"Hungry Export" of Grain to RI and the USSR. "Bread shortage": why the ussr was forced to buy grain in the us wheat imports to the ussr
There is not a word about grain, about its imports, about grain harvesters in general and about the relationship with the United States, in particular.
But that's not all.
The USSR ... collected much less grain [than the USA - MG] and made itself dependent on its import supplies.
What can be understood from this statement? Harvesting less grain than in the United States is wrong, this situation leads to dependence on imports.
The question arises. What is import dependence? In all likelihood, the ratio of imports to domestic grain production can provide an answer to this question. Indeed, when comparing these indicators for the USSR and the USA, one might think that everything is clear. Still would! By the first half of the 1980s, the average annual grain import in the USSR reached 26% in relation to its own harvest, while in the USA it was only 0.3%. And if it comes about the rivalry of these two countries, there is no dispute - dependence! 
But if you still look at the rest of the world, it turns out that even in 1981-1985, when the ratio of purchased and produced grain in the USSR was maximum, in 81 countries of the world the share of imports was even higher. And next to the Soviet Union on the list, for example, countries such as Germany and Mexico, which imported 25.6 and 25.5% of grain in relation to their own production.
Perhaps, despite the growing imports, the USSR really lagged behind America in terms of grain supply? No, the gap doesn't look significant. 
Moreover, there are only a few countries in which in the 70s and 80s there was more grain per capita than in the USSR. These are the USA, Canada, Denmark, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania.
Here is such a " dependence on import supplies". We bought it to be in the top ten in terms of grain per capita. The notorious propaganda ton!
In order to intensively develop animal husbandry in order to further increase the consumption of meat, it is necessary to have a sufficient amount of grain for livestock feed. At one time, Academician Nemchinov, one of the largest Soviet economists, determined the country's total need for grain: a ton per year per inhabitant.
1986-1990 in the USSR, the per capita grain resources were far from a ton, but practically equal to those of the United States. At the same time, in 1990, the inhabitants of the USSR consumed 59 kg of meat per year, and the Americans in 1989 - 113 kg.
But the "reformer" Gaidar begins his story about grain with the same thing that the Soviet agitation talked about - with the statement about the lack of its own production and the need for imports.
To be continued.
Export of grain by Russia at the beginning of the XX century. and grain imports of the USSR at the end of the XX century.
Note. The share of Russian exports in world exports is calculated as the average over the period using data on grain exports by Russia, Denmark, France, Hungary, Romania and wheat exports for Canada, USA, Argentina, India and Australia (net exports). The set of countries corresponds to the largest grain exporters at the beginning of the 20th century. (1907-1913). Data for this period is presented by grain exports for European countries. For Asian countries. North and South America data only exist for wheat exports, which constituted the bulk of their grain exports.
Grain purchases by the Soviet Union, which in 1970 amounted to 2.2 million tons, by 1982, increased to 29.4 million tons and reached a maximum (46 million tons) by 1984.
In the 1980s of the XX century. the purchases of the Soviet Union accounted for more than 15% of world grain imports. In terms of the volume of its imports, the country is far ahead of other large importers (see Table 4.14).
By the mid-1980s, every third ton of bakery products was produced from imported grain. The production of livestock products was based on grain imports. The USSR was forced to conclude long-term agreements on the supply of grain, undertake obligations to annually purchase at least 9 million tons from the United States, 5 million from Canada, 4 million from Argentina, 1.5 million tons from China.
Unlike many other goods that could be obtained through barter trade with the CMEA countries, grain had to be paid in convertible currency. A combination of large-scale grain import spending that could not be reduced, given the long-term problems of domestic Agriculture and weather conditions, with the non-competitiveness of manufacturing products and the unpredictability of prices for raw materials, the supply of which can be used to pay for food imports - became the Achilles' heel of the Soviet economy by the mid-1980s.
In 1981-1985. Under the influence of growing difficulties in supplying the population with food, the share of machinery and equipment in the USSR's imports from capitalist countries is reduced from 26% to 20%, the share of food and industrial consumer goods increases to 44%.
Selling gold is the most important way to solve the problems posed by low yields. This is evidenced by a sharp increase in its supplies abroad in 1973, 1976, 1978, 1981. The rise in gold prices following the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreements in the early 1970s helped the Soviet Union finance grain purchases. However, against the background of rising gold prices from 1974-1975. on the international financial markets, the USSR becomes a net debtor. In the volume of borrowed loans, a high share is made up of short-term loans - up to one year. In 1975, a bad harvest again forced the USSR to increase grain imports. To do this, on a massive scale, you have to take out loans on international financial markets, use your own foreign exchange reserves.
Neither gold mining in the USSR, nor the country's gold reserves, nor external loans could not serve as a stable source of financing for agricultural imports. In the late 1960s and early 1980s, the Soviet leadership used the sale of gold only during crop failures, when the need for grain imports increased. It was impossible to ensure regular purchases of millions, then tens of millions of tons of grain at this expense.
In the 1930s and early 1950s, the resources withdrawn from the countryside made it possible to form an industrial base in the USSR. Large funds were invested, in particular, in the creation of enterprises in the manufacturing industry. The products of such industries form the basis of world trade. When the country faced an urgent need to finance imports of food in the early 1960s, government leaders could hope that it could be met by exporting manufactured products. But this possibility was not even seriously considered. The management knew very well that the products of civil engineering are in the overwhelming majority non-competitive on the world market (see Table 4.15). Can be supplied military equipment vassal regimes, but there is no point in waiting for its payment in convertible currency.
The USSR, like Russia before, has been a major supplier of traditional raw materials throughout its history. Before the start of the massive import of food, these supplies, along with the export of agricultural products, provided the mobilization of funds necessary for the purchase of machinery, equipment, components purchased for convertible currency.
The USSR supplied metals to the markets of developed capitalist countries, but at the same time imported high-quality metallurgical products. This was the case in many other industries as well. These relationships were incorporated into the structure of Soviet foreign trade and the national economy. It was difficult to ensure a sharp increase in the volume of non-resource exports. Refusal to purchase imported equipment was fraught with increasing lagging behind the countries - leaders of modern economic growth.
The transition of the USSR in the 1960s to the position of the largest net importer of foodstuffs created intractable problems for the Soviet leadership. They were aggravated by the fact that the Soviet Union never created large reserves of currency, maintaining them at a level sufficient to service the current trade turnover.
The country's leadership understood the threat posed by the dependence of food supplies on countries considered as potential adversaries. But both the agrarian crisis and the lack of competitiveness of the domestic engineering industry were a given. The Soviet leadership could do little to solve the problems that had accumulated over decades.
Grain imports were initially caused not by the crisis in grain production, but by the structural restructuring of the population's consumption model.
The export of grain continued in the USSR until the end of the 1950s of the last century. The refusal to export it in large volumes and the subsequent increase in imports were due to systemic changes in the structure of public demand for food, in some respects reminiscent of the current structural shifts in the world food market due to sustained economic growth and urbanization in India and China.
During that period, there were serious changes in the methods of implementing the policy of increasing the real incomes of the population. If in the late 1940s - the first half of the 1950s. the main way to increase the income of the population was a periodic decrease in state retail prices with a slight increase in the average wages and the unchanged level of pensions, then from the mid-1950s. the emphasis was shifted towards raising the level of wages of low-paid groups of the population and raising pensions at a generally stable level of state retail prices. Due to this, the population of the USSR began to present a higher demand for livestock products, which, in turn, required corresponding shifts in the structure of agricultural production.
Since the 1960s. in the country, the livestock population began to grow rapidly (with the exception of the sheep and goat population, which decreased somewhat, apparently, as a result of changes in the structure of demand for meat and meat products) (Table 1).
Table 1. Livestock in the USSR and Russian Federation in 1961, 1991
Rather high rates during this period were also observed in grain production. Average annual gross grain harvest in the USSR increased from 121.5 million tons in 1956-1960. up to 196.6 million tons in 1986 - 1990, including in the RSFSR - from 70.2 million tons to 104.3 million tons. As a result, meat production in the country increased over the period 1960 - 1990. from 8.7 million tons (in carcass weight) to 20.1 million tons, including in the RSFSR - from 4.5 million tons to 10.1 million tons, milk - from 61.7 million tons up to 108.4 million tons, including in the RSFSR - from 34.5 million tons to 55.7 million tons.In 1991, the consumption of meat and meat products per capita in Russia reached 75 kg - an indicator that recently approved norms rational nutrition and not achieved to date.
Nevertheless, the pace of demand for livestock products outstripped its supply, and in 1962 an unprecedented action was undertaken at that time: simultaneously with purchase prices, the state retail prices for meat had to be increased significantly (by an average of 30%). butter and milk. Obviously, such actions could not be carried out periodically, both due to the politically affirmed principle of the stability of retail prices for food, and in the light of the tragic events in Novocherkassk that followed this decision. Thus, the main source of ensuring effective demand for livestock products was, as before, an increase in their production with a corresponding increase in the fodder base of animal husbandry.
The decline in the production of meat, eggs, and wool in 1964, following the poor harvest in 1963, when, as a result of drought, the gross grain harvest decreased by almost 25% compared to the previous year, can serve as evidence of the high dependence of domestic livestock breeding on the supply of grain in those years. It is for this reason that in 1963 large-scale purchases of grain abroad in the amount of 9.4 million tons were made for the first time. , it turns out, there are also people who reasoned: how is it possible, before, with lower gross grain yields, we ourselves sold bread, and now we buy. What can you say to such people? If the Stalin-Molotov method is used to provide the population with bread, then this year it would be possible to sell bread abroad. The method was as follows: bread was sold abroad, and in some areas people, due to lack of bread, swelled with hunger and even died. "
Thus, grain imports were initially caused not by a crisis in grain production, but by a structural reorganization of the population's consumption model. Probably, in this context, large-scale grain imports were not the most rational and effective way ensuring a balanced development of domestic animal husbandry and its fodder base. But the same can be said about the current “export grain model”, when the deficit of domestic livestock products is compensated by imports.
In his book "The Fall of the Empire" Yegor Gaidar said the following phrase: The USSR ... collected much less grain [than the USA - MG] and made itself dependent on its import supplies.
From that moment on, the common meme - the USSR could not feed itself - received, as it were, official scientific confirmation. Let's call on some logic to help. I could not feed myself - it means I was starving. This means that he produced such an amount of grain for one person, which was not enough for food. In order to make up for the lack of grain up to this level, "to feed oneself" and made its purchases. I hope my logic is all right here? Let's now see how much grain, as a percentage of that produced at home, the USSR purchased up to this level. For solidity, we will supply the same purchases in the USA next to each other:
Here. The worst of all, it seems, was in 1981-1985. And there is no need to talk about a comparison with the United States at all. Full, in short, guard and full confirmation of Gaidar's words. But we will not be in a hurry. We will add this import to our own production and calculate how much grain a person needs to eat in order to feed himself. Noticing in passing that in terms of grain purchases the USSR stands next to Germany - 25.6% and Mexico - 25.5 %%.
Wow! And the picture is amazing! By and large, there is almost no separation from the United States. Let me tell you a secret - in terms of grain consumption per capita, the USSR lagged behind the countries counted on the fingers of one hand. These are the USA, Canada, Denmark, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania. And, I'm afraid, the USSR provided grain exports to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania for such a high per capita grain consumption.
I have taken these beautiful and comprehensive comparative graphs from here: http://burckina-faso.livejournal.com/267063.html
One more explanation and we will continue. The largest amount of grain was purchased in 1985. Of the 44.2 million tons of grain imports in the USSR, wheat accounted for 21.4 million tons (44%), corn - 18.6 million tons (42%), barley - 3.7 million tons (8%).
We will continue with an intermediate conclusion - grain purchases were not made for the sake of feeding the population. For the sake of propaganda, yes. For the sake of being in the top ten countries for this indicator. But, for me, this is good propaganda. That same ton of grain per person.
- 1960 - 66.9 thousand tons (1.5% of domestic consumption)
- 1970 - 165 thousand tons (2.3% of domestic consumption)
- 1980 - 821 thousand tons (8.3% of domestic consumption)
- 1985 - 857 thousand tons (7.4% of domestic consumption)
- 1986 - 936 thousand tons (7.5% of domestic consumption)
- The amount of meat consumed by the citizens of the USSR was close to reasonable biological standards and therefore they tried to intensify their own production instead of import purchases of meat. The feed industry was an important component of this program. In the structure of compound feed, wheat is present in a significant percentage. Wheat of a low, fifth grade was easily succeeded in the conditions of the USSR. Therefore, the import of high-quality wheat made up for its own feed wheat, which was eliminated for livestock feed. On the one hand, in my opinion, this relaxed agronomists and breeders, but on the other hand, it allowed them to run the farm economically. The fact is that the main exporter of wheat to the USSR is the USA and Canada. The grain purchased from them was economically more profitable to import to Far East USSR, rather than take it from the European part.
- To summarize, I will finish: Import to the USSR is an indicator of the well-being of a country that allows itself high standards of consumption for its population. Food import to modern Russia- an indicator of the catastrophic nature of their own agriculture. Just so you know, there are fewer cows in Russia than there were in the hungry years of 1932-1933.
On December 26, 1963, the United States began delivering grain to the USSR. For the first time, the Soviet Union was forced to purchase 12 million tons of grain abroad due to the fact that the efficiency of the developed virgin soils in Kazakhstan fell annually. The withdrawal from circulation of about a third of the virgin lands raised testified that the extensive methods of developing the agricultural complex - the development of new areas without using the products of the oil economy - did not work. If in 1954-1958 the average yield was 7.3 centners per hectare, then by 1962 it had dropped to 6.1 centners. In 1964, every third loaf of bread was baked from imported grain.
However, according to official statements, the USSR bought grain not because of its shortage, but in order to produce milk and meat from fodder grain to improve the nutrition of Soviet people, the Voice of America newspaper writes today on its pages.
During the development of virgin lands in 1959, a US national exhibition was held in Sokolniki, which was visited by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. At the exhibition, in particular, an American house with a kitchen, washing and dishwasher... It was here that the famous "kitchen debate" took place, when, demonstrating these achievements of the American way of life, US Vice President Richard Nixon chided Khrushchev that such a powerful country as the USSR did not know how to make decent goods for people. Then for the first time the famous Khrushchev sounded: "We will show you Kuzka's mother!"
Nevertheless, the achievements of the American economy, coupled with the failure to develop virgin lands, made a strong impression on the Soviet leader. And soon Khrushchev began his restructuring of the national economy in four main directions. First, the borrowing of American agricultural technologies began, in particular, the "cornification of the whole country."
Secondly, the search for new oil fields began, including in the regions of Western Siberia that were difficult to access at that time.
Thirdly, the priorities in the field of armaments changed: Khrushchev declared tanks, artillery, surface ships and aircraft to be "cave technology", and the basis of the Armed Forces, according to his plans, was to be made up of missile forces.
Finally, realizing that with the vertical of power existing since Stalin's times, reforms are inconceivable, Khrushchev started restructuring the system of managing the national economy, replacing the sectoral principle of organizing the economy with a territorial one (the creation of economic councils), the newspaper notes.
Khrushchev intuitively guessed the set of directions along which movement could lead the country to a more efficient economic structure. However, the practical implementation of the reforms completely discredited good intentions. But most importantly, the system opposed the reforms. In October 1964, Khrushchev was overthrown.
Information of the IA "Kazakh-Zerno": In prosperous years (1973, 1976, 1978, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990), the USSR collected an average of 812 kg gross and 753 kg net per inhabitant, or, respectively, an average of 222 million tons (in bunker weight of grain) and 206 million tons each (in elevator weight of grain).
