Rybakovsky l regional analysis of migration. Rybakovsky, Leonid Leonidovich. Demographic consequences of the accident
(Socis. 2001. No. 6. P. 85? 95)
RYBAKOVSKY Leonid Leonidovich,Doctor of Economics, Professor. Institute for Socio-Political Research RAS.
The worst outcomes of wars, of any scale, are human losses. Life - from the point of view of human morality - is priceless. But from the standpoint of politicians who push people to kill each other, victims are only the inevitable result of wars, and war, Clausewitz noted, is a continuation of politics by other means. Not to mention the early times, even in the 20th century, human losses in wars were and are viewed not as ruined lives, but as lost potential. Human memory has not preserved information about hundreds of thousands, millions of soldiers and civilians who died during ancient, medieval, modern wars, having preserved the names of the Macedonian, Caesar, Barbarossa, Napoleon, and other commanders on whose conscience these victims are.
After any war, and sometimes during ongoing battles, casualties are counted. No exception Second World War... Both the winners and the defeated already in the first post-war years knew, at least, their own human losses. The loss figures published at that time have so far changed little. In 1946, Germany's losses in World War II were estimated at 6.5 million. This figure is being specified, but most of the amendments do not exceed 20 percent. Another thing is the human losses of the USSR. The number of losses, published in the Soviet Union in 1946, had almost quadrupled by the beginning of the 90s. It remains a subject of controversy, which is natural. Sometimes losses are underestimated, albeit insignificantly by 12 - 13%. At the same time, those who are not tired of humiliating their own Motherland continue to overestimate the human losses of the USSR by 1.5 - 2 times. And without these overestimations, the losses are terrible in scale - almost 14% of the pre-war population of the country. In the temporarily occupied territories, every fifth inhabitant was killed or destroyed. Soviet people fought together with the enemy, died together on the battlefields, in concentration camps, at the hands of punishers, etc. During the war and after it, neither victory nor total losses were shared. Before the collapse of the USSR, there was no need for estimates of human losses for individual republics or nationalities. Actually, they are still absent, at least for Russia. The need for them, meanwhile, is obvious. Not in order to show whose contribution to the common victory is more significant, or who lost more people in the common struggle against the aggressor, but only in order to recreate the history of the population of Russia, to assess the damage to its demographic development.
Prerequisites for assessing casualties
for separate parts country
Calculating losses throughout the Soviet Union is fraught with difficulties, which increase manifold when estimates are made for individual parts of the state. Estimates of casualties in such cases are fraught with often fatal information gaps. When guns rattle, statistics are the last thing to think about. And without this, the war leaves a lot of unknowns.
Regardless of which method of assessing human losses is used: the direct counting method, the demographic balance method, the ethno-demographic method, not to mention the method of proportional distribution of losses, it must proceed from a single, common for the USSR, the amount of human losses. Otherwise, the sum of the estimates of the casualties of the now independent states will become inconceivable. In the subsequent judgments and calculations, we proceed from the total loss of 27 million people. Irrecoverable losses of servicemen are accepted at 8.7 million. The civilian population accounts for 18.3 million people. Adopting a different, slightly lower figure for total losses, for example - 26.6 million, we come to an estimate of civilian casualties at 17.9 million, which is only 0.4 million less (1.5%).
Regardless of the method for determining human losses, it was inevitably devalued by the incompleteness and inaccuracy of the original information. We are talking about official data on the population on the eve and after the end of the war, its natural movement during the war years, information about the dead civilian population collected by the Extraordinary State Commission (CHGK) in the liberated regions, etc. There are discrepancies even when different authors use one The source of information . Example ? estimates for Leningrad. It is still unknown how many civilians died in the besieged city. For Leningrad and the region A.A. Shevyakov cites the death toll at 1.4 million. According to P. Polyana, a little more than 700 thousand people died. Both authors use materials from ChGK. According to D. Likhachev, at least 2 million people died in the city during the blockade: many residents of rural areas fled there from the advancing enemy. Nobody took them into account, although they are among the dead.
The number of servicemen killed is not absolutely reliable either. S.N. Mikhalev believes that the amount of irrecoverable losses of servicemen is about 2.2 million more than the one proposed by the military department. Without going into a dispute, we note that the total amount of human losses, calculated by the demographic balance method, does not change from an increase or decrease in these losses, although the ratio of losses of servicemen and civilians does change. In the first case, it is? and?, in the second case - 2/5 and 3/5. The third ratio should also be given, which is obtained if we use the one made by S.N. Mikhalev estimated the total losses of the Soviet Union at 23.6 million people. With the losses of servicemen in 10.9 million, the share of the civilian population remains 12.7 million. Then the ratio of the death of civilians and military personnel is almost 1 to 1 (54 and 46 percent).
The plausibility of the first of the relations is confirmed by this consideration. In Germany, Hungary and Romania, hostilities lasted 4-6 months. There was no purposeful destruction of the population, as was the case in Poland, Yugoslavia and the USSR. The ratio in losses of servicemen and civilians in them is 1: 1. In addition, the main battles took place on Soviet territory, where, along with the soldiers, the Soviet, and not the German, population perished. In our country, the occupation and destruction of the civilian population lasted 2.5 - 3 years. Many settlements changed hands several times; some were destroyed along with the population during battles and punitive operations. As a result of hostilities and punitive operations of fascist troops against partisans in the occupied territory, 1,710 cities and more than 70 thousand rural settlements were completely or partially destroyed and burned. Let's add months-long sieges, blockades, bombing and shelling of cities. These are hundreds of thousands, millions of lives. Consequently, the ratio of the killed servicemen and civilians in the USSR cannot be the same as in Germany and its allied countries.
Internal migrations introduce large distortions in the estimates of human losses for individual parts of a single state. Information about the size of the migrated population from the areas from which our troops retreated is extremely contradictory. They vary within 10 - 25 million. So, according to G. Kumanev, 500 thousand people left Karelia at the beginning of the war, while the population of this republic in 1939 was 470 thousand.
The information of the State Statistics Committee of the USSR about those evacuated during the war years includes 10 million of those who used the railway, and 2 million of those who used water transport. But many left the fighting areas in cars and horse-drawn vehicles, on foot. As the occupied territories were liberated from the Nazi troops, many returned back: some of them were drafted into the army, some died. There are also unknown data on population movements in the second half of the 1940s, when the scale of return migration increased. These factors are not measurable. And on their basis, estimates of the population are made up to the 1959 census. Let us add that for areas from which the population migrated during the war years, estimates of human losses, especially by the method of demographic balance, are overestimated, and for areas that received migrants, they are underestimated.
Traditional methods of estimating human losses
1. Method of proportional distribution of losses. This method assumes that losses are distributed equally across all parts of the population. But this condition is absent when calculating the human losses of the USSR: not all union republics were fully or partially occupied. In addition, the data on the death of civilians in the occupied territories and on those hijacked to work in Germany ("ostarbeiters") differ significantly depending on the time the territory is in the hands of the enemy, the fierceness of the fighting, the scope of resistance, and, consequently, the brutality of punitive operations. ... The nature of the battles in different regions of the country was significantly different. The blockade of Leningrad, the defense of Stalingrad, the Battle of the Kursk Bulge differ from the defense of Brest or Sevastopol not in the fierceness and resilience of the soldiers, but in scale, which cannot be taken into account by the proportional distribution of losses. Therefore, it would be wrong to simply distribute the losses of the civilian population by the proportion of the number of inhabitants of the territories subjected to occupation, and the number of servicemen by the proportion of the union republics in the population of the country.
According to the ChGK data, in the territories that were under occupation for a long time (group 1), the recorded (apparently greatly underestimated) share of people exterminated by the Nazis was 4% of the pre-war population. Approximately 8.4% of the population of these areas was deported to Germany. In territories that were briefly or partially occupied (group 2), slightly less than one percent died. Together with those driven away for forced labor, this gives 1.5%, i.e. almost 8.3 times less than the first group of territories. There are also significant differences within the groups in the death of the civilian population and its removal to forced labor. In the first group - Leningrad (28.3% of the population perished and driven to Germany), Pskov (17.4%), Novgorod (15.7%), Bryansk (12.7%) and Smolensk (8.5%) regions ... In the second - Oryol (7.7%) and Volgograd (5.8%) regions.
To apply the method of proportional distribution of the number of deaths, in addition to the total amount of losses (separately for the military and the civilian population), data on the population in the pre-war and post-war years are also required. This information makes it possible to calculate the rate of change in the population size separately for groups of districts that have been under occupation for a long and short time. The rate of decline in the population of such territories of Russia in the postwar years is higher than in the union republics that were seized by the enemy (in total). Even by 1959, the population of these Russian territories had not reached the level of 1939. The rates of change in the population size by groups of districts are significantly different. Districts of the 1st group suffered the most significantly during the war. In 1959, the population here was 15% lower than the pre-war level. Obviously, it is also wrong to distribute human losses in proportion to the proportion of the civilian population in the occupied territories.
For the calculation, you can take the formula: RP = (OP x TO x DR): TP. Where: RP ? losses of the civilian population of Russia, OP - total losses of the civilian population, TO - the rate of change in the population of all regions that were in the occupation, DR - the share of Russia in the population of the occupied territories, TR - the rate of change in the population of the Russian regions that were in the occupation. There are two calculation options: according to the population dynamics of 1939 - 1951 and 1939 - 1959. In the first case, the loss of the civilian population in the territories of Russia will amount to 6.694 thousand people. In the second - 6.969 thousand. Although both variants of calculations are significantly influenced by the results of the migration movement of the population (in 1939 - 1950 and in 1939 - 1958), they give similar results - 6.7 - 7 million people without the death of servicemen.
2. Direct counting method. The available information limits the use of this method, since its use in its pure form requires complete information about the dead civilian population and military personnel. In practice, however, it is necessary to combine direct account with the proportional distribution of a part of the total losses for the country. In this way, the calculations of civilian casualties were performed in two versions.
Option 1. Information about the deaths of the civilian population of the occupied regions, collected by the ChGK, published by A.A. Shevyakov. 5591 thousand people were exterminated on the territory of Russia (at P. Polyan - 656 thousand people). In total for the USSR, this figure is 11309 thousand people. Thus, the share of Russia accounted for 49.4%, provided that the share of the population living in the occupied territories of Russia was less than 1/3; more than 3/5 of all respondents, the population was in the occupation for a short time. In addition to the death of the population during the fighting and occupation, part of it was hijacked by the Nazis for forced labor. In total, the so-called ostarbeiters from the Soviet Union were hijacked 4129 thousand people, of which 1269 thousand from Russia - 30.7%. According to V.N. Zemskov, in March 1946, 2,591 thousand Ostarbeiters were repatriated to the USSR. The dispute about the number of those remaining in the West is not fundamental to the calculations. It is important how many people were taken out and how many returned (about 63%). Obviously, the percentage of returnees is not the same for different districts. the former USSR... The proportions of the dead and non-returning ostarbeiters are not the same. If Ostarbeiters from Russia behaved in captivity in the same way as immigrants from other parts of the country, with a proportional distribution, Russia accounts for almost 0.5 million non-returning (mostly dead) Ostarbeiters. That is, the number of the dead civilian population in Russia is approximately 6.1 million people.
Option 2. To assess all civilian casualties, the unaccounted losses should be proportionally distributed in addition to the 5,6 mln. Agreeing that all the losses of the civilian population of the USSR amount to 18.3 million people, and those recorded by the ChGK - 11.3 million, it turns out that 7 million civilians remain among the unaccounted for (dead ostarbeiters, displaced persons, etc.). The share of Russia in the number of exterminated and perished population, according to the ChGK, is 49.4%. It accounts for unaccounted losses of the civilian population with a proportional distribution of about 3.458 million and the total losses of the civilian population of Russia are close to 9 million.
3. Method of demographic balance... This method was used to calculate the human losses of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War. Its application presupposes the availability of relatively reliable information about the population at the beginning and end of the war, about those born during the war years, natural mortality for the same period, and the balance of inter-republican migration. There are data from the statistics agencies of the USSR (Russia) and estimates by E.M. Andreeva, L.E. Darsky and T.L. Kharkov (below ADH). The difference between these data is that the latter adjust the pre-war figures downward, while increasing the size of the post-war population, including even census data. The adjustment to the pre-war figures is based on the fact that the pre-war census overestimated the population. Post-war figures have been increased for births and deaths based on corrections for incomplete registration. True, such an amendment for 1946-50. gives an increase in natural growth of only 0.2 million people. The remaining 0.8 million (the difference for 1946 is one million), apparently, refer to the amendments for migration. Migration is the Achilles' heel of all amendments, as well as demographic projections.
ADH for 1946 - 50 provide summary information on inter-republican migration, not complete and inaccurate. We've had to write that destination records and actual check-in points are not the same thing. Transfers and registrations do not coincide in time. Many circumstances affect the accuracy of accounting for migration of the population even at the present time, and after all it comes about the first post-war years. In the mass of those who arrived in the urban settlements of Russia in 1946, those who came "from nowhere" accounted for 74%. With such data on migration, is it possible to confidently judge the size of the population, and even with an accuracy of thousands of people? Population adjustments, if the data are not intended to calculate casualties, be they war or repression, are harmless in themselves. But since the ADH understated the initial population and overestimated the final population in comparison with the data of the statistical agencies, this guarantees the lowest results in the estimates of human losses. If, according to the statistical agencies, the population of Russia from 1941 to 1946 decreased by 14.9 million people, according to the ADH by 13.5 million. Option 2 - ADH data.
The obtained values (14.9 and 13.5 million people) will be increased by the number of births in 1941-1945. To do this, we will use the birth rate data for 1936-1940 and 1946-1950. and information about those who survived to the age of 42 - 28 years by 1979. The number of births during the war years can be determined by the average proportion, equal to their half-sum for two adjacent groups (1936 - 40 and 1946 - 50). up to 37 - 33 years old will be 0.7. If, as the initial data for calculating this coefficient, we take the shares of those who survived by 1979 to 39-38 years (born in 1939-40) and to 32-31 years (years of birth 1946-47), its value will be 673. Then the number born in 1941 - 45 will be in the first case 8.6 and in the second - 8.9 million people.
Those born in the pre-war and war years were partially exterminated during the occupation. Therefore, the proportion of those born in 1946 - 50, 1951 - 55 and 1956 - 60. and those who reached the age of 42-38, 37-33 and 32-28 years old by the 1989 census are higher than those of those who reached this age by 1979.They are, respectively, 0.792, 0.862 and 0.934, 1979 and 1989, divided one by the other, the following ratios are obtained: for persons aged 42 - 38 years - 1.361, for persons aged 37 - 33 - 1.231, and at the age of 32 - 28 years - 1.140. It is difficult to admit that the mortality rate of those born during the war years is lower than that of children born on the eve of the war. Therefore, the ratios 1.231 - 1.281 are clearly underestimated, as are the original coefficients 0.7 and 0.673. If we take the excess coefficients at 1.361, the proportion of those born during the war years and surviving by 1979 to 37 - 33 years will be 0.634, and the number of those born in 1941 - 45. - 9.5 million people. If the difference between the population in 1941 and 1946. add the number of births (let's take 9 million, the average is between 8.6 and 9.5), we get for option 1 the initial value of further calculations at 23.9 million and for option 2 - 22.5 million.
In these numbers ? three quantities are not known: natural mortality, migration gain (loss) and actual human losses. Most often, when determining natural population decline, published indicators of natural increase in 1940 or 1939 are used. and in the post-war years. The most accessible indicators of natural population growth in 1940 and 1950. The natural increase in the population of Russia in 1940 was 12.4 per 1000 population and in 1950 - 16.8. For the war years, average values are taken, in this case the indicator is 14.6 per 1000 population, multiplied by 5 (war years). However, the use of indicators of natural growth in periods adjacent to the war to assess the possible increase in the war years is unreasonable, if only because the birth rate, and, consequently, infant mortality, cannot be taken in terms of peacetime indicators.
To determine natural mortality in 1941-45. data for adjacent periods is required. The painstaking work of E.M. Andreeva, L.E. Darsky, etc. Kharkova made available statistics on the dead in Russia in the 30s - 50s. XX century. In 1936 - 40. the number of deaths in Russia was 10,980 thousand people and in 1946 - 50 years. - 5733 thousand. The average of these values gives 8.4 million people. But the population in the second half of the 40s is less than in the second half of the 30s. Average annual values here are 106.4 and 99.4 million people, i.e. the first is more than the second by 7%, which should increase the number of deaths during the war years. The resulting figure of 9 million includes an inflated infant mortality rate. Births during the war years are more than 2 times less than in the previous 5 years. Therefore, the total number of deaths during the war years, even with unchanged infant mortality rates, should be 1.5 - 2 million people less: approximately 7 - 7.5 million people.
Thus, the difference between the population in 1941 and 1946, increased by the number of births during the war years, should be reduced by the amount of natural mortality. Obviously, the higher the natural mortality rate, the lower the loss of life, and vice versa. We will take 7.5 million people for subsequent calculations. Then, according to the first option, there is an unallocated balance of 16.4 million, and according to the second option - 15 million people. These figures include two components: the balance of inter-republican migration of the population in 1941 - 45. and the loss of Russia in the Great Patriotic War.
Ethno-demographic method
We developed this method and used it to estimate the number of Ostarbeiters in Russia. Methods for assessing the number of Ostarbeiters and human losses differ from each other in that in the first case, the number of survivors of the Russian Federation is determined from the totality of Ostarbeiters. In the second, the losses of the population of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War are distributed among the former Soviet republics. The use of the ethno-demographic method assumes the use of general human losses for the country as a starting value. But separate estimates of civilian and military casualties are needed. These are the figures - 18.3 and 8.7 million. The losses of the civilian population should be distributed among the Union republics, the territories of which were fully or partially under occupation, and the losses of servicemen - across the post-Soviet states.
In general terms, the essence of the ethno-demographic method is that human losses for individual units are determined from the losses of state-forming nationalities. The transfer of calculations to ethnic groups eliminates the main informational difficulty: they become unnecessary migration data. Nevertheless, as with traditional methods, the application of the ethno-demographic method faces information gaps. The main one is that the ethnic composition of the population of the territories that entered the USSR before the war has not been determined.
The ethno-demographic method makes it possible to estimate human losses for each of the main ethnic groups and distribute them to individual parts of the former state. In this case, all calculations are carried out for Russia, although they can be performed for Ukraine, Belarus and other states of the new foreign countries. At the same time, the total losses of the civilian population of Russia are formed from the losses of persons of the main nationalities, which are the titular ones for the largest union republics, the territory of which was fully or partially under occupation.
For calculations, first of all, information is needed on the population and main nationalities of the republics that were fully or partially under occupation at the beginning and end of the war. Unfortunately, the first post-war census was carried out at the beginning of 1959. The situation with information on the composition of the pre-war population is even worse. The latter is available from the 1937 census and can be used without significant adjustment only for Russia. In other republics that were in the occupation, it is either incomplete (Ukraine, Belarus), or absent (the Baltic states). It can be assumed that there were not many representatives of the titular peoples of Russia in the composition of the population of the territories included in Ukraine and Belarus, and the distribution of other ethnic groups corresponded to the census (1937) structure of the same set of nationalities in the population of these republics. It is necessary, however, to exclude a million Poles from the population that became part of Ukraine - an interstate migration exchange carried out after the end of the war. Taking into account its growth in the population of Ukraine will be not 8.7, but 7.7 million people. Excluding Russians and Belarusians from the population, it turns out that the share of Ukrainians is almost 90%, the rest ? Poles, Jews, Czechs, Hungarians, Moldovans, Romanians, etc. Consequently, the number of Ukrainians at the end of 1939 can be increased by more than 7.8 million. In the same way, the number of Belarusians will increase by 3.1 million. Not in Moldova, neither in the Baltics is there, in fact, any information that would make it possible to assess the ethnic composition of the population. But for the loss of human life, Russia does not need this information: the share of the titular peoples of these republics is insignificant in the composition of its population.
There are two options for calculating: the first - the entire number of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians who lived in the USSR before the war is taken, and the second - only their number accounted for by the republics that were in the occupation. The number of Ukrainians, Belarusians and other peoples living in the occupied territories includes the population of the regions annexed on the eve of the war (20.1 million). As a result, at the beginning of 1937 the number of Ukrainians and Belarusians, respectively, increased by 6.1 and 2.8 million people.
Applying the formula described using the method of proportional distribution of human losses, we obtain, regardless of the calculation options, the estimated values for the main nationalities. Then this information is distributed in proportion to the share of Russia in the number of persons of this nationality in the USSR in 1937. The resulting figure of 7.4 million people is the loss of the civilian population. To these must be added the losses of military personnel attributable to the share of Russia. Since the total for the USSR the amount of losses of servicemen proposed by the military department has been adopted, it remains to take on faith the information that relates to the distribution of these losses across republics and nationalities. Detailed information about both is given in the article by G.F. Krivosheeva. According to these data, Russia accounts for 7.9 million dead servicemen, or 66.3% of the total losses for the USSR. This figure is taken from the loss of 11.9 million people. If we assume that the share of Russia in irrecoverable losses (8668.4 million) is also 66.3%, their value will amount to 5.7 million people. With a proportional distribution of losses (the share of Russia in the population of the USSR before the war - 56.4 - 56.8%), 4.9 million servicemen would fall to its share.
Irrecoverable losses attributable to the share of Russia can be calculated using the ethno-demographic method (Table 1).
tableI
Assessment of irrecoverable losses of servicemen
(share of Russia)
|
Nationalities |
Irrecoverable losses (thousand people) |
Share of persons in this nationality - residents |
Irrecoverable losses (thousand people) |
Ukrainians |
|||
Belarusians |
|||
The irrecoverable losses of servicemen related to Russia, obtained using the ethno-demographic method, turned out to be 0.1 million more than those obtained by recalculating the data on Russian losses cited by G.F. Krivosheev.
Estimation of human losses in Russia inGreat Patriotic War
The results of estimates of casualties during the war years, obtained using various methods, are presented in Table 2.
table 2
Assessment of humanlossesdifferent
methods (thousand. people)
Civilian casualties |
Losses of military personnel |
All human losses |
|
Proportional, two options |
|||
Direct, two options |
|||
Balance, two options |
|||
Ethno-demographic |
Analysis of these data allows us to draw a number of conclusions. First, the approximate value of Russia's human losses in the Great Patriotic War, in our opinion, is about 13 million people. It would be naive to pretend to be more accurate with the initial information available at the present time. Although the share of Russia in the human losses of the USSR is 48.5%, it is not as large as the share of the federation in the total population loss for the country during the war years. The population of the Soviet Union from 1940 to 1951 decreased by 12.5 million people, including the share of Russia - 57.3% (7.2 million).
Secondly, taking this figure of human losses and estimates obtained by the demographic balance method, it is possible to determine the results of inter-republican migration during the war years. 1941-1945 the population of Russia increased due to forced migration by an amount from 1.9 to 3.3 million people. The second figure is more realistic. Apparently, there were more migrants, but some of them returned back as the places of exit were cleared, others migrated to the rear, to the union republics, etc.
Third, the remaining 14 (excluding the Karelo-Finnish) union republics account for 3 million losses of servicemen; 6 republics, whose territory was under occupation for a long time, lost 10.9 million civilians. Note that in the total population decline in the USSR (from 1940 to 1951), Ukraine accounts for 33%, Belarus - 10.1%, the Baltic States, Moldova - 2.6%. These figures differ sharply from the distribution of civilian casualties given by P. Polyak. He has the share of Russia - 10.8%, Ukraine - 52%, Belarus - 22.4%, etc. ... According to him, Russia has lost 1.3 million civilians. Then it turns out that other republics - 17 million, provided that their population by the beginning of 1951 had decreased by only 5.3 million people ?!
Fourthly, in the human losses of the Soviet Union, Russia accounts for 2/3 of the dead servicemen and 2/5 of the civilian population. The scale of Russia's losses, their distribution between the civilian population and the military (56% and 44%) does not correspond to that in the USSR (68% and 32%), especially in the rest of the republics (78% and 22%). if Russia's losses are attributed to the size of its population in 1940, it turns out that they amount to 11.9% against 13.9% for the country as a whole. However, the irrecoverable losses of servicemen in the country are 4.5%, and in Russia - 5.2%. Such comparisons for the civilian population should proceed from the fact that not all of Russia was under occupation. In the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, civilian losses amounted to 21%. On Russian - 24.3%. Lost every fourth. There is no such thing in any European country!
The scale of Russia's casualties and their distribution between the civilian population and the military can be explained by several reasons. One of them is that on the western borders of the USSR from the Barents to the Black Sea, the first losses were suffered by border guards and military districts (on the first day of the war they were transformed into fronts), largely staffed by conscripts from Russia. For the 3rd and 4th quarters of 1941, the losses of the Red Army reached 3 million people - 99% of the average monthly personnel; 1942 was no easier. For 1.5 years of the war, the Red Army lost 6 million people. Losses in subsequent years were not only less (about 4 million in 2.5 years), but also decreased: 30.9%, 21.6% and 10.0% in January-May 1945. Prior to 1943, the main losses were carried by Russia. Its share in the irrecoverable losses of the Red Army was: in 1941 - 65% of the all-Union, in 1942 - 77.1% and in 1943 - 69.5%. Later, when the battles mainly took place on the territory of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States and Moldova, then outside the USSR and conscriptions began in the liberated regions, the share of Russia in irrecoverable losses fell: 1944 - 51.8%, 1945 - 50.9%. Thus, the losses of Russian soldiers occur in the years when the country's armed forces were most damaged.
The second reason is related to the first. The intensity of the call for reinforcements from Russia was generally higher during the war years than from other republics. During the war, military commissariats called for 22.7% of Russian citizens, about 17%? citizens of the republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, 12.5% - Ukraine and 12% - Belarus. There are several explanations here. Some republics in 1943 - 1944 were fully or partially occupied, in others there was a different age composition of the population and the level of its socialization. There were other reasons as well.
According to G.F. Krivosheev, during the war, 29.6 million people were mobilized throughout the Soviet Union, which, together with regular military personnel, amounted to 34.5 million. In Russia, according to him, every fifth "put on an overcoat" was called up for military service. Thus, the share of Russia in the number of those called up in the country is 84.5%. At the same time, the loss of servicemen relative to the number of those mobilized in the rest of the republics was equal to 65.2%, and in Russia - 22.8%. These data make obvious the lie associated with the "international" policy of the CPSU: the proportion of soldiers of each nationality was proportional to the proportion in the country's population. The data from the archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense on the national composition of 166 rifle divisions do not confirm this thesis. So, in January-June 1943 in these divisions the share of Russians was 63.8 - 65.6%. But before the war, the share of Russians in the country's population did not exceed 50%. The author of the book is right that as the country was liberated, the share of Ukrainians, Belarusians and some other nationalities increased, while the share of Russians decreased. In particular, in the same rifle divisions from January 1 to December 31, 1943, the share of Russians fell by 6.3 points (64.6 and 58.3%), Ukrainians almost doubled (11.8 and 22.3%), Belarusians? from 1.9 to 2.7%. This is understandable: the mobilization came to the liberated territories. Together with the Russians in 1943, the Kazakhs, representatives of the Transcaucasian republics, and, perhaps, the Kyrgyz were actively replenishing the armed forces. It is clear that the thesis of the proportional participation of nations in the war of the Soviet people pursued a noble goal. But a lie? it is a lie, even with good intentions.
Among the reasons for the great death of civilians is that in Russian territories large-scale battles, in fact, took place four times: the Red Army retreated twice in 1941 to Moscow and in 1942 to Stalingrad, and Hitler's troops were first driven back from Moscow, and then defeated at Stalingrad and at the Kursk Bulge. For almost 2 years, bloody battles took place on Russian territories. The Red Army suffered the greatest losses in the summer and autumn of 1941 and 1942. Settlements changed hands several times, many of them were destroyed as a result of bombing and shelling. Soldiers perished, and civilians who remained in the settlements perished as well. The blockade of Leningrad made a significant contribution to the loss of the civilian population, which claimed at least 1.5-2 million human lives.
The scale of losses among Russians is associated with racial politics in the occupied areas. Russians are most represented among the military and predominated in the civilian population of the occupied regions of Russia (96 - 98%). Of the total losses of servicemen, Russians accounted for 66.3%, Ukrainians - 15.9%, Belarusians - 2.9%, Tatars - 2.2%, Jews - 1.6%, etc. ... According to P. Polyana, in 1941 the enemy captured 58.3% of all prisoners. Among them prevailed, if we proceed from the structure of losses of the first stage of the war, immigrants from Russia. Of the prisoners in 1941, 20% survived to victory, while the survival rate of prisoners in 1944 was 48%. Of course, the length of the stay in captivity affected, but the main thing was that the composition of the prisoners changed. By the way, of the prisoners of war and "Ostarbeiters" defectors were 31.7 thousand Russians, 144.9 thousand Ukrainians and 10.0 thousand Belarusians. For "ostarbeiters" is it for Russia? 1.7%, Belarus - 2.5%, for Ukraine - 6%. There were 0.5%, 0.6% and 2.2% of non-returnees in relation to the loss of persons of the same nationalities. The ratio of defectors to the number of repatriated Soviet citizens is as follows: 2%, 1.9% and 8.8%. The percentage of Ukrainians is largely due to the fact that on the eve of the war it included western territories, the population of which did not have time to integrate into the new conditions.
The attitude of the invaders towards the Russians was much worse than, for example, towards the Ukrainians. Let's refer to P. Polyan, in this matter, far from bias. In the book, which is based on the material collected in German archives, he writes about the Nazis' stake at the beginning of the war on the "superiority" of the Ukrainian over the Russian. Ukrainian prisoners of war were even released; there were other privileges abolished at the end of 1941. Not only Ukrainians, but also the peoples of the Baltic countries, the Germans and especially the Crimean Tatars were in a more sparing regime. Worse, perhaps, was only the Jews, who were subject to total extermination. This practice was due to the fact that the Nazis at the first stage of the war, counting on its lightning-fast nature, were not ready for so many prisoners. Therefore, in 1941, 318.8 thousand people were released from captivity, incl. - 277.8 thousand Ukrainians. Having soon abandoned such measures, they returned to them in 1943: they released those who joined security and other formations - until May 1944, over 0.8 million prisoners of war.
Naturally, the peoples of the Soviet Union are not to blame for the fact that such a fate befell, first of all, the Russian people. It so happened that the main battles of the first stages of the war, when the losses were especially great, were on the territory of Russia. The peoples of the USSR are not to blame for the fact that the Nazis, striving to destroy the friendship of peoples, pursued a differentiated policy, not counting the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians as full-fledged nations. We are not talking about the peculiar national policy of the leadership of the USSR and many other things. This is our common history. It should not be distorted, no matter how painful it is.
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Rybakovskiy L.L.Population migration.
Three stages of the migration process.
(Essays on Theory and Research Methods)
The monograph presents the concept of the three-stage migration process, including the formation of mobility, the actual resettlement and the settling-in of new settlers in the places of settlement. Consideration of each stage is accompanied by a statement of various methodological techniques, with the help of which you can get an adequate understanding of the migration process.
For anyone interested in migration issues
FOREWORD BY THE AUTHOR
The proposed work is not a textbook or even a teaching aid. These are theoretical and methodological developments the author, united around a common theme - the concept of three stages of the migration process. The book is based on the material of two monographs written in the 70s and 80s (115, 118). These books are not only outdated, but also inaccessible. In addition, today there are a large number of those who have joined with great energy in the study of modern migration problems, without having sufficient knowledge in the field of migration. Some of the material in previously published books has been omitted because it ceased to correspond to modern realities and our ideas about that time.
At the same time, the work includes material, mainly statistical, related to Russian reality. The book contains not only and not so much the author's developments, it contains a lot of what was the result of many years of work by scientists of the pre-revolutionary and Soviet times. Without a huge theoretical baggage, created by our predecessors and left as a legacy not only to us, but also to those who will come later, it is impossible to have their own ideas. Unfortunately, in the 90s of the twentieth century, very few new theoretical "delights" appeared. And this is understandable, during the period of “storm and onslaught”, the formation of market relations, the authors of migration works are not fighting for theory, but for survival in the new system, for which money is the most attractive, no matter how it sounds.
Thus, the change in the socio-economic basis and political system in Russia, which led to the strongest transformation of migration processes, the emergence of a huge number of those who began to deal with the problems of population migration, without sufficient experience and knowledge in this area of science, and the author's desire to draw a line under his more than forty years of study of this problem - these are the motives for the appearance of this book. Many questions remained outside its pages. In particular, the author bypassed such people who burst into our scientific life concepts like "integration of immigrants", "migration potential", etc. All of them are waiting in the wings. So far there are no monographic generalizations of forced migrations, as is done in the field of immigration (E. S. Krasinets, T. M. Regent), external (international) migration (V. A. Iontsev, A. N. Kamensky, S. V. Ryazantsev ) etc. There is no development of an integral concept of the state's migration policy, there is no theory of migration management in market conditions. In a word, there is still a lot of space for scientific research.
L.L. Rybakovsky
CHAPTER 1
MIGRATION AS SOCIAL - DEMOGRAPHIC
PROCESS
1.1 Migration movement of the population and its features
The existence of different points of view on certain scientific problems can quite often be explained to the point of triviality simply: they arise due to the fact that different concepts are used for the same concepts, and the same terms are used for different concepts. Endless and sometimes fruitless discussions about various scientific definitions have often led away, and sometimes are still leading scientists away from the analysis of objective social phenomena. This phenomenon was noticed long ago by the outstanding Russian historian V.O. Klyuchevsky, who said that in scientific research they sometimes get carried away with the philological solution of questions, i.e. not phenomena are investigated, but words. As a result of this "philological" method, it sometimes turns out that for the terms that they love, there are no phenomena in life for which all the fuss was started. The latter usually happens when the principles of materialistic dialectics are neglected, and nowadays they often do this because of their dislike for its creators.
According to the materialist understanding of social life, each concept, regardless of the terminology used, is only a form of adequate expression of the most essential aspects of a well-defined objectively existing phenomenon. Only by revealing the essence of this phenomenon, it is possible to formulate its theoretical surrogate and agree on which term to assign to it. Since ancient times, the saying has been known that they do not argue about terms, they agree on them. True, it is not so easy to agree on this.
Nevertheless, we will use the proposed approach. To do this, it is necessary first to establish the most essential features of the subject of our consideration - the migration process, revealing its difference from other types of population movement. This is also necessary because, in defining the subject of demography, disputes over the boundaries of this system of scientific knowledge are still ongoing. Differences in approaches are associated with the attribution of various types of population movement, including migration, to the subject of demography. Note that there was no unanimity in understanding the number and nature of different types of population movement among scientists, and there is no. Here are some examples. Back in the 70s of the last century I.S. Matlin argued that the movement of the population and labor force is subdivided into such types as demographic, intersectoral, interprofessional and territorial (72). In addition to the fact that the natural movement is replaced in this case by a vague demographic movement, there are also no movements associated with a change in social-class or stratification status, educational level, etc.
In the same years, Yu.N. Kozyrev referred to the forms of population mobility as social, migration and personal, apparently, understanding the latter as natural movement (22). G.I. Kasperovich distinguished between territorial, industrial and social movements. (43) B.D. Breev noted in his early works that from the point of view of the formation of the labor force, it is necessary to distinguish three forms of population mobility: territorial, sectoral and professional (106). Speaking about labor resources, one should not forget that elements of natural movement are also inherent in them - the transition from one age group to another and such an unpleasant, if not more, phenomenon like mortality. O.V. Larmin singled out in the movement of the population the processes of natural, mechanical and structural changes, which are organically intertwined with each other (74). In addition to the fact that the social movement of the population is omitted here, the structural one is highlighted as an independent type. There was a kind of mixing of process and structure, which is the moment of the process. V.A. Borisov, in his work already related to the new millennium, distinguishes only two types of population movement: natural and mechanical (migration), while understanding movement as change (10). His typology lacks such a multifaceted movement as the social one.
In general, most sociologists and demographers distinguish three types of population movement: social, natural and migration. Considering a social movement, it should be borne in mind that there is an idea of it in both a broad and a narrow sense of the word. According to this paradigm, all social relations, including demographic relations, are referred to social relations in the broad sense of the word, and social relations in the narrow sense of the word are understood only as a specific area of relations (69). A narrow understanding of social movement remains to this day a thing in itself. It is possible, however, by social to understand all types of movement of the population in the social sphere, with the exception of natural and migration. In this case, the allocation of three types of population movement allows you to have a definite, unambiguous idea of each of them. In particular, the social movement is professional, educational, intersectoral, intersectoral, etc. population movement. It includes changes in areas of employment, occupation, qualifications and much more. Social movement can be represented in two ways: as social development and as a change in social status. In the first case, we mean, for example, the growth of qualifications and educational level, and in the second, social movement, i.e. intra- or inter-sectoral movement of personnel, change of profession, etc.
For isolating the migration movement from the entire set of types of movement, the initial three-term scheme is quite convenient, since, as already mentioned, it unites in the social everything that is not included in the migration and natural movement, which, in the opinion of many demographers, constitute the subject of demographic study. Let us agree to consider both types of population movements as the subject of demography. This will make it possible to define this science as a system of knowledge about the general and specific in the natural and migratory movement of the population, their patterns, factors and consequences. According to the passport of the Higher Attestation Commission specialties, the content of this area of research is "the patterns of reproduction and migration of the population, the features of their manifestation and evolution at different historical stages of social development, in various socio-economic and ethnocultural conditions ..." (93, p. 12). This citation is intended to once again confirm that demography is a science that studies both natural and migration movement of the population, both reproduction and migration processes.
Everything in the world is interconnected and all types of population movements occur inseparably, in organic unity, changing, if we are talking about human society, certain parameters of the aggregates of people. This was known even to the philosophers of ancient times. Each person, like the population as a whole, has certain characteristics. Any person has three types of properties: those that are given to him from birth and either remains unchanged, or changes over time (gender, race, age, etc.), those that are acquired in the course of socialization (education, language, etc.). ), and, finally, those that can be changed quickly enough (for example, profession, social status, etc.). There are characteristics that, from a formal point of view, can only improve, indicating the social development of the individual, but there are those that can change in any direction. The former include, for example, the level of education, the latter - the state of health. Hence, social displacement and social development are not synonymous.
If a person has a lot of congenital and acquired, changing and unchanging properties, then there are even more of them in the population as a whole. Just as the opinion is true that there are no two people who are completely alike, it is even more true that there are no population structures that are identical in their parameters. And this is natural, since the individual, the collective (family) and the population are singular, special and universal, characterized by specific properties and relationships. They can be expressed using various indicators: in some cases, personal characteristics, in others - average and structural indicators.
Any set of people, and even more so such as the population, is subject to both quantitative and qualitative changes. Quantitative changes occur as a result of both "internal" movement, i.e. reproductive process, and "external" - migration of the population. Moreover, both leads to qualitative changes, but the first only in one (age), and the second in many parameters. In turn, the social movement changes only the qualitative characteristics of the population. In this it is similar to the migration movement. But unlike migration, social development encompasses not only parts of the aggregate, but also the aggregate as a whole. Migration, although it contributes to social development, is not the whole set, but only its parts. The migration process is largely associated not only with social development, but also with natural movement. A social movement is also associated with it. Indeed, with an increase in a person's age, for example, his experience multiplies, the level of qualifications increases, and other changes occur.
As a result of reproduction, the population size changes only due to fertility and mortality, and the demographic structure - as a result of the transition from one age to another. In this sense, the reproductive function is inherent not only in the reproductive contingent, which has a reproductive property, but also in the entire population, since the reproductive process includes, along with fertility, mortality and changes in the age structure. Taking into account these three components, population reproduction is not only a generational change based on fertility and mortality, i.e. "entry" into the totality of some and "exit" of other people, but also their movement in the "demographic space", i.e. the transition of generations from one age group to another with a gradual decrease in their initial size.
Unlike natural movement, migration is a spatial movement of the population, a change in its territorial distribution, i.e. geography. In this sense, migration does not change the population of the territory within which it moves. The number and structure of the population is changing only in certain parts of a given territory (country).
The most complex and qualitatively diverse is the social movement, which changes the most important structures for social development: social class, vocational qualifications, etc. These structures are studied by various social sciences, and this is understandable, since a long time ago there was a differentiation of scientific knowledge about the life of the population. It is obvious that the integration of systems of scientific knowledge into a single science on the basis that the natural movement of the population is organically interconnected with its social development is hardly justified. In this sense, D. Diderot's words that unity and uniformity are not the same are true. This should be attributed to the reproduction of the population, carried out as a result of fertility and mortality, and the reproduction social structure occurring as a result of social reproduction. These processes are far from straightforward.
To some extent, there is a similarity between migration and population reproduction. With this in mind, M.V. Kurman wrote: "Natural reproduction and migration of the population are characterized by the interaction of two components: positive (birth, arrival) and negative (death, departure)" (132). Migration and the reproductive process are two components of demographic dynamics. The foregoing corresponds to the views expressed repeatedly in the past on the content of demographic processes. So, in the "Course of demography", which was reprinted several times in the last thirty years of the twentieth century, the processes and phenomena of reproduction, migration, changes in the distribution and structure of the population are referred to demographic processes (55). It should be noted that not only in domestic but also foreign demography, understanding the reproduction of the population as a change of generations based on fertility and mortality, nevertheless, along with natural, migration movement is also referred to demographic processes. Thus, since the change in the size and age-sex structure of the population occurs only as a result of reproduction and migration, demographic processes can be limited by these two phenomena or types of movement.
Although the reproduction and migration of the population can be united by a single concept of "demographic processes", nevertheless, there are significant differences between them. First, the difference is that these are two different kinds population movements. Reproductive processes take place in the same set of people and are an internal movement for it. Migration processes are another matter. They need at least two sets of people (132), for each of which migration is an external phenomenon.
Secondly, in the reproductive process, individual events (death, birth) for each of their participants are one-off, while in migrations, individual events (emigration, immigration) for their participants can be repeated. Therefore, the number of events and the number of participants in migration processes are different, the first is always more than the second. So, in the 70s. in the former USSR, the aggregate migration flow was approximately 14 million events per year, and the number of people participating in migrations was just over 11 million (128).
Third, reproductive and, to some extent, other types of demographic behavior are determined by needs that are directly related to population reproduction. This is the need for children or some other needs that children can satisfy, the need for self-preservation, i.e. in life, the need to create a family. Otherwise in migrations. Here, movements are conditioned not by the needs for migration, but by changes in the socio-economic status that arise among a part of the population. In the first case, needs are the internal goal of demographic behavior, its initial element, while in the second, migration is a means of satisfying other, usually material needs. That is why the level of family well-being is usually inversely related to the realization of the need for children and in direct dependence on migratory movement.
Fourthly, such demographic characteristics of the population are associated with reproduction processes, which either remain unchanged throughout their life (gender), or change in a deterministic manner over time (age). At the same time, migrations interact with variable social characteristics, some of which migration always changes (place of residence, sphere of employment), others sometimes (profession, qualifications).
Fifth, in the reproductive process, each individual event, be it a birth or death, is biological in nature. But these events, representing a series occurring in a certain environment in space and time, already have a social character. Although rare, there are attempts to introduce a biological component into this social process. The matter does not change from the fact that socio-economic conditions are called the determinant of fertility or migration. It should be emphasized categorically that in migration processes not only the entire set of movements, but also each of them individually is social in nature. It is by no means caused by biological, but by social needs. And unlike natural movement, the biological factor is absent here even at the level of an individual event. We can say that the migration process is socially conditioned twice - first as a separate event, and then as a combination of them.
Sixth, migration differs from other social processes and, first of all, from population reproduction by its much greater dependence on objective factors (136). Migration is more "rigidly" associated with various parameters of social economic development- the location of the productive forces, the intensity of urbanization, etc.
Despite the differences, migration and population reproduction are nevertheless only two of the only demographic components on the scale and interaction of which population dynamics depend. The importance of these components in the demographic dynamics of post-war Russia has repeatedly changed (Table 1.1). In the 50-60s. of the last century, primarily as a result of the massive outflow of the population from central Russia to the virgin regions of northern Kazakhstan, the total growth decreased by almost 2 million people. In turn, immigrants to virgin lands, according to the most conservative estimates, increased the population of Kazakhstan in subsequent years by at least 300-400 thousand people.
Table 1.1.
General, natural and migration growth of the population of Russia
1951 - 2000 (thousand people)
| Years | Total gain | Natural growth | Migration gain |
| 1951-1960 | 17820 | 18674 | -854 |
| 1961-1970 | 9965 | 11058 | -1093 |
| 1971-1980 | 8461 | 7917 | 544 |
| 1981-1990 | 9537 | 7583 | 1954 |
| 1991-2000 | 3400 | -6730 | 3330 |
In the 90s, there was a large-scale reduction in the population of Russia, but not due to migration, but as a result of depopulation that swept the country. The country's population has decreased due to natural loss by more than 6.8 million people, of which migration compensated for more than 3.3 million. These are largely former settlers from Russia and their offspring.
1.2. Migration is the process of territorial movement of the population
The level of elaboration of the conceptual apparatus that characterizes a particular social phenomenon largely depends on the duration, depth and scope of the research being carried out. If there is no practical need for such a scientific apparatus, then there is no conceptual apparatus either. Actually, this is what happened with the migration of the population. As soon as the study of population migration was stopped at the beginning of the 1930s, the term "migration" was also "eroded". Migration in the true sense dropped out of the reference literature. It did not appear in the second edition of TSB, which was already published in 1954. Only in the third edition of the ITU (1959) and the Concise Geographical Encyclopedia (1961), the term "migration" was restored in the interpretation of V.V. Pokshishevsky (95).
With the renaissance in the study of population migration that began in the second half of the 60s and continued until the mid-70s, a large number of definitions of this phenomenon and attempts to classify it are associated. The intensification of the study of migration has led to the use of many different terms. Migration began to be called a territorial, geographical, spatial phenomenon, sometimes trying to identify semantic differences where they do not exist. Migration is defined as mobility (lat.mobilis) or in the Russian analogue - mobility, it is also movement, displacement, resettlement, redistribution, etc. Terminological confusion demanded the establishment of order in the scientific apparatus. B.S. Khorev, V.I. Old Believers and many other researchers of population migration (131,143). Among the latest attempts to provide a detailed analysis of the definitions of migration and to carry out their classification is the study of A.U. Homry (142). Unfortunately, his approach was not consistently followed, the author mixed different points of view, failing to separate the broad and narrow interpretation of population migration (141). If we do not touch upon various minor nuances, then all definitions of population migration can be divided into three groups, taking the essential moment as a classification criterion.
The first group, quite widespread at the end of the twentieth century, includes definitions that mix different types of population movement, in particular, migration and social. Here, migration includes sectoral, territorial, professional and social movements (140). A.U. Homra called this approach to the definition of migration broad. (142). However, the point is not how to name the approach, but that migration includes various forms of social movement, although it is obvious that it is illegal to combine the migration and social movement with one concept. Unfortunately, this is quite common.
In a work published in the 60s, Y. Schepansky defines migration as any movement, regardless of a change in location in geographic space (151). In the early 70s M.V. Kurman in a number of works tried to define migration as any form of social movement. For example, he presented staff turnover as a type of migration (54). Later, he noted that territorial migration does not exhaust the whole variety of types of population migration. It includes inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral migration, which can be called production migration. It is quite legitimate to talk about educational and professional migration. Further, he notes that "all types of population movements of social significance should be referred to population migrations in the broad sense of the word" (132, p. 98). In 1976, this point of view was confirmed by him (53).
Actually the point of view of M.V. Kurman is a repetition of what E.F. Baranov and B.D. Breev in the second half of the 60s. In their opinion, migration can be viewed from the point of view of three different aspects - as territorial, sectoral and professional migration. This approach was due to the fact that the authors replaced the term mobility with the term migration (lat. Migratio, i.e. resettlement). As soon as they brought various types of displacement under a single generic concept of "mobility", everything fell into place. In the work published in 1977 by B.D. Breev writes not about migration or migratory mobility, but about the fact that mobility includes territorial, sectoral and professional movement (11). In this, and especially in a work published in 1982, he understands mobility as an expression of a person's ability to change his social status (154). In this understanding of mobility and its types, this point of view cannot be attributed, as A.U. Homr, to this group of definitions, since B.D. Breev is not talking about migration, but about a broader concept - the movement (for him - mobility) of the population, and, by the way, he already considers it not as movement, but as an ability for it.
Speaking about this point of view in general, it should be emphasized that the point is that all definitions in which migration is equated with different types of movement, in essence, confuse territorial and social movement. Here, the identification of different phenomena occurs: the movement of people across the territory and the movement of people by educational groups, professions, industries, enterprises, etc. Indeed, these are all displacements, but displacements that have a different character, and even more so the result.
The second group, the most widespread and now recognized by the majority, includes those definitions of migration that include only territorial movements of the population. The characterization of this group of definitions should not begin with the works of Yu.N. Kozyrev or B.S. Khorev, dating back to the 70s, as A.U. Homr, and from the works of the late 50s - early 60s, when for the first time in post-war literature all possible options definitions of migration referring to territorial movements of the population. More than 20 years later, V.I. Perevedentsev reiterated that population migration can be considered in the broad sense of the word as a set of all movements of people in space and in a narrower, special meaning of the word as a set of migrations of people associated with their change of place of residence for a relatively long period (95).
Considering migrations only as territorial movements of the population, it should be noted that they are very different both in the distance between the place of exit and the place of settlement, and in the status of those objects between which migrants move, and in terms of the periods for which people move, and in purposes. which they are pursuing. Movements can occur both within a settlement and between settlements of different socio-economic status, within and between territories of different taxonomic significance. At the same time, movements can be made voluntarily, compulsorily and involuntarily. They can be based on economic, environmental, social, political, religious and other factors. Migrations may differ not only depending on the factors causing them and methods of movement, but also on their directions, goals, etc. All this determines the variety of definitions of population migration.
There are at least three possible approaches to the inclusion of various types of territorial movement of the population in migration. First of all, migration is understood as all the diversity of the spatial movement of the population, regardless of its nature and goals. This includes moving from one settlement to another, daily trips to work or study outside populated areas, arriving in a particular area for temporary, including seasonal, work, business trips, vacations and other movements. Most researchers exclude from migration those spatial movements that occur within the same settlement. However, there is no consensus in this regard. For example, Yu.N. Kozyrev refers to migration as all movements that occur within settlements, even if they are associated with visiting trade enterprises (33, p. 76)
Further, migration includes such spatial movements that occur between settlements that lead to a permanent or temporary change of place of residence, and also represent a regular two-way movement between the place of residence and the world of work or study. Recurrent occasional business and recreational trips from one populated area to another are not taken into account.
Finally, migration refers to such a process of spatial movement of the population, which ultimately leads to its territorial redistribution. In this case, the attribution of spatial movement to migration is determined by actual relocation from one locality to another and, in a number of countries, by formal registration in a new place of residence. At the same time, there is a connection between the place of residence and the sphere of application of work, study or other activity in one locality.
Depending on one of the three approaches or their combination, any set of types of territorial population movements can be attributed to migration. It is no coincidence that the most opposite points of view can be found in literature. So, I.S. Matlin refers to migration as a change of residence and commuting (72), while V.V. Pokshishevsky believes that pendulum migration should be excluded, since it is only a special form of resettlement (132, p. 14).
Most researchers proceed, however, from the second approach, according to which they classify three types of territorial displacement of the population as migration. But if we proceed from the first approach to the definition of migration, then we can distinguish not three, but four main types of spatial movement of the population. These include episodic, pendulum, seasonal and permanent migrations. Of course, it is most controversial to include in the territorial movement of the population such a type of it as occasional trips. First, A.U. Homra included in migration only such trips as tourism (141), then L.L. Shamileva attributed recreational movements to migration (149), which K.Sh. Amiraslanov also considers it as part of temporary (seasonal) migrations (7).
In addition to the three main types, it is legitimate, especially for modern conditions, to consider episodic migrations as an independent type, and in them - recreational trips, which fully correspond to the concept of "territorial displacement of the population." Of course, one should not forget that all four types of migration are specific in nature, and the population participating in them pursues completely different goals.
Episodic migrations are business, recreational and other trips that are made not only irregularly in time, but not necessarily in the same directions. If the able-bodied contingents participate in business trips, then the rest of the population is also involved in recreational trips. The composition of the participants in episodic migration is very diverse. In terms of its scale, this type of migration is apparently superior to all others. Unfortunately, it is very poorly studied. The only exceptions were, perhaps, only tourist trips, the volume of which constantly increased during the Soviet years. In the early 1980s, the number of persons who made tourist travel more than doubled compared to 1970 and exceeded 60 million (1). Nowadays, the scale of trips of Russian citizens for recreation and for tourist purposes outside the country has increased many times, but it is difficult to say whether this has increased their total volume, including internal movements. In any case, it would be an excessive exaggeration to present a figure of 30 million trips, and this is the share of Russia in proportion to the size of its population in the former USSR. The trip of "shuttle traders" is another matter, which, with a certain measure of convention, can be attributed to episodic migrations. These probably include the pilgrimage and some other movements.
Pendulum migrations represent the daily or weekly journeys of the population from their places of residence to places of work (and vice versa) located in different localities. A significant part of the urban and rural population participates in commuting in many countries. On the most significant scale, it takes place in those agglomerations, the centers of which are large and large cities. In the last 10-20 years, the importance of pendulum migrations in the territorial movements of the population has increased significantly. In a number of countries, the scale of daily commuting is close to and even exceeds the volume of annual irretrievable migrations. According to B.S. Khorev and V.N. Czapek in the last quarter of the twentieth century in the USSR, the ratio between permanent and pendulum migration was 2: 3 (143).
Pendulum migrants increase quantitatively and change qualitatively the labor resources of settlements - centers of attraction, where the number of jobs exceeds their own labor resources or does not correspond to the professional and qualification structure of the population. On the other hand, pendulum migration creates conditions for satisfying the diverse labor needs of residents, as a rule, of small settlements, in which the choice of jobs is qualitatively and sometimes quantitatively limited.
Seasonal migrations are movements, mainly of the able-bodied population, to places of temporary work and residence for a period, usually several months, with the preservation of the possibility of returning to places of permanent residence. Seasonal migrations not only raise the real living standard, but also satisfy the needs of production, which is experiencing a shortage of labor. Such migrations arise due to the fact that in the economy of a number of regions the dominant position belongs to industries in which the demand for labor is uneven over time. As a result, these industries experience an oversized workforce during the busy seasons. Since it cannot be satisfied at the expense of local labor resources, additional labor is attracted from other regions.
The sectors with a seasonal nature of production include, first of all, agriculture. In this industry, the demand for labor is much higher during the planting and harvesting seasons than for the rest, especially winter time... The seasonal industries include the processing of agricultural raw materials. Integration of this industry with agriculture significantly reduces the need for seasonal migration. Branches with a seasonal nature, or stages, of production are also logging (rafting), fishing (coastal fishing) and a number of others. However, the seasonal nature of production is not necessarily accompanied by the seasonal nature of labor. Agroindustrial integration, cross-sectoral cooperation in the use of labor, the use of new technologies and production methods (for example, ocean fishing) essentially nullifies the need for seasonal migration.
An irrevocable species (or resettlement) can be called migration in the strict sense of this word, corresponding to it etymologically. This explains the fact that a number of researchers call irrevocable migration complete, full-fledged, i.e. committed for good. Irretrievable migration simultaneously meets two conditions: firstly, the population moves from one settlement to another, and, secondly, the movements are accompanied by a change permanent place residence. The first condition excludes all kinds of population movements within settlements from migration, and the second - return or short-term trips to other settlements.
The types of migration differ not only in formal characteristics, but also in essence. Thus, irretrievable migration, unlike others, is the most important source of the formation of a permanent composition of the population in populated areas. Naturally, between irrevocable migration and the rest of its types, as noted by M.V. Kurman, there is no insurmountable wall (53). One type of migration can turn into another or act as its starting point. In particular, episodic, pendulum and seasonal migrations are sometimes the predecessors of irretrievable migration, since they create conditions (primarily informational ones) for choosing a possible permanent place of residence.
The third group includes definitions that do not separate such different concepts as movement and mobility. So, T.M. Karakhanova believes that the definition of the essence of population migration should proceed from two interpretations, one of which considers migration as a form of geographic mobility (42). A little later L.L. Shamileva repeated this definition, calling migration a form of population mobility (149). ... The actual dissertation of T.M. Karakhanova, L.L. Shamileva and other graduate students of the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University were carried out in line with the work of B.S. Khorev, who, having set the task of creating a "concept of migration mobility of the population in all its forms" (74), himself in many of his works under the migration mobility accepts migration in the broad sense of the word, and in the narrow sense - only resettlement (86, p. 19 ) Resettlement, in turn, is the territorial mobility of the population, i.e. aggregate characteristics of inter-settlement movements of any kind.
A similar position is taken by O.V. Larmin, who views migration as part of migratory mobility (56). V.N. Chapek and V.M. Moiseenko in the works of the last years of the past century also did not distinguish between mobility and resettlement (81, 145). In the works of other researchers of migration, such as V.I. Perevedentsev, T.I. Zaslavskaya, including ours, until the end of the 70s, no distinction was made between mobility and resettlement. So, in 1970. T.I. Zaslavskaya defined migration as geographic mobility, i.e. movement from one settlement to another, and in 1973 she wrote that population migration is a private form of mobility (78).
At the same time, the terms "mobility" (mobility) and "displacement" are by no means unambiguous. And it is no coincidence that at least four meet different interpretations the term "migratory mobility". Mobility is seen as general concept various types of movement. She is synonymous with relocation. Both approaches are common to most research. In the third case, mobility acts as a general concept of potential and real migration. Finally, mobility is the potential readiness of the population to change its territorial status (37). Back in 1973, perhaps the only researcher - M.V. Kurman noted that the word "mobility" rather denotes the potential ability or readiness of an individual for action than the action itself (132, p. 99).
In 1978. we, together with T.I. Zaslavskaya, expressed the idea that mobility and migration are different concepts. The published article states that we consider the latter definition to be the most preferred. With this approach, one clearly delineates, on the one hand, the psychological readiness to move, and on the other, the actual displacement of the population (37). The definition of migration as territorial mobility seems imprecise, not only for terminological reasons, but also in essence. Population migration should be understood as territorial displacement, and mobility (mobility) - the ability to migrate, i.e. potential migration activity. Let us emphasize once again that population migration is not mobility, but actual displacement. Mobility, in turn, is not a movement, but a readiness for it.
Having clarified the essence of territorial displacement, having established the difference between displacement and mobility, one can define population migration. Migration, as already noted, translated from Latin means movement, resettlement. When applied to humanity, the term "migration" is usually used in conjunction with population. Note that, scientifically, the term "population migration" is very lucky, because its etymological and modern semantic meanings largely coincide.
Once again, we note that displacement and resettlement are by no means synonymous. That is why it is possible to use different terms to refer to migration in the narrow and broad sense of the word. In a narrow sense, migration is a complete type of territorial movement, culminating in a change of permanent residence, i.e. literally means resettlement. The term resettlement, widely used in the 19th century literature, very accurately reflects the essence of such a phenomenon as migration. In other words, this is the case when the accuracy of the definition is not sacrificed for brevity.
Territorial displacement is a broader interpretation of migration. Many researchers refer to migration in a broad sense, as already mentioned, along with non-return also other types of population migration. In a word, territorial movement between different settlements of one or several administrative-territorial units, regardless of the duration, regularity and target orientation, is migration in the broad sense of the word.
1.3. Essence and functions of population migration
Population migration is a social phenomenon. The population is not only a collection of people, but also a specific system of social ties and relations, thus acting as a subsystem of "society" (114). Population migration is as ancient a phenomenon as man. Before the appearance of man, his anthropoid predecessors moved geographically. But these movements presupposed the search for consumer goods given by nature, and not the working conditions for their production. This is the fundamental difference between the migration of any populations of the animal world and the migration of the population.
Migration as a spatial movement of the population is characteristic of all human societies. However, the intensity, direction and composition of migration flows, its social, economic and demographic consequences differ significantly not only in different historical epochs, but also in countries with different levels of economic development, different natural and geographical conditions and population structures.
Population migration affects social development through the implementation of its functions. Functions are those specific roles that migration of the population play in the life of society. Naturally, the functions of migration express its essence, the properties of this phenomenon. Therefore, it is difficult to agree with the opinion of V.I. Staroverov, that migration in demography performs a demographic function, in ethnography - ethnographic, in economic geography - urbanization, in social hygiene - social hygiene, etc. (131)
The functions of population migration are ambiguous. Some of them are independent of the type of socio-economic system and the characteristics of individual societies, the nature of others is determined by the socio-economic conditions of specific countries. The first are the general functions of migration, the second are the specific functions of a particular civilization or, if you like, a socio-economic formation.
T.I. Zaslavskaya when analyzing population migration among its most common functions allocates accelerating, selective and redistribution. In the works of the end of the XX century, the essence of the first of them was reduced to the provision of one or another level of spatial mobility of the population (78). Territorial movements contribute to a change in the socio-psychological characteristics of people, expanding their horizons, accumulating knowledge about various areas of life, exchanging labor skills and production experience, developing the personality, its material, social and spiritual needs, and integrating national cultures. A more mobile population, as a rule, is also more socially active. Thus, migration in any case leads to the development of the population. "Without the creation of mobility of the population, there can be no development" (58. p.246).
The development of the population is very difficult to express using indicators that characterize a particular property of a population of people. It would seem that the most appropriate characteristic is the educational level, but a comparison of migration mobility (the intensity of migration of the population of territorial units) with the level of education (the number of persons with secondary general education per 1000 employed), carried out according to the data of the former Soviet Union, revealed a decrease in the intensity of migration as educational level rises, although theoretically the opposite would be expected.
The role of the educational level of the population is evidence of its social development, an organic element of which is an increase in its mobility. Lenin, to be objective, was not only a proletarian leader, the creator of the Bolshevik party and the Soviet state, but he was also an outstanding scientist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It was he who said that no school can give people what gives them an independent acquaintance with the various conditions of life (58).
Another function of migration is the redistribution of the population associated with the placement of productive forces, the distribution of production capacities and investments between individual territories of the country, including between natural areas, districts, different types of rural and urban settlements. The peculiarity of the redistributive function is due to its inter-territorial nature, since resettlement requires the interaction of the population of at least two regions.
Fulfilling a redistributive function, migration not only increases the population of certain territories, but also indirectly affects the dynamics of demographic processes, since migrants participate in population reproduction. Therefore, the importance of migration in the change in the population of a particular locality is always greater than the share of migrants in the composition of the population of this locality. The role of migration in population reproduction is most significant in areas with a relatively low intensity of natural movement. So, in the Soviet years in the Baltic States, which had the lowest birth rate, there was the highest proportion of descendants of migrants in the natural increase - 30 out of 100 people. On the contrary, in the republics of Central Asia, which were characterized by the highest birth rates, this indicator was 4-5 people (113).
The third function of migration is selective. Its essence is that uneven participation in migration of various socio-demographic groups leads to a change in the qualitative composition of the population of different territories. Experience shows that men and people of working age participate in migration more actively than disabled people and women. There are great differences in the migratory mobility of people of different nationalities, as well as the indigenous inhabitants of a particular region and who have recently moved there from other localities.
The general functions of migration have a certain independence and, at the same time, are closely interrelated. Territorial redistribution of the population and changes in its qualitative composition are carried out only with appropriate mobility. The quantitative redistribution of the population can either be combined or not combined with a change in its qualitative composition in areas of outflow or inflow of migrants. In the same way, intensive qualitative selection of the population can take place even when the quantitative result of redistribution is insignificant (78). Thus, due to the manifestation of selective selection of migrants in areas with even an insignificant balance of migration exchange, the structure of the population can change noticeably. In turn, the outflow of the population from some regions and the influx of migrants there from others will significantly update the composition of the population and change its migration activity. The functions of increasing mobility, redistributive and selective manifest themselves ambiguously in different types migration. In some cases, as, for example, in episodic migration, the functions of the development of mobility are of greatest importance, in others, such as resettlement, all functions manifest themselves in full. Nevertheless, in all migratory movements, the essence of migration is revealed to the greatest extent through its functions.
From the formal, external side, the general functions of migration for all civilizations, all formations are similar. Redistributive and selective functions are characteristic of migration processes throughout. They also contribute to the development of the population. However, the essence of migration is not only in these functions. At least two more functions are inherent in resettlement: economic and social, functions that contribute to changing the living conditions of the population.
Regardless of what socio-economic mechanism is used for the territorial distribution of material factors of production, the economic function of population migration in its most general form is reduced to the combination with the means of production of labor and its carrier - the able-bodied population. The full implementation of this task on the basis of the implementation of the general functions of migration: accelerating, redistributive and selective - should lead to the provision of quantitative and qualitative correspondence between material and personal factors of production. Time will show which mechanism - planning and distribution or market (capital and labor inflow) is more effective.
The social function of population migration is entirely determined by the level of economic development of the country and the policy pursued by it. Within this framework, migrants solve their life tasks: through resettlement they strive to improve their lives. Migration due to the implementation of its social function is an iterative process of improving the living standards of the migrant population. This conclusion is based on the results of sociological surveys carried out in many regions of the country and showing that the bulk of migrants in new places provide themselves with a higher standard of living than in places of exit. This is understandable, otherwise migration would be meaningless for those who want to improve their well-being. True, this applies only to voluntary migrations. Forced and forced migrations are subject to other laws.
1.4. The concept of three stages of the migration process
Unlike natural movement, which is an internal property of such a system as population, migration is a movement external to it. Regardless of the existing definitions of the demographic system, each of them should include such a moment as spatial localization. Therefore, each demographic system is, first of all, a territorially defined aggregate of people. Naturally, the presence of at least two such demographic systems is the first objective prerequisite for population migration.
In migration, every single event, be it arrival, departure or resettlement, is its elementary cell. This provision would not need commentary if other opinions were not encountered in the literature. So, A.U. Khomra believes that "the primary cell of the population migration process should be recognized as the act of changing labor" (141) .. The assertion that labor is the first condition of life, the source of personality development, is completely true. But if migration is understood as a change of place of residence (moving from one settlement to another), then for this it is not necessary to change a profession, occupation, or branch of employment. At the same time, a change in the latter can occur without a change of place of residence.
The migration process is a multitude of events that entail a change of residence. Some of these events are explicit, for example, resettlement, others are latent (the formation of mobility, etc.). In order for all these events to represent a process, they, i.e. arrivals, departures, etc., must constitute a statistically significant population. Migration is a quantitatively massive process.
For each territorial aggregate of people participating in migration exchange with other territorial aggregates of the population, the composition of outgoing migrants does not coincide with the composition of arrivals and not so much quantitatively as qualitatively. This makes resettlement different from other types of migration. So, in tourism, the composition of departures and arrivals is practically the same. The same can be said about pendulum and seasonal migration. Only the structure of such a migration process as resettlement is characterized by great diversity.
Migration, like other processes, takes place over time, so it can be measured in a certain interval. The characteristic of the migration structure is taken as the average for this interval. A structure is a static process, and a process is essentially a dynamic structure, i.e. continuous change of states of the structure. Moreover, not only the structure of the migration process is constantly changing, but also those populations of people who give and receive migrants. Migration, therefore, is the most important factor in changing various sections of the structure of the population of the regions of exit and places of settling of migrants.
So, migration events in their mass, spatially localized, i.e. considered in relation to certain territorial populations of people, taken over a sufficiently long time interval, represent an organically unified series of facts of arrival, departure or resettlement. Each of these series of events can be thought of as a migration process. Processes are a relatively homogeneous series of phenomena connected by mutual causal dependencies, a single series of changes in social systems (151). According to V. Yadov, the process is a purposeful set of mass phenomena of the same order (155). Both of these definitions relatively accurately capture the essence of a simple migration process: the process of population departure from one point (region), population arrival at another point (region), or a certain flow of resettlement. But if there are more than two territorial populations of people between whom there is a migration exchange, then the processes of departure, arrival and resettlement are structurally and quantitatively different from each other.
At the same time, for each territorial population of people, the migration process appears as a twofold movement, i.e. as a stream of departures and as a stream of arrivals. The two-sidedness of the migration process is due not to the fact that gravity forces act in the places of invasion, and pushing forces act in the exit areas (both are present in each area), but the fact that the migration process is the interaction of two oppositely directed relatively homogeneous series of events.
However, if for territorial populations of people the migration process is represented as a series of arrivals, a series of departures and their interaction, the final result of which is a migration balance, then it looks completely different for the participants in the migration. The latter is due to the fact that for a migrant the event is not the beginning (departure) or the end (arrival) of the migration movement, but the resettlement itself, i.e. change of permanent residence. Therefore, when considering migration, firstly, from the side of geographically localized populations of people and, secondly, from the side of resettlement participants, the concept of a migration event has a different meaning. The migration process can also be presented in different ways.
From the formal point of view, the migration process is a series of migration events fixed in space and time. This fixation is carried out at the time of registration of migrants at the new and old places of residence. In the past, this operation was called an extract of the leaving and registration of the arriving population. Each single resettlement is recorded twice: first as the fact of departure and then as the fact of arrival. Both events are separated in time and geographically. But if we consider the migration process not from the formal point of view, but in essence, then it is a set of actual migrations. Formal milestones (fixing departure and fixing arrival) divide the migration process into three stages (phases): initial, main and final. Note that the concept of "stage" is broader than the concept of "phase". A stage is not only a certain moment in the course of development, but also a stage that has its own qualitative characteristics. Therefore, it is this term that is most appropriate for characterizing three different components of the migration process.
The development of the concept of a three-stage migration process falls on the last third of the twentieth century. In a relatively complete form, it was published in the late 1980s (115), although its main provisions were published in the late 1970s. (37). Already from the end of the 50s, studies began to be carried out that revealed the relationship between resettlement and the survival rate of migrants. This kind of connection was described in the literature of the 19th century. In the second half of the twentieth century, they were comprehended again, on the basis of empirical material that was modern for that time. Once again, the old truth was confirmed: the degree of novelty in science is determined by the measure of forgetfulness.
L.L. Shamileva, who noted that the migration process passes in its development the stage of potential migration, the stage of the direct act of migration and the stage characterizing the consequences of migration processes (149). Taking into account the fact that the consequences of migration processes (results of territorial movement of the population) are much wider than the settling-in of new settlers, and potential migration is only one of the aspects of migration mobility, this scheme can be taken as a previous concept of the three-stage migration process.
The fundamental provisions of the concept of a three-stage migration process can be summarized as follows. First, migratory mobility (mobility) and migratory movement (resettlement) are considered as two, albeit interrelated, but essentially different phenomena: the first as the ability (readiness) to migrate (attitude), the second - as an act of movement, the implementation of the attitude for migration. The definition of the differences between these two phenomena and the concepts adequate to them is associated with the introduction of sociological knowledge, in particular, ideas about projective and real behavior, about intentions and their implementation, and the reality of the latter is made dependent on both personal characteristics and situational parameters.
Secondly, there was a rejection of a one-sided understanding of the process of human interaction with a new social environment and natural and geographical conditions. The deepening of knowledge about the survival rate of the population in the regions of resettlement, the isolation from this process of adaptation as its organic component and giving it a subject orientation, allowed the migration of the population to be considered as a process of a complete nature.
Thirdly, the isolation from the resettlement of its pivotal part - the migration flow, made it possible to show the difference between the migration turnover and the number of participants in the process. The cumulative flow appeared as a kind of set of direct and reverse migration movements, structured according to personal and geographic characteristics... Ultimately, migration flows tied together the entire set of areas of exit and resettlement, which created the basis for the formation of regional indicators of migration links.
Thus, any completed migration process consists of three stages:
The initial, or preparatory stage, representing the process of the formation of the territorial mobility of the population;
The main stage, or the actual resettlement of the population, migration flows;
The final, or final stage, serving as the settling of migrants in a new place.
The individual stages of the migration process are closely related to each other. A migrant is a future newcomer during the period of his territorial displacement, and a newcomer is a former migrant during the period of his arrangement and adaptation in the area of resettlement. The extreme stages of the process are also related. Thus, new settlers, with increased migration activity, i.e. ability to relocate, are to a large extent potential migrants.
Chapter 2 FORMATION OF MOBILITY - INITIAL
STAGE OF THE MIGRATION PROCESS
2.1. Migratory mobility and potential
migration. Ethno-demographic differentiation
The first stage of the migration process is the formation of territorial mobility of the population, i.e. his certain socio-mental state. A person in such a state in Russia is usually said to be "light on his feet." However, having a high migratory mobility and being a potential migrant are far from the same thing. Although these concepts are closely related, they are by no means synonymous. Back in the late 60s of the last century, T.I. Zaslavskaya noted that in addition to the practical implementation of the propensity to relocate, there is also a process of forming a potential propensity to migrate (127). Two years later, she gave a complete definition of this concept. "A positive attitude towards mobility, combined with the adopted but not yet implemented decision to move in the world of work, represents the so-called potential mobility" (80, p. 142). Based on her later understanding of this phenomenon, in the above quote, mobility should be replaced by migration. In the field of rural-urban migration, this provision was interpreted by L.V. Korel, in whose opinion "potential migration is a psychological state of readiness of a villager to leave the given village" (49, p. 111-112).
The volumes of potential migration can be determined using a questionnaire survey of the population. Those respondents who answer the corresponding question of the questionnaire that they intend to migrate refer to potential migrants of varying degrees of probability of departure, and the rest - to stable (stationary) residents of the village (78,145).
Unlike potential migration, migration mobility is, as it were, an objectified state, the ability of a person to migrate, formed as a result of accumulated migration experience. Such an experience of L.V. Korel aptly calls a migration biography. The latter includes a set of movements preceding the moment of a sociological survey (49). This is essentially one of the expressions of the level of population mobility. With the help of a certain system of indicators, it is possible to assess the migration mobility of the population, both of a particular territory as a whole, and of its individual groups, differing in different parameters.
Mobility depends primarily on the number of migrations made, the duration of residence in the exit area or place of settlement, etc. It is largely associated with the participation of the population in other types of migration, in particular, in tourism, commuting, etc. The combination of various circumstances can lead to the fact that persons with less migration mobility, ie. migration background or experience, will be among potential migrants, while migrants who have experience in many movements behind them will become part of the permanent population. Nevertheless, under equal living conditions, persons with greater migratory mobility, as a rule, have a greater psychological readiness for resettlement. A person with extensive migration experience is more likely to decide to relocate if he is not satisfied with the living conditions in his last place of residence, than someone who was born in this area and has lived there all his life.
Migration mobility is a property inherent not only to an individual person, personality, but also to the entire totality of people, the population as a whole. An increase in migration mobility is a historical process, irreversible, like the development of mankind. In its most general form, it can be characterized by an increase in the intensity of movements, primarily population movements. In Russia in pre-revolutionary times, according to the approximate calculations of A.A. Kaufman's resettlement was attended by 0.14% of the total population of the country, or 10% of its annual natural increase (44, p. 4). In the postwar years, according to the calculations of M.Ya. Sonina participated in migrations 6 times more than before the revolution (124, p. 161). For comparison with pre-revolutionary times, one can also cite the following fact: in the seventies of the twentieth century. the volume of migration of the population was 3-3.5 times higher than the number of births in the country, and was 4.5-5 times more than the natural population growth (128) More precisely, in the last third of the last century, 25-30 times more participated in migrations, than in the days of A.A. Kaufman.
An assessment of the migration mobility of the population is given in the monograph by V.M. Moiseenko. Her calculations show the dynamics of migratory mobility in the post-war years. In 1940, one resident in the USSR made 12.1 different trips per year, while in 1981 - 21.5 (81). In the 90s, under the conditions of the reformed Russia, the volume and, accordingly, the intensity of population migration decreased. This fact is noted by I. B. Orlova, J. A. Zayonchkovskaya and others. According to Z. A. Zayonchkovskaya in 1990. the total volume of migration was lower than in the past by 20-25%, and in 1963. it decreased by another 30% (75. p.6). IB Orlova writes that in 1992. the total migration turnover per 1000 inhabitants of Russia was less than in 1991. 11% and 1/3 lower than the level of 1986-1990. (123. p. 7). In 2000. the number of migrants registered as arrivals has decreased compared to 1993. by 1.2 million people, and those who left, respectively, by 1 million. in Russia compared to 1973. the scale of arrivals and departures in urban areas decreased 3.3 times. In the last decade, the scale of population migration in Russia was only 1.3 times higher than the number of births. And this despite the fact that there was a sharp drop in the birth rate of the population (the annual number of births in the 90s was about half as much as in the previous decade.)
Of course, the growth of only relocations does not fully characterize the increase in the mobility of the population. It also increases significantly as a result of urbanization processes, the development of tourism, health resort services for the population, etc. The population living in different regions of the country, in settlements of different social status, has different levels of migration mobility. It depends both on the degree of socialization of individuals, individual groups and the population of a particular territorial unit as a whole, and on the characteristics of its structure (Table 2.1.1)
Table 2.1.1
Distribution of constituent entities of the Russian Federation by the level of migration
Mobility in 2000
| Indicators of the intensity of population migration, ppm | Number of subjects of the Russian Federation | Examples of |
| Up to 10.0 | 4 | Moscow region, Saint Petersburg, Ingushetia |
| 10.1 to 15.0 | 16 | Krasnodar Territory, Mordovia, Ryazan Region |
| 15.1 to 20.0 | 35 | Tomsk region, Dagestan, Kaliningrad region. |
| 20.1 to 30.0 | 16 | Khabarovsk Territory, Buryatia, Murmansk Region. |
| 30.1 and up | 8 | Jewish Autonomous Region, Kalmykia, Magadan Region. |
| Total | 79 | Average -16.7 ppm |
The coefficients of the intensity of population migration range from 4.2 (Moscow) to 75.2 ppm (Chukotka). The fact that the indicators are so different, not only for Moscow and Chukotka, but also for the extreme groups (4-10 and 30-75), indicates their low suitability for characterizing migratory mobility. Rather, they characterize the degree of realization of potential migration.
The existing differences in the coefficients of the intensity of migration by regions of the country are, to a certain extent, associated with the migration mobility of men and women, as well as people of different ages (by the way, among the subjects of the Federation in Chukotka the highest proportion of men and one of the highest proportion of people of working age).
All post-war population censuses, in which the time of residence in the place of the census was found out, confirmed that the migration mobility of men in our country is higher than that of women. For example, at the time of the 1970 census. the excess of men over women as a whole in the former USSR was approximately 40%. (128). In 1970. those migrants who in the last two years moved into the area and remained there at the time of the census were counted. In Russia as a whole, such men turned out to be 8.2%, while women were 7.1%, with the ratio in the population of the federation being 45.7 and 54.3%.
The general regularity that the proportion of men over women in the composition of migrants is exceeding, at the same time, has a number of peculiarities. So, when studying rural-urban migration, Korel L.V. found that as the level of urbanization of rural settlements increases, the share of men in the migration outflow decreases (49, p. 103). A number of studies have shown that disposable travel predominates among women, and multiple travels among men (20).
In the 90s, judging by the coefficients of the intensity of migration of men and women, there was a convergence of these indicators. In particular, in 2000. the intensity of migration of men exceeded that of women by only three hundredths of a percentage point, and in urban areas it was 0.07 points, while in countryside indicators of migration intensity among women were higher than among men (by 0.03 points).
The 1970 census also revealed differences in the migratory mobility of people of different ages. Among the urban population of working age, on average in the USSR, it was more than 3 times higher than that of persons who were pre-worker, and almost 4 times higher than among those who were beyond the working age. Migratory mobility in people aged 16-24 is 8-10 times higher than in the age group under 16 years old (128) Differences in the migratory mobility of the population of working age, on the one hand, and those beyond the working age, on the other, were especially significant. , in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia, to the least extent they are observed in the Baltic republics.
Data on the age characteristics of migrants in the 1979 census. have not been published. Actually, there is no information on the migration of the population in the seventies and subsequent years in open publications. This is due to the fact that in 1976. demographic statistics were sequestrated at the initiative of the defense department, supported by the USSR State Planning Committee. The main argument was that the majority of migrants are men and able-bodied people, and this is a mobilization potential. Objections from the Central Statistical Administration and the USSR Academy of Sciences to the closure of demographic information turned out to be little consolation for the participants in the interdepartmental commission.
The information obtained as a result of the 1989 census did not see the light - the Soviet Union collapsed. Therefore, the migration mobility of the population of Russia in the nineties can be judged by the data of the 1994 sample survey. (table 2.1.2)
Table 2.1.2
Intensity of migration of persons of different age contingents in 1994
(the ratio of the number of migrants to the population
Of this age group)
| Age contingents | All migrants | Including: |
|
| Migrants who have lived in the place of examination for up to 2 years | Migrants who have lived in the place of examination for 2 to 5 years |
||
| To able-bodied | 0.315 | 1.103 | 0.931 |
| Able-bodied | 1.123 | 1.165 | 1.226 |
| Older than able-bodied | 1.437 | 0.432 | 0.461 |
Comparison of indicators of the intensity of migration of men and women, calculated for ten-year age groups for 2000, indicates that the highest level of these coefficients is observed in the group of 20-29 years. The intensity of migration of men in this age group is twice as high as among people under the age of 20 and in the group of 30-39 years, and in comparison with the population over 50 years old - 3 times. For women in the 20-29 age group, the indicators are 1.5 and 3-4 times higher, respectively.
Indirect characteristics of the migration mobility of the population, expressed in indicators of the intensity of migration, of course, cannot fully reveal its dynamics and territorial differences in the mobility of various groups of the population. To a greater extent, the level of population mobility could be characterized by the number of movements that a person makes during all or part of his life. Since there was no such accounting either in the former USSR, or in modern Russia, we will use the data for Hungary. According to the materials of the last quarter of the twentieth century, each inhabitant of Hungary made more than four migratory movements during his entire life (31, p. 207).
These indicators should be different for the working-age population and the one that has already retired. Although, of course, the older a person is, the more movements he made during his life, but, on the other hand, the level of migration mobility of the population increases with social development, i.e. in the 80s it was probably higher than, for example, in the 60s.
Migration mobility is not only different among people of different ages, but also among people of the same age living in different regions of the country. So, at one time Ukrainian scientists N.N. Sachuk and V.A. Stakhovich identified territorial differences in the migration mobility of centenarians. They showed that the number of relocations for persons aged 80 and over during their life was 0.53 in Moldova, 0.82 in Abkhazia, 0.85 in Belarus, 0.88 in Ukraine and -1 in Lithuania. 25. Over their entire life, on average in the surveyed regions, 47.1% of people aged 80 years and older did not change their place of residence (20).
Large differences existed in the migration mobility of persons of different nationalities living in the former USSR. 1970 census data. allowed the titular nationalities of the union republics to be divided into four groups depending on the level of migration mobility of the indigenous population living there. As indicators with the help of which the distribution was carried out, the coefficients of the intensity of migration of urban residents and the proportion of people who have lived in places of settlement for at least two years were taken.
The first group included Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians. They had the highest, compared with other nationalities, coefficient of migration intensity, and the share of people who lived in places of resettlement for less than two years (conditionally new settlers) among them was 5-7%.
The second group is Moldovans, Kazakhs, Estonians and Latvians. Representatives of these nationalities migrated with a lower intensity than representatives of the first group - the coefficients of migration intensity were almost 1.5 times lower, and the share of new settlers ranged from 3.1% among Moldovans to 5.8% among Estonians.
The third group is Kyrgyz, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Turkmen and Georgians. This group was characterized by an even lower intensity of migration - 1.5-2 times lower compared to the first group, and the share of new settlers among these nationalities was 1.4-2.5%.
The fourth group is Uzbeks and Tajiks. The intensity of migration among them was 3 times lower than among the nationalities included in the first group, and the share of new settlers was 1.4-2.2%.
The lowest migration mobility was among the indigenous population of the republics of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, who lived in rural areas (4-7 times lower than in Russia). Such a low intensity of migration with high rates of natural increase inevitably led to an increase in the proportion of people of indigenous nationalities in the rural population of these republics. On the contrary, the urban population of the regions of new development, located in Siberia, in the North and the Far East, was distinguished by the highest migratory mobility.
According to the 1989 census, it is possible to establish which main nationalities living on the territory of Russia are characterized by the greatest migration mobility. At the same time, of course, one should not forget that the applied coefficients are just rough indicators for such comparisons (Table 2.1.3).
Table 2.1.3
Intensity of migration of the main nationalities in Russia
(1989 census, relative to the national average)
| Nationalities | Exceeding the average level in arrivals | Exceeding the average level in dropouts |
| Russians | 0.862 | 0.883 |
| Ukrainians, Belarusians | 1.284 | 1.13.4 |
| Tatars, Bashkirs, Chuvash | 1.239 | 1.264 |
| Mordovians, Mari, Udmurts | 0.928 | 0.985 |
| peoples of the North Caucasus | 1.036 | 0.794 |
| peoples of the North | 0.703 | 0.768 |
| Germans, Jews | 0.863 | 1.896 |
| the entire population of Russia | 1.000 | 1.000 |
It is very difficult to comment on the data in Table 2.1.3. The simplest thing is the migration of Germans and Jews. These ethnic groups leave the country most intensively (exceeding the average indicator for the entire population by 1.9 times) and are not very actively involved in internal migrations. It is difficult to explain why the Tatars, Bashkirs, Udmurts, Ukrainians and Belarusians have higher migration rates than Russians, and the latter have lower than average levels. One cannot seriously think that over the years of reforms, only Russians have lost their migration activity. It is easier to comment for the peoples of the Caucasus, where the indicators on arrival are higher than the average level, and those on departure are lower.
Thus, demographic and ethnic differences in the population of different regions of the country determine its different migration mobility. But these characteristics are not decisive in differentiating the migration mobility of various groups of the population. To a decisive extent, the genetic (from genesis) structure of the population influences the migratory mobility.
The genetic structure of the population and its study
In the regions, whose population has been growing for many years due to the intensive migration inflow, a very peculiar totality of people is formed, which is different in a number of characteristics from the population of those territories from which migrants arrive. The main difference lies in the level of stability in the composition of the population. In demography, the term "stable population" has a twofold meaning. Traditionally, stabilization is understood as a process that gives the population all the properties of a stable age-sex structure. This is achieved while maintaining for a definitely long period of time a certain mode of population reproduction set at the initial moment.
The term "stable population" has a different meaning since it refers to the process of population formation, usually in areas of new development. Here, in the aggregate of people, some individuals are replaced by others, regardless of whether they have the same or different demographic characteristics. This replacement is carried out as a result of inter-district migration processes.
Calculating the level of stability (in this case, constancy) of the composition of the population is not only of theoretical importance. It is associated with the development of measures to attract stable labor resources. It is no coincidence that, therefore, in the second half of the twentieth century, the concept of "permanent population" (stable population) could be found in almost all demographic studies devoted to eastern and northern regions country. In a number of works, attempts have even been made to theoretically define this concept (98, 157).
Assessment of the level of stability in the population is impossible without the development of the concept of "permanent population". The comprehension of this demographic concept is organically linked with the concept of the classification of the composition of the population. Classification involves the logical division of the studied population into its component parts. This division is based on this or that principle. Despite the fact that any classification is conditional, it is an important means of scientific knowledge.
The classification of the composition of the population necessitates the dismemberment of the studied population into parts, depending on the differences in the degree of their stability, which, in turn, is directly related to the genesis of various groups of the population, the time of their introduction. Depending on the genesis of various parts of the studied population, indigenous and newcomers can be distinguished in it. The term "indigenous population" in economic literature occurs in a double sense. S.A. Novoselsky refers to the indigenous population of persons who were born in a particular city, and to the newcomer - all those born outside of it (88, p. 205). The same point of view is shared by A.G. Rashin, who singles out indigenous and newcomers in the pre-revolutionary population of Moscow (111, p. 301).
In 1926-1927. In Irkutsk, the registration of immigrants to the regions located east of Lake Baikal was carried out. The authors of the survey compiled on the basis of this registration, among the settlers who passed through Irkutsk, identified the indigenous people, which included persons born in Siberia, and newcomers - natives of other regions of the country (99, p. 36). Researchers of population migration and the settling rate of new settlers in Siberia V.I. Perevedentsev and Zh.A. Zayonchkovskaya also refers the natives of this place to the indigenous population (36, p. 73). The same approach is typical for the practice of statistical accounting of the population in the United States. Already from the middle of the 19th century. the entire population was divided into natives of the United States and natives of other countries, who were children and other descendants of migrants. According to A. Lincoln's definition, the entire US population is former migrants. And this is true, since almost all of the indigenous population living in the United States was exterminated.
In Russia, the population of the northern and eastern territories inhabited at different times, in particular, Siberia, is for the most part newcomers. Significant enclaves of the indigenous population (Komi, Nenets, Buryats, Yakuts, Nivkhs, etc.) have survived in the European North, Siberia, and the Far East. born in other areas) as a native newcomer is illegal. We can only talk about different generations (children, fathers, grandfathers, etc.) of the same newcomer population.
Another meaning put into the term "indigenous population" is the opposition of the newcomer population to the aborigines. M.A. In the mid-thirties of the twentieth century, Sergeev, analyzing the composition of the population of Kamchatka, wrote that in the group of the resident population it is necessary to single out the indigenous people living in the countryside and who are the aborigines of the region (121, p. 155). The same is the opinion of G.A. Agranata, A.B. Kupriyanov and V.F. Puzanova, who include the Aleuts, Eskimos and Indians as the indigenous population of Alaska (2). The point of view of M.A. Sergeev and a number of other authors is legitimate not only etymologically, but also historically: the aborigines are the indigenous inhabitants of the area, who have lived in it from time immemorial. The most ancient inhabitants of a given territory can be identified in the indigenous population. Information about the genesis of this part of the population is associated with their habitation in this area. In addition, the peoples of other localities, with which their original habitation was associated, could also have moved here. For example, the Yakuts and the Buryats who drove them out. These, like other peoples of similar genesis, have been inhabiting their present territory for a relatively long time. Their modern settlement is largely associated with the movement of stronger peoples in the original habitat.
From the point of view of the formation of the population, only two groups are of interest: the nationalities that have lived since ancient times, and the nationalities that moved here before the arrival of the Russian population. The modern settlement of the former is associated with their historical evolution, while the emergence of the latter is due to a number of external factors. The rest of the population is made up of the descendants of people who arrived in the inhabited area from the old inhabited areas. This idea was most definitely formulated by one of the authors of the book "Asian Russia" V.K. Kuznetsov. He writes: "The entire Russian population of Asiatic Russia is a newcomer, in this sense the so-called old-timers of Siberia are the same settlers as the inhabitants of resettlement villages and settlements" (3, p. 188).
Of the greatest interest in terms of the formation of labor resources in areas of new development is, of course, the study of the composition of the newcomer population, and not only because it is many times larger than the indigenous population, but also because the intensive population growth occurs, in essence, through increase in the number of newcomers. If you look deep into Russian history, it turns out that Russians are alien everywhere for the entire present territory of Russia. This is quite convincingly said by the outstanding Russian historian of the late 19th - early 20th century V.O. Klyuchevsky. At first, the Russians, who came to the present central regions of Russia, met here the Finno-Ugric peoples, with whom they peacefully coexisted, in any case no significant clashes have been noted in history. Then, more than 4 centuries ago, coexistence with the Turkic-speaking peoples of the Volga region began. The 19th century is the time of the annexation of the North Caucasus to Russia. Intensive assimilation processes took place among the Russians and all these peoples. Only during the last three generations in the second half of the 20th century. about 1/3 of all Russians were mixed. Nowadays, most likely, there are no Russians who have not been mixed with anyone: Ukrainians, Tatars, Mordovians, Avars, etc. there with indigenous peoples, mutually perceiving much of each other's material and spiritual culture. In a word, nowadays there is enough blood of indigenous people in the new population and vice versa.
Demographic Future of Russia and migration processes
Early 1990s marked by the onset in Russia of a period of prolonged depopulation, which has engulfed almost all of its subjects. This phenomenon is by no means new. Even at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, for example, France was in a period of protracted depopulation. In the XX century. many countries have faced natural population decline. Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Sweden and a number of other states live in the depopulation mode. Russia simply turned out to be an outsider in the circle of European countries, and its society was not ready to accept such a direction of demographic dynamics. From the data presented in Table 1, it can be seen that depopulation in Russia is determined by both components of population reproduction - fertility and mortality. In other words, it is happening under double pressure, which distinguishes Russia from Western European countries.
First of all, Russia has the lowest fertility rates among European countries, and now their level is significantly lower than in previous decades (Table 2). Over the last third of the XX century. in Russia, the regime of population reproduction has deteriorated sharply, and the total fertility rate has decreased. In the 1970s. each woman of reproductive age gave birth to an average of 1.97 children, in the 1980s. even 2.04, which was close to the simple reproduction of the population. But in 1991 this figure dropped to 1.73, and in 2000 - to 1.21. In recent years, the birth rate has slightly increased, but it is still less than 60-65% of the level that provides a simple replacement of generations.
At present, in terms of fertility, Russia is in the group of economically developed countries (such as Italy, Spain, Greece, Germany, Czech Republic), whose total fertility rate is stable at 1.2-1.3. The average European indicator in the second half of the 1990s. was 1.4, while in Russia - 1.3. In Europe, only Albania experienced expanded population reproduction. Consequently, in the 1990s. the prospects for population reproduction in Russia were even worse than in European countries.
In the 1990s. in Russia, not only was the total fertility rate extremely low, but also the number of births was much lower than in previous decades. In absolute figures for the period 1991-2000. children were born by 9.5 million less than in 1981-1990, and 7.2 million less than in 1971-1980. The decline in fertility in the 1990s was so significant that analogies with the Great Patriotic War are appropriate. The number of children born in 1941-1945 in comparison with the previous pre-war five-year period was 56%. Roughly the same thing happened in 1996-2000, when in relation to 1986-1990. the number of births dropped to 55%. one
Table 1
Demographic development of Russia in the 1990s
|
T _ Jtj / ^ ttq TL / LPGLGV |
Natural |
Ratio of numbers |
Total |
Expected pro |
||||
|
Years |
TTTLT Yf * G |
T-I ^ LL y IMCU |
naya decline, |
dead by numbers |
coefficient |
office |
||
|
growth |
born |
fertility (?) |
life (years) |
|||||
|
1991 |
1795 |
1691 |
104 |
0,942 |
1,732 |
69,01 |
||
|
1992 |
1588 |
1807 |
-219 |
,138 |
1,552 |
67,89 |
||
|
1993 |
1379 |
2129 |
-750 |
,544 |
,385 |
65,14 |
||
|
1994 |
1408 |
2301 |
-893 |
,634 |
,400 |
63,98 |
||
|
1995 |
1364 |
2204 |
-840 |
,616 |
,344 |
64,64 |
||
|
1996 |
1305 |
2082 |
-777 |
,595 |
,281 |
65,89 |
||
|
1997 |
1260 |
2016 |
-756 |
,600 |
,230 |
66,64 |
||
|
1998 |
1283 |
1989 |
-706 |
,550 |
,242 |
67,02 |
||
|
1999 |
1215 |
2144 |
-929 |
,765 |
1,171 |
65,93 |
||
|
2000 |
1267 |
2225 |
-958 |
,756 |
1,214 |
65,27 |
||
|
2001 |
1312 |
2255 |
-943 |
,719 |
1,249 |
65,3 |
||
|
2002 |
1397 |
2332 |
-935 |
,669 |
1,322 |
64,8 |
||
|
2003 |
1477 |
2366 |
-889 |
,602 | ||||
Table 2
Average annual number of births and total fertility rates in Russia
The fundamental reason for the decline in the birth rate in Russia is the completion of the demographic transition by the end of the 20th century. Unlike most countries, in Russia the transition from having many children to having few children took place in a relatively short time, full of extreme events - the First World War and the Civil War, collectivization and the rapid growth of industry and large cities, coupled with an increase in the employment of women; repression of the late thirties; Great Patriotic War); and, finally, the reforms of the nineties. In addition to enormous human losses (13 million people died during the Great Patriotic War and more than 0.5 million were exterminated in 1937-1938), Russia underwent radical changes in the age-sex and family structure of the population, reproductive behavior of post-war countries. knees.
Another reason is the measures to stimulate the birth rate in the 1980s, which helped to extinguish the demographic wave, the depression that formed during the war years, and, on the other hand, led to the emergence in peacetime5 of a new wave, the crest of which fell in 1983 -1987 The birth events were concentrated in a short period of time. As a result, women who fulfilled their reproductive plans in the 1990s. turned into a kind of "re-productive ballast". The resulting increase in children born in the 1980s. (about 2.0-2.5 million people), by the end of the 1990s it was completely "eaten".
The third reason lies in the nature of the socio-economic transformation, the fall in the level of well-being of the population, on the one hand, and the growth of demand, a higher standard of living, especially among young people, on the other. As a result, a significant part of young men and women are distracted from reproductive activities (shuttles, labor migrants, etc.), seeking to create material comfort for themselves or simply to survive in market conditions. In the first half of the 1990s. there were at least 10-15 million people or almost 30% of the population aged 20 to 40 years. An attempt to earn "good" money lasts for many years, which does not contribute to the implementation of reproductive plans. This also includes the departure of young women to work abroad. In the 1990s. only in Western Europe, according to rough estimates, approximately 3-4% of Russian women aged 18 to 24 provided paid sexual services. Nowadays, not only is the "brain drain" from Russia, which depletes the intellectual potential of the nation, but also the "aesthetic" image of the people is deteriorating. It is appropriate to recall the novel by A.S. Novikov-Priboya "Captain of the first rank". It explains how the breed of noble gentlemen improved. For any rich monster, beauties from the poor willingly married. "From such a married couple, the children will no longer be as ugly as their father. ... Children will grow up and, in turn, marry beautiful women. In this manner, a special, masterful breed is obtained." Travel abroad young and beautiful women from Russia is accompanied not only by a decrease in the birth rate, but also, if you adhere to the logic of the author of the novel, will lead to a deterioration in the aesthetic quality of the population.
The fourth reason, and it is gradually gaining strength, is the change in reproductive attitudes, which is taking place, largely under the influence of the media, and the introduction of Western models of family, reproductive and sexual behavior into the consciousness of Russian youth. In the 1990s. the share of unregistered, so-called civil marriages(in 1994 there were 6.6%, and in 2002 it was already 9%), the number of illegitimate births increased, and the age of sexual debut decreased. So, in 1990, the share of illegitimate births was 14.6%, in 1995 - 21.1%, and in 2002 it reached 29.5%. At the same time, today's Russian youth are more serious about the creation of "family nests" and the birth of children. Solution first material tasks(buying a house, improving it, buying a car, getting an education and a profession, and, therefore, a well-paid job), and only then expanding the family.
The most negative consequence of the systemic, primarily economic crisis in Russia was the increase in the mortality rate of the population. In the 1990s. the death toll has exceeded the level of the 1980s. by 4.9 million people, and compared with the seventies, increased by 7.4 million. If we take the age-specific mortality rates of the population in the 1980s. and the number of deaths at the same ages in the 1990s, then you can get a surplus of deaths in the last decade in comparison with the previous one. This surplus, or rather supermortality in 1991-2000. amounted to approximately 3-3.5 million people, and together with the losses falling on the third year of the XXI century - about 4 million people. For comparison, let us note that the supermortality rate during the Great Patriotic War, including the death of the population in besieged Leningrad, amounted to approximately 4.2 million people. Among those who died in the peaceful nineties, the proportion of deaths preventable in other socio-economic conditions increased.
The dynamics of the life expectancy of the population of Russia in the seventies - nineties is peculiar. In the sixties, according to this indicator, the country was at the level of European states. But already in 1971-1980. life expectancy decreased by 0.82 years in comparison with the previous decade. In the 1980s. it increased in relation to the previous decade by 0.44 years, but nevertheless remained 0.38 years lower than it was in the sixties, which were most favorable in this respect. In fact, life expectancy has been stagnant for the past 35- ^ 0 years.
All this happened against the background of a rapid increase in life expectancy in developed countries: Japan, USA, Canada, Germany, France, Sweden, etc. The life expectancy of the population of both sexes in the early sixties was 65-67 years in Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and a number of other European countries, while in Russia it was almost 69 years. But already in the 1980s. life expectancy in these and other developed countries exceeded the level of Russia lagging behind by that time by 5-7 years. In the nineties, the average life expectancy for the entire period in Russia decreased in comparison with the previous decade by 2.65 years and at the beginning of the XXI century. was a little over 65 years old, i.e. was less than in the main European countries by 12-14 years. This indicator lagged behind the average European level by 7 years. In 2001, life expectancy for both sexes in Russia was lower than in Great Britain, Germany, Italy, France by 13-14 years, than in Canada and Sweden - by 15 years. According to the UN, Russia now has the lowest life expectancy in comparison with other European countries, including the countries that emerged in the post-Soviet space.
Russia is not only a European country, but also an Asian one. In Asia, its place in the distribution of life expectancy is also far from the best. Among 50 Asian countries, Russia is in the worst third. In terms of life expectancy, Russia's "neighbors" are Indonesia, Guatemala, Mongolia, Morocco, Egypt, all the states of Central Asia, etc. In the group of eastern regions of Russia, only in Western Siberia, life expectancy is close to its average level throughout foreign Asia, while in Eastern Siberia it is lower by 3-4 years, in the Far East - by 1-2 years. In 2001, this indicator in Russia was 17 years lower than in Japan.
The main reason for the increase in mortality was the consequences of the reforms of the 1990s. - the collapse of the health care system and sanitary supervision (forgotten cholera, tuberculosis, and other diseases appeared, almost completely eliminated in the Soviet years); the high cost of effective and the spread of counterfeit drugs; deterioration of the balance and diet (partial replacement of meat products, animal oil, fish for potatoes, cereals, flour products); inaccessibility for the majority of the population to have a good rest and leisure; disregard for health and safety standards, especially in the private sector; "liberalization" of road traffic; lack of effective control over goods produced and imported into the country and saturation of the consumer market with falsified food and alcohol; stressful situations, which resulted in an increase in suicide and mental disorders; deterioration of the crime situation, the spread of drug addiction, etc. The number of suicides was especially significant in 1994-1995, exceeding a total of 120 thousand. Having begun to decline in 1995, the number of suicides in 1999, after another loss of savings by the population, increased again. In 2003, it exceeded the number of murders by 24%, and both, together with poisoning, death from accidents and injuries, including road traffic, exceeded 335 thousand cases, firmly taking the second place among the main causes of death.
The integral influence of an increase in mortality and a decrease in fertility led to a significant natural decline in the population. During the depot-population decade (1992-2001), 7.8 million fewer people were born in the country than died, while in the 1980s and 1970s. it was the other way around: the number of births exceeded the number of deaths by 7.6 and 7.8 million, respectively. Therefore, if in 1971-1990. the population of the country grew during each decade due to natural growth by almost 8 million people, then over ten years of depopulation it decreased by the same 8 million people as a result of natural decline. Figuratively speaking, in the nineties Russia lost the same part of the population as it lived in seven millionaire cities - Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, Volgograd, Yekaterinburg, Kazan, Krasnoyarsk and Novosibirsk.
In 1999-2000. the population of Russia decreased annually by 6.5 people per thousand inhabitants of the country, while in Belarus this figure was 4.9-4.1%, Bulgaria - 4.7-5.1, Hungary - 4.8- 3.8, not to mention Italy, where the natural decline was 0.7-0.8 and Sweden - 0.7-0.3% c. In terms of population size, a large natural decline was observed only in Ukraine (7.0-7.5%). Thus, Russia is distinguished not only by natural population decline (in the last 5 years, 900-950 thousand people per year), but also by the depth of depopulation, which is more significant than in all other countries, with the exception of Ukraine.
Table 3
Periods of decline in the size of a stable population with the corresponding indicators of its reproduction 2|
Net reproduction rate |
Total fertility rate |
Initial population decline rate |
|
|
Up to 75% |
Up to 50% |
||
|
0,7 0,6 0,5 |
1,480 1,270 1,060 |
After 20 years After 14 years After 11 years |
After 49 years After 34 years After 25 years |
At present, in terms of fertility, Russia is a European power that is in the group of advanced developed countries. In terms of the total fertility rate, it ranks among the third of the countries with the lowest values of this indicator (Italy, Spain, Greece, Germany, Czech Republic, only 11 countries where the total fertility rate is stable at 1.2-1.3). At the same time, in terms of life expectancy, Russia firmly occupies a position among the underdeveloped countries (among Asian countries - 16th place out of 50). Only when compared with African states does it look more or less normal: if it were there, it could take a place in the top ten among 50 countries. In a word, in Russia at the end of XX - beginning of XXI centuries, in fact, a unique mode of population reproduction developed: European fertility and Afro-Asian mortality.
Establishing the reasons for the deterioration of the demographic situation is just one of the questions. Another, logically following it, is an assessment of what such demographic development can lead to if society does not realize the significance of the impending threat. The demographic future of Russia can be presented in two ways: as the dynamics of a hypothetical and a real population. In the first case, it is important to establish what kind of population decline can be at the actual level of reproduction that does not provide a simple replacement of generations. In 1999, the total fertility rate in the country as a whole was 1.215, and the net reproduction rate was 0.551; in 2002, the total fertility rate rose to 1.322. Calculations of the rates of possible reduction of the hypothetical population are shown in Table 3. With the reproduction rates prevailing by the end of the 20th century, the country's population would have halved in one third of a century and by 2033-2034. would not exceed 97 million people. But this is a "virtual" representation of the country's future. Numerous forecasts of the demographic future of Russia, based on the existing indicators of fertility, mortality and the age-sex structure of the population living in the country, indicate what can and is already happening in reality. The likely picture is grim enough. Note that the aggregated forecasts made by the Federal State Statistics Service (FSGS) represent the estimated population, which takes into account changes in both natural and migration movements. They adopted a positive migration balance, which, of course, underestimates the rate of population decline (Table 4).
Table 4
Forecast estimates of the population of Russia 3
(initial base - 2000, million people)
|
2005 |
2010 |
2015 |
2025 |
2050 |
|
|
Goskomstat RF, 1996 Goskomstat RF, 1999 UN, 1994 UN, 1998 |
143,0 142,1 144,2 |
140,3 138,7 143,1 |
134,0 142,0 |
137,9 |
129,8 121,3 |
Table 5
Changing components of demographic dynamicsin Russia(thousand people)
|
Years |
Total gain, |
Natural |
Migratory |
CRMS * |
|
decrease (-) |
increase, decrease (-) |
growth | ||
|
1992 |
-31 |
-207 |
176 |
698 |
|
1993 |
-308 |
-738 |
430** |
504 |
|
1994 |
-60 |
-870 |
810 |
290 |
|
1995 |
-330 |
-832 |
502** |
401 |
|
1996 |
-474 |
-818 |
344 |
451 |
|
1997 |
-398 |
-750 |
353 |
390 |
|
1998 |
-411 |
-697 |
285 |
415 |
|
1999 |
-768 |
-923 |
165** |
566 |
|
2000 |
-740 |
-959 |
214 |
406*** |
|
2001 |
-865 |
-937 |
72 |
626 4 |
|
2002 |
-855 |
-935 |
80** |
578 |
|
2003 |
-796 |
-889 |
93 |
728 |
According to forecasts made in 2000 by the United Nations Population Service, of the countries with a population of 140,000 or more, the population will decline by 39 by 2050. Russia ranks 6th in this list in terms of population decline. Estonia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Georgia and Guyana are ahead of it. But in terms of the scale of losses, Russia is in first place. All 39 countries by the middle of the century, according to UN forecasts, will lose almost 152 million, of which Russia will have 41.2 million people (27%), Ukraine - 19.6 million, Japan - 17.9 million, Italy, Germany and Spain combined - 34.4 million people. The essence, of course, is not in the exactness of the numbers, but in the direction and scale of the demographic dynamics. And it is such that by the middle of this century the population of Russia may turn out to be less than 100 million people.
Naturally, demographic dynamics is determined not only by the nature of reproduction processes, but also depends on external migration. In recent decades, depopulation processes in many European countries have been smoothed out to one degree or another by external migration. Migration replaced natural population decline in whole or in part. Russia also belongs to such countries (Table 5).
External migration growth 1992-2003 reached 3.5 million people, which compensated for about 45% of natural loss. From the beginning of depopulation (1992) up to the present time, external migration, with a constant positive balance, has never fully compensated for the natural decline in the population. Moreover, if in the first half of the 1990s. migration gain made up for 60-90% of the natural decline, then at the turn of the century the migration balance sharply decreased and began to compensate for only one tenth of the natural decline (in 2001 8.3%, in 2002 9.4%, in 2003 10 ,5%). And the point here is not that the migration potential of the Russian-speaking population has decreased in the post-Soviet space, but in the migration policy that Russia pursued in the nineties. She did not take advantage of the favorable conjuncture. Due to discrimination (laws on citizenship, state language, voting rights, etc.) in the states that emerged in the post-Soviet space, the Russian-speaking, mainly Slavic, population was ready to return to their historical homeland en masse. The obstacles it encountered quickly extinguished the migratory impulses of the Russian-speaking diasporas, even in countries with a different ethnic culture.
But even with a decrease in the inflow of the Russian-speaking population, primarily Russians, from the countries of the new abroad, migration nevertheless partially offset the decrease in the size of the state-forming ethnic group that occurred in the intercensal period (1989-2002). At the time of the last census (October 2002) the number of Russians in Russia was 116 million against 120 million in 1989. In the intercensal period, due to the increase in migration, the number of Russians in Russia increased by 3.4 million. Consequently, as a result of depopulation, the number of Russians in Russia decreased not by 4, but by 7.4 million. A similar thing happened with a number of other ethnic groups. But that's not all. Due to the change in their nationality by Ukrainians alone, the number of Russians increased by 1.2 million. At the same time, the number of Russians, as a result of the excess of the number of deaths over the number of births, decreased by almost 9 million people, i.e. by 7.5%, while the entire population of Russia during this time decreased by 1.1%.
The reduction in migration flows to Russia, together with the fall in the birth rate, affected not only the quantitative, but also the qualitative parameters of the population. A decrease in the population size, which occurs not from external, but from internally immanent factors, is always accompanied to one degree or another by demographic aging. Specificity of Russia in the 1990s. consisted in the fact that here the aging of the population took place only as a result of a fall in the birth rate, while the increasing mortality of the adult population, especially in the middle of the decade, restrained this process, i.e. promoted rejuvenation. External migration also influenced in the same direction, since among migrants the share of people of young working age is always higher.
Downsizing by the end of the 1990s the inflow of migrants and the balance of migration brought to naught
the role of this factor in population growth and rejuvenation. It is natural that sokra
shrinking migration gain and increasing life expectancy
(if this process begins), will further accelerate demographic aging, as a result of
which will increase the demographic burden on the part of persons of age
those older than able-bodied (table 6).
Table 6
Distribution of the resident population of Russia by main age groups(for the beginning of the year)
|
Years |
Average age |
Younger than able-bodied |
In able-bodied |
Older able to work |
|
(years) |
age, in % |
age, in% |
age, in% |
|
|
1979 (census) |
34,0 |
23,3 |
60,4 |
16,3 |
|
1989 (census) |
34,7 |
24,5 |
56,9 |
18,5 |
|
1999 (estimate) |
37,1 |
20,7 |
58,5 |
20,8 |
|
2009 (forecast) |
15,0 |
63,5 |
21.5 hg |
|
|
2016 (forecast) |
15,3 |
59,9 |
24,8 |
.
If at the beginning of 1999 there were 356 old-age pensioners per 1000 people of working age, then by 2016 there will be 415. At present, even with a lower demographic load on the part of old-age pensioners, their financial situation is deplorable, if not to say stronger. Moreover, over the years of reforms, their social status has deteriorated sharply and something incredible for Russian traditions happened: the younger generations have ceased to respect the older population. But the country has no future when young generations do not provide materially and spiritually the existence of those who gave them life.
The decline in the population and its aging can be called whatever you like: depopulation, a decline in demographic potential, decrepitude of the nation, its extinction, degeneration, etc. The point is not in words, but in the fact that the modern character of demographic development in all cases is a warning to the peoples of Russia. In a predictable future, the disappearance of most of the peoples inhabiting the regions, from which during the centuries-old history around the geopolitical core - the Moscow principality - the multinational Russian state was formed, may occur.
World history is full of examples when peoples numerous for their time and seemingly invincible disappeared without a trace. The most ancient powerful state of the Assyrians in Western Asia in the 7th century. BC e. was captured by other peoples, some of its inhabitants were exterminated, and the other, mingling with the conquerors, disappeared along with their state. In the steppe expanses between the Don and the Danube in the X century. Inhabited by the Pechenegs, who often attacked ancient Russia. At the end of the XI century. under pressure from the Polovtsy, they were driven into the lower reaches of the Danube, where they mixed with the Polovtsy and disappeared as such. Prior to the colonization of America, its southern and northern parts are believed to have had as many as 50 million Indians. While exploring the vastness of North America, the colonists exterminated many tribes. Nowadays, there are several hundred thousand Indians in this part of the mainland.
History shows that in the past, the disappearance of peoples was associated with their conquest and extermination, assimilation among the victors, or simply expulsion from their historical habitats. In the third millennium, Russia is creating a historical precedent when large peoples in peacetime, without external influence, can disappear only because the reproduction of the population has "narrowed" to a level that does not guarantee its survival.
To prevent this from happening, Russia must mobilize all possible sources and factors of population stabilization. This goal is formulated in the Concept of the demographic development of the Russian Federation approved by the Government of the country. It should be noted that in 2000-2002. the number of births began to increase - in 2002 they amounted to 1.4 million children born against 1.2 million in 1999. In 2003, the number of births increased by another 80 thousand. Some are inclined to associate this process exclusively with the stabilization of the economy, others rightly attribute it to shifts in the age structure, which is influenced by the so-called "demographic waves". At the beginning of the XXI century. a numerically larger generation of women entered reproductive age than before, which led to an increase in the number of births. In 1999, the share of women of reproductive age in the average annual population was 26.8%, and in 2003 it was already 27.7%. But the structural factor isn't the only reason. The other is associated with a slight increase in the number of children born to one woman of reproductive age. In a word, there has been a slight improvement in the birth rate, albeit a small one. Of course, this was affected by the fact that the population began to feel the emerging stabilization in the country associated with economic recovery. The phenomenon of belief in changes for the better needs to be studied, since this already happened in 1986-1987, when Soviet people believed in the changes for the better promised by M. Gorbachev.
The slow growth of the birth rate, which has been taking place for 4 years, while the mortality rate remains high, will not save Russia from natural population decline. A reduction in mortality is needed. Reducing it to the parameters of the 1980s. could save the lives of at least 400-500 thousand people, which would have not only demographic, but also enormous humanitarian significance. Mobilizing reserves for reducing mortality from preventable causes does not require huge investments. Nevertheless, the growth in the birth rate that has begun, even if supplemented by a reduction in mortality, will not be able to influence a radical change in the regime of population reproduction and ensure positive demographic dynamics. Therefore, in the first decade of the XXI century. the rate of decline in the country's population will largely be determined by the scale of the influx of migrants from abroad.
Despite the decrease in the number of the peoples of Russia (Russians, Tatars, Komi, Kabardians, etc.), who remained in the new foreign countries, their number is still quite large. According to the 1989 census, they lived in the former Soviet republics of 28 million people, and now - from 20 to 22 million (the number decreased due to natural decline, migration outflow to Russia and other countries of the new and old abroad, as well as nationality). The decrease in the scale of migration of Russians and other titular peoples of Russia from the states of the new abroad and the decrease in the migration growth of the population of Russia as a whole are caused, on the one hand, by the liberalization of the attitude towards the Russian-speaking population (linguistic and other indulgences) and its integration into the local ethnocultural environment, especially that part of it. , which is to some extent mixed with the indigenous people, and on the other hand, with the fact that migrants in their historical homeland still do not meet with proper understanding and support due to the lack of a consistent migration policy regarding compatriots who remained abroad.
In its migration policy, Russia does not take into account not only its own, but also someone else's experience. And the experience of, for example, post-war Germany, France, Japan and some other countries testifies to the enormous political and economic gain of the states that returned their compatriots from the territories they left. France under General de Gaulle made the historically correct decision to leave North Africa. Being in a difficult economic situation, she resettled 1.5-2 million French people to her homeland, although this put a heavy burden on the budget of the country with a population of less than 45 million people. Defeated Germany with a devastated economy returned more than 10 million ethnic Germans to the original borders of the Third Reich. This increased the population of the country by 15-20%. After the end of World War II, devastated Japan returned from the regions of occupation (China, Korea, Southeast Asia and South Sakhalin) about 4.5 million people, which increased its population by 5-6%.
The influx of the Russian-speaking population from the new abroad in the current decade may, with the appropriate migration policy of Russia, amount to several million people. The real scale of migration will depend on the policy pursued by the states of the new abroad in relation to the Russian-speaking population (the status of the Russian language, replacement of leadership positions, education, etc.), and on the migration policy of Russia in relation to compatriots who remained in the post-Soviet space. But in any case, the influx of migrants from the new abroad will significantly slow down the decline in the population of Russia. In subsequent years, the migration potential can be completely exhausted, because the population that has aged and has passed into the category of pensioners and those who are born and undergo socialization outside their historical homeland are unlikely to emigrate to Russia.
A more restrained migration policy should be pursued with respect to immigrants from the old abroad. It is obvious that the Russian state will not be able to exploit its natural resources on a large scale without an influx of foreign labor. Russia is the largest country in the world in terms of territory, it owns 1/8 of the world's territory, huge agricultural land, among which the world's best black soil. This gives it the opportunity to be self-sufficient, to form a balance of food and agricultural raw materials through its own production. Russia is a forest country, which fully meets its needs with commercial timber, raw materials for the production of cellulose, cardboard, paper, etc. It possesses colossal world reserves of fresh water (only in Baikal the volume of fresh water is 23 thousand cubic kilometers, which is approximately one fifth of the world's reserves). It accounts for a fifth (21%) of the world's resources, which is more than the share of its territory (12.6%), not to mention the country's share in the world population (2.4%). Russia possesses 45% of the world's natural gas reserves, 13% - oil, 23% - coal, etc. Projected reserves of resources in Russia are estimated at 140 trillion. US dollars. Given the value of Russia's gross domestic product in 2002, these resources will last for about 400 years, and with a doubling of GDP, for at least two centuries. The fact that Russia is one of the richest countries in the world is its plus. And the minus is that up to the XXI century. most of the country's territory remained poorly developed and poorly populated. At present, the population density indicators of the eastern regions of Russia are about 30 times lower than the average population level of the entire Asian continent. But the old-inhabited part of the country is not so densely populated either. Its population level is more than 2 times lower than in the rest of Europe.
Historical experience shows that a country cannot preserve its territories if they are poorly populated and unprotected. There are enough examples to confirm this thesis. Two events, one in the 19th and the other in the 20th centuries, are most striking. The first historical lesson is the civilized loss of Alaska (over 1.5 million sq. Km), sold to the United States in 1867. But there were not only buyers on Russian territory. She always attracted invaders. Hitler, preparing an attack on the USSR, explained that the expansion of the living space for the German people can occur only at the expense of Russia. According to this doctrine, after the seizure of the USSR by the Nazis, it was envisaged to annihilate 46-51 million Russians and other Slavic peoples within several years. But the Russian, like other Soviet territories at that time, turned out not only to be a tasty morsel for the invaders, but also one of the factors thanks to which the lightning victory of the Nazis turned into their crushing defeat. Russia should not forget the bitter experience even in the face of radical changes in international relations, good-neighborly coexistence, strategic partnership and comprehensive globalization.
In our opinion, what has been said should be fully taken into account when considering long-term immigration programs and implementing an appropriate migration policy. This is of particular importance for the sparsely populated eastern regions of the country. There are poorly mastered Russian territories border on densely populated areas of China, whose population continues to grow rapidly. Already at present, from 100 to 110 million people live in the regions of China bordering on the south of the Far East. The border regions, primarily Primorye and Amur, will be able to avoid the fate of Alaska, Texas, Kosovo and a number of other regions of the world only with a consistent implementation of such a policy that would meet both the national interests of Russia and the national interests of China. The foundation of this policy is the strength and large-scale economic relations between countries doomed to live in their neighborhood. A special block of this policy should be a long-term migration program. Its essence is the creation of such prerequisites that will allow immigration, primarily illegal, to be replaced by temporary labor migration. The purpose of attracting labor from China could be the joint mutually beneficial exploitation of the natural resources of Siberia, the Far East, and other regions of the country. With this formulation, the question of who should populate the Far East - immigrants from neighboring countries or the titular peoples of Russia - and the question of which natural resources can be exploited by China will be linked to the prospects of its economic development.
Demographic expansion in the future is possible not only from the countries of the Pacific region. It is also likely in the region of Russia's southern borders. Beyond their borders, a powerful community of Islamic states is being formed, into which sooner or later a part of the states - the former union republics of the USSR - will be drawn into it. In the countries of this community, the population is growing rapidly, the conditions of employment of which are limited due to the lack of land and the agrarian orientation of the economy. By the beginning of the XXI century. in Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, other Arab countries of the Persian Gulf zone, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey lived about 450 million people, mainly of the Islamic faith. According to UN forecasts, by 2050 their population will reach one billion, and in each of the last three countries the number of inhabitants will exceed the Russian one.
The population explosion expected in the first half of this century in a number of countries (in Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Iraq and some other populations will double), the concentration of multi-million armies of the unemployed amid the Islamization of the former Soviet republics and the strengthening of their ties with neighboring Muslim states can significantly change the geopolitical situation in the south. Russia, cause a powerful migration expansion. In this geopolitically important area, an active migration policy should also be pursued, not limited to the issuance of migration cards.
Most likely, without an annual migration inflow (its value will depend on the size of natural decline and the dynamics of labor resources), stabilization of the population of Russia and maintenance of the labor potential at a level sufficient for sustainable economic development cannot be achieved. The solution of these two interrelated tasks comes down to both the reception of migrants - future citizens of Russia, primarily from the countries of the new abroad, and the attraction for a reasonable period of labor migrants with certain social parameters from the old abroad.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Age structure of the population of the RSFSR. According to the 1989 All-Union Population Census.
Goskomstat of the RSFSR. M., 1990.
Demographic Yearbook of Russia. Goskomstat of the Russian Federation. M., 2001.
Demographic Yearbook of Russia. Goskomstat of the Russian Federation. M., 1996.
Demographic Conceptual Dictionary. Ed. L. Rybakovsky. M., 2003.
The demographic future of Russia. Ed. L.L. Rybakovsky and G.N. Karelova. M.,
2001.
Population of the USSR for 70 years. Ed. LL. Rybakovsky. M., 1988. "- -"
Estimated population of the Russian Federation until 2016 (Stat.
bulletin). Goskomstat of the Russian Federation. M., 2000.
Russian statistical yearbook. Official edition. M., 2003.
Rybakovsky LL. Applied demography. M, 2003.
Ryazantsev S. Impact of migration on the socio-economic development of Europe: modern
new trends. Stavropol, 2001.
Stabilization of the population of Russia (possible directions of the demographic
politicians). Ed. Karelova G.N. and Rybakovsky L L. M., 2001.
Population of the Russian Federation by sex and age as of January 1, 1999.
Goskomstat of the Russian Federation. M., 1999.
1 This work was financially supported by the Russian Foundation for Humanities (project 02-03-18144-a).
2 Calculations were carried out by V.M. Arkhangelsky, they abstract from the peculiarities of the age structure of the population and admit that it has stabilized.
3 Medium options are accepted.
4 KRMS - the coefficient of effectiveness of migration links, the ratio of the number of departures to those arriving in per thousand, the indicator of reciprocity used in pre-revolutionary resettlement activities.
Article based on materials from Wikipedia
((Scientist | Name = Leonid Leonidovich Rybakovsky | Original name = | Image = | Width = | Image description = | Date of birth = 4/21/1931 | Place of birth =, RSFSR, USSR | Date of death = | Place of death = | Citizenship = → ((Flagification | Russia | size = ())) | Research area =, demography, sociology | Place of work = | Alma mater = | Supervisor = | Famous students = S. V. Ryazantsev | Known as = | Awards and prizes = (| style = "background: transparent" | |))) Leonid Leonidovich Rybakovsky(born April 21, 1931) - Soviet and Russian demographer, sociologist and economist. Doctor of Economics, Chief Researcher of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ISPI RAS).
Biography
He made a contribution to the theory of population migration, proposed an ethno-demographic method for assessing human losses. Author of over 200 scientific works (including 10 author's monographs and over 30 chapters in collective monographs).
Author of dozens of articles in the journals Population, Sociological Research, Political Education, Bulletin of Statistics, Social Partnership, Ethnopanorama, Russian Federation, Social and Demographic Policy, International Economics. Author of articles in sociological and demographic encyclopedias, reference books on labor economics and social policy.
Member of the board of the Ministry of Health and Social Development of the Russian Federation, member of the Coordination Council for Social Strategy under the Chairman of the Federation Council, member of the Scientific and Expert Council of the Federal Migration Service.
Under his leadership, the Concept of the demographic development of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2015 was developed, approved by the government in 2002.
Awards
He was awarded the medal "For Valorous Labor", the Medal of the Order "For Merit to the Fatherland" II degree, the Order of Friendship, the gold medal of Moscow State University for outstanding contribution to demographic science, the silver medal named after V.I. P. Sorokin for the development of sociological science, the VDNKh silver medal for the successes achieved in the development of the national economy of the USSR, the Veteran of Labor medal, and the badge of Excellence in the Social and Labor Sphere.
Scientific works
Monographs
- Problems of the formation of the population of the Far East (monograph). - Khabarovsk, 1969 .-- 200 p.
- Population of the Far East for 100 years (monograph). - Moscow: Nauka, 1969 .-- 180 p.
- Regional analysis of migrations (monograph). - M .: Statistics, 1973 .-- 159 p.
- Methodological foundations of population forecasting (monograph). - M .: Statistics, 1978 .-- 208 p.
- Population migration: forecasts, factors, policy (monograph). - M .: Nauka, 1987 .-- 199 p.
- The population of the Far East (monograph). - M .: Nauka, 1990 .-- 170 p.
- Human losses of the USSR and Russia in the Great Patriotic War (monograph) ... - M .: Catalog, 2001 .-- 192 p.
- Migration of the population (issue 5) Stages of the migration process (monograph). - M., 2001 .-- 159 p.
- Applied demography (monograph). - M .: ISPI RAN, 2003 .-- 206 p.
- Population migration (theoretical questions) (monograph). - M .: ISPI RAN, 2003 .-- 238 p.
- Reproduction of labor resources of the Far East (monograph). - M., 1969 .-- 125 p.
- Territorial features of the population of the RSFSR (monograph). - M .: Statistics, 1976 .-- 230 p.
- Social factors and features of migration of the population of the USSR (monograph). - M .: Nauka, 1978 .-- 141 p.
- Rybakovsky L. L. et al. Demographic processes in a socialist society (monograph). - M .: Finance and statistics, 1981 .-- 295 p.
- Rybakovsky L. L. et al. Population of the USSR for 70 years (monograph). - M .: Nauka, 1988 .-- 214 p.
- Rybakovsky L. L. et al. Demographic future of Russia (monograph). - M .: Human Rights, 2001. - 51 p.
- Rybakovsky L. L. et al. Stabilization of the population of Russia (monograph). - M. Publishing house TsSP, 2001 .-- 262 p.
- Rybakovsky L. L. et al. Demographic development of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug: situation, forecast, policy (monograph). - Khanty-Mansiysk, 2002 .-- 212s.
- Rybakovsky L. L. et al. Demographic development of the Samara region: Problems and directions of policy. - M .: Globus, 2003 .-- 206 p.
- Rybakovsky L. L. et al. Demographic conceptual dictionary. - M .: TsSP, 2003 .-- 351 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. 20 years of depopulation in Russia - Moscow: Econ-inform, 2014 - 228 - ISBN 978-5-9506-1114-8 - 500 - ru
Russian demographer, sociologist and economist. Born in 1931 in the city of Spassk, Primorsky Territory. In 1953 he graduated from the Kuibyshev Planning Institute. Doctor of Economics since 1971 (specialty - regional studies), professor - since 1977 (specialty - demography). Since 1959 he has been working at the Academy of Sciences, since 1974 - at the Institute of Social and Political Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Currently, he is the chief researcher of this institute. He was awarded the medal "For Valiant Labor", the medal of the Order of Merit to the Fatherland, II degree, the Order of Friendship.
Rybakovsky L.L. published in many magazines, encyclopedias, reference books, etc. more than 200 scientific works, including 10 author's monographs and over 30 chapters in collective books, including textbooks and teaching aids on demography, population migration, sociology and labor economics. A number of works have been translated and published in Spanish, French, German, English and other languages. The most significant author's monographs: "Regional Analysis of Migration" (1973), "Methodological Issues of Population Forecasting" (1978), "Population of the Far East for 150 Years" (1990), "Population Migration: Forecasts, Factors, Policy" (1987). The last work was awarded a silver medal of the Exhibition of Economic Achievements.
Recently, the monographs "Human losses of the USSR and Russia in the Great Patriotic War" (2001), "Applied Demography" (2003), "Migration of Population. Questions of Theory" (2003), as well as collective works under his editorship "Demographic Future Russia "(2001)," Stabilization of the population of Russia (opportunities and directions of demographic policy) "(2001)," Demographic conceptual dictionary "(2003)," Demography "(2005)," Strategy of the demographic development of Russia "(2005)," Practical demography "(2005).
The main scientific ideas developed by L.L. Rybakovsky relate to the theory of population migration. The author proposes a classification of the population depending on the length of stay in the territory. This classification includes three basic concepts: "local natives", "old-timers" and "new settlers". Of great importance for the regional analysis of migration is the proposed in the late 1960s. the coefficient of the intensity of inter-district migration links (ICIM). The value of this coefficient does not depend on the size of the population of both the exit regions and the places of arrival of migrants. The advantage of this indicator is that it allows you to determine the true value of inter-district migration links.
A significant contribution to the theory of migration was the development of the concept of three stages of the migration process. The fundamental provisions of the concept are reduced to the separation of such concepts as readiness for migration (mobility) and resettlement (implementation of this readiness). These concepts are associated with the introduction of sociological knowledge into the migration problems, in particular, ideas about projective and real behavior, potential migration and migration mobility.
New for demographic science is the one proposed by L.L. Rybakovsky ethno-demographic method for assessing human losses for the USSR and individual parts of this state. The essence of the ethno-demographic method is that human losses for the countries of the former USSR are determined from the losses of those ethnic groups that are state-forming.
The calculations of the human losses of Russia in the Great Patriotic War, carried out by the ethno-demographic method, showed that the share of the RSFSR accounted for approximately 13.2 million human lives lost in 1941-1945, including 5.8 million military personnel, civilian population - 7.4 million people. The same method was used to calculate the number of repressed, including the number of those sentenced to death and the supermortality rate of political prisoners in 1937-1938, who were in Russia.
Main publications
- Rybakovsky L.L. Problems of the formation of the population of the Far East (monograph). - Khabarovsk, 1969 .-- 200 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. Population of the Far East for 100 years (monograph). - Moscow: Nauka, 1969 .-- 180 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. Regional analysis of migrations (monograph). - M .: Statistics, 1973 .-- 159 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. Methodological foundations of population forecasting (monograph). - M .: Statistics, 1978 .-- 208 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. Population migration: forecasts, factors, policy (monograph). - M .: Nauka, 1987 .-- 199 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. The population of the Far East (monograph). - M .: Nauka, 1990.-170 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. Human losses of the USSR and Russia in the Great Patriotic War (monograph). - M .: Catalog, 2001 .-- 192 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. Migration of the population (issue 5) Stages of the migration process (monograph). - M., 2001 .-- 159 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. Applied demography (monograph). - M .: ISPI RAN, 2003.-206 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. Population migration (theoretical questions) (monograph). - M .: ISPI RAN, 2003 .-- 238 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. and other Reproduction of labor resources of the Far East (monograph). - M., 1969 .-- 125 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. and other Territorial features of the population of the RSFSR (monograph). - M .: Statistics, 1976 .-- 230 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. and other Social factors and features of migration of the population of the USSR (monograph). - M .: Nauka, 1978 .-- 141 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. and other Demographic processes in a socialist society (monograph). - M .: Finance and statistics, 1981 .-- 295 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. and others. Population of the USSR for 70 years (monograph). - M .: Nauka, 1988.214 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. and other Demographic future of Russia (monograph). - M .: Human Rights, 2001. - 51 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. and other Stabilization of the population of Russia (monograph). - M. Publishing house TsSP, 2001 .-- 262 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. and others. Demographic development of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug: situation, forecast, policy (monograph). - Khanty-Mansiysk, 2002.-212s.
- Rybakovsky L.L. and others. Demographic development of the Samara region: Problems and directions of policy. - M .: Globus, 2003 .-- 206 p.
- Rybakovsky L.L. and other Demographic conceptual dictionary. - M .: TsSP, 2003.-351 p.
