Battle of Kalka score. Battle of Kalka (briefly). The march of the Russian troops
Having conquered the entire Middle East and China, Genghis Khan sent three of his tumens, under the command of Subeday and Jochi Khan, to scout out the regions beyond the Caucasus. There the Tatar-Mongol detachment collided with the Polovtsian troops, which were defeated by them. The remnants of the Polovtsy retreated beyond the Dnieper, where they turned to the Russian princes for help.
In the spring of 1223, a large council of princes was assembled, at which a decision was made to provide military assistance to the Polovtsian Khan Kotyan. The princes of the remote, northern regions of Russia refused to support the Polovtsians. It was decided to fight on Polovtsian soil. The result of this decision was the Battle of Kalka. The united Russian regiments were headed by Mstislav Kievsky, Mstislav Udaloy and Mstislav Chernigovsky. The first battles with the advanced Mongol detachments began immediately after the crossing of the Dnieper. The Mongols did not fight and retreated within eight days. When the path of the Russian army was blocked by the small river Kalka, a military council was organized, during which the opinions of the leaders differed. Mstislav Kievsky argued about the need for defense, and Mstislav Udaloy strove into battle.
The Battle of Kalka began on May 31, 1223. After examining the Mongol camp, the prince decided that he alone would cope with the enemy. Initially, the course of the battle turned towards the Russians, but the Mongols delivered the main blow not to the center, where the Galician prince stood with his retinue, but to the left Polovtsian wing. The nomads, unable to withstand the powerful onslaught, began to retreat indiscriminately. The running Polovtsian cavalry confused the ranks of Russian warriors ready to march, who were immediately pushed by the Mongols. The situation could still be saved by the Kiev prince, but moved by resentment against the Galician prince, he did not strike at the flank of the Tatars. Russian troops outnumbered the Mongol ones, but the fragmentation of the detachments and the shameful flight of the Polovtsians led to a crushing defeat for Russia.
Mstislav of Kiev fortified himself on a hill, where for three days he successfully repelled all the attacks of the Tatar troops. Then the Mongols went to the cunning, the leader of the roaming Ploskinya kissed the cross in front of the Kiev prince, assuring him that the Tatars would let everyone go home if they lay down their arms. Yielding to persuasion, Mstislav surrendered, but the Mongols did not keep their word. All ordinary soldiers were taken into slavery, and the princes and military leaders were put under the flooring, on which they sat down to feast, celebrating the victory. The Battle of Kalka was over within three days.
Mongolian troops tried to continue the offensive on the lands of the Chernigov principality, but faced with the first fortified city - Novgorod Seversky, retreated back into the steppe. Thus, the Battle of Kalka allowed the Mongols to conduct a thorough reconnaissance in force. They appreciated the Russian army, but in their report to Genghis Khan, the lack of unity in the Russian princes was especially noted. During the invasion of Russia in 1239, the fragmentation of Russia into principalities was widely used by the Mongols.
The battle on the Kalka River showed what inconsistency in actions can lead to. Russian troops suffered huge losses, no more than a tenth of the soldiers returned home. Many noble warriors and princes perished. The battle on Kalka demonstrated to the Russian princes the power of the new enemy, but the lesson was not learned and the invasion of the Mongol-Tatar hordes on the Russian land that followed 16 years later slowed down the development of Russia for almost two and a half centuries.
Battle on the Kalka River- This is a battle between the combined Russian-Polovtsian army and the Mongolian army under the command of the commanders Jebe and Subedei on the Kalka River (the territory of modern Donetsk region). The battle lasted 3 days. First, the Polovtsians and the main Russian forces were defeated, and after 3 days on May 31, 1223, the battle ended in complete victory for the Mongols. At least nine princes and many well-born boyars and ordinary soldiers from the Kiev, Galicia-Volyn, Chernigov, Smolensk principalities perished in the battle.
Events leading up to the Battle of Kalka.
IN 1219
, 1220
and 1221 years Mongols captured the central regions of Khorezm with Samarkand and Bukhara. Sultan Muhammad fled to the west, and a pursuit of 3 tumens was sent after him ( tumen- 10 thousand horsemen) headed by Jebe, Subedei and Tohuchar-noyon. Tohuchar noyon was defeated in Iran.
After the capture of Urgench at the end of 1221, he ordered Jochi to continue his conquests in Eastern Europe, and sent Jebe and Subedei to the Transcaucasus and the Black Sea steppes. The main goal of this campaign was the Alans, Hungary and Russia, including Kiev, and the kurultai of 1235, after which the invasion of Europe still took place, only repeated these goals. in 1222 they succumbed to the persuasions of the Mongols and violated their alliance with the Alans, after which the Mongol army invaded the Polovtsian steppes from the North Caucasus. The late Tver Chronicle reports on the reaction of Mstislav of Kiev to the news of the Mongols approaching the borders of Russia: “ While I am in Kiev - on this side of the Yaik, and the Pontic Sea, and the Danube River, the Tatar saber cannot be waved
“.
The Polovtsian Khan Kotyan Sutoevich, together with other Polovtsian khans, turned to his son-in-law, the Galician prince Mstislav Mstislavich Udatny and other Russian princes, asking them for help against a formidable new enemy: “ Our land has been taken away today, and your morning, when it comes, will be taken
“.
Kotyan Sutoevich supported his words with great gifts to the Galician prince. Mstislav Udatny took the initiative in organizing a congress of princes to discuss a campaign against the approaching Mongols. He said that if the Russian princes did not help, they could join the Mongols, and then the danger would be greater. The South Russian princes gathered in Kiev for a council under the leadership of three "oldest" princes: Mstislav Romanovich of Kiev, Mstislav Udatny and Mstislav Svyatoslavich of Chernigov. sent an army to help the southern princes, but it did not have time for the Kiev gathering. After long negotiations, the princes decided to meet the enemy on the Polovtsian land, not letting him into Russia. The collection was appointed on Zaruba, near the Varyazhsky island (the island was located opposite the mouth of the Trubezh river, now destroyed by the Kanev reservoir), 10 kilometers from the present Trakhtemyrov of the Kanevsky district of the Cherkasy region. The composed, large army did not have a common commander: the squads of appanage princes obeyed their princes.
When the squads gathered at the agreed place, the Mongolian embassy arrived to the princes: “ We have heard that you are going against us, having listened to the Polovtsians, but we did not touch your land, nor your cities, nor your villages; they did not come to you, but by the will of God they came to the slaves and grooms of their Polovtsians. You take the world with us; if they run to you, drive them away from you and take their property; we have heard that they have done you a lot of harm; we beat them for this“.
After listening to the ambassadors, the Russian princes ordered all of them to be killed, after which the combined forces moved further down the Dnieper.
At the mouth of the Dnieper near Oleshya, the Galicians met the second Mongolian embassy with the following note: “ You listened to the Polovtsians and killed our ambassadors; now you come at us, so go; we did not touch you: God is above us all“.
Unlike the first embassy of the Mongols, it was decided to release these ambassadors in peace. The Galician army marched up the Dnieper to the island of Khortitsa at the rapids, where it joined up with the rest of the troops. Crossing to the left bank of the Dnieper and finding the enemy's forward detachment, the Russians, after a short but bloody battle, put the Mongols to flight, the commander Ganibek was killed. Ibn al-Athir described these events as follows: “ The Uruses and Kipchaks kindled a desire to defeat the Tatars: they thought that they had retreated out of fear and weakness, not wanting to fight them, and therefore promptly pursued the Tatars. The Tatars all retreated, and they chased in the footsteps of 12 days
“.
Moving east and not seeing the main forces of the enemy, Russian troops two weeks later reached the bank of the Kalki River, where they defeated another vanguard of the Mongols.
The forces of the parties in the Battle of Kalka.
Mongol-Tatar army.
The number of Mongols when they first appeared in the Caucasus in 1221 is estimated at 20 thousand people. The Mongols' tactics were of a pronounced offensive nature. They tried to inflict swift blows at the enemy taken by surprise, to disorganize and disunite his ranks. They, whenever possible, avoided large frontal battles, smashing the enemy in parts, exhausting him with continuous skirmishes and surprise attacks. For battle, the Mongols formed in several lines, having heavy cavalry in reserve, and in the front ranks they fielded warriors of the conquered peoples and light detachments. The battle began with throwing arrows, with which the Mongols sought to confuse the enemy's ranks. They strove to break through the enemy's front with surprise strikes, divide it into parts, widely using flanking, flanking and rear strikes.
The strength of the Mongolian army was the continuous leadership of the battle. Khans, temniks and thousanders did not fight together with ordinary soldiers, but were behind the formation, on high places, directing the movement of troops with flags, light and smoke signals, corresponding to the signals of pipes and drums.
The Mongol invasion was usually preceded by careful reconnaissance and diplomatic training aimed at isolating the enemy and stirring up internal strife. Then there was a hidden concentration of Mongolian troops at the border. The invasion usually began from different directions by separate detachments, heading, as a rule, to one previously designated point. First of all, the Mongols sought to destroy the enemy's manpower and prevent him from replenishing the troops. They penetrated deep into the country, destroying everything in their path, exterminating the population and driving away herds. Observing detachments were deployed against the fortresses and fortified cities, devastating the surroundings and preparing for the siege.
Russian army.
There are no exact data on the size of the combined Russian-Polovtsian army. Estimates vary greatly: from ~ 10 thousand warriors plus 5-8 thousand Polovtsians (D.G. Khrustalev), up to 103 thousand warriors and 50 thousand Polovtsian horsemen (V.N. Tatishchev).
The basis of the troops was made up of Galicia-Volyn, Kiev and Chernigov troops. The Smolensk and Turovo-Pinsk troops also took part in the campaign. The Polovtsi were commanded by the voivode Mstislav of Galician Yarun.
The military organization of the Russian principalities was negatively affected by feudal fragmentation. The squads of princes and cities were scattered over a vast territory and were weakly connected with each other, the concentration of significant forces was associated with difficulties. Nevertheless, the princely squads were superior to the Mongolian army in armament, tactical techniques and combat formation. The armament of Russian warriors, both offensive and defensive, was famous far beyond the borders of Russia. Heavy armor was massively used. However, the squads, as a rule, did not exceed the number of several hundred people and were of little use for actions under a single command and according to a single plan.
At the same time, the main part of the Old Russian army was the militia. It was inferior to the nomads in weapons and the ability to wield them. The militia used axes, spears, less often spears. Swords were rarely used.
The army of the Polovtsians.
The Cumans, divided into many tribes and nomads, did not have a single military organization. Each khan independently took care of the armament of his detachment. Polovtsian warriors, in addition to bows, also had sabers, lassos and spears. Later, squads with heavy weapons appeared in the troops of the Polovtsian khans. Heavily armed warriors wore chain mail, lamellar shells, and helmets with anthropomorphic iron or bronze masks and aventails. Nevertheless, detachments of lightly armed horse archers continued to be the basis of the troops. Some Polovtsian detachments served in the Byzantine and Georgian armies, took part in the civil strife of the Russian princes. As a result, by the end of the 12th century, many Cumans had significant military experience, improved tactics and military affairs in general.
The course of the battle on the Kalka River.
After two successful clashes for the Russian-Polovtsian troops, the princes gathered a council of war, at which they tried to work out a plan for further action. The main issue was the parking lot. Some suggested setting up a camp where the army had already gathered and waiting for the enemy's approach. Others insisted on moving towards the Mongols. The decision was never made, each prince eventually chose the tactics of action for his squad, without notifying the other princes.
In the morning May 31, 1223 detachments of the allies began to cross the river. The first to cross it were detachments of the Polovtsian cavalry together with the Volyn squad. Then the Galicians and the Chernigovites began to cross. The Kiev army remained on the western bank of the river and began the construction of a fortified camp. Forward Mstislav Udatny sent a Polovtsian watchman under the leadership of an old companion in the campaigns and the Lipitsk battle of Yarun. The squad of Mstislav Udatny moved to the right and took a position along the river, the squad of Mstislav Chernigovsky stood at the crossing on both banks of the Kalka, the squad of Daniil Romanovich moved forward as a striking force. Mstislav Kievsky stood behind the crossing on a rocky ridge and surrounded the camp with a palisade, enclosing it with carts.
Seeing the advance detachments of the Mongol army, the Polovtsy and the Volyn detachment entered the battle. Initially, the battle developed well for the Russians. Daniil Romanovich, the first to enter the battle, fought with unparalleled courage, not paying attention to the wound he received. The Mongol vanguard began to retreat, the Russians rushed in pursuit, lost their ranks and faced the main forces of the Mongols. When Subedei saw that the forces of the Russian princes moving behind the Polovtsy were significantly behind, he ordered the main part of his army to go on the offensive. Unable to withstand the pressure of a more staunch enemy, the Polovtsians fled.
The Ipatiev Chronicle tells in detail only about the events in the center of the battle, where Daniel acted, his cousin uncle, Prince of Lutsk Mstislav Yaroslavich Dumb, and Oleg Kurskiy, apparently, was the first to cross the river from Chernihiv regiment, and connects the subsequent flight with the blow of the new Mongol forces. The Novgorod first chronicle calls the flight of the Polovtsy the reason for the defeat, and the Suzdal Chronicle (according to the Academic List) connects the flight of the Polovtsy with the introduction of additional forces by the Mongols into battle. The Mongolian right wing, the attack wing, achieved success faster than others. The Polovtsi ran to the crossing, crushing and upsetting the regiments of Mstislav Chernigov, already ready to march. Then the Mongols attacked the Galicians and those Polovtsian detachments that still remained on their flanks. First Mstislav Lutsky tried to help them, and then Oleg Kursky, but their squads were crushed and defeated by the Mongols. The defeat of the Russian and Polovtsian detachments from his camp was seen by Mstislav Romanovich, the Kiev prince, but he made no attempt to help them.
Having defeated the main forces of the Russians and Polovtsians, Subedei organized a siege of the Kiev camp by the forces of the khans Tsugir and Tesha, and he himself, with the main part, rushed to pursue the surviving Russians, constantly attacking the exhausted soldiers. Only a few Russian soldiers were able to take refuge in the Kiev camp, the rest retreated into the steppe in different directions. Galician and Volyn squads fled to the Dnieper, where their boats and boats remained. Sinking on them, they chopped down the rest of the ships so that they could not be used by the Mongols. The Chernigovites retreated to the north under continuous enemy attacks, losing their prince and his son. During the retreat, the Smolensk squad managed to repel enemy attacks and at the Dnieper the Smolensk people broke away from their pursuers. The squads of other principalities, as well as smaller detachments that could not join their main forces, were pursued by the Mongols to the Dnieper and at the same time suffered heavy losses.
While the Mongols pursued the surviving Russian soldiers, part of their army led the siege of the Kiev camp. Attacks on him alternated with shelling. The position of the Russians was aggravated by the lack of water supplies and its sources. They had no access to the river. On the third day, negotiations began. The leader of the Brodniks, Ploskynya, sent by Subedei, swore on the cross that if the Russians lay down their arms, none of them would be killed, and the princes and governors would be released home for ransom. The Mongols, avenging the death of their ambassadors, did not keep their promise: after the Kievites left the camp, they were attacked. Some of the soldiers were killed, some were captured. Russian princes and other military leaders were put under the boards and crushed by the victors, who sat down to feast on top. There is a version that during the negotiations the Russian princes were given a promise not to shed blood and, strangling them under the boards, the Mongols considered their promise fulfilled.
Losses in the Battle of Kalka.
The exact losses among those who fought are unknown. At the same time, the sources retained estimates of the victims only in the Russian army. There is no data on the Polovtsian and Mongolian losses. According to the chronicles, only one tenth of the Russian army survived the battle. The only author who names Russian losses in numerical terms (though very approximate, as he himself says) is Henry of Latvia. In the Chronicle of Livonia, written around 1225: “ That year there were Tatars in the land of the Valvas of the Gentiles. Some call the Valvas desks. They do not eat bread, but feed on the raw meat of their cattle. And the Tatars fought with them, and defeated them, and destroyed everyone with the sword, while others fled to the Russians, asking for help. And the call went through all Russia to fight the Tatars, and kings from all over Russia came out against the Tatars, but they did not have enough strength for the battle and they fled before the enemies. And the great king Mstislav from Kiev fell with forty thousand soldiers who were with him. Another king, Mstislav of Galician, fled. Of the remaining kings, about fifty fell in this battle. And the Tatars chased them for six days and killed more than a hundred thousand people (and only God knows their exact number), the rest fled“.
Departures after the Battle of Kalka.
The Mongols pursued the remnants of the Russian army to the Dnieper. Their detachments invaded directly into the territory of Russia. According to the Ipatiev Chronicle, Mongolian patrols reached Novgorod-Svyatopolch. But having learned about the arrival of Vladimir's troops in Chernigov, led by 14-year-old Vasilko Konstantinovich Rostovsky, the Mongols abandoned the plan for a campaign against Kiev and went to the Volga, where they were defeated by the Volga Bulgars near Samara Luka. The surviving 4 thousand people returned to Central Asia. across the steppes of modern Kazakhstan. Along this path, but already in the opposite direction, the Mongols undertook their Western campaign a little over 10 years later. Many historians believe that The Battle of Kalka became a turning point in the history of Rus. She not only significantly weakened the strength of the Russian principalities, but also sowed panic and uncertainty in Russia. It is no coincidence that chroniclers more and more often note the mysterious phenomena of nature, considering them signs of future misfortunes.
Tragedy on Kalka. In the Polovtsian steppes and on the borders of Russia, a select detachment of Genghis Khan's troops operated under the leadership of his best commanders - the young talented Jebe and the wise old Subede. The Polovtsian Khan Kotyan, within whose borders the Mongols entered, turned to the Russian princes for help. He wrote to his son-in-law, Prince Mstislav the Bold, who at that time was reigning in Galich: "Our land was taken away today, and tomorrow, when they come, they will take it." However, in the Russian principalities, the request of the Polovtsians for help was met with doubt. The princes did not trust their ancient opponents, and the appearance on the Russian borders of a new, hitherto unseen Mongolian army was perceived as a way out of the steppe of another horde of nomads. There were the Pechenegs, then the Polovtsians. Now some Tatars have appeared. Even if they were strong, there was confidence that the Russian squads would defeat these newcomers too. Such sentiments were reflected in the congress of princes in Kiev, which gathered at the initiative of Mstislav the Bold. The Galician prince called for action against the unknown and terrible enemy. Not everyone responded to his call. The Kiev prince Mstislav Romanovich, Mstislav Svyatoslavich of Chernigov, Daniil Romanovich, who reigned at that time in Vladimir-Volynsky (son-in-law of Mstislav the Bold), as well as smaller princes agreed to participate in the campaign. Help, in essence, was refused by the powerful Russian prince, the son of Vsevolod the Big Nest, Yuri Vladimir-Suzdalsky. True, he sent a Rostov regiment, but he did not have time to appear.
Upon learning of the Russian army's uprising, the Mongols, loyal to their principle of splitting enemies, sent an embassy to the Russian princes, which stated: “We hear that you are going against us, listening to the Polovtsians, and we have not occupied your land, or your cities, or We came to you, but to the slaves and to our grooms, to the filthy Polovtsians. And you take the world with us. " But, having already heard about the treachery and cruelty of the Mongols, the Russian princes refused to negotiate with them, killed the Mongol ambassadors and moved towards the enemy.
The first fight with the Mongols was successful. The leading Mongol detachments fled to their main forces. Russian squads continued to advance further into the steppe, striving, as in the days of the confrontation with the Polovtsians, to resolve the matter on enemy territory, away from their native lands.
Map. Battle of Kalka.
The decisive battle between the united Russian squads and the army of Jebe and Subede took place on May 31, 1223 on the Kalka River, not far from the coast of the Sea of Azov.
In this battle, separatism and political selfishness of the Russian princes manifested themselves. While the squads of Mstislav the Bold, Daniil Volynsky and some other princes, with the support of the Polovtsian cavalry, rushed to the enemy, Mstislav of Kiev stood with his forces on one of the hills and did not participate in the battle. The Mongols managed to withstand the blow of the allies, and then went on the offensive. The first to falter were the Polovtsians. They fled from the battlefield. This put the Galician and Volyn army in a difficult situation. The squads fought bravely, but the general preponderance of forces was on the side of the Mongols. They broke the resistance of the Russians, they ran. Mstislav Udaloy and Daniil Romanovich fought in the thick of the battle, arousing the admiration of the Mongol commanders. But their courage could not resist the art of war and the strength of the Mongols. Both princes with a few warriors escaped the pursuit.
Now the turn of the most powerful among the Russian troops, the Kiev army, has come. An attempt to take the Russian camp by attack to the Mongols failed, and then they went for another trick. Jebe and Subede promised Mstislav of Kiev and other princes who were with him a peaceful outcome of the case and the passage of their troops freely to their homeland. When the princes opened their camp and left it, the Mongols rushed to the Russian squads. Almost all Russian soldiers were killed. The princes led by Mstislav of Kiev were captured. They were tied hand and foot, thrown to the ground, and planks were placed on them, on which the Mongol commanders sat during the victorious feast.
During battles on Kalka killed six princes, of the ordinary soldiers returned home only one in ten. Only the Kiev army lost about 10 thousand people. This defeat turned out to be one of the most difficult for Russia in its entire history.
The Mongols took possession of a vast territory - from China to Central Asia and the Caucasus. Genghis Khan divided it among his sons. The western lands went to the eldest son Jochi, who died the same year as his father (1227). At the head of the Western ulus (part) of the Mongol Empire was the son of Jochi - a young, energetic Batu (Batu). In 1235, at the kurultai Mongol khans, which took place under the leadership of the new great khan Ogedei, the son of Genghis Khan, it was decided to march to Europe, "To the last sea".
A new terrible danger loomed over Russia.
Russian history knows triumphs and crushing defeats. One of the most tragic events in the history of Russia was the battle with Mongol troops on the Kalka River. The significance of the Battle of Kalka for the Russian princes can be assessed by the lessons learned from this history and well learned in the future, already victorious battles, which are more than a hundred and fifty years away to wait.
The reason for the appearance of Mongol troops in Russia
After the conquest of the Asian principalities, Temujin-Genghis Khan sent his troops, led by Jebe and Subadei, in pursuit of Sultan Muhammad. The number of troops under these generals was estimated at 20 thousand people. The campaign of the two servants of the supreme ruler of the Mongols was also of an intelligence nature. When approaching the Polovtsian lands, the Polovtsian leader Kotyan, who alone could not resist the Mongols, asked the Galician prince for help, reinforcing his visit with large gifts. The battle on the Kalka River in 1223 began at the council of the Russian princes in Kiev, where it was decided to go out to meet the Tatar army. The princes who took part in the battle covered themselves with glory and became teachers of other leaders of the Russian squads in a long struggle with the Mongol-Tatars. The reasons for the battle were in the performance of their duties as allies and reluctance to let the Tatars into their lands. These noble aspirations could not triumph because of pride and disunity, which took many years to overcome.
The battlefield and the course of the battle
The opposing forces were not equal. The Russian army in the battle of Kalka outnumbered the enemy's forces; according to various estimates, the ranks of the Russians were from 30 to 110 thousand people. When approaching Kalka, the Russian princes Daniil Romanovich, Mstislav Romanovich, Mstislav Udaloy met the enemy in minor skirmishes, successful for Russian soldiers. Before the battle, there was a council in the camp of the Kiev prince, where the leaders of the squads were never able to develop a single battle tactics.
At dawn on May 31, 1223, the Polovtsian Khan Kotyan began crossing the river and met the advance detachments of the Mongols. In the outset, the outcome of the battle was seen as favorable for the coalition. The Polovtsi crushed the light horsemen, but fled from the main forces. Many chroniclers see this as the reasons for the defeat, because the fleeing Polovtsians brought confusion into the formation of the squads, which were just unfolding after overcoming the river.
The tragic result was also brought closer by the unwillingness of the Kiev prince Mstislav Romanovich to move his troops to the rescue, he left his squads on the opposite bank and prepared for a siege. The Mongolian cavalry rapidly developed success and drove the scattered Russian squads to the Dnieper. The battle with the Mongol-Tatars on Kalka was completed with the capture of the camp of the ruler of Kiev and the killing of all the captive princes under the platform of the feasting victors.
Russia grieves
The defeat at Kalka plunged the population of Russia into complete confusion and sowed fear of the Tatar horsemen. Order and discipline then showed for the first time their superiority over the strength and power of individual scattered squads. In terms of the quality of training and uniforms, Russian soldiers had no equal then, but small squads performed local tasks to protect the lands of their prince and did not see allies among their neighbors. The Mongol-Tatars were united by the great idea of conquering the world and were an example of discipline and battle tactics. Awareness of the need for unity took place in Russia hard and for a long time, but it led to the triumph of Russian weapons on the Kulikovo field a century and a half after the terrible tragedy.
At the end of the XII century, far from our place, in the steppes of Central Asia on the territory of present-day Mongolia, then inhabited by the tribes of the Merkits, Oirats, Kereits, Mongols and Tatars, there were important events, which largely determined the course of the history of all Eurasia in the following centuries. One of the leaders named Temujin (Temuchin) stood out from among their nomadic leaders, thanks to his talent as a commander and politician, will and boundless cruelty. The future "Shaker of the Universe" was born, according to the Persian historian Rashid ad-Din, in 1154 or 1155. Temujin succeeded, it seemed, the impossible: he managed to end the eternal military clashes between the tribes and directed their united energy to external conquests. In the spring of 1206, at the congress of nomadic leaders (kurultai), Temujin was "raised on a white mat of honor" and proclaimed the supreme ruler under the name of Genghis Khan.
Genghis Khan created from the nomadic horse masses, usually not distinguished by discipline, organization and stamina, an excellently organized, disciplined and mobile army. It was divided into tens, hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands (tumens, darkness). At the head of the divisions were vassals (noyons) dependent on Genghis Khan, associated with him by an oath of allegiance. Often mentioned in the literature, the term "nuker" (nokor, ie friend) in relation to the Mongol warrior meant a warrior, close in status to a member of the Old Russian or Old German squad. The main cadres of nоkоr come from the ruling class, but they could also include people of simple origin. For the most part, they themselves chose a noyon, whom they decided to serve on an oral contract. Noyons were endowed with a dependent nomadic population (ulus), the number of which made it possible to form military units subordinate to them (thousands, tumens). The area where the ulus roamed was called a yurt. A special place in the structure of the Mongol Empire was occupied by the Genghisids (genus of Genghis Khan), only to them could belong supreme power, the entire population was their ulus (ancestral possession). At the very foot of the Mongolian hierarchical pyramid were the poor, the rabble (kharachu) and slaves.
Mobile, perfectly organized, welded together by iron discipline and one-man command, ruled by the talented and loyal noyon commanders nominated by Genghis Khan, the Mongol army turned into a formidable weapon of conquest.
Its first victims were the neighboring feudal states of the Tanguts and Jurchens on the territory of modern China. In the campaigns of 1219-1221, the army of Genghis Khan defeated the state of the Khorezm Shahs in Central Asia, ancient cities, the famous centers of craft, trade and culture of Otrar, Bukhara, Samarkand fell. The invasion was marked by mass extermination and slavery of the population, destruction of the economy, the transformation of cities into ruins.
In the summer of 1220, after the crossing of his troops across the Amu Darya River, Genghis Khan sent three tumen (about 30 thousand soldiers) under the command of Jebe Noyon and Subedei Bagatur in a raid to the west, which historians traditionally consider as a reconnaissance raid in preparation for a great campaign to conquer the countries of the West. Having passed northern Iran with fire and sword, the Tumens bypassed the Caspian from the south and ended up on the territory of modern Azerbaijan. An attempt by the Mongols to penetrate into the steppes of the North Caucasus through the "Iron Gates", a narrow passage between the western coast of the Caspian Sea and the eastern end of the Caucasus Mountains near modern Derbent, did not bring success, the Derbent ruler, the Shirvanshahs, did not let them through. Under the pretext of negotiations, Subedei and Jebe took hostage representatives of the local nobility, who, on pain of death, showed the way to the North Caucasus through the Shirvan Gorge.
Here, the Alans (Ossetians), Lezgins and Polovtsians (Kipchaks), who had been wandering in the local steppe for more than a century, jointly opposed the conquerors. Failing to achieve victory in the battle with their united army, the Mongols resorted to cunning. Here is what Ibn al-Athir, an Arab historian of the first half of the 13th century, a contemporary of events, tells: “The Tatars sent to the Kipchaks to say:“ We and you are of the same clan, and these Alans are not yours, so you have nothing to help them; your faith is not like theirs, and we promise you that we will not attack you, but we will bring you as much money and clothes as you like; leave us with them. " The deal between them was settled in terms of money, clothes, etc .; they (the Tatars) really brought them what had been pronounced, and the Kipchaks left them (Alan). Then the Tatars attacked the Alans, made a beating between them, rampaged, robbed, took prisoners and went to the Kipchaks, who quietly dispersed on the basis of the peace concluded between them, and learned about them only when they descended on them and invaded their land. ... Then they (the Tatars) began to attack them over and over again, and took from them twice as much as what (themselves) brought them. Hearing this news, the Kipchaks living in the distance fled without any fight and left; some took refuge in the swamps, others in the mountains, and others went to the country of the Russians. "
Jebe and Subedey spent the autumn and early winter of 1222, expelling the Ciscaucasian Polovtsians, to the Stavropol and Kuban regions, where conditions for winter grazing of horses are quite favorable: “This land is abundant in winter and summer pastures; there are places in it that are cool in summer, with many pastures; and (there are) places warm in winter (also) with many pastures, i.e. low-lying places on the seashore ”. The next target of the Mongols was the trading cities of the Crimea, as reported by the already mentioned Ibn-al-Athir: “Having come to Sudak, the Tatars took possession of it, and its inhabitants dispersed; some of them with their families and their property climbed the mountains, some went to sea and left for the country of Rumskaya ... ”. This knowledgeable Arab historian calls Sudak (Surozh) the city of the Kipchaks, explaining that they get their goods from here, and characterizes in detail the turnover of this city: “... ships with clothes come to it; the latter are sold, and girls and slaves, Burtas furs, beavers, squirrels are bought with them ... ”.
The capture of Sudak by the Mongols is usually attributed to January 1223. Unfortunately, neither Ibn-al-Athir, nor Rashid-ad-Din (Volume 1, Book 2, Section 2, Part 7), who also spoke about this event, do not report how the Mongols got from the North Caucasus to Crimea. There are two possible routes: the shortest - through Taman and the Kerch Strait (Cimmerian Bosporus), and a longer, purely land - through the lower reaches of the Don, Northern Azov and Perekop. Many historians (including P.P. Tolochko, J. Fennel and others) on the maps proposed by them indicated the advance of the Jebe-Noyon and Subedei-Bagatur troops in exactly this way - along the northern coast of the Sea of Azov and, through Perekop, to the Crimea ... At the same time, they were guided by a simple consideration: the Kerch Strait in our time usually, even in the height of winter, does not freeze, and there could not be any floating means to quickly ferry tens of thousands of riders and replacement horses in the then Crimea. According to S.A. Pletneva, the Mongols nevertheless crossed the Kerch Strait, and O.B. Bubenok cites in his article, as arguments in favor of crossing the strait on ice, the testimony of Herodotus (5th century BC) and the Turkish author Evliya elebi (second half of the 17th century) about the possibility of crossing the Cimmerian Bosporus when it freezes. Let us point out two more evidences in favor of such a possibility, which were not mentioned in the work of O.B. Tambourine.
In 1792, a marble slab was found on the Taman Peninsula, on which it was knocked out in 1068: “In the summer of 6576 (1068) indica 6 Gleb the prince measured the sea on ice from Tmutarakan to Korchev 14,000 yards. " Tatar poet Mehmed Senayi, court chronicler of the Crimean Khan Islam Giray III, flatteringly and flatteringly describes the winter crossing of the troops on the ice across the Kerch Strait during the Tatars' campaign to the Caucasus (1648-1650), to the country of the Circassians: “... between the fortress Kersh and Taman is the Black Sea strait nine miles, at other times many ships were involved in the crossing here, usually the Islamic army could not cross even in twenty days. By the will of Allah Almighty, and the luck of Sahibkiran Khumayun, this bottomless sea froze and became solid like an agate stone, and the army crossed over like a huge iron bridge. "
Evidence of the freezing of the Kerch Strait and the passage of troops across it (on ice) from the 11th to the 17th century can be multiplied and multiplied. Thus, overcoming the frozen strait by the Mongols on the way to Sudak in the winter of 1222/1223 should be considered very likely, although we have no direct evidence of this fact.
6.2. Dating the Battle of Kalka
Before turning to the description of the events associated with the Battle of Kalka, let us consider their dating in the Russian chronicles and in the Eastern chroniclers. This is far from an idle question, stormy discussions about the date of the famous battle continued among historians until the 30s of the twentieth century, separate attempts to revise this date are being made now. To make it easier to understand the dating of the Battle of Kalka and understand what is the essence of the problem over which historians have been struggling for more than a century, let us summarize the main news of Russian chronicles and Eastern authors in two tables. The external inconsistency on this issue in the annalistic messages immediately catches the eye (see Table 6.1). It is easiest to write off the discrepancies in the dates as errors of chroniclers and scribes, they, in this sense, were not infallible, and they themselves admitted it.
Lavrenty-Mnykh (monk), finishing in the spring of 1377 the rewriting of the chronicle, which we now call, after his name, Laurentian, completed it with an eloquent confession: “... where he described, or rewrote, or did not add, honor, correcting, sharing God ( those. for God's sake), and do not curse, since the books are dilapidated, and the mind is young - has not reached. " But the reasons for the discrepancies in the annals in the dates are not only negligence, the "young mind" of the scribes or the dilapidation of books.
A big problem was created in this sense by the very system of chronology, borrowed by Russia, together with Christianity, from Byzantium. As in Constantinople, in Kiev they began to count the years from the "creation of the world", which "took place" 5508 years before the birth of Christ. In Byzantium, the year began in September, while Russia left the beginning of the year in March, as it was before her baptism, and new Year from September 1 (from Semyonov day), it was established in our country only at the end of the 15th century. Having shifted the beginning of the year by six months relative to Byzantium, the "literate and scribes" in Russia in March were faced with a choice of which number to assign to the coming new year, the number of that year that began last September and continued (according to Byzantium), or the number of the next year, which will start only next September. If the chronicler in March chose the number of the current year (as in Byzantium), then the style of the chronicle is called "March", if he preferred the number of the year, which will begin in Byzantium next September, then the style of the chronicle is called "Ultramart". Each chronicler solved this issue in his own way, therefore, in practice, in ancient Russian sources there are both "March" and "Ultramart" styles. It is clear that the difference in the designation of the same date for these two styles will be exactly 1 year. Each of the surviving chronicles is a collection of news borrowed from earlier sources using both the March and Ultramart styles. Therefore, in the same chronicle there are news dated in different styles.
Let us explain everything stated above with a simple and concrete example. In September 1222 (according to modern chronology), 6731 began in Byzantium from the creation of the world. The event of May 1223 (according to the modern calendar) is dated in Russia in March style to May 6731, and according to Ultramart - to May 6732 (which in Byzantium will begin only in September 1223).
Thus, the Laurentian, Ipatiev, Novgorod I and Tver chronicles date the battle on Kalka in 1223 (according to the modern calendar), different years from the creation of the world (6731 and 6732) appeared in their news due to the use of both the March and Ultramart styles ( see table 6.1). Eastern sources, completely independent of the Russian chronicle, confirm this date (see Table 6.2). Consequently, the most reasonable date of the Battle of Kalka at the present time is 1223.
We know the special point of view on this issue of the Mariupol historian and ethnographer R.I. Sayenko (now deceased), who attributed the events on Kalka to 1224, but, in the light of everything stated above, we cannot agree with her.
Table 6.1... Russian chronicles about the date of the Battle of Kalka
| A source | Date from the creation of the World according to the annals | The style of the annalistic message (March, Ultramart) after N.G. Berezhkov | Note |
| Laurentian Chronicle | May 30, 6731, on the day of memory of the holy Great Martyr Eremiah | March | The number is indicated incorrectly, the day of commemoration of the Holy Martyr Hermias is celebrated on May 31 (June 13, new style) |
| Ipatiev Chronicle | 6732 g. | ultramart | – |
| Novgorod I Chronicle | May 31, 6732, on the day of memory of the holy Great Martyr Eremiah | ultramart | – |
| Rogozhsky chronicler | June 16, 6734 * | ultramart | June 16 is indicated erroneously, this is the date when Vladimir Rurikovich became prince in Kiev (instead of Mstislav Romanovich who died on Kalka) |
* The year is clearly unreliable; it is not taken into account in modern studies.
Table 6.2... Eastern sources about the date of the Battle of Kalka
* The Muslim chronology is based on the Hijra (higra) - the resettlement of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina (622).
The chronicles also differ regarding the exact date of the battle (month, day) (see table 6.1). In the Ipatiev Chronicle, the date and month are not indicated at all, in a short message from the Laurentian Chronicle it is indicated May 30, the Novgorod I Chronicle, most informed about the events on Kalka, gives May 31. In a number of late (15th century) chronicles, in the Sofia I, Novgorod IV, Moscow Academic Chronicle, the Chronicler Rogozhsky, the date is indicated as June 16. What date should you stop at?
For May 30 and 31, it is quite easy to identify the mistake and make the right choice. Immediately after these dates, the messages, fortunately, contain a pious clarification that this happened on the feast day of the Holy Martyr Hermias, which was celebrated in Russia on May 31. How could it appear in the annals of May 30? In ancient Russian sources, there were no special signs for numbers, they were denoted by letters with a special dash at the top (tilde, title), for example: a҃ = 1, b҃ = 2, l҃ = 30, etc. When rewriting, one of the copyists missed a҃ , and May 31st (a҃) turned into May 30th ().
The consequence of such an error is, in our opinion, the appearance in the Chronicler of Rogozhsky of an obviously unreliable 6734 year of the battle (instead of 6731 from the creation of the world). Most likely, they confused a҃ = 1 with d҃ = 4, since the outline of the letters but("az") and d("good") in ancient Russian sources are quite close.
Since June 16, as the chronicle date of the Battle of Kalka, the situation is somewhat more complicated, but the fact that it is erroneous was reliably proven back in 1854 by A.A. Kunikom. A detailed presentation of the arguments in favor of the thesis about its erroneousness would take too much space, we will only point out that this is not the date of the battle itself, but the entry into the Kiev table of Prince Vladimir Rurikovich (instead of Mstislav Romanovich who died on Kalka). This issue is discussed in detail in the notes (pp. 317-318) to the detailed work of N.G. Berezhkov on the chronology of Russian annals.
Cited in later than chronicles, memoirs and testimonies of foreigners about Russia, the dating of the Battle of Kalka often contains how gross errors that there is even no point in considering them. For example, the Austrian diplomat Sigismund Herberstein, who twice (in 1517 and 1526) visited Russia, in his "Notes on Muscovy" (1549), referring to the chronicles and "stories of many people" (?), Dated the events on Kalka to 6533 from the creation of the world (1024 or 1025).
Thus, with a high degree of probability, it can be argued that initially the sources pointed to May 31, 1223, as the date of the unfortunate battle: "Behold, the malice come on for the month of May 31" (Novgorod I Chronicle,). It should be recalled, however, that the events on Kalka lasted for several days (from an unsuccessful battle after crossing the river, to the capture and death of a part of the Russian army), and to which of these events the indicated date should be tied is still unclear.
Concluding our journey through the chronological wilderness, let us point out another seemingly well-known fact. In February 1918, with the calendar reform in Russia, the day count was moved forward by 13 days. In this regard, May 31st according to the old style (Julian calendar) became June 13th according to the new style (the Gregorian calendar introduced in Catholic countries back in 1582 by Pope Gregory XIII). The chronicles, of course, are written according to the Julian calendar, according to which the date of the battle on Kalka is May 31. From any modern Orthodox church calendar, you can find out that the day of remembrance of St. Hermias, which was mentioned by the chroniclers, is celebrated today on June 13th. How can we be? What day, according to the new style (Gregorian calendar), is considered the anniversary of the battle? Without delving into calendar intricacies, let's say that the difference between the Julian and Gregorian calendars increases by 1 day in 128 years. Therefore, at the end of the 16th century, with the introduction of the Gregorian calendar, the counting of days had to be moved relative to the Julian by 10 days, and in the 20th century by 13 days. At the beginning of the XIII century, when the Battle of Kalka took place, this difference was 6 days, and May 31 in the annals according to the Julian calendar corresponds to our current June 6 (new style). It turns out, strictly speaking, that the anniversary of the battle according to the modern calendar should have been celebrated annually on June 6th.
If anyone has the desire and the opportunity to raise a pile for the peace of the souls of our ancestors who fell in the battle, then what an abundance of options opens up before him: May 31, June 6, and June 13! In my opinion, it is better to do this on June 6 or 13, with the first young cucumbers and other gastronomic pleasures of the beginning of summer. You shouldn't just mark all three dates at once ...
And what about the celebrations dedicated to the Battle of Kalka, which are held annually on May 31 in the Kamennye Mogily reserve? Participate, be sure to participate! And go to these celebrations yourself, and take your grandchildren with you! We must bow down to the ground to that group of enthusiasts, the main engine of which was V.A. Sirenko, who in our difficult time was able not only to organize these celebrations, but also to make them a local tradition over the years! It is only through such a collective action that the general public (even if not very experienced in chronological subtleties) can now join history, feel a blood and indissoluble connection with their ancestors - Russian warriors and princes who fell in battle.
6.3. Prelude, battle and defeat.
After wintering in the Crimea, Jebe and Subedey moved in the spring of 1223 through Perekop to the north, in the steppe between the Sea of Azov and the lower course of the Dnieper. What was happening at that time in Russia and within the Polovtsian field?
There is no doubt that in Russia they were well informed about the appearance of the Mongols, as well as about the events in the North Caucasus and Crimea. The news of the emergence of a new dangerous enemy was brought not only by the Ciscaucasian and Crimean Polovtsians, the whole steppe between the Don and the Dnieper began to move, gripped by fear of the Mongols.
The Ipatiev Chronicle: “In summer 6732. An unheard-of army is coming, the atheistic Moabites, recommenders to the Tatars, came to the Polovets land. … Yurgii Konchakovich is all the Polovtsian, you can't stand against their face, their awesome emo ”. Konchak's son Yuri, who inherited power over the most powerful association, the Donetsk Polovtsians, could not resist the Mongolian tumens. The Novgorod I Chronicle supplements this laconic message with tragic details: Yuri Konchakovich and Daniil, the son of the famous Khan Kobyak in the past, died in clashes with the Mongols (according to the chronicles, even before the Battle of Kalka).
Panic-stricken Polovtsians rushed to Russia for help, trying in every possible way to emphasize their loyalty and striving for unity in the face of common danger (the baptism of the influential Polovtsian Khan Basta is very significant in this sense). Having betrayed their Alan allies earlier at a critical moment, the Kipchaks paid dearly for this. The lesson was well learned, the Polovtsians realized how important it is to have a reliable ally in the impending terrible events.
In the previous chapter, we have already said that many princes in Russia were connected with the Polovtsian nobility by kinship. The prominent Polovtsian Khan Kotyan turned for help to his son-in-law, the influential prince Mstislav Mstislavovich (Udatny), who ruled at that time in Galich: “... our ( Polovtsian) earth today ( Today) taken away, and yours will be taken in the morning. " The sublime rhetoric was heavily supported by the rich gifts to the Russian princes - "horses and velbluds, and buffaloes, and girls ...". With the active participation of Mstislav Romanovich, who reigned in Kiev, a coalition of princes was formed, at a council in Kiev, held in the winter of 1222/1223, it was decided to meet the Mongols and give them battle outside Russia, "on someone else's land."
By comparing all the chronicle news, you can establish the composition of the coalition. In addition to Mstislav Udatny (Toropetsky), Mstislav Romanovich and Mstislav of Chernigov (the chronicles call them senior princes), it included younger princes: Daniil Romanovich (future Daniil Galitsky), Mikhail Vsevolodich, Vsevolod Mstislavich (son of a Kiev prince), Vladimir Rurikovich Smolensky, Prince Andrey (son-in-law of Mstislav of Kiev), Prince Alexander Dubrovichsky, Prince Svyatoslav Kanevsky, Izyaslav Ingvarevich, Svyatoslav Shumsky, Yuri Nesvizhsky. The influential Yuri Vsevolodovich Suzdalsky was not at the council, he sent to the aid of Prince Vasilko Konstantinovich Rostovsky (he was not in time for the battle). Let the reader not be misled by the abundance of princely names and high-profile titles, the specific petty trivia prevailed, about which they later spoke with irony in Russia: "In the Rostov land there is a prince in every village!"
The chronicles do not report on the participation of the Black Klobuki in the campaign, but their presence on the Kalka River is more than likely: without these loyal nomadic vassals of Kiev, not a single campaign to the steppe could do. Among the members of the coalition, the "Galician Vygons" are mentioned, led by the governors Yuri Domamirich and Derzhikray Vladislavich. According to most experts, this is a Slavic population expelled (or fled) from Galich, which included both commoners and separatist-minded boyars (boyar families of Domamirich and Kormilichich). The Vygonians settled south of the lands of the Galich principality, between the upper reaches of the Dniester and Prut rivers, on the territory of today's Moldova.
Khan Kotyan headed the Polovtsian "regiments" on Kalka; the chronicle also names the Russian governor Yarun. In the Tver Chronicle and the Chronicler Rogozhsky, closely associated with it, it is said about the participation in the battle and death of the hero Alyosha (Alexander) Popovich from the city of Rostov on Kalka. If this is not a late insertion of the XIV-XV centuries, then an interesting plot about the last Russian hero, continuing the epic tradition, could have entered the Chronicler Rogozhsky from the Suzdal vault of the XIII century. The question of on whose side the brodniks participated in the battle (and whether they participated at all), we will discuss later, analyzing the course of the battle itself.
The coalition was very motley and loose; there was practically no united will and general command in it. Formally, Mstislav Romanovich of Kiev was in charge, but Mstislav Mstislavovich Galitsky possessed the greatest authority in the affairs of the military, endowed with military experience, energy, marked by luck (Udatny!) And courage (with a noticeable share of adventurism). The Ipatiev Chronicle directly speaks of the bad personal relations of Mstislav Udatny with Mstislav Romanovich and Mstislav Chernigov: “... enmity) the ima is great ... ".
It is extremely difficult to determine the total number of the Russian-Polovtsian army that opposed the Mongols in the events on Kalka. Known estimates are based on chronicle reports of losses and the proportion of survivors after the battle. These messages are confused and contradictory. It is said that one in ten survived. The number of killed soldiers from Kiev varies from 10,000 in the Laurentian Chronicle to 30,000 in the Tver Chronicle. How many adult men are there in everything that was not very extensive then Kiev principality, perhaps, and not scrape together ... As mentioned above, all estimates of the size of the Russian-Polovtsian army are very shaky, according to R.P. Khrapachevsky (it seems to us more or less reasonable), the entire army did not exceed 40-50 thousand soldiers (20-25 thousand Russians with Black Klobuks and Galician exiles, no more than 20 thousand Polovtsians). The number of Mongols can be said more definitely, according to most historians, it was 20-30 thousand horsemen.
In its composition, the united Russian-Polovtsian army was supposed to have not only a lot of cavalry, but also a significant proportion of foot soldiers, as evidenced by the large number of ships used to deliver troops to the area of the Dnieper rapids (cavalry, as a rule, were not transported in boats). The average speed of movement of such a mixed army across the steppe was determined in the second half of the 19th century by historians N. Aristov and N. Barsov when analyzing V. Monomakh's campaign in 1103 on the Molochnaya River, it was 25 versts (26.8 kilometers) per day. Already today, having considered the movement of the mixed army of Dmitry Donskoy before the Battle of Kulikovo from Kolomna to the mouth of the Nepryadva River, historians have received an average daily march of 22-23 kilometers. These two independent estimates gave close results, therefore, below we will consider the length of the daily passage of a mixed Russian-Polovtsian army on average about 25 kilometers.
Preparations for the battle on Kalka were coming to an end, the princes and squads "horse and arms" were going on a campaign, touched by the calls for help (and rich gifts) of Khan Kotyan. Not everyone in Russia sympathized with the Polovtsians who suffered from the Mongols and were eager to help them, in the annalistic messages there is more gloating than sympathy: “The Polovtsian of the godless have killed a lot. And inєkh znanasha, and so we kill them with the yoke of God and cleanse him to Matera. Much more evil is spreading the lands of the Polovtsi of Ruskoy land, for the sake of the all-merciful God, although he will destroy and punish the godless sons of Ishmael, the Kumans, as if to avenge the blood of the Khrystiyansky ... ".
The troops of both sides begin to move into the area of the Dnieper rapids, where they were destined to collide for the first time.
The sources do not give any specific information about the time and route of the Mongols from the Crimea, there are only reports that they “stayed for some time in the land of Kipchatsk, but then, in 620 ( February 4, 1223 - January 23, 1224) moved to the country of Russians. " Being in the Crimea for several months, Subedei and Dzhebe could not but know where the Russian lands are, and which land road to go there. An ancient trade route leading to Russia began immediately to the north of Perekop, and the Mongols most likely moved along it. This path led to the Krarian (Kichkassky) ford across the Dnieper north of Khortitsa, described by Konstantin Porphyrogenitus, who emphasized that Khersonites (Byzantine merchants, inhabitants of the Crimea) were going through it when they returned by dry route from Rus. Subedei and Jebe set out on a campaign after the steppes turned green and tens of thousands of horses (the basis of Mongolian military power) were fed after wintering.
The chronicles give some details of the collection and routes of movement of the Russian-Polovtsian army. The army gathered at the border town of Zaruba (today a settlement remains from it near the village of Zarubintsy, Kiev region, on the right-bank Dnieper steep slopes north of Kanev). The place of gathering was chosen very thoughtfully, there was a Zarubinetsky ford across the Dnieper nearby, allowing troops to approach from the Left Bank. Most likely, the Mongols sent their first embassy here, to Zarub, trying to split the Russian-Polovtsian coalition by diplomatic methods. An attempt to disunite the opponents and beat them one by one, so successfully implemented by Subedei and Jebe in the North Caucasus, failed here: "The princes did not listen to the same Russia, they beat the ambassadors ...". Having executed the ambassadors, the princes in April began to move south along the Dnieper. During campaigns in the steppe, the cavalry usually walked on the right bank overland, the foot soldiers sailed down the river in boats (see Monomakh's campaign to Molochnaya in 1103). A convenient gathering place was Khortytsya (Varyazhsky Island), here the troops could calmly accumulate, without fear of a sudden strike from the nomads.
Thanks to the Galicia-Volyn vault in the Ipatiev Chronicle, the route of the approach of the Galician Vygonians is also known. They went to the Black Sea, descending along the Dniester (in the chronicle, erroneously - along the Dnieper), then ascended with the whole flotilla of a thousand boats along the Dnieper to the rapids "and stasha about the river Khortice, on the broadway about Protolchi ..." The modern map shows two rivers Khortitsa flowing into the Old Dnieper: Upper Khortitsa (flows opposite the Baida Island) and Lower Khortitsa, located to the south, between the modern village of the same name and Razumovka. Since the chronicle clearly connects the Khortitsa River with the ford, and we believe that we are talking about the Kichkassky (Krarian) ford, we give preference to the Verkhnyaya Khortitsa River, it is closer to this ford.
Here again the question arises, what are the chronicle Protolchi? This name is found in sources more than once and is interpreted by historians in different ways. From the point of view of the philologist I.I. Sreznevsky, Protlch-protolch, this is "a compressed river bed, a swiftness." With regard to Monomakh's campaign to Molochnaya, S.A. Pletneva considers Protolchi "a wide right-bank valley of the middle Dnieper". K.V. Kudryashov, on his maps dedicated to the same campaign, places the Protolch'i on the Left Bank, below the rapids, between the Volnyanka River and the Kichkassky ford. Analyzing the geographical aspect of the events on Kalka, K.V. Kudryashov is even more specific in his localization of the Protolches: "The protesters were placed below the rapids, but above the island of Khortitsa, on the very ford, which from time immemorial served as a famous crossing point across the Dnieper." On the other hand, according to the oral local tradition, the name Protoloch was assigned to the low-lying (southern) part of the Khortytsya island, where there are no steep steep shores, since 1955 it has been partially flooded by the waters of the Kakhovsky Sea. DI. Yavornitsky also places Protolchu in the southern part of Khortitsa, "against the Horse Waters." In modern literature, the annalistic Protolchi, as a place of gathering of troops in 1103, 1190 and 1223, is often identified with the southern part of Khortitsa. However, excavations of medieval settlements in the southern part of the island bring more and more Golden Horde finds (including coins from the mid-14th century). In this regard, the settlements on Khortitsa are being re-dated towards rejuvenation, their connection with the annalistic Protolchs is increasingly becoming purely speculative, although it cannot be categorically rejected.
Taking advantage of such a disagreement in opinions, we venture to express our own assumption that those places in the Dnieper valley where steep steep slopes receded from the water, forming a break of the high bank, were called protolch. Therefore, on the Left Bank, the valley of the Volnyanka River, the mouths of the gullies that go out to the Dnieper at modern Pavlokichkas, on the Right Bank - the mouths of the Volnaya, Purisova, Baburka, and the river valleys of the Upper and Lower Khortitsa could be called protolchki. The southern end of Khortitsa, where the shores gently sink to the water, could also be called protolch, in contrast to the rest of the steep and high coastal edge of this island. It is understandable why the chronicles speak of the boats stopping in protolch, here it was convenient to moor and unload foot soldiers and cargo on the gentle bank, while the high, steep banks represent a difficult obstacle in this sense.
Thus, it is very likely that the Galician Vygons, with their numerous boats, settled at the mouth of the Upper Khortitsa River, near the Kichkassky ford.
By the way, in publications about the Battle of Kalka there is a statement that these "vygons" were vassals of the Galician prince. If these are exiles, fugitives from the Galician principality (separatist-minded boyars, common people), then they could not be connected with the Galician prince by relations of vassalage (service in exchange for the grant of an inheritance). The place of the vassal during the medieval war - as part of the squad of the sovereign (Galician prince)! The Ipatiev Chronicle really mentions the Galician squad: "Galicians and Volyntsi kizhdo with their princes ...". The "vygontsy" are mentioned in the same place, but separately from the princely squads, and they were not vassals of Mstislav Mstislavovich Toropetsky (Udatny).
Consequently, according to chronicles, the united Russian-Polovtsian army concentrated on the island of Khortitsa and on the Right Bank, beyond the Old Dnieper. A wide water barrier insured against a sudden enemy strike.
Somewhere here, on the territory of modern Zaporozhye or in its immediate environs, the united army visited the second embassy from the Mongols. This time, the essence of the Mongolian proposals is described in the most detail in the Novgorod I Chronicle of the older version (Synodal List): “And I sent the second Tatar ambassadors to them, like this: go ahead; but we didn’t tell you, but God’s all. ” There is no talk of any calls to jointly deal with the Polovtsy, and therefore the ambassadors (unlike the first embassy) kept their heads on their shoulders, and were released without hindrance.
With regard to the two Mongolian embassies mentioned by us in the Novgorod IV Chronicle, the Chronicler of Rogozh and the Chronicle of Abraham, there are reports that 17 days have passed from the execution of the first embassy to the appearance of the ambassadors. The first embassy visited the princes at the Zarubinetsky ford, the second - in the area of the Dnieper rapids. Could the princes, moving on horseback along the right bank of the Dnieper, cover a distance of almost 400 kilometers in 17 days? This is possible already with a day's march of 24 kilometers, for a purely equestrian army it is quite achievable. Some distrust of this news is due only to the fact that the above chronicle sources date from the end of the 15th - 16th century, in the earlier chronicles of the 13th - 14th centuries (Lavrentievskaya, Ipatievskaya, Novgorodskaya I senior edition) there are no such news.
According to the Novgorod I Chronicle, Mstislav Mstislavovich was the first to cross to the left bank and with 1000 soldiers entered the battle with the Tatar "watchmen" (reconnaissance patrol), apparently watching the crossing. However, the Ipatiev Chronicle (Galicia-Volyn vault), clearly not indifferent to the young Volyn prince Daniil (the future Daniil Galitsky), credits him with the first meeting with the Mongols, who came "to see Lyadia Ruskikh."
Here is an interesting (but controversial) detail of the crossing. It is possible that the crossing of the Dnieper was carried out with the help of a floating bridge formed by a multitude of boats, made up side to side: “according to the Dnipro who crossed over, as if to cover the water from a multitude of lyadia”. The text of the Ipatiev Chronicle says "... a multitude of people ...", but some historians believe that this is a slip of the tongue (see, for example, the comments on the text of this chronicle on the Izbornik website), and it is precisely about the multitude of boats that covered the Dnieper, and not about a lot of people. How many rooks would it take for a floating bridge? To do this, it is necessary to estimate the width of the Dnieper River before the construction of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station on it in 1932. Just at the site of the Kichkassky ford, in 1902-1908, the Kichkassky bridge with a length of 336 meters was built across the river (blown up in 1920 by the Makhnovists). It is unlikely that the width of the boat exceeded 3 meters; to make a floating bridge of the same length, at least 110 ships are needed. Even if the chronicle exaggerates, reporting about 1000 boats only among the "Galician Vygons", then the Russians clearly had several hundred ships, and they could have made such a bridge.
The assessments of the combat effectiveness of the Tatar army, which were given by the Russians at the first meeting with him, are curious and characteristic. From their Polovtsian allies, the princes knew about the victories of the Mongols, where did it come from, even before the first battle, that the Tatars were unimportant warriors, arrows, simpler than the Polovtsians? What does the arrow have to do with it? The Russians rated the enemy by appearance, they did not find in the ranks of the Mongols heavily armed cavalry (distinguished from the Polovtsians by chain mail and helmets with masks to protect the face), the most combat-ready and staunch enemy of theirs in the steppe war. The Tatar army consisted of lightly armed archers (shooters), among the Polovtsy such warriors did not differ in military skill or endurance. Hence the shapkozakidatelny assessment of the enemy by part of the Russian soldiers.
Chroniclers-contemporaries of the appearance of the Mongols in Eastern Europe also speak of their light weapons, deny the presence of chain mail and helmets with masks: "Their weapons are light and [made] of leather." Mentioned only of metal plates sewn on the front of the armor made of bovine skins. “Their armor is made of leather, almost impenetrable; offensive weapons [made] of iron ... "," ... their shells are made of leather, and they are stronger than iron, and in the same way the horse harness. " Thus, the sources almost unanimously say that the Mongols, in the first half of the XIII century, had no heavily armed cavalry. The arguments that she was then the main branch of the Mongols, as well as the assumptions about her participation on the side of the Tatars in the Battle of Kalka, are groundless.
The remnants of the Tatar "watchman" defeated by Mstislav Mstislavovich with the governor Gemyabeg (Gonyabek, Sgemyabek) were pushed back to the top of the Polovtsian mound, but they could not resist there either: “... and burying the governor in his belly, Gemyabega is still alive, although he lives in his belly. ". Gemyabeg was captured and executed by the Polovtsy, who begged the prisoner from Mstislav Udatny. According to M.V. Elnikov, the first successful clashes with the Mongols took place "near Saur-Mogila (...) known from legends and stories (...) on the Konka River, where iron arrowheads from the late Middle Ages are found." This is most likely a rocky hill on the right bank of the Konka River, two kilometers northwest of the modern village of Yulievka. The assumption is completely sound, in contrast to the dubious constructions of V.N.Shovkun and V. Arkhipkin, who considered the vicinity of Yulievka to be the site of the main battle and defeat on the Kalka, and Saur-Mohyla was the fortified camp of Mstislav Kievsky. With sensational discoveries V.N. Shovkun, who boldly refute everything that is known about the Battle of Kalka from Russian chronicles, was repeatedly introduced to readers by the local newspapers Industrial Zaporozhye and Zaporizhzhya Sich, but let me not comment on these articles ...
In accordance with the Ipatiev Chronicle, on Tuesday (date not specified) there was a general crossing of all the princely squads and Polovtsians to the left bank of the Dnieper. The first clashes with the Tatars were successful: “… Ousrєtosh Tatareve of the Ruskyi regiment. ... Ruskyi victory and gnasha are far away in the field, and taking their cattle ... ". The same chronicle speaks further about the pursuit of the retreating Mongol detachments for 8 days "until the river of Kalka." Here another clash with the Mongols took place and “Ivan Dmitrievich was killed ( most likely, the Russian voivode, such a prince among the participants in the battle is not mentioned in the chronicles) other two with him ... ".
Judging by the Ipatiev Chronicle, the Russian-Polovtsian army was divided into at least two parts. In the vanguard were the Galician-Volyn regiments and Polovtsians, the energetic and courageous (before adventurism) Mstislav Udatny commanded here: “Mstislav Mstislavlich led the kou Kalkou Danilovi ( Romanovich Galitsky) from the regiment inm regiment with him, and himself on it, pereide, eha himself in the guard ... ". Another part of the army, which followed at some distance, was led by the nominal head of the coalition, Mstislav Romanovich Kievsky. We have already mentioned the enmity of these two leaders, noted in the annals. The division into two groups developed spontaneously, under the influence of relationships of property and kinship, and not tactical considerations.
The further course of events is reconstructed by comparing the Ipatiev and Novgorod I chronicles. After the passage of Kalka, the Russians "... sending the watchmen Yarun from Polovtsi, and you yourself will be stasha." The first blow of the main Mongolian forces fell on this forward "watchman" led by the voivode Yarun, the Polovtsians were thrown back and, in flight, crushed the advanced Russian forces: "... and all shriveled up, and there was a set of evil and fierceness. " A characteristic detail: Mstislav Udatny, already realizing that he had faced the main forces of the enemy, did not notify Mstislav Romanovich of Kiev "who was not seeing the country" and did not turn to him for help!
The personal courage and art of wielding weapons displayed by individual Russian soldiers did not play any role in the atmosphere of disorganization and general flight, and the princes had to "turn their horse to the bog", fleeing the pursuing Tatars: "Tatars went along the Russian princes, hitting the Dnieper ... ... The mounted warriors had some chances to reach the saving crossing before the Tatars, but the fate of the Russian foot army was most likely sad. In our treeless places there was nowhere to hide, reeds along the beams and individual bushes could not provide a saving shelter.
Mstislav Udatny managed to cross over: “Mstislavits Mstislav earlier crossed the Dnieper, cutting off ( pushed away) Daniil Romanovich Volynsky and Vladimir Rurikovich Smolensky, who soon occupied the Kiev grand-ducal table, escaped with the remnants of the squads. It seems that we are really talking about the destruction of a floating bridge made of boats so that the Tatars would not pass along it, but the Russian warriors, who had not yet had time to approach the crossing, also lost their chances of salvation. During this indiscriminate retreat to the Dnieper, no less than six princes perished: "... they drove up to the Dnieper, killing 6 princes: Svyatoslav Yanevsky, Izyaslav Ingvorovits, Svyatoslav Shumskago, Mstislav of Chernigov with his son, Gyur Nesvezhsky."
Let's return to that part of the army, which was headed by Mstislav Romanovich Kievsky. It does not follow from the chronicle texts that he crossed the Kalka. Seeing the flight and defeat of the Russian army, he did not intervene in the battle, but remained in his camp together with princes Andrey (his son-in-law) and Alexander Dubrovichsky: be on the mountain above the river above Kalkom; whether the place is rocky, and that you put the city near you in kolikh, and fight with them from that city for 3 days. " Part of the Mongol army, which did not participate in the pursuit of the remnants of the Russian army retreating to the Dnieper, under the leadership of two governors "Chgyrkan and Teshukan" laid siege to the fortified camp of Mstislav. The camp was fenced not with stakes, as is usually believed (where did they get them from in our treeless places?), But "stakes", that is. carts, wheeled carts. The location of the camp “on a mountain above the river above Kalkom; no place is rocky ”, of course, created difficulties for the besiegers, but it was not an insurmountable obstacle for the Mongols, who had the experience of taking real fortresses. The position of the Russian squad under a hail of arrows, without water, without outside help, should be assessed as hopeless. Mstislav was forced to enter into negotiations, trying to bargain for life, in exchange for a ransom. As a negotiator, the Mongols used the voivode of Brodniks, nicknamed Ploskynya (the chronicle does not report the name), rightly believing that the princes would rather believe a Christian ("... the voivode is honest with a kiss ..."). Voluntarily or involuntarily, but Ploskynya deceived the princes: “... he lied to the trick: if he tied it up, he would betray them by his Tatars; and took the city, and cut the people, and fell that bone ... ". The captive princes, unlike other warriors, were prepared for an honorable, according to Mongolian concepts, execution (without shedding blood). They were crushed by the boards, on which the winners sat down to feast: "... and having issued them, put them underneath the boards, and at the very top of the saddle to have dinner ...".
Let us now turn to the question of the role of the roamers in the events on Kalka. Quite often there is a statement that they participated in the battle on the side of the Mongols. Let's see how this statement is justified.
Here is a typical quote from the book of the Mariupol journalist N.G. Rudenko: "... im" I am one of them ( brodnikov) - the leaders of Ploskin - brought to us the Lavrenty and Novgorod literature. The stench informs about those who, in the battle on Kaltsi in 1223, rotsi the rovers fought on the side of the Mongol-Tatars ... ". Immediately, we note that in the entire text of the list of the Laurentian Chronicle that has come down to us, dated 1377, nowhere is there any mention of not only the voivode Ploskyn, but in general about the brodniks in the battle on Kalka. The Novgorod I Chronicle of the older edition (Synodal List) speaks only of the presence of wanderers with the Tatars at the besieged camp of Mstislav ("the same wanderer from the Tatars was gone"), about Ploskyn's participation in the negotiations and his violation of "kissing the cross". Did the leader of the roamers deserve the epithet "okannyi" (sinful, damned), which the chronicler awarded him? Yes, of course, even if he and his gang did not participate in the battle on the Mongol side. After all, he committed a sin by breaking the oath on the cross, but nowhere in the annals does it say that the roamers participated in the battle on the side of the Tatars!
On the other hand, there is no reason to link the “kissing of the cross” of Ploskyn, mentioned in the Novgorod I Chronicle, with his oath of allegiance to the Kiev prince Mstislav Romanovich, as is done in work. It does not follow from the chronicle that Ploskynya swore allegiance to the prince, he only promised, kissing the cross during the negotiations, that the princes would not be killed, but released for a ransom: "... how not to beat them, let them go to the ransom ...".
Summing up all the available (and extremely scanty!) Information about the Brodniks and their leader Ploskyn in the Battle of Kalka, it must be stated that the chronicle does not say on which side they participated in the battle, and whether they participated in the battle at all. There is only information about their stay with the Tatars at the besieged camp of Mstislav Romanovich and the deception of the princes during negotiations. Beyond that, one can only make assumptions and assess the degree of their plausibility. In my opinion, the following scenarios are possible, which in no way contradict the message of the Novgorod I Chronicle:
1. The Brodniks came as allies, together with the Russians and Polovtsians, took part in the battle and were captured at its first stage.
2. Brodniks did not participate in the battle, but were captured by the Mongols before the battle, for example, on the Left Bank, below the rapids, where the army of Jebe and Subedey followed the Dnieper bank from Perekop to the Kichkassk ferry.
Personally, taking into account the early news of the Brodniks, who came, together with the Polovtsy, as allies to the Russian princes (see the message of the Ipatiev Chronicle under 1147), the first scenario seems more plausible. This course of events is described in the popular book by M.V. Elnikov. Further, the Tatars could use Ploskynya "with comrades" as an involuntary human shield and negotiators; when capturing cities, the Mongols practiced this in Khorezm and, later, in Russia.
There is no doubt that the leader of the roamers was a Christian, this directly follows from the chronicle news already quoted by us. Can Ploskynya and his army be considered Slavs? It is impossible to give a categorically positive answer to this question. Judging by the nickname of the leader (we do not know his Christian name, received at baptism), his belonging to the Slavs is very likely, but no more. But his gang, most likely, was very motley in the ethnic sense, it could include both Slavs and Alans-Ases, Bulgarians, even nomads who fought off their ancestral koshes and changed the original way of life. It seems logical to consider the Brodniks of the first third of the 13th century as descendants of the Saltovo-Mayatsk culture, the remnants of the mixed sedentary population of the Khazar Kaganate (see Chapter 4), but this does not follow from written sources. Unfortunately, according to the results of excavations, it has not yet been possible to prove the Slavic affiliation of the Brodniks. As an archaeologist, M.V. Yelnikov considers the main obstacle in this at the moment to be the impossibility of archaeological or anthropometric (by measuring the remains) of separating the roammers from the general array of pre-Mongol and Horde burial sites in our steppe.
That's all for now about the wanderers. Let us return to them in the next, Horde chapter, much more information has been preserved about the settled population of our steppes in that era. Our constant interest in the roamers is associated with the assumption (so far - unproven, let's not forget about it!) That their gangs later became the embryos of the Cossacks, both Zaporozhye and Don.
And what about Russia after the defeat on Kalka? Many were left to lie in the steppe of its defenders and plowmen, a lot of representatives of the Russian nobility, governors and boyars: “… and many people were thirsty; and there was a cry, and a cry, and sorrow over the hail all over, and over the village. " Today we cannot reliably estimate the size of these human losses, contemporaries of the battle on Kalka also found it difficult to do so. According to the Laurentian Chronicle, some of the Kiev warriors killed 10,000 people: "Kyyan oneєkh drove a volume of 10 thousand to the regiment, and it would be crying and tough in Russia ...". From the "Livonian Chronicle" of Henry of Latvia: "And the Tatars chased them for six days, and killed more than a hundred thousand people (and only God knows the exact number of them), the rest fled ...". The fugitives, reaching for Russia, were also plundered along the way by the former Polovtsian allies, taking away not only horses, but also clothes: "... and some Polovtsi were run away from their horse, but also from other countries."
The chronicles are practically unanimous that after the battle the Mongols did not go to the Right Bank, but turned from the Dnieper and moved along the lands of the Left Bank: "... the Tatars returned from the Dnieper River ...", "Turn the Tatars back from the Dnieper River to the Eastern land ..." At the same time, specific cities and villages on the left-bank Pereyaslavl land, which were destroyed, were not named, but when moving along the Dnieper to the north, Pereyaslavschina should inevitably come under attack. From the Dnieper cities, according to chronicles, Novgorod Svyatopolch (Svyatopolkov), founded in 1095 on the high right bank of the Dnieper, on the ancient Vitichev hill, suffered. Contrary to the opinion of M.V. Elnikov, the chronicles do not contain any reports of the destruction by the Mongols of the fortified cities on the Right Bank, along the Ros River (Rodnya, Korsun, Torchesk, Boguslavl). Of the cities of the Seversk land, as a victim, only Novgorod-Seversky (on the Desna) is mentioned, and even then, only in one chronicle, Patriarch's or Nikon's. After Kalka, there was no one in Russia to stop the Mongols on the Left Bank with a sword, and attempts to go out to meet them with a procession ended in tears: “… to those who do not lead Rousi to flatter them, proceeding from the cross. They beat them all ... ”.
Where the Tumens of Subedei and Jebe then went, the chronicles do not report, the Mongols simply disappeared from the Russian horizon. But information about the further route of the Tatars can be gleaned from the eastern authors, the already mentioned Arab historian Ibn-al-Athir writes: “… The Tatars (…) went to Bulgar at the end of 620. When the Bulgar inhabitants heard about their approach to them, they ambushed them in several places, marched against them (Tatars), met them and, luring them until they went behind the ambush site, attacked them from the rear, so that they (Tatars) remained in the middle; the sword drank from all sides, many of them were killed and only a few of them survived. They say that there were up to 4,000 of them. They went (from there) to Saksin, returning to their king Genghis Khan. " Thus, at the end of 620 AH (4 Feb 1223 - 23 Jan 1224), the army of Subedei and Jebe suffered a serious defeat somewhere in the Volga Bulgaria (in the middle reaches of the Volga, on the territory of modern Tatarstan), from their invincible tumens little is left. The city of Saksin, mentioned further by Ibn al-Athir, was located in the Lower Volga region.
Rushing like a whirlwind across the Caucasus, the Polovtsian Field and Russia, the Mongols disappeared from the Russian horizon, but left us one of the most intriguing mysteries of medieval history: where did the battle on Kalka take place?
6.4. About the place of the battle on Kalka.
The opinions given in the epigraph well illustrate the well-known saying that every pessimist is a well-informed optimist. Alas, most often amateurs express extreme optimism about the search for the site of the battle on Kalka. As they delve deeper into the problem, their optimism passes away like a childhood illness, being replaced by an understanding of the complexity of the issue and extreme caution in statements and assessments. Alas, the task of localizing the place of the battle is extremely difficult and, as I believe, today, it does not have a single indisputable solution. What is the problem?
Information about the site of the battle on Kalka can be obtained, generally speaking, either from written sources (Russian chronicles, Eastern authors, Western European sources), or from archaeological material. Let's consider all these possible sources and try to extract everything that is possible from them in order to shed light on the issue of interest to us.
Let's start with written evidence. The situation is simpler with European reports, as a rule, apart from mentioning the very fact of the battle, they do not provide any geographic information on its place.
An exception is the History of the Tatars, written by Benedict Pole from Wroclaw, a companion and translator at the Plano Carpini embassy (we will talk about this embassy in detail in our place), which Pope Innocent IV sent to the Mongols. The embassy took place in 1245-1249, proceeding through Kiev to the east at the end of the winter of 1245, i.e. just 22 years after the events of interest to us. In this "History of the Tatars" by brother Caesar de Bridia (as it is traditionally called by the name of the translator) it is said about the place of the battle: "And the Komans, having united with all the Russians, fought with the Tartars between two streams - the name of one of them is Kalk, and the other is Koniuzu, that is, "water of sheep", because "coni" in Tartar means oves [sheep] in Latin, and uzzu means aqua [water], and they were defeated by the Tartars. ”What can be useful here? The battle took place between two small rivers ( “Streams”), one of which is called Kalk. The second river Koniuzzu just wants to be connected with the Konka, but we have no reason for this, except for some similarity of names.
The Polish historian and geographer Matthew Mekhovsky (1457 - 1523), talking about the battle on Kalka, reports that the Polovtsy and Russians got to its place from Protolchey (Protol'tsa) on the Dnieper "... by twelve crossings to the Kalka River (Kalcza)". Obviously, we mean daily crossings. The source of information for him was the "History of Poland" by the earlier Polish historian and Catholic hierarch Jan Dlugosz (1415-1480), who used Russian and Lithuanian chronicles in his work.
The news about the Battle of Kalka in the writings of Sigismund Herberstein, the Venetian ambassador to Muscovy Francesco Tiepolo and the Polish historian Reingold Heydenstein is extremely stingy in terms of information, from geographical information they contain only a mention of the Kalki River (Tiepolo also does not mention it).
What do the eastern authors report about the geographical realities of the battle?
The Arab historian Ibn-al-Athir, without mentioning the Kalka River, rather briefly talks about the course of the first clash of Russia with the Mongols, but reports that the Russians chased the Tatars for 12 days, after which a decisive battle took place. According to the text, it is not clear from what moment these twelve days 'transitions of the retreating Tatars should be counted: “Having heard the news about them, the Russians and Kipchaks, who had time to prepare for battle with them, set out on the Tatars' path to meet them before they came to their land, and reflect them from her. The news of their movement reached the Tatars, and they (Tatars) turned back. Then the Russians and Kipchaks had a desire (to attack) them; believing that they had returned out of fear of them and out of powerlessness to fight them, they zealously began to persecute them. The Tatars did not stop retreating, and they chased in their tracks for 12 days ... ".
And here is what Rashid ad-Din writes about the battle in the “Collection of Chronicles” (“Jami at-tavarih”, volume 1, book 2, section 2, part 7): “The Kipchaks and Uruses, believing that they [Tatars] retreated in fear, pursued the Mongols at a distance of twelve days' journey. Suddenly the Mongol army turned back and hit them ... ". Kalka is again not named, and it is difficult to understand from what moment the countdown of these 12 days of travel should begin.
The Persian historian Juzjani, a contemporary of the Battle of Kalka (born around 1193, fled from the horrors of the Mongol invasion of India), who was extremely negative towards the Mongols, limited himself to a brief report about the conquest of the Kipchak steppe, about the first clash of the conquerors with Russia in his "Nasir ranks "Is not said at all.
The Persian historian Juvaini, who is very aware of the Mongol conquests, who himself served in Khorosan to the Mongols from a young age, in his "History of the Conqueror of the World", written only 30-40 years after the Battle of Kalka, in 1252-1260, does not mention this battle at all ... Vassaf says nothing about her either, whose "History" contains a lot of other interesting information about the Mongols and is based on the works of Juvaini, Rashid-ad-din and, apparently, on oral tradition and eyewitness accounts.
The later Egyptian historian Badr-ad-Din al-Aini (1360-1451) reports very briefly about the first clash of the Mongols with the Russians: “The Kipchaks took refuge in the lands of the Russians, who were Christians, and agreed with them to give the Tatars a battle. They agreed with them, but the Tatars inflicted a very strong defeat on them ... ". This gives nothing to determine the place of the battle.
In Chinese sources, Kalka (in the spelling "A-li-tszi") is mentioned as the site of the battle of Subedey "... with the older and younger Mstislavs, a Russian tribe who surrendered ...". There is indeed a phonetic similarity between the Russian name of the river and its Chinese transcription, but this is the geographic reality in Chinese sources.
Almost everything that we know about the Battle of Kalka today has its source in the Russian chronicle. In order not to miss anything from this valuable source, I had to analyze all the chronicles, vaults and chronicles at my disposal with mention of the battle and extract the maximum possible from them to determine its place. These are the chronicle sources. Let's proceed to their detailed analysis.
Table 6.3... Russian chronicles used to localize the site of the battle on Kalka
| P / p No. | Name of the chronicle, set, list | Creation time, list | The nature of the message | River name (mentioned year) |
Number of day trips to battle | Note |
| 1 | Laurentian Chronicle | end of XIII century, list of 1377 | short | not | not | |
| 2 | Ipatiev Chronicle | end of XIII - beginning of XIV century | detailed version 1 | Calca, other Calca (1223), on Kalki (1236) | There is no episode with Gemyabek, there is about the seizure of booty, the camp of Mstislav Kievsky is only mentioned | |
| 3 | Novgorodskaya I senior edition, Synodal List | end of XIII - beginning of XIV century | detailed version 2 | Over the Kalak river, over the river over the Kalk (1223) | 9 after crossing the Dnieper, we went beyond the Kalak river | There is an episode with Gemyabek, there is no seizure of booty in the first skirmish, in detail about the death of the camp of Mstislav Kievsky |
| 4 | Novgorodskaya I junior edition, Commission list | mid 15th century | detailed version 2 | For the Kalok river, above the river above the Kalk (1223) | 9 after crossing the Dnieper, we went beyond the Kalok river | |
| 5 | Novgorod IV Chronicle | late 16th century | Brief | On Kalki (1223), on Kalki (1380) | not | |
| 6 | Pskov I Chronicle | late 15th century | Brief | not | ||
| 7 | Pskov II Chronicle | late 15th century | Brief | On Kalki (1223) | not | Suzdal fought with Tatars on Kalki |
| 8 | Pskov III Chronicle | late 16th - 17th century | Brief | On Kalki, to Kalki, from Kalki (1223) | not | Suzdal fought with Tatars on Kalki |
| 9 | Tver Chronicle | Mid 15th century | About the Kalkak massacre, up to the Kalka river, over the Kalka river (1223), hedgehogs on Kalki, on Kalki, from Kalok (1236) | |||
| 10 | Chronicler Rogozhsky | mid-15th century list | short | On Kalka (1226)? | not | 17 days from the execution of 1 embassy until the second appearance of the ambassadors, the death of Alyosha Popovich |
| 11 | Trinity Chronicle | 1408 g. | short | No (1223), on Kalki (1380) | not | The text is the same with the Laurenivka Chronicle |
| 12 | Patriarchy or Nikon Chronicle | mid-16th century | very detailed, synthesis of versions 1 and 2 | About Kalki, about the Kalka massacre, on Kalka, up to the river to Kalka, over the Kalka river (1223) | 8 from the place of a successful battle and the capture of loot to the Kalki River | There is an episode with Gemyabek, there is about the seizure of prey in the first skirmish, in detail about the death of the camp of Mstislav Kievsky, the death of Alyosha Popovich |
| 13 | Sophia I Chronicle | lists of the 15th - 17th centuries | very detailed, synthesis of versions 1 and 2 | Up to the Kalka River, on the firm Kalece River, the Kalka River, over the Kalka River (1223) | 8 from the place of a successful battle and the capture of loot to the Kalki River | There is an episode with Gemyabek, there is about the seizure of prey in the first skirmish, in detail about the death of the camp of Mstislav Kievsky, the death of Alyosha Popovich |
| 14 | Chronicle on the Resurrection List | mid 15th century | very detailed, synthesis of versions 1 and 2 | to the Kalka River, on the former Kaltse River, the Kalka River, crossing the Kalka River, over the Kalka River (1223), on Kalki (1380) | 8 from the place of a successful battle and the capture of loot to the Kalki River | There is an episode with Gemyabek, there is about the seizure of prey in the first skirmish, in detail about the death of the camp of Mstislav Kievsky, the death of Alyosha Popovich |
| 15 | Chronicle of Abraham | late 15th - early 16th century | Two short messages, under 6731 and 6732 | On Kalki, on the Kalka river (1223), Kalki (1380) | not | 17 days from the execution of 1 embassy until the second appearance of the ambassadors |
| 16 | Volyn short chronicle | early 16th century | short | Fights on Kolka (1223) | not | death of Alyosha Popovich |
| 17 | Vologda-Perm chronicle. Cyril-Belozersky List | mid-16th century | very detailed, synthesis of versions 1 and 2 | Kalskoe massacre, to the Kalka river, on the firm Kaltse river, the Kalka river, zaidosh across the river beyond the Kalka, over the Kalka river (1223), Kalkakh (1380) | 8 from the place of a successful battle and capture of prey to the Kalka River | There is an episode with Gemyabek, there is about the seizure of prey in the first skirmish, in detail about the death of the camp of Mstislav Kievsky, the death of Alyosha Popovich |
| 18 | Sofia time | early 16th century | very detailed, synthesis of versions 1 and 2 | Up to the Kalka River, on the stronger Kaltse River, the Kalka River, over the river beyond the Kalka River, over the Kalka River (1223), on the Kalki River (1380) | 8 from the place of a successful battle and capture of prey to the Kalka River | There is an episode with Gemyabek, there is about the seizure of prey in the first skirmish, in detail about the death of the camp of Mstislav Kievsky, the death of Alyosha Popovich |
| 19 | Vologda Chronicle | late 17th - early 18th century | short | On Kalki (1223) | not | The battle of the Russian princes with the filthy Polovtsy (!), The death of Alyosha Popovich |
| 20 | Piskarevsky chronicler | end of the first quarter of the 17th century | detailed, cut off | on Kalki (1223), on Kalki (1380) | not | There is an episode with Gemyabek |
| 21 | Ustyug Chronicle. Matsievich's list and the Archangel-city chronicler | first quarter of the 16th century | short | On Kalki (1223) | not | The battle of the Russians with the Polovtsians, the Polovtsians won and drowned the Russian princes in the river and a lot of strength (troops) (?!) |
| 22 | Kholmogory Chronicle | mid-16th century | very detailed, synthesis of versions 1 and 2 | Kalsky battle, to the Kalka river, on the more vicious Kalka river, the Kalka river, over the Kalka river (1223) | 8 from the place of a successful battle and capture of prey to the Kalka River | There is an episode with Gemyabek, there is about the seizure of prey in the first skirmish, in detail about the death of the camp of Mstislav Kievsky, the death of Alyosha Popovich |
All mentions of the Battle of Kalka, as well as of the Kalka River itself, in the annals can be divided into three groups.
1. In the messages of 1223 (in articles under 6371 "March" or 6732 "Ultramart"), it is said about the battle of interest to us. A more or less detailed version of events is set out in all the 22 chronicle sources presented in the table (see Table 6.3).
2. In the Ipatiev Chronicle, the battle on Kalka is also mentioned in a message under the year 1236 (6745 "Ultramart" year from the "Creation of the World"), which tells about the beginning of the Batu invasion, about the arrival of “... ". The Tver Chronicle also speaks of the beginning of the Mongol conquest, reminding the reader that the same foreigners came with whom the Russian princes unsuccessfully fought on Kalka: “... by finding the godless foreigner, Taurmen, hedgehog on Kalka ...”. The messages under 1236 in the Ipatiev and Tver annals give us nothing new for determining the place of the battle.
3. The third group of references refers to the events of the fall of 1380 (6888), when Mamai, who returned to the lower Dnieper steppes after being defeated in the Battle of Kulikovo, was defeated “on Kalki” by the ruler of the Blue Horde Tokhtamysh. Reports of this, another battle, timed to the Kalka (Kalkam) and took place almost 150 years after the first clash with the Mongols, are available in the Novgorod IV, Trinity, Vologda-Perm chronicles, in the Sofia timetable, the Chronicle according to the Resurrection list, the Abraham Chronicle and The Piskarevsky Chronicler. Here is a typical account of events taken from the Piskarevsky chronicler: “Then Mamai was not in the midst of fleeing and running to his land in a small squad, and behold, the news came to him that a certain [y] tsar was coming to him from the east, named Taktamysh, from Blue hordes. Mamai, the same army is ready for us, and with that army ready I will go against him, and fight on the Kalki, and fight them, and Tsar Taktamysh will defeat Mamai and drive him out. "
What useful information about Kalok's location can be drawn from these references? Tokhtamysh moved to the battlefield from the east, from the lower reaches of the Volga, having conquered Saray and the Ulus of Khadzhi-Circassian (Khadzhitarkhan, i.e. Astrakhan) before that in the summer of 1380. Mamai came out to meet him from the city of Ordu (Kuchugur settlement 30 kilometers south of modern Zaporozhye), so they could meet and fight, most likely, in the lower reaches of the Don or in the Northern Azov region. In most historical works, it is the Northern Azov region that is indicated as the site of the battle between Mamai and Tokhtamysh. However, in the well-known work of M.G. Safargaliev's meeting of Mamai with Tokhtamysh was moved more than 300 kilometers to the north, to the Vorskla basin, to its left tributary Kolomak (Kolmak). In support of this point of view (stated by V.G. Lyaskoronsky back in 1907) M.G. Safargaliev gives two arguments. Firstly, in the Vorskla basin there are, in his opinion, names associated with Mamai: Mamai-Surka and Mamayevo tract, and secondly, Mamai wanted to meet the enemy at the Lithuanian border, counting on the help of his ally Yagaila, which is why he moved from the lower reaches Dnieper to the north, to Vorskla. M.V. Elnikov, who is well acquainted with the toponymy of Zaporozhye, rejects the first argument with bewilderment, rightly noting that Mamai-Surka and Mamayevo tract are located on the lower Dnieper, and not in the Poltava region. The second argument also does not look convincing: if Mamai wanted to meet Tokhtamysh closer to the Lithuanian border, then for this he did not have to go far to the north, the Lithuanian border was literally "close at hand", the border of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with the Horde passed north of the rapids, in the end of the XIV century, right along the Dnieper.
And the last thing about the arguments of M.G. Safargalieva. Having stated all his arguments in favor of the version of Vorskla as the place of the battle where Mamai was defeated, he writes in the next sentence, refuting himself: "Broken at the Dnieper rapids, Mamai fled to Crimea." Here's to you, grandmother, and St. George's Day! Where is Vorskla in the Poltava region, and where are the Dnieper rapids ?!
It remains to summarize that the clash between Mamai and Tokhtamysh “on Kalki” in 1380 took place, most likely, in the Northern Azov region. There are currently no weighty arguments against this statement. Consequently, the "Kalki" we are looking for and the place of the battle of 1223 must be localized in the Northern Azov region.
Let's return to the main array of references to the first battle with the Mongols, contained in the annals under 1223 (6731 or 6732). It is characteristic that in 17 out of 22 analyzed chronicle sources the name of the river is given in the plural: Kalki, on Kalki, etc. This cannot be an accident, and philologists dealing with toponymy (geographical names) have long paid attention to this. They are practically unanimous in that the Kalka is not one river, but several rivers located close to each other and, possibly, belonging to the same river system (the main watercourse and lateral tributaries). In 1976 Donetsk philologist E.S. Otin pointed to yet another strong evidence of the Calock plurality that went unnoticed for a long time. Here is an interesting excerpt from the Ipatiev Chronicle: “... going to the river Kalkya, the stratosh and the guard of Tatarstan, the watchman who fought with them and killed Ivan Dmitrievich in two other ways with him. By the Tatar, who went away to the river Kalka ... ".
The Russian army goes to the river Kalka, here it clashes with the Tatar "watchmen" and the Tatars drive off to the "off" (that is, another, another) Kalka. In addition to that Kalka, to which the Russians walked for 8 days, they talk about some other, different Kalka! Other Kalka is also mentioned in the Sophia I, Vologda-Perm and Kholmogorsk annals, in the Sophia calendar.
The plurality of Kaloks - for philologists, has long been a reliably established fact, which must be taken into account by everyone who, in one way or another, is engaged in the battle of 1223.
From specialists in toponymy, you can read many other interesting details about the Kalki (although they have nothing to do with determining the place of the battle). In their opinion, Kalki were originally called Kalami (masculine plural), hence the masculine diminutive forms Kalok, Kalets, Kalchik.
In accordance with M. Vasmer's etymological dictionary, this name comes from "kal" - mud, puddle. The upper reaches of our Azov rivers really often represent in the summer just a chain of puddles or a dirty ravine overgrown with reeds. By the opacity and turbidity of the water, our rivers are strikingly different from the Dnieper.
The main written source that allows to reliably localize the Kalki (Kaly) as a river system is the Book of the Big Drawing (KBCH), compiled in 1627 in Moscow, in the Discharge Order. Geographic information about the Field (regions south of Tula, up to the Crimea and the Sea of Azov), contained in it, dates back to the second half of the 16th century, it was drawn from materials of the Russian embassies in Crimea, from the painting of the watchmen protecting the southern borders from Tatar raids. The Orthodox magnate Prince Dmitry Ivanovich Vishnevetsky (Baida), who in 1556-1561 “rode away from the king” of Poland and served Tsar Ivan IV (the Terrible), could also provide information about the river network and localities on the left bank of the Dnieper.
In the "Book to the Big Drawing", in the painting (description) of the Kalmiya road, we read:
“And from the top of the Miyusa river to the top of the Elkuvaty river; and the top of the river Elkuvaty is a mound high, and on it there are 3 stone men.
And from the river Elkuvaty to the top of the rivers to Kalam.
And those rivers all on the left side of that road fell into the sea.
And on the right side of the road is the Tor river.
And from the rivers from Kal to the river to the Karatosh and the Karatosh river to overshoot.
And from the river Koratosha to the river to Berl ... ".
I apologize for the lengthy quote, it's worth it! What can be learned from this? Sequentially, from east to west, the headwaters of the main rivers of the Northern Azov region are listed, which are encountered during the movement of the Kalmius road. The Kala rivers are numbered between the Mius and the Berdy (Berla) basin, since the Karatosh (Karatysh) is a left tributary of the Berda, starting at the Stone Graves, south of Rozovka. On modern maps, there is only one river system between the Mius and Berda basins - Kalmius with tributaries! Consequently, the chronicle rivers of Kala are the rivers of the Kalmius basin (Kalmius itself, Kalchik, Kalets and their numerous tributaries).
The second important conclusion (alas, very sad for me) is that the Karatysh flowing near the Stone Graves, most likely, cannot be counted among the Kalam rivers, since it is mentioned separately, along with the Kalami. Stocks of Stone Graves, as the site of the 1223 battle, are clearly falling! It's a shame, you know, for the Rozovsky district ...
Therefore, the site of the battle should be localized, probably by the Kalmius and Kalchik basin.
When describing the Northern Azov region, the rivers of Kala are mentioned in the "History of the Scythian" by Andrey Lyzlov (1692): , and Muses, - the essence of the fields of tacos are vital and abundant in grass, as if you could hardly believe it powerfully. For tamo the grass is as high as the reed of the sea, and it is soft green. " The names of the rivers of interest to us are again used in the masculine gender, while Lyzlov, in describing the Azov region, refers to the famous work of the Italian Alexandro Gvagnini (“as Gwagnin writes”), published in 1578 in Latin in Krakow, which is usually briefly referred to as “Description of Muscovy”. Unfortunately, this work of Gvagnini has not yet been fully translated from Latin into Russian, and I was not able to make sure that Lyzlov was accurately citing it when describing the rivers in the Azov region.
The rivers at Lyzlov are listed from west to east (from Perekop to Azov). If Agarlibert is modern Byrd, and Muz is Mius, then Big Kal and Small Kal, indicated between them, are the rivers of the Kalmius system. And again we come to the conclusion that medieval Kala is Kalmius with tributaries!
New and interesting for us here is that the Kaly, according to Lyzlov (Gvagnini), are also united by the common name Bein. Note that on the map of Crimea (Tavrica) and adjacent areas by G. Mercator from the atlas of William Blau (1635), on the northern coast of the Sea of Azov, between the rivers Agatelibert and Muss, in place of modern Kalmius, the river is shown Binkael. It is possible that this map has something to do with the work of Gvagnini.
Now let's try to use the information about the number of day trips before the first battle with the Mongols in 1223 to localize its place. It is clear that this requires:
1) determine the starting point from which the countdown of daytime transitions begins in the source;
2) choose a route of movement;
This simple and logical sequence of actions is very, very difficult to implement in this case. To begin with, there are three different versions of the number of hops (see Table 6.3). In 12 out of 22 chronicle sources, the number of transitions is not indicated at all (including in the often cited Laurentian Chronicle).
The chronicles of Novgorodskaya I, senior and junior, say that the battle took place after 9 days of crossing after the general crossing of the Dnieper: “... ryku ... ".
In the Ipatiev, Tver annals and other Russian sources (see Table 6.3), we are talking about 8 day marches, but the countdown begins from the first successful battle in which the Russians captured a large prey: “Ruskyi won, and gnasha is far away in the field, and taking their cattle, and outekosh from the herd, as if the cattle would be filled with all of them. Ottoudou idosha 8 days before the river of Kalka ... ".
A number of foreign sources speak of 12 days' march to the place of the battle (Ibn al-Athir, Rashid ad-Din, M. Mekhovsky). The same figure is named in a late Russian source, "The History of the Scythian" by Andrey Lyzlov, who used the works of Dlugosh and Mekhovsky in his historical research, from whom he borrowed these 12 day trips: Calcu ... ".
Let's compare the information about the daytime crossings. The Ipatiev and Novgorod chronicles do not contradict each other in this, they simply begin to count the transitions at different points in time. In Novgorod reports, they count from the moment of the general crossing, and in the Ipatiev Chronicle - from a successful battle and the capture of prey, which took place after the crossing. Hence the difference of one day's march.
With 12 day crossings, it is more difficult. Ibn al-Athir and Rashid ad-Din do not indicate how these 12 transitions are counted. Their messages boil down to the fact that the Tatars feigned retreat, and the Russians pursued them to the place of the unfortunate battle for 12 days. How can this be combined with 9-day crossings (in Novgorod news) from the general crossing of the princes to the battle? Before whom did the Tatars retreat for three whole days, before all the Russian forces crossed the Dnieper? The analysis of chronicle messages allows, it seems to me, to answer this question without any special "exaggeration". Even before the general crossing, small skirmishes took place, which were successful for the Russians. According to the Ipatiev Chronicle, young Daniil Romanovich Galitsky with his cavalry puts to flight the Mongols who have approached to "see the oladii Ruskykh". Before the general crossing, Mstislav Udatny (according to Novgorod news) with 1000 soldiers defeated the "guards of the Tatar", the remnants of the "watchmen" with the voivode Gemyabek unsuccessfully try to escape on the Polovtsian mound. Every time the Russians win these episodes, the Tatars are defeated again and again and retreat. This continues for three days, until all the Russian-Polovtsian forces crossed to the left bank of the Dnieper and were drawn into the pursuit of the fake retreating Tatars, which ended after 9 days with the massacre on Kalka. Thus, the reports of the Eastern authors about the 12-day transitions are quite consistent with the Russian chronicle news.
Matvey Mekhovsky, whom we have already mentioned, in his "Treatise on the Two Sarmatias", is completely specific and categorical: the Russians came from Protolchey (crossing point) to Kalka in 12 days' march. In this he follows the message of Jan Dlugosz in the "History of Poland", but where could Dlugosz himself get this information in the second half of the 15th century? Jan Dlugosh's use of the works of Eastern authors (Ibn al-Athir, Rashid ad-Din) should be rejected as extremely unlikely. There remains one possible source - the Russian chronicles, and Dlugosz himself confirms the fact of their use in the preparation of the History of Poland (I quote from an article by the Polish historian D. Dombrowski, there is no complete Russian translation of Dlugosz yet): “If other people's (events) are often associated with the history of Poland , it seemed to me necessary to remind about them not out of insolence, for I know my strength, but in order to introduce ours to them. Therefore, having already turned gray, I took up the study of the Russian alphabet in order to make the limits of our history more understandable. "
How did Dlugosh use the Russian chronicles? On this score, the opinions of both domestic and Polish historians practically coincide. We will quote D. Dąbrowski again: “Alexander Semkovich (Semkowicz A. Krytyczny rozbiуr Dziejów Polskich. S. 52 - 53) convincingly wrote about the imperfection of Dlugosz's method of working with the material of the chronicles. He determined that the problems stemmed from insufficient knowledge of the Russian language, specific treatment of references from the chronicles (a superficial reduction of the narrative taken from the source, the presentation in one paragraph of the chronicle of events that took place over several decades). And, finally, these problems were associated with an absolute ignorance of the chronology used in Russia. It is difficult to disagree with this short and fair assessment. "
But the opinion of M.V. Dmitrieva: “Based on available sources, Jan Dlugosh usually processed their information and expanded it, trying to give the narrative a dramatic character. Some of these "extensions" have turned, in essence, into interpretations and additions, which call into question the very factual core of this or that fragment of the "Chronicle".
Thus, we have no confidence that J. Dlugosh is correctly transmitting the information he received from Russian sources (including the battle on Kalka). This also applies to the reports of M. Mekhovsky and A. Lyzlov about the first clash with the Mongols, in that part of them, where they are based on the "History of Poland" by Dlugosh. Therefore, to determine the place of the battle on Kalka, it remains to use either the Ipatiev Chronicle (8 day crossings), or Novgorodskie Izvestia (9 crossings).
How accurate are the descriptions of the Battle of Kalka in some of the late Russian chronicles of the 16th – 17th centuries? After all, here too we meet simply with anecdotal details! The Vologda Chronicle under 1223 reports on the battle of the Russians with the nasty Polovtsy (!), And the Ustyug Chronicle (Matsievich's list) goes even further: the Polovtsy not only won, but also drowned Russian princes in Kalka and a lot of force (troops) !!!
Comparing the Ipatiev and Novgorod Chronicles, we notice that in the Ipatiev Chronicle, 8 days' marches are counted from the place of the first successful battle, in which the Russians captured a lot of booty, but we do not know where this happened. Therefore, in the localization of the site of the battle on Kalka, it is advisable to be guided by the chronicles of Novgorodskaya I senior and junior, where the count of 9 day crossings begins from the place of the crossing - Kichkassky (Krarian) ford, located just north of the island of Khortitsa, on the territory of modern Zaporozhye. Thus, we have a starting point, from which, along the route, we should count 9 day crossings of 25 kilometers for a mixed (horse and foot) Russian-Polovtsian army.
Further, everything is much more sad, we are forced to step on the shaky ground of assumptions and hypotheses. None of the sources known to me says anything about the route of the Mongols (and the Russians pursuing them) from the crossing to the place of the battle! It has to be built purely speculatively, focusing on the general direction "east - southeast" when moving from modern Zaporozhye to the Kalmius basin. The most likely route is along the river. Konki, which was mentioned in 1954 by K.V. Kudryashov, noticing in passing in his article that such a route "was indicated in our historical literature," but without giving any specific references.
Here is the calculation of distances in kilometers and daytime crossings along the proposed route of movement of the Russian-Polovtsian army from the ferry to Kalmius (Table 6.4).
Table 6.4... Distances from the Kichkassk ferry along the route along the Konka
(on a map with a scale of 1: 200000)
| Plot No. | Section of the path | The length of the site on the map, cm | Section length, km | Section length in day crossings |
| 1 | Kichkas - Yulievka | 15,0 | 30 | 1,20 |
| 2 | Yulievka - Orekhov | 15,0 | 30 | 1,20 |
| 3 | Orekhov - Canopy | 19,0 | 38 | 1,52 |
| 4 | Canopy - Horse Strife | 8,0 | 16 | 0,64 |
| 5 | Horse Strife - Kamysh-Zarya | 12,0 | 24 | 0,96 |
| 6 a | Kamysh-Zarya - Rozovka (Stone Graves) | 15,0 | 30 | 1,2 |
| 6 b | Kamysh-Zarya - the grave of Seredinovka | 30,0 | 60 | 2,4 |
| 6 in | Kamysh-Zarya - Granite | 44,0 | 88 | 3,52 |
| Total: | Kichkas - Rozovka (Stone Graves) | 84,0 | 168 | 6,72 |
| Total: | Kichkas - the grave of Seredinovka | 99,0 | 198 | 7,92 |
| Total: | Kichkas - Granite | 113,0 | 226 | 9,04 |
For greater clarity, let us plot the results of calculations on the map of the Northern Azov region (Fig. 6.1). From the starting point on the territory of the modern city of Zaporozhye, where the Russians and Polovtsy crossed, an arc with a radius of 225 kilometers (9 day crossings). Even moving strictly in a straight line, the Russian-Polovtsian army would not have been able to advance east of this arc, passing in the Azov Sea along the Mokroi Elanchik river, in 9 days of movement. In reality, the army moved, applying to the terrain and circumstances, along a certain broken line (we assume, along the Konka river). Thus, the account of the day's marches according to Novgorod news allows us to reliably establish that the battle on Kalka took place west of Mokry Elanchik.
Fig. 6.1... Geographical aspects of the Battle of Kalka
Passing along the Konka, the army, pursuing the Mongols, had to reach the watershed heights in the area of modern Kamysh-Zarya, separating the Berda basin (from the south) from the upper reaches of the Gaichur, Yanchur and Kobylnaya (from the north). Further uncertainty in the assessment possible way becomes even more. In essence, the route was chosen by the retreating Mongols, the Russians and Polovtsy could only follow them. As the old proverb says: "Before a hare in the field there are a hundred roads, and before a wolf pursuing him - only one" (for a pertinent proverb - thanks to one Mariupol colleague, he suggested). Later nomads (Tatars and Nogai during the times of the Crimean Khanate) preferred movement along watersheds in our steppe areas. This is how their routes (sakms) were laid, judging by the descriptions of Boplan, Thunmann and modern authors. From Kamysh-Zarya, the path along the watersheds leads to Rozovka, this is how the second Catherine railway from Volnovakha was laid in the first years of the twentieth century, which still exists today. There are two possible paths from the vicinity of Rozovka along the watersheds. The first way - to the east, it leads through the outskirts of Volnovakha in the interfluve of Kalchik and Kalmius. The second path is to the southeast, past the upper reaches of the Kalchik to its lower course (Fig. 6.1). Here we can no longer make a choice that is justified even to the smallest degree. After passing the section between Kamysh-Zarya and Rozovka along the watershed, it is impossible to say anything definite about the further route of the Russian-Polovtsian army to the site of the battle on Kalka.
To clearly define what we mean by the term "place of the battle on Kalka", let us return to the description of the event itself in the annals (see section 6.3 "Prelude, battle and defeat"). The vicissitudes of the battle are stretched both in time and space. The long-term retreat of the Mongols ends with the fact that they inflict a powerful blow on the vanguard of the Russian-Polovtsian army, which, under the leadership of Mstislav Udatny, crossed the Kalka. The Mongols immediately overturned the advanced Polovtsian "watchman", crushed by the Polovtsian fleeing in disorder, the Russian regiments were defeated in a fleeting battle. Their disorderly flight began, in which the princes were also involved, including Mstislav Udatny and Daniil Galitsky. This rout determined the whole further course of events. As we know from the chronicles, the "slashing of evil and fierce" took place after crossing one of the Kaloks (the plurality of Kaloks was already mentioned above). Taking into account the general direction of movement of the Russian-Polovtsian army to the east (or southeast) and the predominantly meridional (from north to south) flow of the rivers of the Kalmius basin, it can be assumed that the defeat of the forces of Mstislav Udatny took place several kilometers to the east (or southeast). east) from one of the Kaloks (Kaly). Not a very specific conclusion, but nothing more definite about the place of the defeat of Mstislav Udatny's detachment can be said so far.
Mstislav Romanovich of Kiev, with another part of the Russian army, was at that time in a fortified camp and did not participate in the battle: “Prince Mstislav Kyevskiy, seeing such evil, do not step from the place that he stood on the mountain above the river above Kalkom ; whether the place is rocky, and that you put the city near you in kolikh, and fight with them from that city for 3 days. " On which bank of the Kalka this camp was located is not clear (the chronicles do not mention the passage of Mstislav Kievsky's detachment across the river, otherwise we could definitely point to the eastern bank). It is also unclear whether this is the Kalka through which Mstislav Udatny crossed before his defeat. It may well be that we are talking about two Kalakhs flowing not far from each other, with one river located to the west (on its bank was the camp of the Kiev prince), and the other to the east (it was after its passage that the detachment of Mstislav Udatny was defeated).
Having defeated Mstislav Udatny, the Mongols were divided. Some of them began the pursuit and destruction of the Russians and Polovtsians who were retreating to the Dnieper. Such persecution inevitably disintegrates into many local skirmishes that took place over a large area to the west of the place of the defeat to the very banks of the Dnieper.
Another part of the Mongols, under the leadership of the governor "Ts'gyrkan and Teshyukan", began the siege of the camp of Mstislav of Kiev, which ended three days later with the captivity and death of the princes. The place where this camp was located was rocky (see the quote above), and many hypotheses about its location have already been expressed. It should be noted that in many works the "default" site of the Kalka battle is understood to be the camp of Mstislav Kievsky. It's also good if the authors recall the key previous episode of the battle - the defeat of the detachment of Mstislav Udatny. The place of defeat is usually located east of the camp of the Kiev prince.
Thus, we need to find in the Northern Azov region, west of Mokroe Elanchik, somewhere in the Kalmius basin or near it, a rocky place above the river, where, according to chronicles, the camp of Mstislav Kievsky stood. The problem is that there are many such places. Not being able to present the history of the search here, we will restrict ourselves to the fact that, at the present time, in our opinion, there are three most promising places.
Let us consider in detail all these places, comparing the available arguments "for" and "against" each of them.
Let's start with Stone Graves located 6-7 kilometers south of Rozovka, where there are vast outcrops of ancient rock formations that have formed here a whole mountain system in miniature, individual peaks of which rise 50-70 meters above the surrounding steppe. The presence of such an impressive "rocky place" in combination with the upper reaches of the Kalchik located just a few kilometers to the northeast (see Fig. 6.2) could not fail to attract the attention of historians in their search for the site of the battle on Kalka.
The first archaeological research in the vicinity of Rozovka was carried out by Lieutenant General N.E. Brandenburg in 1889, and it was the hope that brought him to our places to find material traces of the battle on Kalka. As you know, this hope did not come true, the burial mounds to the north-east of modern Rozovka, near the German colony No. 1 Kirshwald of the Mariupol district, which he examined, contained burials of the Bronze Age.
The plans of the Mariupol Museum of Local Lore (MKM) for 1927-1928 included the archaeological study of the newly formed (April 5, 1927) reserve "Stone Graves" and the area around it "with a radius of 7-8 versts in search of the supposed site of the battle on Kalka ". Patriarch of Mariupol local history P.M. Pinevich, in his report for 1928 on excavations and archaeological surveys in the Mariupol region, mentions Kamennye Mogily, and in general the area in the triangle between Rozovka, Kalchinovka and the village of Temryuk (modern Starchenkovo), as a possible site of the battle on Kalka.
In the September issue of the journal Voprosy istorii, 1954, an article by a well-known expert in the field of historical geography, K.V. Kudryashov, which was his answer to school teachers A.S. Pshenichny and I.G. Sarbash from the Stalin region, who asked "to cover the issue of the site of the battle on Kalka." Stone Graves are unambiguously named in the article as the location of the camp of Mstislav Kievsky, and the defeat of Mstislav Udatny, according to K.V. Kudryashov, took place at the origins of Kalchik. After this publication, the view of Stone Graves as the site of the battle on Kalka becomes predominant in the mass media of the Zaporozhye and Donetsk (then Stalin) regions, in the circles of local historians and ethnographers, this point of view is also presented in the well-known "History of Cities and Villages of the Ukrainian SSR" ...
Fig. 6.2... Rozovka and Stone Graves
(fragments of sheets L-37-015 and L-37-027 of the map of the General Staff building 1: 100000 were sewn together).
The camp of Mstislav Kievsky was located, according to K.V. Kudryashov, in one of the depressions of the Eastern Ridge of Stone Graves (see Fig. 6.3) and is covered from the east by the Karatysh River. At the end of the 60s of the twentieth century, its course was blocked to the south by a 200-meter dam, as a result of which the upper reaches of the Karatysh near the Eastern ridge were flooded by the formed artificial lake with an area of 20 hectares with a depth of up to 6-7 meters. Previously, Karatysh flowed here in a gully with steep banks and was famous during my childhood for an incredible number of large crayfish. Residents of Rozovka, Nazarovka and other surrounding villages traditionally gathered here on May 2 for May Day, rejoiced in the spring flowering of steppe herbs, had fun as best they could, and paid tribute to the excellent taste of crayfish cooked over a fire, smelling of smoke and dill.
Fig. 6.3... Stone Graves. Eastern ridge. View from the east, May 2005.
Historically, out of the total area of the Kamennye Mogily reserve of 400 hectares, about 100 hectares are located on the territory of the Rozovsky district (Zaporozhye region), and the rest went to the Volodarsky district of the Donetsk region. M.V. Elnikov in his book mistakenly placed the upper reaches of the Kalchik and "Stone Graves" in the Kuibyshevsky region, most likely, outdated maps let him down. After the restoration in June 1992 of the Rozovsky district, these objects are located on its territory, as it was before (until December 30, 1962).
In the 90s of the twentieth century, through the efforts of the director of the reserve V.A. Sirenko and other local enthusiasts, ethnographers, with the support of the regional administrations of the Rozovsky and Volodarsky districts, public organizations, efforts are being made to perpetuate the memory of the battle on Kalka. In 1999, a worship cross made of dark stone was erected on the territory of "Stone Graves" (Fig. 6.4), replacing the wooden cross that had been erected a year earlier. By the 777th anniversary of the battle, a chapel in honor of the patron of the Cossacks, Ilya Muromets (opened on May 27, 2000), built by the Union of Cossacks of South-Eastern Ukraine "Zaporizhzhya Army" and the Union of Cossacks of Donbass "Liberty" appeared near the estate of the reserve.
These efforts to perpetuate the memory are worthy of respect and all support, but we must face the truth. Of course, even now, half a century later, the arguments of K.V. Kudryashov in favor of the Stone Graves and the upper reaches of Kalchik, as the site of the battle on Kalka, look quite weighty and are shared by many local historians and historians. But we must not forget that there are also arguments “against”, which cannot be dismissed so easily.
Fig. 6.4... Stone Graves. Memorial cross to those who fell in the Battle of Kalka. May 2005.
Here's the first argument. Calculation of the distances along the proposed route of movement of the Russian-Polovtsian army (see Table 6.4) gives from the crossing in the territory of modern Zaporozhye to Kamennyi Mogila less than 7 day crossings (more precisely - 6.72). Even taking into account possible errors in the choice of the route (which we have already mentioned above), the deviation from 9 day crossings (according to Novgorod news) is still too great ... You can, of course, console yourself that the route was not chosen very accurately, but this is my doubt does not remove. After all, no one has ever proposed another, more reasonable route ...
The second argument against the Stone Graves, as the location of the camp of Mstislav Kievsky, has been known for a long time. It is strange that K.V. Kudryashov, in his famous article in 1954, did not consider it necessary to mention him, if only for the sake of objectivity. According to the annals cited in this article, the rocky place of the camp was located on the mountain "above the river nad Kalkom". The eastern ridge of Stone Graves rises, as you know, over the Karatysh River. From the “Book to the Big Drawing” (KBCH), to which Kudryashov also refers, it irrefutably follows that Karatysh (Karatosh) has nothing to do with Kalkams (Kalam). According to KBCH, Karatysh is not Kalka! K.V. Kudryashov could not help but understand this, and wrote in his other book that "the prisoners between Mius and Karatysh of the Kala or Kalka rivers are the present Kalmius with the Kalchik tributary." By locating the camp of Mstislav of Kiev over Karatysh, we come into conflict either with the Book of the Big Drawing, or with the Novgorod chronicle news, that is, two most important written sources on which all serious attempts to localize the site of the battle on Kalka are based.
In an effort to overcome this contradiction, it is sometimes assumed that the names of our rivers were recorded in the KBC at the end of the 16th - beginning of the 17th centuries, almost 400 years after the battle, and in 1223 the names could be different, and then Karatysh was still one of the Kaloks. This assumption does not look very convincing, no evidence of Karatysh's belonging to the Kalki has been presented at the present time.
These are the arguments that speak against the location of the camp of Mstislav Kievsky at the Stone Graves. But the passage of the Russian-Polovtsian army through the territory of the modern Rozov district, or even through the immediate vicinity of Rozovka, in the light of everything that we now know about the battle on Kalka, should be considered very, very likely.
Of course, the most compelling and irrefutable evidence of the connection between the Stone Graves and the headwaters of Kalchik with the famous battle of 1223 could be its material evidence, but this is exactly what is bad here (as in all other promising places). In view of the importance of the issue, we will consider possible material traces of the Kalkinsky massacre in more detail at the end of the section.
Let us now turn to the next promising place of the battle on Kalka, to the mound Grave-Seredinovka in the vicinity of Volodarsky (Fig. 6.5). A kilometer south of the modern village of Shevchenko, on the right bank of Kalchik, the valley of which is now filled with the reservoir of the same name, there are several domed outcrops of pink granite to the surface. Two of them are quite insignificant, and the third, more large-scale, is Mogila-Seredinovka (mark 154.9), examined by P.M. Pinevich in July 1928 in search of traces of the Kalka battle. This rocky dome, neither in height, nor in the area of granite outcrops, nor in the steepness of the slopes, can be compared with the Stone Graves. At the end of June 2009, I visited this "rocky place" and carefully examined it. Most of the Midway is turfed and covered with grass. Its northern slopes are steeper, to the east (towards Kalchik) the grave descends more gently. The western and southern slopes are also gentle, a couple of hundred meters to the south there is a scattering of massive smoothed granite boulders, which have the characteristic appearance of "sheep's foreheads". Attracted by rumors about the presence of ancient drawings and inscriptions here (Pinevich also mentions them), I carefully examined their surface for several hours, but all searches were unsuccessful (except for the result of thoroughly skinned elbows and knees). The bizarre relief of the surface of the boulders is most likely the result of many years of work by wind, water and the sun, and not the work of human hands.
Fig. 6.5... Volodarskoe and Grave Seredinovka
(fragment of sheet L-37-027 of the map of the General Staff building 1: 100000).
The summit of Seredinovka is now leveled, on it the site of the memorial complex was built, topped with a multi-meter obelisk-spire made of stainless steel, resembling a Red Army bayonet in outline (Fig. 6.6). This obelisk is visible at a great distance, and the inhabitants of the surrounding villages call it “Shevchenko's spire”. It has nothing to do with the battle on Kalka, it is a monument to the soldiers of the 417th Azerbaijan Republic who fell in September 1943 during the liberation of the Azov Sea. rifle division 4th Guards Cavalry Corps of the 2nd Guards Army of the Southern Front, (the plate with the inscription, unfortunately, has already disappeared somewhere).
Fig. 6.6... The grave of Seredinovka and the Shevchenko spire. View from the southwest, June 2009.
Could Mogila-Seredinovka be the camp of Mstislav Kievsky? There seems to be good reason for this assumption. It rises above the Kalchik valley, just 2 kilometers west of the river. The defeat of the vanguard detachment of Mstislav Udatny by the Mongols could have taken place east of Kalchik, on its left bank. The calculation of the movement of the Russian-Polovtsian army from the crossing on the Dnieper to Seredinovka gives almost 8 days' transitions (see Table 6.4), this is closer to the chronicles than in the case of Kamennyi Mogily. It should be noted that the slopes of Seredinovka are not steep enough to create obstacles for the assault. However, the main protection of the besieged camp from the Mongols could have been the carts enclosing it, and not the steepness of the rocky slopes.
A visit to Mogila-Seredinovka allowed me to answer one more question that had tormented me for a long time. I believed that from its summit, located only 20 kilometers north of Mariupol, the participants in the battle could not help but notice the sea. Why, then, are the chronicles silent about the important fact of the proximity of the Kalkinsky massacre to the coast of the Sea of Azov? So: from the top of Mogila-Seredinovka, on a clear summer day, in conditions of excellent visibility, I did not see the sea! In the east, at the very line of the horizon, you can see the elevator of the Kalchik station, in the south you can clearly see the smoking chimneys of the Mariupol factories and microdistricts of the city, but the sea from here is really impossible to see with the naked eye. Therefore, the silence of the chronicles about the proximity of the battle site to the Sea of Azov is understandable.
In my opinion, Mogila-Seredinovka and the surrounding area to the east are rightfully considered one of the possible places of the 1223 battle with the Mongols.
The famous Mariupol regional historian, researcher of the Mariupol Museum of Local Lore R.I. Sayenko considered the most likely site of the battle on Kalka the valley of the Kalmius river between the villages of Granitnoye and Starolaspa (Telmanovsky district)... Slightly north of Granitnoye, the Dubovaya ravines (along which the villages of Novogrigorovka and Staroignatovka are located) and Khan-Tarama go out into the Kalmius valley (see Fig. 6.7). Above these places, the Kalmius channel forms several bends downstream. In the area of the Maksimova gully, the river formed a ledge in the southeastern direction; on the western (right) bank of Kalmius, a steep, rocky cliff rises in this place. Here he was, according to R.I. Sayenko, fortified camp of Mstislav Kievsky. The advance detachment of Mstislav Udatny, with his Polovtsian allies, was defeated, according to her assumption, on the plain adjacent to the eastern bank of Kalmius, where the Korneev and Maksimov beams are located. Now this is the vicinity of the villages of Novaya Maryevka, Pervomayskoye, Krasny Oktyabr (Fig. 6.7).
Fig. 6.7... Kalmius at Granite.
(fragment of sheet L-37-016 of the map of the General Staff building 1: 100000).
On the rather controversial views of R.I. Sayenko, we have already spoken about the dating of the battle, the reasons for choosing this particular Kalmius site as the location of the Mstislav Kievsky camp remain not entirely clear. Slightly upstream, on the same right bank, closer to Staraya Laspa, south of the 195.4 mark, there is an equally impressive “rocky place”. There is such a place nearby on the left (eastern) bank of Kalmius (see Fig. 6.8, photo courtesy of LV Mariupol ethnographer). It is not clear why R.I. Sayenko determined the place of the camp precisely on the right bank, because the chronicles do not say whether the Kiev prince crossed the Kalka with his associates, and his camp could also be on the left bank.
Fig. 6.8... Valley of Kalmius between Granitnoye and Starolaspa. View from the north, July 2002.
All these "rocky places" on Kalmius between Granitnoye and Starolaspa have one thing in common: these are not mountainous hills, but simply steep coastal cliffs (see Fig. 6.8). In this case, the all-round defense of the besieged camp could be organized only by fencing off such a cape with steep banks from the steppe by a number of carts.
Calculation of the distances from the Kichkassk ferry (Zaporozhye) to Kalmius near Granitnoye gives almost exactly 9 days of passage (see Table 6.4), as in the Novgorod chronicle news. This is impressive, but it cannot serve as an irrefutable (as they say, 100%) proof of the location of Mstislav's camp here. Recall that the route itself is not exactly known, it was chosen on the basis of the most general assumptions, as already mentioned above.
According to the local oral tradition prevailing among the Azov Greeks, the battle on Kalka is associated with the Khan-Taram gully, translating its name as "Bloody gully". This is mentioned in his article by R.I. Sayenko, referring to a certain military map late XIX century. As far as I know, the public of the Telmanovsky region is making certain efforts to perpetuate the memory of the battle on Kalka in the Granitnoye region. According to the staff of the Mariupol Museum of Local Lore, there is even a video film about the events of 1223 on Kalmius, filmed by the works of local enthusiasts.
With the "material evidence" of the battle in the Telmanovsky area, the situation is the same as in all other alleged places (that is, very bad).
P.M. Pinevich, in his report of 1928, among the possible places of the battle on Kalka also calls “... the hill between the r. Kalmius and R. Kalchik near Mariupol ". As far as I know, no one has undertaken a serious assessment and survey of this place. One thing can only be said: being so close to the sea, the participants in the events could not fail to notice it, the Azov Sea would be surely mentioned by the chronicler, talking about the unfortunate battle. But, as we said above, there is not a word about the proximity of the sea in any of the 22 chronicle sources describing the events on Kalka.
Concluding the review of possible places of the battle of interest to us in the Northern Azov region, I would like to note the following. If in the first third of the XIII century on the site of modern Mariupol there was a hypothetical city of the wanderers Domakh (Adomakh), about which N.G. Rudenko, or at least a large settlement, the Russians and, even more so, their Polovtsian allies would certainly know about this. The chroniclers would not have had to connect the battle with unknown steppe rivers like Kalok to anyone in Russia. We would now talk about the Battle of Domakh ...
It remains to consider the alleged physical evidence of the Battle of Kalka, all those finds in the Northern Azov region, which can be considered as having at least some relation to the events of interest to us.
Let's start with the Stone Graves and the surrounding area. I have heard a lot about the finds of antiquities in our places (including, of course, treasures) since childhood. But a strange thing ... One had only to try to document the finds, shoot and measure them in order to put them “into scientific circulation”, and this material evidence of the massacre on Kalka often melted, “like a dream, like a morning fog”!
The book on the history of the Rozovsky district contains information about the discovery by local residents in 1869 in the Shirokaya Mogila burial mound (mark 226.8 modern map, at the checkpoint 375 km) of human remains, sabers and spears. In the same place, in one of the mounds near the Shirokaya Grave, they found a weapon, a stirrup, and the remains of a saddle next to human bones. Reports of these findings in the upper reaches of the Kalchik, just a dozen kilometers from the Stone Graves, brought N.E. Brandenburg, the excavation of which we have already mentioned above. Further destiny finds unknown.
According to V.I. Maryukhi, published in the local newspaper "Rosinform", during the construction of the dam (pond) of the Experimental Station in 1967-1968, the remains of medieval weapons were discovered a few kilometers north of Kamennyi Mogily (according to his story - a votok and a spearhead). In the same article, V.I. Maryukha mentions the discovery near the reserve in 1968 of "a battle ax of a Russian soldier of the XIII century." None of these finds have survived to this day.
Another Old Russian battle ax was found on the right bank of the Karatysh, at the site of one of the Late Bronze (?) Settlements discovered by members of the archaeological circle of the Shevchenko school, led by S.P. Shevchuk.
The finds to the west of the Stone Graves and the upper reaches of Kalchik, dating from the beginning of the 13th century, may be of particular interest, since they can be associated with the disorderly retreat along the Berda to the Dnieper of the remnants of the Russian-Polovtsian army, destroyed on Kalka. Fragments of chain mail made of iron rings with a diameter of 0.7 centimeters, in the manufacture of which wire about 2 millimeters thick, were found 45 kilometers west of Kamennyi Graves, in the village of Alekseevka (upper reaches of the Berda). Fragments are exhibited in the literary and historical museum of the village of Smirnovo, S.P. Shevchuk, in his book on the history of the Kuibyshevsky region, connects this find with the events on Kalka.
In the upper reaches of the Berda, during the construction of the road between Smirnov and the village of Vershina-2, in the embankment of one of the kurgans, along with human remains, an ancient Russian battle ax was found, dating from the XII-XIII centuries. According to the description of S.P. Shevchuk, the total length of the ax is 14.2 centimeters, with a blade width of 4 centimeters and a sleeve diameter of 2 centimeters. The ax is also on display at the Smirnov Museum. Emphasizing the rarity of such finds in our area, Shevchuk mentions the presence in the funds of the Zaporozhye Museum of Local Lore of another similar ax, the place of which is unknown.
In the summer of 2009, history lover O.V. Kulchenko from Rozovka told me that he has a battle ax (in his opinion - Old Russian), which he discovered in the fall of 1975 on a field south of the village of Luhanskoye, behind a headquarters adjacent to the southern outskirts of the village (see Fig. 6.2). The place of the find lies just between the Stone Graves and the upper reaches of the Kalchik. When it turned out that we were talking about a fragment of an ax, I was seized with doubts: in the fields around Rozovka, iron fragments of the most bizarre shape are not uncommon; during the retreat in early October 1941, our troops blew up a whole warehouse of aerial bombs at the airfield north of the village.
O.V. Kulchenko kindly provided his find for photographing and making measurements, it really is a part of an ax (Fig. 6.9). The weight of the fragment is 140 g, the length from the fracture (in the figure it is on the right) to the blade is 120 mm, the width of the blade is 71 mm, and the width at the fracture is 24 mm. The fragment has a maximum thickness of 7 mm at the fracture and gradually tapers towards a sharp blade. Corrosion damage is noticeable (the edges of the blade are torn, on the entire surface there is an uneven coating of brown-brown corrosion products - iron oxides). The bushing and butt are absent, the break is most likely at the point of the ax narrowing in front of the bushing. The fracture is not "fresh" (recent), its surface is covered with the same corrosion products as the entire fragment. In the initial state, the length of the ax from Lugansk was apparently at least 150 mm, and the width of the blade was up to 90 mm.
Fig. 6.9... Ax from Lugansk. Photo 2009
To determine whether this find has anything to do with the Battle of Kalka, the ax must be sent to specialists for dating and deciding on its ownership. Without prejudging a qualified conclusion, let us compare the find with the descriptions of medieval axes in the available reference books.
Let's start with the well-known manual by A.N. Kirpichnikov on Old Russian weapons (SAI E1-36, issue 2). Judging by the shape of the fragment, the ax from Lugansk could have belonged to I, III, or VII Old Russian type (according to the classification adopted in this book). In terms of size and weight, it is more of a combat than a working ax (the latter are larger and more massive, their usual weight is 600-800 g). It is difficult to say anything definite about the dating of the fragment.
Two ancient Russian axes of the XI-XII centuries from the Pervomaisky (Mangush) region, presented in the exposition of the Mariupol Museum of Local Lore, bear no resemblance to a fragment from Lugansk.
Could the ax belonged to the nomads who fought on both sides? Describing the antiquities of medieval nomads of Eastern Europe, G.A. Fedorov-Davydov does not mention axes as a type of weapon at all. The three working axes presented in his work among the objects of everyday life have nothing in common with a fragment from Lugansk.
Accidental finds near Mogila-Seredinovka are mentioned in the report by P.M. Pinevich for 1928: "... local peasants - the Germans find the remains of military equipment: pieces of swords, parts of chain mail, spearheads and arrows." Nothing more definite and specific, indicating the events of 1223, could not be found.
A Christian bronze amulet-medallion with the image of St. George the Victorious is known in the Granitnoye area (see Fig. 5.4, item 11 in the previous chapter); it was found on the southeastern outskirts of the village. The authors of the message date two similar amulets (the place where the second was found is unknown), which arrived at the DonSU Archaeological Museum, at the end of the 12th - beginning of the 13th century. Based on the dating and the ancient Russian origin of the medallions, in the message these findings are linked to Igor's unsuccessful campaign in 1185 or to the battle on Kalka. I would like to believe in this, but we must not forget how widespread Christianity was among the Polovtsians at the beginning of the 13th century. The medallion did not have to be worn by a Russian warrior who came to Kalmius, it could have been lost by a local Christian Polovtsian. So this accidental find cannot be unambiguously associated with the battle on Kalka.
Just a few kilometers east of the border of the Rozovsky district, in the upper reaches of the Kalchik between Malaya Yanisol and Katerinovka, in the spring of 1990, the burial of a medieval nomad was discovered, which is interpreted as a material trace of the events of 1223 on Kalka. During the spring field work, students of the school of the village of Kirovskoye (A. Bondarenko and Z. Shirinov) and their teachers (G.G. Malibashi, A.V. Moskalenko) discovered human bones, a horse and a helmet with a mask. A saber, a head of a scabbard, a stirrup, scraps of chain mail, and a bronze button were also removed from the ground. The burial, destroyed by the processes of natural erosion, was located on the slope of a ravine 1.5 km north of the village of Kuibyshevo, Volnovakha region. All items, including bone remains, were transferred to the school museum of the village of Kirovskoye.
For a whole range of features, the author of the article attributes the burial to the monuments of the Black Cowls, known from the excavations in Porosye. The burial dates back to pre-Mongol times, i.e. the first third of the XIII century. The presence of a helmet, a mask with traces of silvering, chain mail, sabers are signs of a military burial and the high social status of the deceased. Comparing these signs with the realities of the Black Bucks burials of warriors of the corresponding rank, E.E. Kravchenko rightly records two important differences: the absence of a burial mound and household items in the burial at Kalchik (there are no items made of precious metals at all). Taking into account all these circumstances, it was concluded that the burial was hidden (on the slope of the ravine) and hasty, which logically followed from the situation that developed for the Russians and their Blackbuck allies after the defeat at Kalka. Due to the high status of the deceased, he could not be left without burial, but it was impossible to fully comply with the burial ceremony due to lack of time and fear of the victors' abuse of the grave.
Even taking into account some ambiguity with the composition of the grave goods in the burial and the circumstances of the discovery described in the work of E. A. Kravchenko / 99 /, at present there are no compelling reasons to reject the conclusions of this article and reject a possible connection between the burial and the battle on Kalka.
That's all that can be said for today about the material traces of the events of 1223. As you can see, archaeological material at the beginning of the XIII century in our area is very, very scarce. Basically, these are isolated random finds that can only be associated with the battle presumably.
There is no doubt that one of the most famous and large-scale battles of the Russian Middle Ages took place in the Northern Azov region, most likely on the territory of the present Rozovsky, Volodarsky, Volnovakhsky or Telmanovsky districts. But why is the situation with its material traces so bad? I'm not the first, and I'm not the last to ask this damn question ...
A partial answer to it has already been given in the literature on the basis of an analysis of the circumstances of the Kalkinsky massacre. Mass accumulations of remains after the battle could be in two places: at the site of the defeat of the Russian-Polovtsian army of Mstislav Udatny and at the "rocky place" where the camp of Mstislav Kievsky was. As a result of the pursuit, the remains could also have been scattered along the route of retreat to the Dnieper. Neither the Russians nor their allies could collect and bury their fallen in accordance with the accepted rituals, of course, they could not (the Black Kobuz burial at Kalchik is most likely a rare exception). Metal objects from the slain were collected by the victors (like everything of any value). Human and horse bones from the Russian-Polovtsian army remained in the steppe.
The conquerors on Kalka, the Mongols, had the opportunity to perform a funeral rite over their fellow tribesmen. In the descriptions of the battle, one can often find the statement that the Tatars burned their fallen. Most likely, it is erroneous and based on the description of Mongolian rituals of a much later time. Burning (cremation) and abandonment in the steppe appeared among the Mongols and their steppe neighbors quite late, together with Lamaism. In the 13th century, they buried the deceased in the ground, and the burial was always secret. Giuzjani, Rubruk and Karpini wrote about this. The Mongols tried in every possible way to hide their burials: a mound was not poured over them to destroy all traces, herds of horses were chased over the graves. Therefore, purposeful searches for massive Mongolian burials associated with the Battle of Kalka are most likely unpromising, these graves can only be found as a result of a happy accident.
The human and horse remains of the Russian-Polovtsian army were taken up by wolves and foxes, steppe scavengers. The powerful jaws of a wolf can easily cope with the bones of a horse, and even more so of a person. If surviving bones remain among the steppe grasses, then in a few years on the surface of the day they lose their organic components, become brittle and crumble into dust. Bone remains buried in the ground also lose their organic components (collagens), but they are replaced by inorganic salts from groundwater. In this case, the bones are mineralized, hardened and can already be preserved for a very long time.
In stony places, the soil layer is thin, in it the bone remains do not accumulate, but are washed off by rain or melt water to the bottom of the beams, where they can naturally be buried and survive. Here, at the bottom of the beams near the alleged battle sites, one can count on some finds.
We examined all the material that is available today at the site of the battle on Kalka. The results are not very encouraging. In my opinion, there are three promising places: Kamennye Mogily and the headwaters of Kalchik (south of Rozovka), Mogila-Seredinovka (east of Volodarskoye) and the Kalmius valley near Granitnoye. Each of these places has its own arguments "for" and "against", but neither written sources, nor scanty archaeological material do not allow us to make a final choice today. There is little hope for the discovery of new written sources that would shed light on the question of interest to us. We can only hope for new finds of material traces of the battle on Kalka, when the systematic efforts of archaeologists or just a lucky chance will give us indisputable evidence in favor of a particular place.
We conclude the section with the same thing we started with: the task of localizing the place of the battle is extremely difficult and, in my opinion, today it does not have a unique and indisputable solution. So was this section worth writing? I saw my main task in isolating reliably established facts among hypotheses, assumptions, and even just fictions. Objectively assess the plausibility of hypotheses by weighing the pros and cons. Find some firm foothold in the vast, but unsteady expanse of everything written and expressed to date about the site of the battle on Kalka, determine the "stove from which those local historians can dance" who will seriously deal with this issue.
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