned tasks, acting 10 times more efficiently than the rest.
Separate and consolidated detachments were from the brigades of the Siberian, Moscow, Ural, Trans-Baikal, Far Eastern, North Caucasian military districts.
In the spring of 1995, there were no detachments left in Chechnya, the last - separate special forces unit, assigned to the North Caucasian Military District, returned to Russia in the fall of 1996.
The years that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union were the most difficult for the army in general and the special forces in particular. In a series of reforms and reorganizations army special forces such damage was inflicted that he did not suffer even during the wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya. After the war in Afghanistan, some brigades returned to their former places of deployment, some were disbanded. From time to time, parts of the brigades were thrown into places of armed clashes with various illegal formations. Thus, the 173rd detachment participated in the elimination of unrest in Baku and Ossetia, when it was necessary to intervene in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict, fought on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Detachments GRU Moscow Military District supported the constitutional order in Tajikistan. Fighters 12th special forces brigades The Transcaucasian Military District fought in Tbilisi and Azerbaijan, then, since 1991, in Nagorno-Karabakh and North Ossetia. The 4th brigade (Estonia) was disbanded in 1992, before that they withdrew special purpose brigade from the Soviet Group of Forces of Germany. Also disbanded Pechersk Special Forces Training Regiment.
After the collapse of the Union 8th, 9th and 10th Special Forces Brigades became part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and here the 8th was reorganized and turned into the 1st parachute regiment, the other two were disbanded. Belarus got 5th Special Forces Brigade, Uzbekistan - 15th Special Forces Brigade,459th special forces company, one training regiment.
It will not be possible to find out until the end this question, even inveterate CIA-shnikam. Partly due to the secrecy of information, partly due to the constant reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - in other words, reductions. But if we analyze the available information, we can calculate that today there are at least 9 special forces brigades and two battalions "West" And "East". There are a number of military formations whose fighters are identical to the one that was in the special forces. Although it is not a fact that these units are part of the GRU system - they may well end up in the department, individual intelligence units, the Navy, GUIN, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the FSB structures.
Spetsnaz GRU of Russia. Primary selection. How to get into the GRU?
Special Forces is the dream of many boys. Agile, fearless warriors, it would seem, are capable of anything. Let's face it, joining a special forces unit is difficult, but possible. The main condition for the possibility of considering a candidate is service in the army. Then the series of selections begins. Mainly in special forces of the GRU of the Russian Federation take officers and ensigns. The officer must have a higher education. Recommendations of reputable employees are also needed. It is desirable for the candidate to be no older than 28 years old and have a height of at least 175 cm. But there are always exceptions.
As for physical training, the quality of its implementation is strictly monitored, rest is minimized. Basic requirements for the physical preparation of the applicant.
The physical standards that must be passed successfully are as follows:
- Run 3 km in 10 minutes.
- Hundred meters in 12 seconds.
- Pull-ups on the crossbar - 25 times.
- Abs exercises - 90 times in 2 minutes.
- Push-ups - 90 times.
- A set of exercises: press, push-ups, jumping up from a crouching position, transition from an emphasis crouching to an emphasis lying and back. Each individual exercise is done 15 times in 10 seconds. The complex is performed 7 times.
- Hand-to-hand combat.
In addition to passing the standards, work is being done with a psychologist, a full medical examination, and a lie detector test. All relatives must be checked, in addition, parents will need to obtain written consent to the candidate's service. So how do you get into GRU (special forces)? The answer is simple - you need to prepare from childhood. Sport should firmly enter the life of a future fighter.
From the first day, the soldier is told in every possible way that he is the best. As the coaches say, this is the most important moment. In the barracks itself, fighters often arrange covert checks on each other, which helps to always be on alert. To strengthen the spirit and form the character of the recruit, they are taught hand-to-hand combat. Periodically, he is put into battle against a stronger opponent in order to teach him how to fight even with an opponent who is obviously superior in training. Also, soldiers are taught to fight using all sorts of improvised means, up to a tightly folded newspaper. Only after a warrior has mastered such materials, he trains on shock equipment. Once every six months, fighters are checked for readiness for further service. . Warriors are in constant motion, they are not allowed to sleep all the time. Thus, many fighters are eliminated.
A warrior trains every day, without days off and holidays. Every day you need to run 10 km in less than an hour, and with additional weight on your shoulders (about 50 kg). Upon arrival, a 40-minute circuit training session is performed. This includes push-ups on the fingers, on the fists and jumping up from a sitting position. Basically, each exercise is repeated 20-30 times. At the end of each cycle, the fighter pumps the press a maximum of times. Hand-to-hand combat training takes place every day. Strikes are practiced, dexterity and endurance are brought up. Training spetsnaz GRU — .
According to many, in Russia for several years now, in the course of a large-scale military reform, the systematic destruction of the GRU, a specific structure created at the dawn of Soviet times, has been carried out. The reform, of course, affects other types of the Armed Forces, and not only military intelligence, but it is intelligence that is destroyed in the first place as a result of giving it the so-called "new look".
Researchers agree that it is categorically impossible to leave everything as it was, however, analysts have a very ambiguous attitude towards the ongoing reforms. Many consider the negative result of the reforms to be the revealing fact that 70,000 square meters of the complex of buildings on Khodynka, built for the GRU General Staff, once the second largest and most powerful intelligence agency after the KGB and the FSB, were empty. 9.5 billion rubles were spent on their construction.
What is GRU
GRU GSH stands for the Main Intelligence Directorate, organized under the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. During the entire post-revolutionary period and up to the present day, this body has been the central governing body of the Russian Armed Forces. Subordinates to the GRU chief of the General Staff, as well as the Minister of Defense of the country. The department is in charge of all types of intelligence, which is carried out in the interests of the Armed Forces. This includes, among other things, intelligence:
- space,
- electronic,
- undercover.
The latter is given priority in the GRU. It is the agents who obtain secret materials and the latest samples of foreign weapons.
As Emperor Alexander III said almost 150 years ago, Russia has only two faithful allies - its army and navy. Today, in 50 or 150 years, this statement will remain an axiom. Russia will not be able to exist without these strong and loyal allies, and they will not be strong without a developed and powerful military intelligence.
Can the story of the GRU end?
A Brief History of the GRU
November 4, 1918 is considered the birthday of the GRU. It was then that the Registration Department was formed as part of the Field Headquarters of the Soviet Red Army. The order to create it was signed by the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the republic, which was then Leon Trotsky. He appointed Semyon Aralov, a veteran of Russian intelligence, as the first head of the GRU. This legendary personality was formed in the period before the First World War.
Initially, the GRU was called RUPSHKA - the Registration Directorate of the field headquarters of the Red Army (Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army). The purpose of its creation was to coordinate the efforts that intelligence services made on all fronts and in the armies, obtaining information for the General Staff of the Red Army.
From the very beginning of its activity, the GRU was engaged in:
- strategic and operational intelligence,
- obtaining military-technical information,
- obtaining information about the latest scientific achievements in the field of aircraft.
A few years after its birth, RUPSHKA became the 4th Directorate of the General Staff. In official documents, it was designated as military unit N44388. It was renamed the GRU General Staff on February 16, 1942 by order of the People's Commissar of Defense. At the same time, serious staff changes and structural changes took place.
Another major milestone in the history of the development of management was November 22, 1942. It was then that military intelligence, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, was withdrawn from the GRU. From now on, undercover intelligence was no longer conducted by the intelligence departments of the fronts, and the department itself became subordinate to the People's Commissar of Defense, and not to the General Staff of the Red Army.
His main task at that time was to conduct undercover intelligence abroad. First of all, these were the territories of the USSR occupied by the Nazis. At the same time, the RU - Intelligence Directorate, whose task was to lead military intelligence, appeared as part of the General Staff.
The legendary structure, which is known to everyone as, appeared already in the post-war years. His birth is considered to be 1950. From 1955 to 1991, the GRU was called the GRU General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Since 1991, it has received its modern name, i.e. GRU General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. One can only speculate about its structure and number, since it is a state secret.
What's going on with the GRU these days
Despite top secrecy, some data is still disclosed. In 2009, the leadership of the department was changed to a more accommodating one. As everyone is assured, this was done in order to prevent the complete collapse of the GRU. The reform, however, has rather tragic consequences.
According to known data, before the reform, the organization included 12 main departments, as well as 8 auxiliary departments and departments. At present, key departments have been reduced to a critical minimum, most of which have been liquidated with the dismissal of thousands of specialists. The scientific research (R&D) and experimental design (R&D) departments that existed in the specialized research institutes of management, known as the 6th and 18th Central Research Institute, stopped working.
According to inaccurate data, every second officer was dismissed, and this led to the loss of the opportunities that existed within the department. Thus, out of 7,000 officers, less than 2,000 are currently left. The final "cleansing" took place after the resignation of V.V. Korabelnikov, who was the head of the GRU from 1997 to 2009.
Almost completely destroyed electronic intelligence. According to The New Times, on the territory of foreign countries there was a 40% reduction in the number of so-called "mining units" in the management. They were responsible for undercover and strategic intelligence.
The situation with the education of new personnel is also difficult, since the training of illegal agents was completely curtailed after the liquidation of the specialized faculty. Professors and teachers of the Military Diplomatic Academy, which previously had three faculties, were massively dismissed:
- agent-operational intelligence;
- strategic undercover intelligence;
- operational-tactical intelligence.
The faculty involved in the training of military attachés has also undergone an extreme reduction. The analytical apparatus of the GRU was liquidated. Foreign intelligence units are gradually transferred to the subordination of the SVR.
Even the most experienced officers are subject to dismissal for rather formal reasons, such as length of service. The specifics of military intelligence suggests that only experienced army officers can become specialists, and this, of course, leads to the fact that already established military men aged 30-35 years old come to the GRU, and the older they get, the more they should be valued . The waste of the real "golden fund" of the specific Russian intelligence community is obvious.
Such radical changes have led to the fact that at present, from a unique strategic tool in its essence, capabilities, scale, the GRU has been forcibly turned into an amorphous, purely secondary structure. Against the background of such degradation, most likely, the next optimization management reform will take place.
Apparently, the Ministry of Defense is placing its bet on the Senezh special forces center, which was previously removed from the control of the department, and was directly subordinated to the Chief of the General Staff. Astronomical amounts are allocated for its development. The Minister of Defense oversees the center, ordering non-standard, even exotic weapons and foreign-made equipment for it. The desire is obvious: something similar to the cinematic American "Delta" is being created. For most analysts, this position of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense causes slight bewilderment, since the place where specialists are trained is at the same time a recreation center for top management.
The Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is the main intelligence agency of Russia. GU is a new name introduced in 2010 during the military reform. Decryption of the GRU of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The outdated designation GRU is widespread among the people.
On the shoulders of this body lies the intelligence of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The Directorate coordinates subordinate intelligence departments, following the Constitution of the Russian Federation and acting in the interests of the state. Intelligence officers intercept information through personal involvement (conspiracy) or the use of electronics and radio.
Organization history
In the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, military intelligence existed back in the USSR (more precisely, its prototype). On the basis of the GRU of the USSR in 1992, after the signing of all documents on the collapse of the military coalition, the main body and its officers passed to Russia. On the basis of the old management, an updated one was created. The abbreviation GRU (stands for the Main Intelligence Directorate) of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was brought to the official level in 2010 after the reform of the military administration. The change in the name of the body did not affect its tasks.
During its existence, the department has participated in many missions. In 2015, employees collected information and conducted a report on the plans of Islamic groups in Central Asia. The merits of intelligence officers include the destruction of the Chechen militant leader, information analytics and actions to annex the Crimean peninsula in 2014, planning attacks in Syria in 2015, and assistance in establishing international contacts.
At the moment, the situation of the intelligence department can be called positive, since all the scouts have been bought out or exchanged and are in Russia, or on a mission abroad, but at large.
Tasks of the GRU
The set of tasks of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces was defined back in 1992 and has remained unchanged ever since. The main goals of the organization:
- information support that benefits the political, military, technical or scientific development of the country;
- providing the central bodies of the Russian Federation (the President, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff) with the information necessary for making decisions in the field of foreign policy, economics and military relations;
- creation of conditions favorable for the implementation of the foreign policy goals of the Russian state.
Officially, information about the structure of intelligence units is not disclosed. According to unconfirmed data, the organization has 21 divisions, of which 13 are main and 8 are auxiliary. Approximate composition:
- EU countries (First Office).
- America, Australia, UK, New Zealand (Second division).
- Asia (Third).
- Africa (Fourth).
- Operational intelligence (Fifth department).
- OSNAZ (radio engineering, Division Six).
- NATO.
- SPN (sabotage department).
- Military technologies.
- military economy.
- Strategic management.
- Department of information warfare.
- Space exploration.
Auxiliary departments:
- personnel;
- operational and technical;
- archives;
- information service;
- foreign relations;
- administrative department.
Among the lower departments there is OBPSN - a special purpose security department.
All departments are managed by the organizational and mobilization center located at the headquarters of the organization. The address of the headquarters is Grizodubova Street in Moscow, where the official office of the head of the department and his council is located. The former headquarters building is located at 76 Khoroshevskoye Highway. You can get from one building to another by walking just 100 meters.
Find out: How many conscripts serve in the army in Russia in 2018
The number of intelligence structures
Official data on the strength of the intelligence officers were not disclosed. According to analysts, the number of military personnel in this industry ranges from 6,000 to 15,000 people.
The intelligence forces include combined arms military units (military units) - 25,000 people. All of them are under contract. Subordinate to the management are artillery units, special equipment, and a fleet of vehicles.
GRU equipment
Much attention is paid to the appearance of scouts. The official uniform is gray (for officers) or dark blue (for subordinates) overcoats with red and gold design elements. The chief dressed in a black uniform with blue accents.
The modern emblems were designed in 1997. There is a small, medium, large emblem, which are attached to the chest or sleeve. The big one is for officers only.
The weapons equipment of the fighters is carried out according to the standards of the army. Special units should be armed with an improved set of weapons - machine gun, knife, pistol, etc. Since the time of the USSR, the weapons of the GRU are considered the best.
Personnel training
Officers for the GRU are mainly trained at the Academy of the Ministry of Defense. Leading military personnel are also trained at the Ryazan Airborne School in the direction of special intelligence. A candidate who wants to enter one of the schools and subsequently become a scout must have a good knowledge of foreign languages, a high level of physical fitness, and excellent health.
There is additional education at the Academy of the Ministry of Defense - Higher Academic Courses. The structure of the GRU includes two of its own research institutes located in the capital.
Grushniks worked actively and successfully wherever the interests of the USSR were:
We at the Association for Cross-Border Cooperation have already written about what the world is preparing for:
Sobyanin, Shibutov: Actors and the balance of power on the eve of the Third World War. Geopolitics of rafting. // RELGA. No. 6. 05/05/2010.
http://www.relga.ru/Environ/WebObjects/tgu-www.woa/wa/Main?textid=2614&level1=main&level2=articles
http://guralyuk.livejournal.com/1446133.html
http://megakhuimyak.livejournal.com/841593.html
However, with the most active preparations to repel domestic political threats, preparations for war are not just frozen, but worse, as follows from the following material by A. Yermolin, military intelligence (the GRU of the General Staff of the Russian Ministry of Defense) is systematically destroyed.
Those. orange February-1917 and 1914 in one bottle...
Anatoly Yermolin: Destroyers of the Fatherland. Why did they clean up military intelligence. The death of the GRU empire. One of the country's two most important intelligence services is being systematically destroyed by the "KGB-FSB-SVR corporation." History of the Main Intelligence Directorate. Maps, diagrams. // The New Times. 02/21/2011.
http://newtimes.ru/articles/detail/34773/
http://www.compromat.ru/page_30468.htm
Illustrations: The New Times
Yermolin Anatoly
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Click on image to enlarge
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Destroyers of the Fatherland.
Why did they clean up military intelligence
February 23 - Day of Defenders of the Fatherland. But after the terrorist attack in Domodedovo, which was preceded by explosions in the subway, on the railway, in the air, it is simply ridiculous to say that the Russian state is protecting its citizens. Although it is precisely this - protection from internal and external threats - that is the main function of the state, what we pay taxes for. There are many reasons for this. The first and foremost is corruption, which has permeated the entire vertical of power from top to bottom, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Lubyanka. Explosives were brought to Domodedovo from the North Caucasus by bus, having passed all possible checkpoints and checks without hindrance, just like bombs were brought to the Dubrovka theater 8 years ago. The price is hundreds of human lives. The second reason, closely linked to the first, is the inability of the authorities to formulate a coherent, well-founded concept of national interests, to identify real challenges. The concept of national security, formulated by the Security Council, still sees the main enemy in NATO and the United States. Hence the complete chaos in organizations whose job it is to get information about threats before they become the bloody facts of our lives.
A vivid example of this is the situation with the institution that was once the country's second most important intelligence agency: the GRU, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. What is happening to our security and to those who are called upon to protect it, The New Times figured out.
The headquarters of the GRU on Khodynka is a complex of buildings with an area of more than 70 thousand square meters. meters, the construction of which was completed in 2006, is almost depopulated. Echoing empty corridors and complete uncertainty. The destruction of the GRU was preceded by a media campaign that few noticed. Already after the first arrest of GRU Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov in 2005 in connection with the assassination attempt on Anatoly Chubais, rumors spread that militant terrorist groups were being formed within the service (Kvachkov's last arrest in December 2010 turned these rumors into real accusations).
["Rossiyskaya Gazeta", 04.02.2011, "Court recognized Vladimir Kvachkov's arrest as lawful": On Friday, the Moscow Lefortovo Court recognized as lawful the decision to prosecute reserve colonel Vladimir Kvachkov. He is accused in the case of attempted armed rebellion and assistance to terrorist activities. […] Recall that Kvachkov was taken into custody on December 23 by the decision of the Lefortovo Court of Moscow at the request of the Investigation Department of the FSB of Russia. The court authorized his detention until 23 February. He is charged under serious articles of the Criminal Code - assistance to terrorist activities and attempted armed rebellion. The colonel, if the court finds him guilty, faces 20 years in prison. […]
The former military intelligence officer himself suggests that the testimony of his colleague from Tolyatti became the basis for his new persecution.
- According to the documents that we have, in Togliatti a man armed (I emphasize) with a crossbow for 10 thousand rubles sent a group to Vladimir, which was preparing an armed rebellion there. He was the head of the Togliatti branch of the Minin and Pozharsky People's Militia. He was arrested. After 10 days of interrogation, he testified against me,” Kvachkov told reporters. - Inset K.ru]
Films like the Spy Games series began to appear on the screens, exposing traitors among the top of the GRU, arranging endless conspiracies, compiling lists to shoot oligarchs and politicians trading the military secrets of the Motherland right and left. Naturally, they were exposed by their “near neighbors” (as the KGB was called in Soviet times, while the GRU was called “far neighbors”), that is, the Federal Security Service. And how could it be otherwise, if a native of this service has been ruling the country for 10 years now? Since all the main events took place "under the carpet", the citizens simply did not see that a powerful propaganda campaign was underway to prepare for the liquidation of the GRU.
GRU officials consider the destruction of the military intelligence system a fait accompli. A little more than three months ago, on November 5, 2010, celebrating their professional holiday in the Crocus City banquet hall, veterans and active service officers one after another raised toasts to the “blessed memory” of the intelligence agency with which their personal and professional fate.
The GRU is historically the most secret special service of the intelligence community, first of the USSR, and then of Russia. That is why it is the most vulnerable. Even veterans can talk about her problems only when, as they say, they are tired, and despair turns out to be stronger than the habit of living under the heading “secret”. The current situation is such that there seems to be nothing to lose.
Lieutenant General Dmitry Gerasimov, the former head of the GRU department who led all the special forces brigades, said in an interview with The New Times: “I am deeply convinced that the GRU special forces are completely deliberately destroyed. Of the 14 brigades and two training regiments of the GRU, at best, no more than four brigades remained. At the same time, one must understand that this is no longer GRU special forces, but ordinary military intelligence, which is part of the Ground Forces. One of the best brigades - Berdskaya - was liquidated. With great difficulty, they managed to defend the 22nd brigade, which in peacetime received the high title of "Guards". This is our most combat-ready formation, constantly fighting in the most critical areas in Afghanistan, Chechnya and other "hot spots". I can say that the so-called "osnaz" - parts of electronic intelligence - have also been eliminated. In essence, we are building an armed force that can't see or hear anything."
According to rough estimates of experts, out of 7,000 officers who served in the GRU in Soviet times, less than 2,000 now remain in the structure. According to intelligence officers interviewed by The New Times, the GRU kept afloat until its former head, General army Valentin Korabelnikov: after his forced resignation at the end of the summer of 2009, the final purge of the GRU began.
A high-ranking GRU officer who, along with Korabelnikov, resigned from the central apparatus of military intelligence, told The New Times on condition of anonymity that he considers the collapse of the service a purposeful action: “The first attempts to systematically weaken the GRU were made under Pavel Grachev*. At the initial stage, the main blow was dealt to the "osnaz", as a result of which all the electronic intelligence centers available in the USSR were liquidated both on the territory of our country, with the exception of the Transcaucasian direction, and at Russian military bases **. Further, all the main lines of work of the GRU, from strategic and undercover intelligence to auxiliary units and the Military Diplomatic Academy, which trained intelligence officers both for military attachés and for illegal GRU residencies, underwent a gradual weakening and reduction.
It is known that in the specialized research institute of the GRU, all development and research work (R&D and R&D) has been stopped. The Military Diplomatic Academy (VDA) began to cut teaching staff. According to the interlocutor of The New Times, the number of "mining units" of the GRU responsible for undercover and strategic intelligence on the territory of foreign countries has been reduced by 40%. Perhaps the leadership of the Ministry of Defense has its own reasons for this, but it was done so clumsily that today a huge number of intelligence officers who perform official duties outside of Russia already know that they actually have nowhere to return. This not only deprives them of any motivation for further work, but also turns them into potential targets for recruitment by foreign intelligence services.
Mass layoffs are taking place among the most experienced GRU officers who are dismissed on formal grounds in connection with the achievement of the length of service established by law***. Unlike the SVR, which has a sufficient number of specialized educational institutions for recruiting and intelligence training of very young people, the specifics and traditions of the GRU require that only the most experienced military officers, who are already at least 30 years old at the time they enter the GRU, be selected for military intelligence. 35 years. The dismissal of such specialists is an obvious waste of the “gold reserve” of the Russian intelligence community.
Strangers among their own
Combat officers of the GRU today can be found both in expensive offices and at railway stations, where they work as loaders, in shops, among repairmen or handymen. They speak obscenely about the reform of their former service, but sometimes they squeeze out correct definitions.
“The GRU empire is dying,” says the “professor”, an imposing middle-aged man in a starched shirt, who looks like a typical representative of creative bohemia. - I have such an image in my eyes: a professional athlete, whose legs and arms were amputated, his eye was knocked out and his eardrum was damaged. He is still alive, he understands everything, he sees something else, he can hardly hear, his heart is still beating, but he will not be able to be reborn. "Professor" is an analyst with extensive undercover intelligence experience. He is fluent in several European languages and Arabic, and has traveled to more than 50 countries around the world. Dismissed for uselessness. Now unemployed.
"Furniture assembler" is a space intelligence officer. About 40 years old. Brought up, educated, military bearing, correct literary speech and competence unusual for a worker catches the eye. Works part-time in an Italian furniture salon. Collects imported furniture, assembles household appliances. “It is disgusting to see how our pathetic attempts to save at least something from the Soviet cosmonautics are passed off as the achievements of recent years,” he throws irritably. - Well, this is necessary: Serdyukov (Minister of Defense) advertises the Resource satellite! They are still of Soviet assembly, they are stored in warehouses. And they were made not for the military, but for oilmen. There is no resolution, it is difficult to distinguish a cruiser from an aircraft carrier, and even in armored vehicles it is completely confused.
“We and military intelligence are two big differences, but the GRU special forces were merged into the Ground Forces,” says a heavily knocked-down man, about fifty years old. “But it was we who were the most productive: both Khattab and Basayev are our work.” Senior officer of the GRU special forces, awarded four military orders. Extensive experience of participating in special events around the world. He carried out special tasks in Yugoslavia, fought for many years in the North Caucasus. Is no longer needed.
But the GRU agents were hit the hardest. Against the backdrop of public support for the SVR after the failure of the illegal foreign intelligence network associated today with the name of Anna Chapman, nothing is demonstratively done to protect GRU agents captured on the territory of Georgia and other Transcaucasian states. All the latest failures of military intelligence are used only to justify the inefficiency of the GRU. According to the interlocutors of The New Times, as a result of this approach, a number of agents recruited on the territory of the states of Southwest Asia have already been executed.
The formal reason for the systemic attack on the GRU was the unpreparedness of the army for an armed conflict with Georgia. So, according to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, who commanded a group of Russian troops during the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in August 2008, the General Staff was surprised by the presence of Soviet air defense systems of the Buk air defense system in the Georgian side **** and modern Western airspace control systems, which made it possible to inflict serious damage on the Russian Air Force. According to current officers of the central apparatus of the GRU, at a meeting of the leadership following the results of the war, without embarrassment in terms, the Minister of Defense accused military intelligence of not having the necessary intelligence information. Meanwhile, the intelligence officers themselves claim that their information was simply not considered when assessing the operational situation and making decisions by the country's top leadership. According to them, military intelligence sent all the necessary information, including information about the delivery of modernized Buk systems by Ukraine. So both the Ministry of Defense and the top state leadership of the country were at least aware of the situation. Or they could have been aware if they had paid attention to the information of the GRU. But: the chief of military intelligence has lost the right to a direct personal report to the president, and the information he sends passes through at least two filters - through the chief of the General Staff and the minister of defense. Under the conditions of military reform, when there is a redistribution of resources and money, when generals of different branches of the armed forces are fighting to maintain their posts and feeders, the one who has direct access to the “ear” wins. The GRU, the eternal and longtime rival of the KGB and those who inherited the committee, was deprived of this access.
Don't ask why
According to a former high-ranking officer of the central apparatus of the GRU, "even very big people" who try to answer the question of what is the point of destroying the institution of military intelligence, at best, end up in retirement, at worst, they die under unclear circumstances, as happened with General GRU Major Yuri Ivanov, who was responsible for organizing military intelligence throughout the Caucasus region. The body of 53-year-old General Ivanov, the country's most important secret bearer, who, according to the official version, was on vacation in Syria, was strangely discovered in the coastal waters of Turkey in August 2010.
[Komsomolskaya Pravda, 08/30/2010, "The Mysterious Death of a GRU General": Major General Yury Ivanov, Deputy Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, was buried on August 28. On the same day, an obituary appeared in the official printed organ of the Ministry of Defense, the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper. Meanwhile, the general died on August 6 - he drowned while diving and his body was found in Turkish territorial waters in the Mediterranean Sea. It is also known that Yuri Ivanov was on a business trip to Syria, which borders on Turkey.
There are three main versions of the death of a high-ranking intelligence officer. The first is heart problems that arose during deep-sea diving (Ivanov was quite seriously interested in diving). However, the 53-year-old general was in good health and had never complained about the "motor". The second is a malfunction of underwater equipment. Here there may be questions - whether it was rented, brought with you or borrowed from Russian specialists in Syria itself. The Turkish side did not transfer any data on the equipment to Russia.
The third version is an attempt. Scouts of this level rarely die naturally (unless due to old age). Previously, Yuri Ivanov headed the intelligence of the North Caucasus District and repeatedly visited Chechnya. […]
Yes, and in Syria, the general was clearly carrying out a mission that corresponds to his high position. Most likely he was inspecting the Russian maintenance base located in the port of Tartus. Before 2011, a full-fledged foreign base of the Navy should appear there, and it is impossible to do without the participation of intelligence in its activities. - Inset K.ru]
As the interlocutor of The New Times told, veterans of the service name three reasons explaining not only the death of the general, but in general the entire amount of measures to eliminate military intelligence.
First: the main business of the customers of the so-called GRU reform is connected with money laundering and offshore companies. And only the strategic intelligence of the GRU could pose a threat to this business, since it had the ability to control and monitor such actions. And at the same time, she did not belong to the KGB-FSB-SVR corporation.
Second, a kind of informal "special service" has already been formed in Russia, serving the interests of a narrow group of people who really govern the country. The people working for this structure are not gathered together, but serve in various units of various special services of the Russian Federation. For the successful functioning of such a “network system of the elite”, it is important to solve one difficult task: to destroy all alternative sources of intelligence information capable of independent comparative analysis.
Third: competition. The positions of the FSB and the SVR can be protected by the top leadership of the country, close to these special services. The interests of the GRU are alien to these people. The example of the United States, where there are more than a dozen different independent intelligence agencies, is not accepted as an argument. The ability to provide a competitive advantage to “ours” is more important than solving real intelligence tasks.
Interlocutors of The New Times see another task solved by destroying the GRU. It is closely connected with the interests of influential non-military groups related to unhealed hotbeds of tension, for example, in the Caucasus. The fact is that there is a certain specificity of the actions of special forces groups and their fundamental difference from the tactics of military intelligence officers. The main advantage of the GRU special forces lies in the combination of operational skills in obtaining information with combat operations, including the use of special means. Spetsnaz scouts, unlike military scouts, are capable of operating both in the city - as an illegal underground, and in the forest - as a classic sabotage unit. Employees of such a unit, as a by-product of their activities, can get access to very confidential information about the real channels and sources of funding, about federal contacts of their “wards”, etc. And competitors from Lubyanka have no guarantees of the loyalty of the Gereush scouts.
Fools and agents
“All this is absurdity and conspiracy theories,” said Colonel Vitaly Shlykov, a former GRU officer and member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, to whom The New Times presented the arguments of his former colleagues, military intelligence officers. The main problem, Shlykov is convinced, is the "cowardly sabotage of the reform of the armed forces carried out by Minister Serdyukov by individual" arrogant generals ". According to Shlykov, the situation that has developed in military intelligence cannot be qualified as collapse, since nothing terrible is happening there. Highly professional special forces, the expert answers General Gerasimov, in general, in his opinion, should not be subordinate to military intelligence: an independent body should be created, which should be entrusted with the command of special forces, as is customary in most of the most developed countries of the world, Shlykov believes. As for the virtually destroyed global GRU electronic intelligence network, according to the expert, today Russia, with all its desire, cannot play the geopolitical role that belonged to the USSR during the Cold War, just as there is no global confrontation between the two camps. So why spend so much money on it?
A completely different matter, according to Shlykov, is strategic and undercover intelligence. This resource of Russia cannot be lost. But he is convinced that a situation has developed in the GRU when the value of an agent was leveled by unskilled analytics: "Agents - yes, they are valuable, but fools sat above them!" A recognized expert in the field of military construction believes that the GRU, which had a huge information and analytical service (it included 6 thematic departments and 6 departments in the structure of the 7th department, working only through NATO), for a long time abused the exclusive right to analyze and interpretation of the information obtained, preventing other analytical groups from working in this area, for example, such as the center headed by the former head of the Foreign Intelligence Service and former Foreign Minister Academician Yevgeny Primakov (Primakov's comment to The New Times could not be obtained). “It was high time to demonopolize the obtained information,” says Colonel Shlykov.
Demonopolized. Together with the entire GRU system.
* Pavel Grachev was the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation in 1992-1996.
** These are the bases Lourdes in Cuba, Vostok in Vietnam, Zvezda in Burma, Ramona in North Korea, Horizon in Mongolia.
*** For all military personnel, this age comes after 25 calendar years of service and on average this falls on 42-45 years.
**** Self-propelled anti-aircraft missile system for combating air targets at low and medium altitudes.
***
Russian military intelligence failures from 2000 to 2011
2000 Japan
On September 7, 2000, representatives of Japanese counterintelligence arrested Captain 3rd Rank Shigehiro Hagisaki during dinner in a Tokyo restaurant with Russian military attache Viktor Bogatenkov.
For a long time, the Japanese officer passed on information about the units and formations of the US Navy stationed on the territory of his country to the Russian military intelligence representative. After the arrest of Shigehiro Hagisaki, the Russian intelligence officer was expelled from the country.
2001 Bulgaria
At the end of March 2001, three employees of the GRU were expelled from Bulgaria: military attache captain 1st rank Vladimir Lomakin, his deputy colonel Sergei Vlasenko and embassy adviser Boris Smirnov.
This event was preceded by the detention by counterintelligence agencies of the former head of the analytical department of the military intelligence service of Bulgaria, as well as the director of the secret archive service of the country's defense ministry. According to the local press, it was these Bulgarian intelligence officers who transmitted information about the situation in the Balkans to Russian intelligence officers. In addition, they could transmit information regarding the mothballed spy network of the Bulgarian special services, data on the abuse of influential persons and politicians, information about wanted documents, persons, etc. Embassy adviser Boris Smirnov was also accused of trying to get into the national parliament of Bulgaria people who are well disposed towards Russia.
2004, Germany
At the end of 2004, in the city of Amorbach, German counterintelligence agencies detained Alexander Kuzmin, Consul General of the Russian Federation in Hamburg.
Information about military systems, about the latest German weapons, as well as the governing documents of the Bundeswehr, was provided to him by an agent who later turned out to be a double. After being detained and handed over to the Russian side, Alexander Kuzmin left the FRG.
2004, Qatar
On February 13, 2004, the car of Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, the ex-president of the unrecognized Republic of Ichkeria, was blown up in Doha, the capital of Qatar. Two bodyguards died on the spot, Yandarbiev's 13-year-old son Daud was wounded, and the separatist leader himself was taken with severe injuries to the intensive care unit of one of the city hospitals, where he later died on the operating table. On February 18, 2004, local law enforcement authorities detained three employees of the Russian diplomatic mission in Qatar on suspicion of organizing a terrorist act: Alexander Fetisov, secretary of the Russian Embassy in Qatar (later released by local authorities), Anatoly Belashkov and Vasily Bogachev. The last two returned to their homeland only in December 2004 after long negotiations with the Qatari side.
2005, Germany
Russian military intelligence officer Alexander Parfentiev, who served as an employee of the military attache at the Russian embassy in Berlin, was detained in the spring of 2005. The German side claimed that Parfentiev managed to recruit a Bundeswehr officer and organize the collection of information. But later, the German soldier decided to turn himself in to the counterintelligence authorities with a confession. On March 10, 2005, before meeting with the agent, the Russian diplomat was detained by the German counterintelligence agencies. After being detained and handed over to the Russian side, GRU officer Parfentiev left Germany.
2007, Austria
In June 2007, Austrian counterintelligence agencies detained Vladimir Vozhzhov, deputy head of the international cooperation department of Roscosmos. He was in Vienna as a member of the Russian delegation that arrived at the session of the UN Committee on Outer Space. After a harsh reaction from the Russian Foreign Ministry (Vladimir Vozhzhov had diplomatic immunity, but the Austrian side demanded that Moscow deprive him of this status and transfer it to local justice), the Roscosmos representative was expelled from Austria.
According to the Austrian press, the source of the Russian intelligence officer was an Austrian Air Force non-commissioned officer Harald Z., who served in a helicopter squadron. He began to cooperate with Russian military intelligence in 1995. According to one version of the local media, Harald had information about the combat readiness of the country's Air Force aviation fleet, the availability of fuel and ammunition in military depots, information about the "friend or foe" recognition system, and also about the radio frequencies used in the Austrian Air Force. According to another version, Harald handed over to the Russian intelligence officer the technical documentation of the new Tiger combat helicopter, which is in service with a number of European countries. Another source of information for Vozhzhov could be the owner of the engineering and consulting company Werner Franz G. (citizen of Germany), who from 1992 to 2007 was the manager of one of the world's largest aircraft manufacturing companies, Eurocopter.
History of the Main Intelligence Directorate
The history of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Armed Forces begins on November 1, 1918, when a secret order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (RVSR) approved the staff of the Field Headquarters, which consisted of six directorates, including the Registration Directorate (Registrupr). It was the first centralized and full-fledged intelligence agency of the Soviet Republic. Since the order was announced on November 5, it is this date that is celebrated as Military Intelligence Day.
On April 4, 1921, by order of the RVSR No. 785/141, the Register was transformed into the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters (Razvedupr). It is generally accepted that the period from 1921 to 1924 is the actual beginning of the history of the Main Intelligence Directorate.
In the same period, the residencies of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters and the Foreign Department of the GPU (the prototype of the future Foreign Intelligence Service - the main source of political information for the country's leadership) merged. However, the effectiveness of the joint residency was low, so subsequently everything returned to its place, and the military-political leadership of the country again had two independent sources of information.
In November 1922, the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters was transformed into the Intelligence Department. However, the reorganization carried out did not justify itself, since the new structural unit did not correspond to either the real volumes or the nature of the assigned intelligence tasks. In this connection, in 1924, the Intelligence Directorate was re-formed. In 1926, when all departments of the Red Army headquarters became numbered, the Intelligence Directorate was assigned a number. This is how the Fourth Office was born.
Next was the war. In April 1943, the country's leadership decided to create the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army and the Main Intelligence Directorate, which was directly subordinate to the People's Commissar of Defense.
This division of military intelligence continued until the end of the Great Patriotic War. In June 1945, it was decided to reorganize the military intelligence system and create the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army.
From the mid-1960s to the 1990s - the best period in the history of the GRU. The management staff is growing, logistics is a priority. Particular attention has been paid to military-technical intelligence, the first orbital groups are being created, belts are being built from radar stations, huge areas of antenna fields are growing, unique space control facilities are being built, and the latest radio and electronic intelligence ships are being supplied to each fleet.
With the advent of the 1990s, the reduction of the GRU begins.
