Military Observer. Tarutinsky maneuver - a march of great importance for Russia Tarutinsky battle of 1812
The Tarutino maneuver of 1812 - a march of the Russian army during the Patriotic War from Moscow to Tarutino (a village on the Nara River, 80 kilometers south-west of Moscow, now the Kaluga Region), conducted under the leadership of General-Field Marshal Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov 5 - September 21 (September 17 - October 3, new style).
After the Battle of Borodino, when it became obvious that it was impossible to keep Moscow with the remaining forces, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov outlined a plan, which was to break away from the Napoleonic army and occupy a flank position in relation to it, create a threat to French communications, prevent the enemy from entering southern regions of Russia (not ravaged by the war and rich in supplies) and prepare the Russian army to launch a counteroffensive.
Kutuzov kept his plan a big secret. On September 2 (14), leaving Moscow, the Russian army headed southeast along the Ryazan road.
On September 4 (16), after crossing the Moskva River at Borovskiy ferry (not far from the present town of Zhukovskiy), Kutuzov, under the cover of the rearguard of General Nikolai Nikolaevich Raevskiy, unexpectedly turned the main forces of the Russian army to the west.
The Cossacks of the rearguard succeeded in a demonstrative retreat to Ryazan to captivate the vanguard of the French army. I must say that covering the retreat, the Cossacks imitated retreat 2 more times, and the French followed them along the Kashira and Tula roads.
The vanguard of General Mikhail Andreyevich Miloradovich and the detachment of Nikolai Nikolaevich Raevsky were moved towards Moscow; detachments for partisan actions were allocated.
Having lost sight of the Russian army, Napoleon sent out strong detachments along the Ryazan, Tula and Kaluga roads. For several days they were looking for Kutuzov, and only on September 14 (26), the cavalry of Marshal Joachim Murat discovered Russian troops in the Podolsk region.
Subsequently, Kutuzov secretly (mainly at night) made a retreat along the Old Kaluga road to the Nara River.
On September 21 (October 3, new style), Russian troops stopped in the area of the village of Tarutino, where they took up a new fortified position. The brilliantly organized and carried out Tarutino maneuver allowed the Russian army to break away from Napoleon's army and take an advantageous strategic position, which provided her with preparations for a counteroffensive.
As a result of the Tarutino maneuver, Kutuzov retained communication with the southern regions of Russia, which made it possible to strengthen the army, cover the arms factory in Tula and the supply base in Kaluga, and maintain contact with the armies of Alexander Petrovich Tormasov and Pavel Vasilyevich Chichagov.
Napoleon was forced to abandon the attack on St. Petersburg and ultimately, leaving Moscow, retreat along the Old Smolensk road, that is, through the areas already ravaged by the war. The Tarutino maneuver showed Kutuzov's outstanding military leadership, his ability to impose his will on the enemy, put him in disadvantageous conditions, and achieve a turning point in the war.
Tarutino camp
Tarutino camp is a fortified camp in the Tarutino area (a village on the Nara River, now the Zhukovsky district of the Kaluga region, 80 kilometers south-west of Moscow), which was occupied by the Russian army from September 21 (October 3, new style) to October 11 (23) during the Patriotic War of 1812 after the abandonment of Moscow.
The Tarutino camp was located on an advantageous area for defense, relying on which it was possible to keep under observation the roads from Moscow - Old Kaluga, Tulskaya and Ryazan.
The front and the left flank of the Tarutino camp were covered by rivers (Nara and others), along the front earthen fortifications in the form of flashes and lunettes (14 in total) were built, the river banks were scarped.
In the forest, covering the rear of the Tarutino camp, there are notches and rubble. The army was located on both sides of the Old Kaluga road: in the 1st line - the 2nd and 6th infantry, in the 2nd - 4,5,3 and 7th infantry and 1st cavalry corps, in the 3rd - 8th Infantry Corps and part of the cavalry, in the 4th - two cuirassier divisions and reserve artillery (about 400 guns).
Flushes are field (sometimes long-term) fortifications. They consist of two faces, 20-30 meters long, each at an obtuse angle. The corner with the top is directed towards the enemy.
Lunette is an open field or long-term reinforcement, consisting of at least 3 faces. In the field lunette, usually 1 - 4 companies were located.
To cover the flanks of the battle formation, the following were advanced: left - 5, right - 2 jaeger regiments; the vanguard of the army (2nd and 4th cavalry corps) was located 3 kilometers north of Tarutino.
The apartment of Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov and his headquarters were located first in Tarutino, and then in the village of Letashevka (currently - the Maloe Litashovo tract, 3 km southwest of Tarutino).
In the Tarutino camp, the Russian army was reorganized, supplemented, supplied with weapons, ammunition and food and prepared for active offensive operations. Army partisan detachments were sent to the rear of the enemy.
In connection with the preparation of a counteroffensive in the army, the number of cavalry increased significantly. The troops carried out enhanced combat training. Kutuzov used his stay in the Tarutino camp to prepare for the transition of the Russian army to a counteroffensive and already in the Tarutino battle on October 18 (October 6) defeated the vanguard of the French army.
In 1834, at the entrance to the village, a monument was erected with the money of the peasants of the village of Tarutino and nearby villages with the inscription: "At this place, the Russian army under the leadership of Field Marshal Kutuzov, having strengthened, saved Russia and Europe."
By the way, it was in the Tarutino camp that the great Russian poet, and then the lieutenant of the Moscow militia, Vasily Andreevich Zhukovsky, wrote the poem "A Singer in the Camp of Russian Warriors", which glorified him throughout Russia.
The Nara River in the Tarutino region. The river served as a natural strategic barrier that protected the Russian army.
From the high slopes of the river valley, the surrounding area was visible many miles ahead.
The clear edges of the lunettes are still clearly visible on the ground.
Here and there in the vicinity of Tarutin you can find ditches and ramparts of ancient fortifications.
Monument in Tarutino.
Tarutino battle
The Battle of Tarutino or the Battle of Tarutino is a battle between Russian and French troops on October 6 (October 18, new style) during the Patriotic War of 1812 near the Chernishnya River (a tributary of the Nara River) 8 kilometers north of the village of Tarutino. The participants themselves called the battle "Battle of Chernishnya" (Kutuzov) or "Battle in Vinkovo" (Colencourt). Vinkovo is the old name of the current village of Chernishnya.
Tarutino battle
At the beginning of October 1812, after completing the preparation of the Russian army for the counteroffensive, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov directed the first blow against the French vanguard (28 thousand people, 187 guns, under the command of Marshal Joachim Murat), located on the banks of the Chernishnya River.
Kutuzov's plan was to strike the main blow with the group of General Leonty Leontyevich Bennigsen (3 infantry and 1 cavalry corps, 10 Cossack regiments) against the left flank, and by the group of General Mikhail Andreyevich Miloradovich (2 infantry corps, guard and reserve cavalry) together with the main forces of the Russian army - against the center of the French vanguard, in cooperation with the partisan detachments of Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov and Alexander Samoilovich Figner, advancing behind enemy lines, to surround and destroy him.
At 7 o'clock in the morning on October 6 (18), the Cossack regiments of Vasily Vasilyevich Orlov-Denisov attacked the French in the village of Teterinka, threatening to envelop their left flank. Behind them, the advance units of the main forces of Bennigsen's group began to attack. The position of the French avant-garde became critical. Murat retreated. Russian troops (Orlov-Denisov's Cossacks and Miloradovich's cavalrymen) pursued them to Spas-Kupla.
The main forces of the Russian army, which had advanced to the Chernishnya River, were not brought into battle: Kutuzov, having received a report about the withdrawal of Napoleon's troops from Moscow, stopped them and returned them to the Tarutino positions.
The result of the Tarutino battle was a partial defeat of the French avant-garde, which lost about 2500 (according to other sources - 4000) people killed and wounded 2000 prisoners, 38 guns and the entire baggage train. Russian losses amounted to 300 killed and 904 wounded (according to Kutuzov's report). According to the inscription on the wall of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, the Russian army lost 1183 people killed and wounded.
The Tarutino battle was the first major tactical victory of the Russian army after the Battle of Borodino, which strengthened the morale of its troops on the eve of the counteroffensive.
Bust of Ataman Platov at the war memorial near the village of Kuzovlevo (not far from Chernishnya).
Ataman Platov's Cossacks performed many feats during the Tarutino battle. At the village of Teterinki, the Cossacks captured a French battery of 18 guns. Esaul Kostin, who was the first to capture a French gun, was particularly distinguished. The carp centurion captured the gold standard of the 1st cuirassier regiment. Sergeant Filatov stabbed General Deri, the commander of the guard, Murat. During the battle, more than 170 Cossacks were killed, but they themselves killed almost 2,000 French.
Although, there are other opinions about the Cossacks, such as the memoirs of General A.P. Ermolov: "... The rich carts were a tasty bait for our Cossacks: they engaged in robbery, got drunk and did not think to prevent the enemy from retreating.".
Memorial sign near the village of Chernishnya.
Among all the events of the war of 1812, the most significant for society was the Battle of Borodino, the abandonment and fire of Moscow, however, for historians, tacticians and strategists of subsequent times, the main turning point of the Patriotic War was the brilliant march-maneuver, which in late September - early October was performed by the retreating Russian army ... Napoleon himself was amazed by the scale and correctness of the organization, and most of M.I. Kutuzov believed that in one Tarutinsky passage, the Most Serene Prince could be ranked among the greatest commanders of the New Time.
Course of events
On the evening of September 17 (5), the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Field Marshal M.I. Kutuzov unexpectedly gives the order to turn off the Ryazan road, along which the army was still retreating, and go to Podolsk. None of the corps commanders knew where and why the army was turning, and only by the evening of the next day did the Russians find themselves on the Tula road near Podolsk. Further, the Russian troops set off along the Old Kaluga road south to Krasnaya Pakhra, after passing which they stopped at the village of Tarutino.
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The military historian and adjutant of Kutuzov, who was present during the implementation of this flanking maneuver, A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky describes the advantages that the Russian army received from these movements: “Having become a firm foot on the Kaluga road, Prince Kutuzov had the opportunity: 1) to cover the midday provinces, which were abundant in supplies; 2) threaten the path of enemy action from Moscow through Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk; 3) to cross the troops of the French communications stretched over an excessive space and 4) in the event of Napoleon's retreat to Smolensk, to warn him along the shortest road. Indeed, the Tarutinsky maneuver allowed the Russian troops to simultaneously cover from the enemy the provisions stocks in Kaluga, and the arms factories in Tula, and the foundries in Bryansk, and also prevent Napoleon from entering the fertile southern provinces. Moreover, such an arrangement of Russian troops deprived Napoleon of the opportunity to carry out the so-called "autumn plan" of the campaign against St. Petersburg.
In fact, for the first time in the campaign, Kutuzov outplayed Napoleon, putting him in check and forcing him to play according to his scheme. A. Jomini admitted that in the history of wars from ancient times "The retreat that the Russian army made in 1812 from the Neman to Moscow ... not allowing itself to be upset or partially defeated by such an enemy as Napoleon ... of course, should be placed above all others" not so much for the "strategic talents" of the generals as " regarding the amazing confidence, steadfastness and firmness of the troops. " The great army became more and more entangled in a cleverly placed trap in which Moscow was the bait.
The ghost of the Russian army roams the fields
But how did Kutuzov manage to hide the movement of more than 80,000-strong army from Murat's cavalry pursuing it on the heels? The point here was the old military trick with lighting fires: the French patrols, unable to get beyond the rearguard of Miloradovich, and then the Cossacks of Efremov, could only be content with the sight of lighted fires, according to which they considered the approximate number of the military group ahead of them. However, in this case, they were deceived by the Cossacks in the same way as at one time Khan Akhmat on the Ugra River was deceived by Ivan III - there were several tens of times more fires than was necessary for the two Cossack regiments that covered the retreat. In addition, the covering troops constantly made some kind of false maneuvers. Kutuzov wrote in a report to the emperor: “The army, making a flanking movement, for the secrecy of this direction, introduced the enemy into bewilderment on every march. Heading herself to a certain point, she disguised herself meanwhile with false movements of light troops, making demonstrations, now to Kolomna, now to Serpukhov, followed by the enemy in large parties. "
Map from the book of A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky
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Here is how Murat G. von Roos describes this campaign in his memoirs: “We drove off, accompanied by the smoke that drove towards us from the direction of the city. The sun shone through the smoke, painting all visible objects yellow. The Cossacks were very close in front of us, but that day they did not even exchange pistol shots.<…>The next day, September 16, we pulled further along the road leading to Vladimir and Kazan.<…>We saw our opponents only in the evening, when we approached the wooden town of Bogorodsk, which stood to the right of the road. " For another whole day, the French moved in the direction in which the Cossacks had disappeared. On the third day “Early in the morning I paid a visit to my commander, Colonel von Milkau. He greeted me with the words: “We have lost the enemy and every trace of him; you have to stay here and wait for new orders ",- writes Roos.
Indeed, continuing to follow the retreating ghost of the Russian army along the Ryazan road, Murat missed the flanking movement of the Russians and on September 22 (10), when the Cossacks dispersed along with the fog, he found an empty road in front of him.
Marshal B. de Castellane describes a colorful picture, more than others, perhaps testifying to the mood of the French troops at this moment: “Our vanguard is twelve miles away. The Neapolitan king, standing in the mud in his yellow boots, with his Gascon accent, spoke to the officer sent by the emperor, in such expressions: “Tell the emperor that I honorably led the vanguard of the French army further than Moscow, but I'm tired, tired of all this, hear Do you? I want to go to Naples to take care of my subjects. "
On the same days, Kutuzov sent a report to the emperor with the following content: “I still receive information about the success of my false movement, for the enemy followed the Cossacks in units (that is, the detachment left on the Ryazan road). This gives me the convenience that the army, having made a flank march of 18 versts tomorrow on the Kaluga road and sending strong parties to Mozhaiskaya, should be very concerned about the enemy's rear. In this way I hope that the enemy will seek to give me a battle, from which, in an advantageous location, I expect equal success, as at Borodino. "
Of course, after more than a week, as Roos writes, the French “We found the Russians again, who seemed to have sunk into the abyss from the moment when ... we saw them on the top of the hill near Bogorodsk. The bloody war fun began again; all types of weapons were put into action, every day, often from morning to evening, cannon firing took place ... ". But that was already a completely different story.
Staff games: opponents and supporters of maneuver
The Tarutino maneuver caused fierce controversy in the headquarters and stirred up a new wave of intrigue around the field marshal. Chief of staff L.L. Bennigsen, F. Buxveden, M.I. Platov and their supporters. Historian E.V. Tarle writes that "At this time in the headquarters, except for two or three people, no one understood the enormous and beneficial significance of Kutuzov's movements."
The position of Kutuzov was worsened by the fact that Murat nevertheless opened the movement of Russian troops and began to press the Russian rearguard on the Kaluga road. Bennigsen's comrades foaming at the mouth insisted on a battle with Murat at Krasnaya Pakhra, to which Kutuzov categorically disagreed, arguing that it was necessary to retreat even further south, to the village. Tarutino, because from there it will be easier to control the three roads leading from Moscow to Kaluga. Their dispute went so far that Kutuzov announced that he was resigning power and giving Bennigsen the entire headquarters, all the adjutants and the army: "You command the army, and I am only a volunteer" he said to Bennigsen, giving him the opportunity to look for a place to fight. Bennigsen honestly all morning looking for a place to fight in the vicinity of Krasnaya Pakhra, did not find anything and said that it was really impossible to fight here. After which Kutuzov "regained" command and ordered to retreat.
In the future, Kutuzov will deal with Bennigsen more harshly, in one of the disputes in which Bennigsen argued that Kutuzov's position was wrong for an attack on the French vanguard (another maneuver that Kutuzov promised to do and did not commit), the commander-in-chief said bluntly: "Your position near Friedland was good for you, well, but one hundred concerns me, I am content with this position, and we will stay here, because I am the commander here, and I am responsible for everything." Another reminder of the defeat at Friedland was a grievous insult to Bennigsen. With caustic ridicule and de facto dismissal, Kutuzov destroyed the persistent critic of the Tarutino maneuver.
Be that as it may, but after all the advantages of the Tarutino maneuver became fully obvious, many of those generals who opposed him not only recognized this plan as ingenious, but even claimed to be its authorship. However, the most impartial and revealing evidence is the opinion of Kutuzov's rival and the author of the “retreat” concept: "This action,- wrote M. B. Barclay de Tolly, - provided us with the opportunity to complete the war with the complete extermination of the enemy. "
Russian victory
Tarutino battle- the battle on October 18, 1812 near the village of Tarutino, Kaluga region, between the Russian troops under the command of Field Marshal Kutuzov and the French troops of Marshal Murat. The fight is also called the battle under the river Chernishneya, Tarutino maneuver or battle in Vinkovo.
The victory at Tarutin was the first victory of the Russian troops in the Patriotic War of 1812 after the Battle of Borodino. The success strengthened the spirit of the Russian army, which launched a counteroffensive.
Background
"Gg. generals and officers gathered at the front posts with expressions of courtesy, which led many to conclude that there was a truce. "
Both sides remained in this position for two weeks.
The rest of the corps under the command of Miloradovich were to shackle the right flank of the French in battle. A separate detachment of Lieutenant-General Dorokhov, according to the plan, is to cut off Murat's escape routes on the Old Kaluga road near the village of Voronovo. Commander-in-Chief Kutuzov remained with reserves in the camp and provided general leadership.
The battle could have ended with incomparably greater benefit for us, but in general there was little communication in the actions of the troops. The field marshal, confident of success, remained with the guards, did not see it with his own eyes; private chiefs gave orders at will. The huge number of our cavalry close to the center and on the left wing seemed more collected for the parade, flaunting harmony more than speed of movement. It was possible to prevent the enemy from joining his infantry scattered in parts, bypassing and standing in the way of his retreat, for there was a considerable space between his camp and the forest. The enemy was given time to gather troops, bring artillery from different sides, reach the forest without hindrance and retreat along the road through it through the village of Voronovo. The enemy lost 22 guns, up to 2,000 prisoners, the entire train and crews of Murat, the king of Naples. The rich carts were a tasty bait for our Cossacks: they engaged in robbery, got drunk and did not think of preventing the enemy from retreating.
The goal of the Tarutino battle was not fully achieved, but its result was successful, and success was even more important for raising the spirit of the Russian troops. Previously, in the course of the war, in no battle on either side (even at Borodino) had such a number of captured guns as in this one - 36 or 38 guns. In a letter to Tsar Alexander I, Kutuzov reported 2,500 killed Frenchmen, 1,000 prisoners, and another 500 prisoners were taken the next day by the Cossacks during the pursuit. Kutuzov estimated his losses at 300 killed and wounded. Clausewitz confirms French losses of 3-4 thousand soldiers. Two generals Murat were killed (Deri and Fischer). The day after the battle, a letter from Murat was handed over to the Russian posts with a request to hand over the body of General Deri, chief of Murat's personal guard. The request could not be satisfied, since the body was not found.
The military historian Bogdanovich in his work cites a list of losses of the Russian army, where 1,200 people appear (74 killed, 428 wounded and 700 missing). According to the inscription on the marble slab on the wall of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, the Russians lost 1,183 people killed and wounded.
Alexander I generously awarded the commanders. Kutuzov received a gold sword with diamonds and a laurel wreath, Bennigsen - diamond insignia of the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called and 100 thousand rubles. Dozens of officers and generals - awards and promotions. The lower ranks, participants in the battle, received 5 rubles per person.
Tarutino. 1812 Electronic reproduction from the Wikimedia Foundation repository.
Tarutinsky maneuver (Patriotic War, 1812). The transition of the Russian army under the command of Field Marshal M.I. Kutuzov from Moscow to the village of Tarutino September 5-21, 1812 After Battle of Borodino Kutuzov took upon himself the responsibility to surrender Moscow to the French in order to preserve the army. “With the loss of Moscow, Russia is not yet lost ... But if the army is destroyed, both Moscow and Russia will perish”- said Kutuzov to the generals at the military council in Fili. So the Russians left their ancient capital, which for the first time in 200 years was in the hands of foreigners.
Leaving Moscow, Kutuzov began to retreat in a southeast direction, along the Ryazan road. At the same time, the Cossack units and corps N.N. Raevsky continued to retreat to Ryazan, and then "disappeared" into the forests. By this they misled the French vanguard of the Marshal I. Murat , who followed on the heels of the retreating army, and the Russians broke away from the pursuit. Murat again overtook the Russian army in the Podolsk region. However, attempts to attack her were thwarted by the general's rearguard. M.A. Miloradovich ... He withstood a series of battles, not allowing the French cavalry to upset the ranks of the retreating army (see. Spas Purchase ).
During the withdrawal, Kutuzov introduced tough measures against the desertion that began in his troops after the surrender of Moscow. Having reached the Old Kaluga road, the Russian army turned to Kaluga and, crossing the Nara River, camped in the village of Tarutino. Kutuzov brought 85 thousand people there. available composition (together with the militia). As a result of the Tarutino maneuver, the Russian army got out of the blow and took an advantageous position.
While in Tarutino, Kutuzov covered the southern regions of Russia rich in human resources and food, the Tula military-industrial complex and at the same time could threaten the communications of the French on the Smolensk road. The French, on the other hand, could not advance from Moscow to Petersburg without hindrance, having the Russian army in the rear. Kutuzov actually imposed the further course of the campaign on Napoleon. The main thing is that the Russian commander, having saved the army, received all the advantages of his position - the master on his own land.
In the Tarutino camp, the Russian army received reinforcements and increased its strength to 120 thousand people. One of the most significant additions was the arrival of 26 Cossack regiments from the Don region. The share of cavalry in the Kutuzov army increased significantly, reaching a third of its composition, which played an extremely important role in the period of the pursuit of Napoleonic troops. The issue of providing the cavalry with everything necessary was thought out in advance, in particular, more than 150 thousand horseshoes were delivered to the army.
In addition to manpower reserves, the army received substantial material and technical support in a short time. In August - September alone, the country's main weapons smithy, the Tula plant, produced 36,000 rifles for the army. Kutuzov also entrusted the Tula, Kaluga, Oryol, Ryazan and Tver governors with the obligation to prepare 100 thousand short fur coats and 100 thousand pairs of boots for the army.
Despite all its tactical achievements, the French army in Moscow found itself in a strategic blockade. In addition to the Tarutino camp, where Kutuzov's troops were stationed, a second army was actually created around Moscow, consisting of partisans and militias. Its number reached 200 thousand people. Having reached the ancient Russian capital, the Napoleonic army found itself in a dense blockade ring. Napoleon, who came to a country deeply alien to him, could not establish his base here and found himself in isolation. The only thread connecting the French with the familiar world was the Smolensk road, along which they carried out a constant supply of provisions, ammunition and fodder to Moscow. But it was under the control of partisan detachments and could at any moment be tightly blocked by a strike from Tarutino. At the same time, Napoleon's hopes that the capture of Moscow would force the Russians to conclude peace were not justified due to the tough position of Alexander I, who was determined to continue the struggle.
During his stay in Moscow, Napoleon lost 26 thousand people. killed, missing, died from wounds and diseases, i.e. suffered losses comparable to a major battle. Gradually, the illusory nature of success from the occupation of Moscow by the French became quite obvious. All this forced Napoleon to leave Moscow. In 1834, a monument was erected in Tarutino with funds raised by peasants with the inscription: “At this place, the Russian army under the leadership of Field Marshal Kutuzov, having strengthened, saved Russia and Europe” (see Chernishnya, Maloyaroslavets).
Used materials from the book: Nikolay Shefov. Battles of Russia. Military history library. M., 2002.
Tarutinsky maneuver of 1812, a maneuver march of the Russian army during the Patriotic War of 1812 from Moscow to Tarutino (a village on the Nara river, 80 km southwest of Moscow), conducted under the leadership of the general-field worker. M.I.Kutuzov 5-21 sept. (17 Sept - 3 Oct). After the Battle of Borodino in 1812, when it became obvious that it was impossible to keep Moscow with the remaining forces, M.I. communications, to prevent the enemy in the south. districts of Russia (not ravaged by the war) and prepare Russian. army to go over to the counteroffensive. Kutuzov kept his plan a big secret. 2 (14) Sept., Leaving Moscow, Rus. the army headed to the south-east. along the Ryazan road. 4 (16) Sep after crossing the Moskva River at the Borovsky ferry, Kutuzov under the cover of the rearguard of General. H. H. Raevsky unexpectedly turned ch. strength of Russian. army at 3. The Cossacks of the rearguard succeeded in a demonstrative withdrawal to Ryazan to captivate the vanguard of the French. army. 7 (19) Sep. Russian the army arrived in Podolsk, and two days later, continuing the flanking march-maneuver, in the district of Krasnaya Pakhra village. Riding the Old Kaluga road, Russian. the army camped and stayed here until 14 (26) Sept. In the direction of Moscow, the vanguard of the general was put forward. M.A. Miloradovich and the detachment of H.H. Raevsky; detachments for partisans were allocated. action. Having lost Russian. army out of sight, Napoleon sent out strong detachments along the Ryazan, Tula and Kaluga roads. For several days they were looking for Kutuzov, and only on September 14 (26). cavalry of Marshal I. Murat discovered Rus. troops in the Podolsk region. Subsequently, Kutuzov secretly (mainly at night) made a retreat along the Old Kaluga road to the river. Nara. 21 Sep (3 Oct.) Rus. troops stopped in the district with. Tarutino, where they took up a new fortified position (see Tarutino camp). The brilliantly organized and conducted T. m. Allowed the Russian. army to break away from Napoleon's army and take an advantageous strategist, a position that provided her with preparation for a counteroffensive. As a result, T. m. Kutuzov retained communication from the south. regions of Russia, which made it possible to strengthen the army, cover the arms factory in Tula and the supply base in Kaluga, maintain contact with the armies of A.P. Tormasov and P.V. Chichagov. Napoleon was forced to abandon the attack on St. Petersburg and ultimately, leaving Moscow, retreat along the Old Smolensk road, that is, through the regions already ravaged by the war. In the military field Kutuzov's outstanding military leadership, his ability to impose his will, put him in unfavorable conditions, and achieve a turning point in the war was manifested.
D. V. Pankov
Used materials of the Soviet military encyclopedia in 8 volumes, volume 7.
Read on:
Patriotic War of 1812 (chronological table).
Tyrion. Tarutino ... (participant's memories).
Griois. Tarutino ... (participant's memories).
