Finnish defensive line on the Karelian isthmus. By what principle are the ranks formed? What is Mannerheim Line
Already in the 1960s, an official version began to form in Finland historical events 1939-1944 years. The official version ignored the miscalculations and mistakes of the Finnish leadership in these fatal years for the country. This version also justified or hushed up Finland's cooperation with Nazi Germany. At the same time, an official point of view on the war with Finland was also formed in the Soviet Union. As part of the official Soviet version all the blame for the war of 1939-1940 and the war of 1941-1944 was undoubtedly placed on Finland.
Within the framework of this article, we will briefly analyze one of the myths of the Finnish official history, which was so successfully thrown into Russian-language near-historical literature during the years of perestroika and is still often heard in conversations and in the press. The Finnish official version of events claims that the Finnish army in 1941 stopped at the border line of 1920 (the so-called "old border") and did not advance further into the territory of the Soviet Union. This statement is strongly rooted in the literature and public consciousness in Russia and Finland, but this statement is false. In the summer of 1941, the Finnish army, according to the German plan "Barbarossa", advanced in several directions, and the first blow was struck by the Finns in the northern Ladoga area at the junction between the 21st and 7th Armies. As a result of a successful offensive, the Finnish units reached the old border at the end of August 1941 and crossed it. In Karelia, the Finnish army and German units advanced to the Svir, going abroad in 1920 for several tens and hundreds of kilometers. The Finns occupied Olonets, Petrozavodsk, Medvezhyegorsk, crossed the Svir and created a major foothold on its southern coast. On the southern shore of Lake Onega, the Finnish army invaded the modern Vologda region.
German units from the Kirishi-Tikhvin region were advancing towards the Finns along the southern coast of Ladoga. German and Finnish troops were to meet on the Svir, closing the deadly encirclement around Leningrad. If the plans of the German and Finnish command had come true, there would have been no Road of Life in the winter of 1941-1942. This would mean the fall of Leningrad and the death of the troops defending it and the civilian population of the city. However, these plans were not given to come true - in November the Volkhov Front struck a counterattack, on December 9, 1941, Tikhvin was liberated, and the Germans were driven several tens of kilometers across the Volkhov River to the west. The deadly threat to Leningrad was eliminated.
On the Karelian Isthmus, the Finns began a large-scale offensive only in mid-August 1941 and brilliantly carried out their pre-war plans - the Soviet defense was dissected in the center of the isthmus (the area of the Gremuchy lock), and troops were deployed across the Vyborg Bay. As a result of two weeks of heavy fighting, there was a threat of encirclement of the Soviet group in the west of the Karelian Isthmus, where the 115th, 43rd and 123rd rifle divisions defended Vyborg. The departure from Vyborg to the former Mannerheim Line began too late, as a result of which three Soviet divisions were surrounded near Vyborg (in the area of modern stations Matrosovo and Sveklovichnoe).
As a result of this operation, the way for the Finns to Sestroretsk, Beloostrov and Leningrad was opened. The Finns reached the line of the old border - the Sestre River - by September 1, 1941.
Pictures of Finnish soldiers drinking their horses from the Sestra River have been circulated in all Finnish newspapers. It would seem that the Finns have achieved the goal of the war and the army can be dispersed to their homes, but this did not happen.
The Finns did not stop at the old border on the Karelian Isthmus. Mannerheim, commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, gave the order to continue the offensive on Leningrad on the Karelian Isthmus beyond the line of the old border of 1920. This order provoked riots in several Finnish regiments, but in general the army obeyed and crossed the Sestra River. The order did not explain how far the Finnish army would go in its offensive - to Leningrad, further, closer? The purpose of this offensive was to straighten the front line on the Karelian Isthmus, but no one explained the objectives of the offensive to the Finnish soldiers, who needed to die for this. Finnish units advanced deep into Soviet territory at a distance of up to 30 kilometers. They stopped only in front of the main strip of fortification of the Karelian fortified area.
The only place where the Finns did not cross the old border on the Karelian Isthmus was a section about 2 kilometers long from the coast of the Gulf of Finland to Mount Hatsilanmaki (the area of the current traffic intersection where the roads to the Kurortny District, the Scandinavia highway and Beloostrov). After this offensive, the Finnish army stopped and began to build defensive structures. The Finns did not continue their offensive further to Leningrad, despite two official demands from the Germans.
Mannerheim motivated his refusal by the lack of heavy artillery and dive bombers necessary to break through the long-term Soviet defense of the Karelian fortified area. At the same time, the diplomatic Finnish marshal invited German units to the Karelian Isthmus, if the Germans needed so much that someone would attack Leningrad from the north. From all of the above, the reader can see that the statement that the Finns stopped their advance in 1941 on the old border and did not go further is a lie.
Bair Irincheev, historian, St. Petersburg
Mannerheim Line and Maginot Line, Molotov Line and Vostochny Val, Stalin Line and Siegfried Line, Soviet and Japanese fortified areas on Far East and so on, etc. - in this book you will find comprehensive information about all the "Chinese walls of the XX century" and a professional analysis of their effectiveness.
Why in 1939-1945. the "positional impasse" of the First World War did not repeat itself? Is it possible in principle to create an "insurmountable" line of defense? Are the colossal costs of building fortified areas justified? And how exactly did the assault groups manage to break through the most powerful defensive systems?
Mannerheim Line
Mannerheim Line
By the end of the 30s of the XX century, the Finnish command, seeking to protect their country from a blow from the Soviet Union, primarily on the Karelian Isthmus, created a powerful defense system there, which was commonly called the Mannerheim Line. This is not entirely true. Therefore, before talking about the Finnish defense, it is necessary to clearly understand what it was.
In the military-historical works of the Soviet period, we constantly come across the term "Mannerheim Line" and we believe that it was she who resisted the advance of the Red Army in 1939 and 1940. At the same time, it is indicated that the Mannerheim line was a deeply echeloned strip of long-term firing fortifications with a total depth, together with the operational zone, up to 100 kilometers. In the history of the Order of Lenin of the Leningrad Military District (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988) on page 129 it is stated that “the Mannerheim line consisted of three main, forward and two intermediate strips, as well as cut-off positions. On all three lanes of this line, there were over 1000 bunkers and bunkers, of which 296 structures were long-term reinforced concrete ... In total, there were about 200 reinforced concrete structures on the main defense line. " And in the book "Fights in Finland" (Moscow: OGIZ, 1941) it is indicated that during the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, Soviet troops "captured 356 bunkers and 2425 bunkers."
What did the Finns really have on the Karelian Isthmus?
The construction of the first defensive structures on the Karelian Isthmus began in the spring of 1920 at the initiative of Major General O. Enkel, who had headed the General Staff of the Finnish Armed Forces the day before in the fall. She passed through Rempetti, Humaljoki, Summa, lakes. Muolaanjärvi, lake. Eyuryapyaanjarvi, part of the Vuoksi-Taipe water system (now Klyuchevoe, Emilovo, Soldatskoe, Lake Glubokoe, Lake Rakovoe, Vuoksa, Solov'evo) and consisted of 18 defense nodes stretched out in a line, each of which included several long-term stone-concrete (bunkers ) and wood-earthen firing points (bunkers), covered from the front with anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles. It should be noted, however, that in Finnish scientific literature Under the term "Mannerheim Line" is meant, first of all, the main fortification position on the Karelian Isthmus during the Soviet-Finnish "winter war" of 1939-1940. This position only partially coincided with the line of the main defensive zone, on which there were long-term emplacements built before 1939.
It all started with the fact that in connection with Finland's intention to secede from the former Russian Empire After the events of 1917, K. Mannerheim, by his order of May 7, 1918, sent two of his representatives to the command of the Eastern Army (the grouping of Finnish white forces in the eastern part of the country) - Lieutenant Colonel A. Rappe and Major K. von Heine, who arrived to serve in Finnish army from Sweden. They were instructed to draw up a preliminary plan for the construction of defensive structures on the Karelian Isthmus in accordance with the recommendations and instructions of the commander of the Eastern Army. When drawing up this plan, it was necessary to take into account that the proposed activities were to be carried out with the resources available within the next two months. The finished plan was to be sent to Mannerheim's headquarters no later than May 25 of the same year with the conclusion of the commander of the Eastern Army.
These works were completed with a slight delay. Lieutenant Colonel A. Rappe dated this plan on June 1, 1918. In accordance with this plan, the construction of fortifications was to be carried out taking into account the need to create convenient starting positions for possible offensive actions of the Finnish and White Guard troops in the direction of Petrograd. At the same time, A. Rappe, in his assessment of the situation, proceeded from the fact that the enemy would defend Petrograd, including through active offensive actions, and then his counterblows could be directed into the interior of Finland or along the highway and railroad tracks towards Kivennapa (now the village Pervomaiskoe) and Vyborg, or on the Rautu site (now the village of Sosnovo). But the Vyborg direction was considered the most probable.
To ensure the security of Finland in this operational direction, A. Rappe proposed to build three defensive positions along the Finnish-Russian border. The first, or forward, position was to pass directly at the very border. The second, or main, position was outlined from Fort Ino and further through the villages of Kivennapa and Lipola to the banks of Ladoga. The third, rear, position was supposed to go along the line of Muurila - Kuolemayarvi - Kaukyarvi - Perkyarvi - Valkjarvi - Rautu - Taipale.
In engineering terms, all three positions had to be well equipped with various structures. So, at the front line and at the main positions, it was necessary to dig 25 kilometers of trenches and create obstacle courses with a total length of 100 kilometers. Such work would have required a total of 195,000 man-days. The construction of a rear defensive position, which roughly coincided with the main defense zone erected in the 1920s-1930s, which included a system of reinforced concrete firing points (DOT), was supposed to spend about the same number of man-days. Taking into account the laying of roads and communication lines, the total number of man-days should have reached 400,000. However, the plan drawn up by A. Rappe remained unfulfilled due to the resignation of General K. Mannerheim on May 29, 1918.
Nevertheless, the idea of strengthening the borders of independent Finland continued to live. On September 16, 1918, the acting chief of the General Staff of the Finnish Army, German Colonel von Redern, proposed to the Committee for Military Affairs to start fortification work on the Karelian Isthmus. The Finnish Senate made a corresponding decision on October 29 of the same year and decided to allocate an appropriation of 300,000 marks for the construction of fortifications. Individual military units were involved in the work, primarily sapper companies, as well as up to 200 Soviet prisoners of war. But this time, too, the plan for fortification of the border was only partially implemented. In several areas, only wire barriers and machine-gun nests were erected.
On September 16, 1919, Major General Oskar Enkel came to the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Finnish Armed Forces, who continued the work on strengthening the border on the Karelian Isthmus, begun by his predecessors. At the same time, he took into account the fact that in conditions of emergency mobilization, the military units stationed in Vyborg must certainly have time to complete their deployment on the main defensive zone before the aggressor reaches it. He believed that it would be very difficult to ensure the fulfillment of such a task at positions located near the border. Therefore, the western flank of the projected Enckel Line was moved away from the Soviet border.
Construction work according to Enckel's plan was carried out from 1920 to 1924. Initially, it was envisaged to build only the main line of defense. But a year later, when construction was already underway, this initial project was supplemented by a plan for the construction of a second line of defense, covering the exit to Vyborg.
In total, according to Enkel's project, 168 defensive structures were erected, of which 114 were machine-gun, 6 - gun casemates and one - machine gun. Also, 10 fire control posts, 27 shelters for personnel and 10 small concrete infantry positions were set up. In addition, 16 more structures were built outside the main and second lines of defense to cover the most threatened areas.
The firing points, located in a wooded and swampy area, were equipped exclusively with machine guns. But in the area of wide open Vuoksinsky reaches, gun fire cover was considered more effective. Therefore, in 1922, Enkel turned to the Ministry of Defense with a proposal to build five small coastal artillery forts on the northern coast of Vuoksa-Suvanto, equipped with 76-mm rapid-fire cannons of the 1900 model. However, the guns were installed in these forts only in December 1939.
The main defensive zone consisted of a system of 18 defense nodes stretched out in a line, each of which included several wood-earthen field fortifications (DZOT), long-term stone-concrete structures (DOT), as well as anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles. The nodes of defense themselves were placed on the main defensive line extremely unevenly: the intervals between individual nodes of resistance sometimes reached 6-8 kilometers.
For ease of management, each defense unit had its own index, which usually began with the first letters of the nearby settlement. If the account is taken from the coast of the Gulf of Finland, then the designations of the nodes will follow in this order: "N" - Humaljoki, now Ermilovo, "K" - Kolkkala, now Malyshevo, "N" - Nyayukki, "Ko" - Kolmikeeyala, "Well" - Hulkeyala, "Ka" - Karhula, now Dyatlovo, "Sk" - Summayuola, "La" - Lyahde, "A" - Eyuryapyaa, now Leipyasuo, "Mi" - Muolaankyla, now Gribnoe, "Ma" - Sikniemi, "Ma" - Myalkelia, now Zverevo, "La" - Lauttaniemi, "No" - Neisniemi, now Mys, "Ki" - Kiviniemi, now Losevo, "Sa" - Sakkola, now Gromovo, "Ke" - Kelya, now Portovoe, "Tai "- Taipale, now Solovyovo.
In addition, the fortification system of the Enkel line included a rear defensive zone, which covered the approaches to Vyborg. It consisted of 10 defense nodes, which were located in the following order: "R" - Rempetti, now Klyuchevoe, "Nr" - Nyarya, "Kai" - Kaipiala, "Nu" - Nuoraa and "Kak" - Kakkola, now Sokolinskoe, "Le" - Leviyainen, "A.-Sa" - Ala-Saine and "Y.-Sa" - Julia-Saine, now V.-Cherkasovo, "Not" - Heinjoki, now Veshchevo and "Ly" - Lyuyukulia, now Ozernoye.
The defense units themselves were of varying power. So, the defense center "N", which was located northeast of the village of Humaljoki, in addition to field fortifications, included four small one-story machine-gun single-arm bunkers of frontal fire, covering the railway and the coastal highway. Defense center "K" occupied the northeastern part of the village of Kolkkala and included, in addition to field fortifications, anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles, seven small single-embrasure machine-gun bunkers for frontal fire, four concrete shelters and one command post. Defense center "N" was located within the northeastern tip of Lake Kuolemayarvi (now Lake Pionerskoye) near the village of Nyayukki and included, in addition to field fortifications, anti-personnel and anti-tank obstacles, three single-embrasure machine-gun pillboxes, one command post and two concrete infantry positions. Defense center "Ko" was located on the territory of the village of Kolmikesyala and included six single-embrasure machine-gun bunkers for frontal fire, three concrete shelters, one command post and two concrete infantry positions. The Nu defense center was located on the territory of the village of Hulkiya-la. Defense center "Ka" was located in the center of the village of Karhula and included five single-embrasure machine-gun pillboxes and two shelters.
The defense unit "Sk" was quite powerful, which was located on the territory of the village of Summakulia and included seven one-embrasure and two two-embrasure machine-gun pillboxes for frontal fire, one of which also combined the function of a small shelter. In the same defense center, there were four more separate shelters.
Defense center "La" adjoined almost closely to the left flank of the fortified site "Sk" and consisted of two single-embrasure machine-gun pillboxes for frontal fire, two shelters and four command posts. (Later the index "La" was changed to "Sj"). Defense center "A" was located 2 kilometers southeast of the Eyuryapää railway station (Leipäsuo) and consisted of five small single-arm machine-gun pillboxes of frontal fire that shot through the area along the railway bed. (Later the index "A" was replaced by "Le".) The tenth defense unit, "Mi", was located within the village of Muolaankyla and consisted of five single-arm machine-gun pillboxes, one artillery caponier equipped with a 75-mm ship gun "Meller", five shelters and two command posts. Defense center "Ma" was located at Cape Sikniemi and consisted of three single-arm machine-gun bunkers.
The twelfth defense center "Ma" occupied the southeastern outskirts of the village of Myalkela, stretching along the banks of the Salmenkaita River. It consisted of one single-embrasure machine-gun bunker, four shelters and three concrete infantry positions. According to reports, in the same area in 1924 the construction of an artillery caponier was started. At Cape Lauttaniemi there was another defense unit, which consisted of two single-embrasure machine-gun pillboxes and one artillery caponier of flanking fire, designed for four guns. Like other artillery installations of this type, the caponier had a small barracks for the garrison, protected by powerful concrete walls.
The fourteenth defense center "No" was located on the neighboring Cape of Neusniemi and included one single-embrasure machine-gun bunker and one artillery caponier of flanking fire. Defense center "Ki" was located in the center of the village of Kiviniemi on the northern bank of a turbulent channel. It included two machine-gun single-embrasure bunkers and one machine-gun-machine-gun-artillery caponier. Defense center "Sa" was located near the Sakkola village on the shores of Lake Suvantoyarvi (now Lake Sukhodolskoye). It consisted of two machine-gun single-embrasure bunkers and one artillery caponier. Defense center "Ke" was located on the territory of the village of Kelya and also consisted of two machine-gun single-embrasure pillboxes and one artillery caponier. And finally, the eighteenth defense node, "Tai", occupied a vast area of Cape Koukkuniemi, crossing the territories of the villages of Kirvesmäki, Terenttilä and Taipale. It included 10 single-embrasure machine-gun bunkers for frontal fire, one artillery caponier and one shelter.
Thus, a total of 69 machine-gun bunkers for frontal fire, one machine-gun and artillery bunker, 8 artillery caponiers, 25 concrete shelters, 9 concrete command posts and 7 concrete infantry positions were built on the main defense zone.
At the rear defensive position of the Enkel line within 10 defense nodes, 43 single-embrasure machine-gun bunkers, two shelters, three command posts and two concrete infantry positions were built.
In particular, the "R" defense unit was located near the village of Rempetti and included five machine-gun single-embrasure bunkers, two concrete shelters and one concrete command post. Defense center "Nr" occupied the northern shore of Lake Nyaryanyarvi (now Lake Zaichikhino) and included seven machine-gun single-arm bunkers for frontal fire, as well as one concrete command post. The Kai defense center was located in the central part of the Kaipiala village and included three single-embrasure bunkers, one command post and two concreted infantry positions. Defense node "Nu" was stationed in the western part of the village of Nuoraa and included three single-embrasure bunkers for frontal fire. The Kak defense unit was located in the village of Kakkola and included four single-embrasure bunkers for frontal fire. Defense unit "Le" was located near the Leviyainen farm and consisted of one single-embrasure bunker.
The A.-Sa defense unit, which was located in the village of Ala-Sainiye, and included nine one-embrasure bunkers, was quite powerful. The defense unit "Y.-Sa", located in the village of Yulia-Sainie and including six one-embrasure bunkers, was somewhat weaker. Even weaker was the No defense unit, which relied on the Heinjoki village and included three single-embrasure bunkers. And, finally, in the village of Lüyükülä, there was a defense center “Lu”, which included two single-embrasure pillboxes.
Thus, the total number of all permanent structures built on the main and rear positions of the Enkel line by 1924, taking into account both bunkers for two and three machine guns outside the zone of these positions, amounted to 168 units.
At the same time, experts noted that the Enkel line was not devoid of shortcomings, the reason for which lay not so much in the technical imperfection of the structures, but in the scarcity of funds allocated for its construction. From the initial progressive idea of erecting a system of machine-gun oblique crossfire bunkers had to be abandoned at the very beginning, since its implementation would require to build significantly more firing points than with the use of frontal fire bunkers with an angle of firing sectors of 90 degrees. Almost all concrete structures were characterized by low quality concrete, almost complete absence of flexible steel reinforcement and a large volume of filler - sand, gravel and stones. The only metal part that was used in the ceiling of permanent defensive structures was the I-beam.
The overwhelming majority of the structures of the Enkel Line were of a single-storey type, that is, one-storey. The exceptions were the two-storey shelter located in the fortified node "Ko" and the two-storey cannon caponier in Patoniemi (fortified node "Tai"), in which the shelter for the garrison was located directly under the battle casemate. Some pillboxes combined two rooms: a battle casemate and a shelter for 4–6 people, equipped with bunk bunks.
The design of the embrasures of all machine-gun pillboxes assumed frontal fire and did not provide fire cover for adjacent long-term firing points. All structures were extremely vulnerable to direct fire into the embrasure area.
On February 26, 1932, the chief inspector for technical issues, Colonel W. Sarlin, after several preliminary conversations with an experienced fortification specialist I. Fabricius, invited him to lead the construction of fortifications on a new section of the line. By this time, the Finnish military command had already made a concrete decision on the construction of an additional, twenty-first defense center in the system of the main defensive zone, stretching from Lake Kuolemayarvi (now Lake Pionerskoe) to the coast of the Gulf of Finland east of Cape Kurenniemi and which included six one-story bunkers for 2-3 machine guns each. It was this site that received the conditional abbreviation "Ink" from the name of the village of Inquila, located in the center of this stronghold.
Fortification works in the redistribution of this sector were carried out by the forces of a sapper battalion. The first pillboxes of the fortified node "Ink" (Ink-1 and Ink-2), located in its northern part, were erected in 1932. They were single-tier and were intended to conduct flanking machine-gun fire, cutting off the advancing enemy infantry from tanks. Unlike their predecessors, these structures had a number of innovations and advantages. In particular, these are side protective walls covering the embrasures from the frontal direction, saturation with flexible steel wire reinforcement, high quality concrete. The rest of the pillboxes (Ink-3, Ink-4, Ink-5 and Ink-7), built in 1933-1934, were also caponiers of flanking fire, but had embrasures protected by vertical armor plates 10-15 centimeters thick and 2x3 meters. They also had, in addition to battle casemates, underground shelters that could accommodate from 12 to 24 personnel. Each room had its own well, from where it was possible to replenish supplies of fresh drinking water, sleeping places with bunk bunks were also equipped there. In cold weather, the room was heated by stoves. In total, in the "Ink" area in the period from 1932 to 1934, the sapper battalion built six reinforced concrete machine-gun pillboxes. The last bunker, a two-level caponier, with three battle casemates and embrasures protected by armor plates, with an underground barracks for a platoon of soldiers, located on the lower level in a 20-meter corridor, was built only in 1937.
In 1936, Lieutenant Colonel I. Fabricius was appointed head of the design and fortification department. From that time on, a fundamentally new stage of design work began on the line of defensive structures. The main attention was paid to the development of designs of two-, three-embrasure bunkers for flanking fire, well camouflaged and inscribed in the landscape of the area, reinforced with armor protection and equipped with armored domes. At the same time, Fabricius proceeded from the fact that the old single-embrasure bunkers of frontal fire, located in the directions of the likely main enemy strikes, would not be able to withstand the onslaught of large masses of troops reinforced with modern military equipment.
The construction of such structures began on August 26, 1936. First of all, efforts were focused on the modernization of old structures, which consisted mainly in the fact that new reinforced concrete battle casemates of flanking fire were attached to them using high-strength materials. In some cases, the old pillboxes were simply reconstructed into shelters, and sometimes completely new pillboxes of the "millionth" type were erected in addition to them.
Five of the twenty old fortified nodes underwent modernization: "Sk", "La", "Ma", "Mi" and "A". At the same time, the indices of some of them have changed. Thus, the fortified knot "La" turned into "Sj" (Summajärvi), and "A" into "Le" (Leipyasuo). Many permanent structures located in these fortified nodes have been radically reconstructed. So, in the fortified node "Sk", five old front-type structures have turned into modern bunkers for flanking fire, in addition to which three new reinforced concrete fired structures have appeared. At the defense nodes "Sj" and "Le", two million-plus bunkers were added each. In 1939, new long-term firing points were built in the fortifications "Mi" and "Ma". Between Lake Muolaanjärvi and the fortified node "Le" at the beginning of 1938, the twenty-second fortified node "Su" (Suurniemi) was erected, consisting of five pillboxes, a shelter and a command post, as well as a system of field fortifications, anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles.
Beginning in 1937, the first bunkers of the so-called "millionth type" began to be built on the Karelian Isthmus. They received this name because of the large sums of costs for their construction, often in the millions of the then Finnish marks. On this basis, the bunker ("Sj-5") even received the code name "Million".
The first structures of this type had a design that provided for the presence, as a rule, of two or three battle casemates connected by underground passages, which were usually used as a small barracks with a capacity for a platoon of soldiers, as well as an office space that, if necessary, supported the autonomous combat and life support of the garrison in for a certain time in a complete blockade. The battle embrasures of these fortresses were protected by 3–5 (even seven on the Le-7) by bundled armor plates, each of which had a thickness of 60–70 mm. According to the calculations of specialists, such armor protection had to withstand a direct hit from 6-inch artillery shells. The armor plates were of foreign production, most of them were purchased in the Czech Republic. A series of such pillboxes included casemates "Ink-b", machine-gun caponiers "Sk-IO", "Sk-2" (fortified unit “Summakyulya”), “Sj-4” (fortified unit “Summayarvi”), “Le-6” and "Le-7" (fortified node "Leipyasuo").
Most of the pillboxes of the last period of construction had one or more armored towers built into the ceilings. The thickness of the armor of such towers reached 18 centimeters. In the upper part of the armored tower, observation slots were cut for a circular view of the terrain. A steel drum with a slot rotating inside the tower excluded accidental bullet or shrapnel hits inside the tower.
"Millions" bunkers built in 1939 "Sk-11" ("Peltola") and "Sj-5" ("Millionaire") differed in their design only in that the battle casemates in them were made entirely of reinforced concrete without the use of armor protection ... Their battle casemates, separated from each other at a distance of 30 to 40 meters, were interconnected by an underground corridor-barracks.
The Finns concentrated their main defense efforts in the central sector, in the defile between Lake Muolaanjärvi-Eyuryapääanjärvi and the northern bank of the Samekaita River (now the Bulatnaya River). Even during the reign of O. Enckel, this area was reinforced with eight machine-gun half-caponiers, one anti-splinter shelter and three concreted infantry positions. These old fortifications were distributed over three fortified nodes. In addition to them, in 1939, at the nodes "Mi" and "Ma" they began to build more modern reinforced concrete structures according to the designs of Belgian engineers. In addition, on October 9, 1939, the “Arajoki Work Area” was established, where, under the leadership of a certified Finnish engineer A. Arajoki, the construction of 40 new one-story reinforced concrete caponiers was started, of which only 23 had been erected by the beginning of the war.
Regarding the intensification of construction work, K. Mannerheim writes in his memoirs: “In the summer of 1939, a truly popular movement arose for the voluntary construction of defensive fortifications. Volunteers in an even stream came from all over the country to the Karelian Isthmus, where representatives of all groups of the population worked side by side for four months, sacrificing their summer vacations in the name of the country's defense. In addition, significant sums of voluntary donations were collected to finance the construction of fortifications ... During the summer, anti-tank obstacles were built on the most threatened areas - stone bridges, ditches and counter-escarps - which significantly increased the strength of the defensive positions. Unfortunately, later it turned out that the installed boulders should have been even higher in order to effectively block the terrain and prevent the advance of enemy tanks. "
When preparing an operational defense, the Finns were well aware that they would hardly be able to repel a sudden offensive of the Red Army troops directly on the state border line. Therefore, in front of the main defense zone, a support zone was prepared (the foreground, operational obstacle zone), the depth of which reached 20-30 kilometers in the Kexholm direction, and 49-65 kilometers in the Vyborg direction. The relatively shallow depth in the Kexholm direction was explained by the fact that in its rear, in front of the main defense zone, there was a powerful water barrier - the Vuoksen-Virta River and Lake Suvantojärvi, 800 to 2600 meters wide.
The support zone was equipped on highly rugged terrain with lines of strong points and intermediate positions, interconnected by fire, covered with anti-tank obstacles and wire obstacles. As a result, all roads leading to the front edge of the defense, and the road were covered with strongholds, intermediate positions and various obstacles. On the Keksholm direction, there was one strong point for every 4–6 kilometers along its depth. On the Vyborg direction, where the road network was better developed, most of the strong points, intermediate positions and fortified lines were located at the crossroads of frontal and rocky roads. The total number of lines of pivot points and intermediate positions ranged from six to eight. The Finns believed that such a placement of strongholds for the assault on each of them would certainly require a change in artillery positions. All roads within the support strip were destroyed or mined with a density of up to 400 minutes per kilometer, and they were covered with solid blockages 400–500 meters wide.
Depending on the importance of the direction, the availability of roads and terrain conditions, strong points and intermediate positions were defended by forces from a platoon reinforced with heavy machine guns and anti-tank guns to a battalion reinforced with artillery. Most of the strongholds were supported by one or two batteries of 76mm and sometimes 122mm guns.
The strongholds were designed for a perimeter defense and were located so as not to allow them to go around. They usually consisted of one or two lines of rifle trenches, sometimes reinforced with rifle blockhouses. In the depths, behind the rifle trenches, there were machine-gun nests, trenches for anti-tank guns and mortars, as well as observation posts. From the front, all strong points were covered with two, less often - one strip of wire obstacles such as a reinforced fence or a network in two or three rows of stakes.
The main defense efforts were concentrated within its main zone. However, by the end of autumn 1939, the main fortification work on this strip had not yet been completed. In a state of combat readiness (taking into account the unfinished Muolaanjärvi-Salmenkayta fortification) 74 old single-embrasure machine-gun bunkers for frontal fire, 48 new and modernized bunkers, which had from one to four machine-gun embrasures for flanking fire, 7 artillery bunkers and one machine-gun artillery caponer. In total, 130 permanent firing structures were located along a line about 140 kilometers long from the coast of the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga. The western flank of the main line of defense was 50 kilometers away from the border, and the eastern one - 16 kilometers.
In the early summer of 1939, work also began on the intermediate defensive position - line "V" by volunteers. However, by the autumn of that year, only anti-tank obstacles and rows of barbed wire had been erected in some areas of this position.
In the fall of 1939, the fortification works, interrupted in 1924, were resumed at the rear defensive position - the "T" line, which ran from the Suomenvedenpohja Bay to Kyakisalmi (now the city of Priozersk). According to the data given in the book "The History of the Fortification of Finland", before the conclusion of the peace treaty of March 12, 1940, 7 bunkers and 74 bunkers were completely built on this section of the defensive line, 3 bunkers and 24 bunkers remained without finishing work, at the initial stage of work was 182 bunkers and 131 bunkers. In addition, 11 kilometers of trenches were dug along this line, 131 kilometers of access roads were laid for the passage of heavy vehicles, and a number of wire and anti-tank obstacles were erected.
The Finns well understood the danger of the massive use of tanks in breaking through the defense. In this regard, "Instructions on the location and erection of anti-tank obstacles against medium 10-20 ton tanks" were developed, approved by the commander of the armed forces and chief of the General Staff on May 23-24, 1939. They, in particular, indicated that each anti-tank obstacle should be monitored and covered with fire weapons. Therefore, it should not be located closer than 150 meters, but no further than 200 meters from the front edge of the main defense zone.
To strengthen the anti-tank defense, it was prescribed to use the advantages of the terrain. On especially important areas, it was proposed to make the barriers multi-row. It was pointed out that “wire barriers, shot through by flank machine-gun fire, forming a fire cover network for the main defensive line, must be placed between it and the anti-tank barrier. In addition, a wire fence on low stakes can be placed inside and in front of the fence. In relation to machine-gun pillboxes, the anti-tank obstacle should be located so that the tank does not come closer than 500-600 meters to them, "in order to prevent the firing of aimed fire from the tank at the vulnerable points of the pillbox." With regard to stone nadolbov it was said that they should sit firmly in the ground, with a depth of 40-60 centimeters and an elevation above the ground of the three front rows by 80 centimeters, and the back row - about one meter. In addition, by the fall of 1939, Finnish sappers had erected about 136 kilometers of anti-tank obstacles and about 330 kilometers of barbed wire along the main line of defense.
True, K. Mannerheim himself characterizes the state of the defense zones somewhat differently. In particular, in his memoirs, he writes: “In order to accelerate the very modest work to strengthen the Karelian Isthmus, I have developed a new program, which at the beginning of July 1939 I handed over to the Minister of Defense. In it, we demanded the allocation of new funds to complete the construction of defensive fortifications on the line between the Gulf of Finland and the Vuoksi River, as well as for the construction of a second line, located further, between the Vyborg Bay and the Vuoksi River. Continuation of this line in the eastern direction ... And this issue was not considered to the end, because the war began. "
Thus, the system of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus (Mannerheim Line), according to I.V. Tyulenev at the December meeting of the senior command personnel of the Red Army, consisted of a support strip ("first foreground") with a depth of 36 kilometers, a main defense strip with a depth of 6 kilometers, a second foreground with a depth of 18 kilometers, a second defense strip with a depth of up to 3 kilometers and a Vyborg fortified area with a depth of up to 3 kilometers. Its total length was 135 kilometers, and its depth reached 78 kilometers, of which 66 kilometers were well equipped in engineering terms. It consisted of 296 permanent reinforced concrete and 897 granite structures. By 1939, about 136 kilometers of anti-tank obstacles and 330 kilometers of barbed wire were erected in front of the main defense zone. Measures were also taken to create zones of artificial flooding of the area.
For more than two decades, the Finnish General Staff has been working on how the troops should operate in the support zone. Thus, K. Mannerheim wrote in his memoirs: “For twenty years before the General Staff there was a nightmare the question of how our covering forces would be able, in case of war, to defend themselves on the Karelian Isthmus, while the main forces of the field army had time to take their positions. This fear was generated primarily by the fact that the Russians, due to the proximity of Leningrad, might unexpectedly concentrate large forces on the border, and, in addition, we expected that their aviation would greatly interfere with the mobilization and concentration of our army ...
But the fortifications built on our territory could not serve as a factor equalizing the balance of forces. By design, they were very modest and, with a few exceptions, were located only on the Karelian Isthmus. There were only 66 concrete pillboxes along the defensive line about 140 kilometers long. 44 firing points were built in the twenties and are already outdated, many of them were notable for poor design, their placement left much to be desired. The rest of the pillboxes were modern, but too weak for heavy artillery fire. Recently built barbed wire fences and anti-tank obstacles did not fully meet their function ... ".
In accordance with the existing system of long-term defensive structures, the operational formation of the 7th Finnish Army on the Karelian Isthmus was in one echelon with the allocation of a significant part of the forces to the support zone. The main forces included six infantry divisions, and the covering forces included two separate infantry brigades, combined into a division subordinate directly to the army commander. The remaining two separate infantry, one cavalry brigade and separate infantry battalions, as you can see, constituted the combined-arms reserve of the formation. Depending on the nature of the terrain and composition, army corps defended strips from 56 to 70 kilometers, divisions from 10 to 25 kilometers. This is quite consistent with the memoirs of K. Mannerheim, who writes:
“The army consisted of six divisions, located along the main line of defense, which ran from the Gulf of Finland through lakes Kuolemayarvi and Muolaanjärvi to the Vuoksi River, further in the direction of Suvanto and to Lake Ladoga along the Taipalenyoki River. On the seventy-kilometer front from the Gulf of Finland to Vuoksi, four divisions of the 2nd Army Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Ehkvist, defended. The divisions' defense zones were 10-25 kilometers wide. On the eastern part of the Karelian Isthmus, in a continuous strip 56 kilometers long, two divisions of the 3rd Army Corps, commanded by Major General Heinrichs, held the defense.
Between the main position and the border there was a zone up to 50 kilometers deep, in which, in accordance with the operational plans developed in peacetime, the covering forces fought deterrent battles until the field army had time to reach the main position. The unification of the main part of the covering forces (1st and 2nd brigades) into a new division, subordinate directly to the army commander, also did not imply a passive position ... ". A verbal order to create a covering group was given to the army commander on November 3, and a written order on this was followed on November 11.
The training of troops was of great importance for solving the tasks of defense. Even before the creation of the final grouping of forces on the Karelian Isthmus, in early August 1939, exercises were conducted with the formations of the Karelian army in accordance with the plan for the upcoming defense. K. Mannerheim writes: “The exercises, preparation for which began in early spring, were held on the Karelian Isthmus in early August. In accordance with the disposition, the forces of the "yellows" / the enemy / pushed back the covering troops of the "whites" / the Finnish troops / to the east of Vyborg, where the offensive of the "yellows" was stopped. When the concentration of the "white" forces northeast of Vyborg was completed, a general attack on the right flank of the "yellow" followed.
True, somewhat below he notes with bitterness: “The military exercises ended with a parade of troops in Vyborg, at which very numerous forces that took part in the maneuvers were represented. The audience was incredibly delighted with what they saw, but it was more difficult for a professional to share the general admiration. The feeling of satisfaction caused by the completion of tasks by the troops during the exercises themselves, the good state of the parade, despite the long marches and hot weather, was hampered by the awareness of how small the results were in the field of armaments. Military representatives of foreign states were able to make sure that Finland did not have a single anti-tank weapon. The armored vehicles that took part in the exercises were represented by several dozen tanks, some of which were outdated, and the new ones, despite the demands of the Defense Council, had no weapons. The air force was super modest. If we were to compare all this with the reserves of armored vehicles and aviation that a neighbor had abroad, then the shortcomings would look even more prominent. "
A few months before the start of the Soviet-Finnish war, the Finnish army was put on full combat readiness, which K. Mannerheim also admits: “Finland, naturally, could not sit idly by when the war of the great powers began. On September 1/1939 / I asked to be given the opportunity to recruit again a part of the reservists of the covering and naval defense forces, which had been demobilized in August. I was given such powers, and this event was held immediately. On my advice, the government at the end of September decided to increase the readiness for defense in such a way that the officers and non-commissioned officers transferred to the reserve in 1938 underwent one-time training in three rounds during the fall ...
On October 6, the entire system of covering troops was mobilized, after which the military units were immediately redeployed to the border areas ... I proposed holding a training exercise for reservists on October 11, for which the personnel were called up with the help of summons handed to each personally. Covert exercises that began on October 14 corresponded to the general mobilization. The border areas were liberated, and part of the population of the cities that were in the danger zone were transferred to other places ...
Our troops were thoroughly familiar with the border zone, and their training, almost dogma, included training in conducting active deterrent battles on the isthmus. I, therefore, proceeded from the assumption that in this first and, perhaps, the last phase of mobile warfare, they would be able to deliver a serious blow to the enemy, who, as we assumed, was not accustomed to the terrain covered with forests. This would raise morale, which would undoubtedly be severely tested in a defensive battle. And the terrain on the Karelian Isthmus contributed to the conduct of deterrent battles. Long, narrow and as yet not covered with ice lakes and marshes formed a defile along which the enemy troops were forced to advance and in which it was convenient to inflict flank attacks on them. The location of the main position increased the possibilities of such tactics, but, of course, the prerequisite was that the battles in the foreground would be fought by large forces and in close cooperation with divisions on the main line of defense.
Thus, by the beginning of the Soviet offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, the Finnish command was able to prepare a powerful defense zone there, well-developed in engineering terms, select a type of defense that suits the conditions of the situation, develop an operation plan, in accordance with which to conduct military exercises and fully deploy a defensive group troops, including forces intended for operations in the support zone.
By November 1939, on the Karelian Isthmus, where the main blow was expected, the 7th Army (commander - 2nd rank commander V.F. Yakovlev) was deployed from the Soviet side in advance, as part of the 19th and 50th rifle corps (9 rifle divisions, 3 tank brigades, 5 artillery regiments of the RGK). To support the ground forces from the air, the command of the Air Force of the Leningrad Military District had 28 aviation regiments, 7 separate aviation squadrons and 3 aviation detachments of spotters. In total, these units included 1,839 aircraft, including 484 bombers. Directly to support the offensive of the 7th Army, 1,633 aircraft were allocated, that is, 88.7% of the total. Of these, there were 149 long-range bombers (DB-3), 536 medium bombers (SB), as well as 238 TB-3, R-5 and SSS aircraft capable of carrying from 400 to 500 kg of bombs. In total, the command of the 7th Army had 930 bombers to destroy the Finnish long-term defensive structures. To cover these forces, there were 665 I-15, I-16 and I-153 fighters.
For the defense of the Karelian Isthmus, the Finnish command deployed the Karelian army in advance, consisting of 7 infantry divisions, 4 separate infantry divisions, one cavalry brigade and several separate infantry battalions. The aviation group of the Leningrad Military District was opposed by the Finnish Air Force, which, as of September 1, 1939, had 388 aircraft of various types, including only 63 fighters capable of withstanding Soviet bombers. Almost 200 aircraft were medium and light bombers, and 73 were training aircraft.
At that time, the Armed Forces of Finland, according to K. Mannerheim, were very weak. As their weaknesses, he points out:
“… - Almost negligible anti-aircraft and anti-tank defense.
The air force currently at its disposal accounts for only 50 percent of the number of aircraft that is supposed to be on the staffing table; there is not a single aircraft in reserve. However, the staffing is clearly insufficient, if we take into account the vastness of the territory of our country.
Armored vehicles include three dozen obsolete tanks purchased twenty years ago, after the First World War, and even used in it, and thirty modern light Vickers tanks, purchased a year ago, but still not armed.
Artillery is very weak in numbers.
Of the 15 divisions, three still lack weapons and equipment. The plan of replenishment / troops / ammunition has not yet been fulfilled. "
Thus, the Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus were significantly inferior to the Soviet troops, especially with regard to aviation. Even taking into account the fact that the Finns will send all their fighters against the aviation of the 7th Army, they will be inferior in number to Soviet fighters by more than 10 times. This means that Soviet aviation could easily seize air supremacy and provide targeted bombing at the enemy's long-term defensive structures.
The Soviet offensive on the Karelian Isthmus began on November 30, 1939 and consisted of five successive stages.
At the first stage, in 12 days (November 30 - December 12, 1939), units of the 7th Army, with the support of aviation and navy, only crossed the Finnish support zone and reached the front edge of the main defense zone at the front of 110 kilometers. The average rate of advance when overcoming the support strip was less than 4 kilometers per day. At the same time, the losses of the troops of the 7th Army were so significant that the Soviet command decided to make an operational pause. It lasted almost two months (December 13, 1939 - February 10, 1940). During this time, on the Karelian Isthmus, the Soviet command deployed an additional 13th army (corps commander V.D.Grendal) consisting of four (49, 150, 142 and 4th) rifle divisions, one tank brigade, two artillery regiments of the RGK and two aviation regiments, the commander of the 7th army was appointed commander of the 2nd rank K.A. Meretskov and prepared a new offensive operation.
The breakthrough of the enemy's main line of defense and access to the second line of defense was carried out within 10 days (February 11-21, 1940). He was also associated with heavy losses. This was again followed by a six-day operational pause (February 22-27, 1940), during which the advancing troops were regrouped. And only then began a seven-day (February 28 - March 7, 1940) offensive by the 7th and 13th armies on a 60-kilometer front from Lake Vuoksi to the Vyborg Bay, which completed the breakthrough of the second line of defense of the Finns.
Thus, it took Soviet troops 96 days to overcome the defense of the Karelian army with a total depth of up to 90 kilometers. The average rate of advance was extremely low and amounted to less than one kilometer per day. The theory of a deep offensive operation, developed and adopted in the Red Army in the 30s, was not implemented in practice. At the same time, the losses of the Soviet troops advancing on the Karelian Isthmus were very significant. So, from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940, the 7th Army lost almost 18.5 thousand people in killed, wounded and missing, the 13th Army - 20.7 thousand people. The losses of these associations by the wounded, frostbitten and sick amounted to 81.4 thousand and 68.5 thousand people, respectively.
In part, the reasons for the success of the Finnish defense were indicated by the commander of the 7th Army K.A. Meretskov in his report at a meeting at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the commanding staff to collect experience of hostilities against Finland, which took place from April 14 to 17, 1940 in Moscow. He referred to them:
The presence of a well-developed engineering support zone (pre-field), which "in its depth, fortification development and the strength of automatic fire, was, as it were, an independent defense zone."
Good camouflage and high stability of the stone and earth defensive structures of the main line of defense, "the increased resistance of which against 152-mm and even 203-mm shells did not immediately distinguish them from concrete."
Insufficient reconnaissance of enemy defenses.
The unwillingness of the Soviet troops to fight the enemy's minefields.
Unreadiness of sapper units to quickly restore bridges destroyed by the enemy.
The premature introduction of the main forces into battle, associated not with weakness, but with a delay in the advance guard.
Routine, mechanical input by the commanders into battle of the second echelons with a decrease in the pace of the offensive without taking into account the situation, the possibility of maneuver (bypass, coverage).
Insufficient artillery preparation for the attack. The offensive was carried out in the conditions of the continuing survivability of long-term firing structures. It was not possible to destroy the concrete pillboxes, as a result of which the infantry was cut off from the tanks.
Lack of experience in breaking through a defense saturated with long-term defensive structures. Moreover, in the latter case, he, referring directly to I.V. Stalin, said:
“Our charters are based on the experience of the maneuvering period / First / World War and did not give any idea of war in positional conditions with long-term structures. The world war in the West developed in positional conditions, and there is a wealth of experience in this direction, which was greatly developed after the world war, but this experience has not fully reached us.
The Germans and French published their archives of the World War a long time ago, but when they will be published in our country is completely unknown, and this has led to a delay in studying the rich experience, especially in trench warfare. There is no systematic literature on the experience of the war in Spain and China. If we were in such a position that we could not study foreign literature and know how military affairs were developing abroad, then intelligence officers had to help us in this regard, which they did not. And only when the second imperialist war began, we found out that not only the Finns, but also the Western states have deep lines of defense.
Despite the fact that we are late in studying the experience of the West, we still need to rather have documents and materials that give the experience of modern war. Now there is a war in Europe, we do not receive foreign newspapers and magazines and do not know what they write there. We get brief summaries only from our newspapers. This is, comrade. Stalin, and prevents us from following the development of military affairs. "
At the same time, neither K.A. Meretskov, nor any other of the military leaders present at this meeting did not pay attention to the fact that the Finns, despite the limited territory and time:
1. We found it possible to create a deep support zone (foreground) in front of our main defense zone, within which it was envisaged to conduct maneuvering operations with limited forces by various tactical methods.
2. Already at the first signs of a threat of war, a grouping of covering troops was deployed near the state border.
3. Made a decision on the upcoming defensive operation.
4. Conducted the exercise in accordance with the decision.
It is this, in combination with the factors indicated
K.A. Meretskov, and became the reason for the successful conduct of the first defensive operation by the Finns with the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war. K. Mannerheim later wrote: “We were able to transfer both the covering troops and the field army to the front on time and in excellent condition. We got enough time - 4–6 weeks - for the combat training of the troops, familiarizing them with the terrain, for continuing the construction of field fortifications, preparing for destructive work, as well as for laying mines and organizing minefields. "
At the same time, he believed that the army commander allocated insufficient forces to the support zone to solve the problem in the current situation. He writes: “Contrary to my instructions, the battles began to be fought with too weak forces, which made it impossible to delay the enemy for a long time. So we lost the brilliant opportunity to deliver even more sensitive blows to the advancing troops. This is all the more annoying, since the enemy, as we expected, moved in dense masses, bypassing forests, which were mined in many places. Rows of Russian soldiers moved under the cover of tanks along the roads we had destroyed and often got stuck in traffic jams. And then they became convenient targets for both infantry fire and artillery shelling, but ours did not have sufficient forces to effectively use these opportunities ... on the Uudenkirkko and Kivennapa directions, two regiments were attached, one for each direction. "
The low rate of advance of the Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus allowed the Finnish command to improve its techniques in the course of maneuvering defense. Mannerheim writes: “In conversations about how to alleviate the situation, the idea was born to form special anti-tank units, armed with bundles of grenades and mines. I gave the order to create such units in every company, battalion, regiment and division. And soon they received another simple but effective weapon - an incendiary bottle. Close battles against tanks in the winter war were the greatest manifestations of heroism, because in order to go to a tank, having only a bunch of grenades and a Molotov cocktail in your hands, both art and courage are required. "
No sooner had the Germans come to their senses from the attacks in the south, as in June 1944, they were attacked by the fourth Stalinist strike defeat of the Finnish army in the region of Karelia ... As a result, the Red Army defeated the Finnish troops, liberated Vyborg and Petrozavodsk, and liberated part of the Karelo-Finnish Republic.
Influenced by the successes of the Red Army, our allies were no longer able to further delay the opening of the second front. On June 6, 1944, the American-British command, with a delay of two years, began to land a large assault force in northern France.
On June 10, 1944, the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation began. The offensive of Soviet troops in Karelia in 1944 was the fourth "Stalinist blow". The strike was carried out by the troops of the Leningrad Front on the Karelian Isthmus and by the troops of the Karelian Front in the Svir-Petrozavodsk direction with the support of the Baltic Fleet, Ladoga and Onega military flotillas.
The strategic operation itself was subdivided into the Vyborg (June 10-20) and Svir-Petrozavodsk (June 21 - August 9) operations. The Vyborg operation solved the problem of routing the Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus. The Svir-Petrozavodsk operation was supposed to solve the problem of liberating the Karelo-Finnish SSR. In addition, local operations were carried out: Tuloksinskaya and Bjorkskaya landing operations. The operations were attended by the troops of the Leningrad and Karelian fronts, which had 31 rifle divisions, 6 brigades and 4 fortified areas. Soviet fronts numbered more than 450 thousand soldiers and officers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, more than 800 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1.5 thousand aircraft.
The fourth "Stalinist blow" solved several important tasks:
The Red Army provided support to the Allies. On June 6, 1944, the Normandy operation began, and the long-awaited second front was opened. The summer offensive on the Karelian Isthmus was supposed to prevent the German command from transferring troops to the west from the Baltic States;
It was necessary to eliminate the threat to Leningrad from Finland, as well as important communications that led from Murmansk to the central regions of the USSR; liberate the cities of Vyborg, Petrozavodsk and most of the Karelo-Finnish SSR from enemy troops, restoring the state border with Finland;
The headquarters planned to inflict a decisive defeat on the Finnish army and withdraw Finland from the war, forcing it to conclude a separate peace with the USSR.
Background.
After the successful winter-spring campaign of 1944, the Stavka determined the tasks of the summer campaign of 1944. Stalin believed that in the summer of 1944 it was necessary to clear the entire Soviet territory of the Nazis and restore the state borders of the Soviet Union along the entire line from the Black Sea to the Barents Sea. At the same time, it was obvious that the war would not end on the Soviet borders. It was necessary to finish off the German "wounded beast" in his own den and free the peoples of Europe from German bondage.
On May 1, 1944, Stalin signed a directive on the beginning of the preparation of the troops of the Leningrad and Karelian fronts for the offensive. Particular attention was paid to the need to conduct an offensive in the specific conditions of the area in which the Red Army had already had to wage a difficult and bloody struggle during the Winter War of 1939-1940. On May 30, the commander of the Karelian Front KA Meretskov reported on the progress of the preparation for the operation.
On June 5, Stalin congratulated Roosevelt and Churchill on their victory - the capture of Rome. The next day Churchill announced the start of the Normandy operation. The British Prime Minister noted that the start is good, the obstacles have been overcome, and large landings have successfully landed. Stalin congratulated Roosevelt and Churchill on the successful landing of troops in Northern France. Also, the Soviet leader briefly informed them about further action Red Army. He noted that according to the agreement at the Tehran conference, an offensive will be launched on one of the important sectors of the front in mid-June. The general offensive of the Soviet troops was planned for the end of June and July. On June 9, Joseph Stalin additionally informed the British Prime Minister that preparations for the summer offensive of the Soviet troops were being completed, and on June 10, an offensive would be launched on the Leningrad Front.
It should be noted that the transfer of the military efforts of the Red Army from south to north was unexpected for the German military-political leadership. Berlin believed that the Soviet Union was capable of carrying out large-scale offensive operations in only one strategic direction. The liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine and Crimea (the second and third Stalinist strikes) showed that the main direction in 1944 would be the southern one. In the north, the Germans did not expect a new big offensive.
Forces of the parties. THE USSR. For the Vyborg operation, the troops of the right wing of the Leningrad Front were involved under the command of Army General (since June 18, 1944, Marshal) Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov. On the Karelian Isthmus, the 23rd Army was already under the command of Lieutenant General A.I. Cherepanov (in early July, the army was headed by Lieutenant General V.I.Shvetsov). It was reinforced by the 21st Army of Colonel-General D. N. Gusev. Gusev's army was to play a major role in the offensive. Considering the power of the Finnish defense, in three years the Finns built powerful defensive fortifications here, strengthening the "Mannerheim line", the Leningrad front was significantly strengthened. Two artillery breakthrough divisions, an artillery and cannon brigade, 5 artillery divisions of special power, two tank brigades and seven self-propelled guns regiments were transferred to it.
The 21st Army under the command of Dmitry Nikolayevich Gusev included the 30th Guards, 97th and 109th Rifle Corps (a total of nine rifle divisions), as well as the 22nd fortified area. Gusev's army also included: the 3rd Guards Artillery Breakthrough Corps, five tank and three self-propelled artillery regiments (157 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations) and a significant number of separate artillery, sapper and other units. The 23rd Army under the command of Alexander Ivanovich Cherepanov included the 98th and 115th rifle corps (six rifle divisions), the 17th fortified area, one tank and self-propelled artillery regiment (42 tanks and self-propelled guns), 38 artillery divisions. In total, both armies had 15 rifle divisions and two fortified areas.
In addition, the front's reserve included the 108th and 110th rifle corps from the 21st Army (six rifle divisions), four tank brigades, three tank and two self-propelled artillery regiments (the total tank grouping of the front consisted of more than 300 armored vehicles) as well as a significant number of artillery. In total, more than 260 thousand soldiers and officers were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus (according to other sources - about 190 thousand people), about 7.5 thousand guns and mortars, 630 tanks and self-propelled guns and about 1 thousand aircraft.
From the sea, the offensive was supported and supported by coastal flanks: the Red Banner Baltic Fleet under the command of Admiral V.F. From the air, the ground forces were supported by the 13th Air Army under the leadership of Lieutenant General of Aviation S. D. Rybalchenko. The 13th Air Army was reinforced with the reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command and consisted of about 770 aircraft. The air army consisted of three bomber air divisions, two assault air divisions, the 2nd Guards Leningrad Air Defense Fighter Air Corps, a fighter air division and other units. The aviation of the Baltic Fleet consisted of about 220 aircraft.
The plans of the Soviet command. The terrain was difficult to pass - forests and swamps, which made it difficult to use heavy weapons. Therefore, the command of the Leningrad Front decided to deliver the main blow with the forces of Gusev's 21st Army in the seaside direction in the area of Sestroretsk and Beloostrov. Soviet troops were to advance along the northeastern coast of the Gulf of Finland. This made it possible to support the offensive of ground forces with naval and coastal artillery, and the landing of amphibious assault forces.
Cherepanov's 23rd Army was supposed to actively defend its positions in the first days of the offensive. After the 21st Army reached the Sestra River, Cherepanov's army also had to go on the offensive. The remaining three armies of the Leningrad Front, concentrated on the Narva sector of the Soviet-German front, had to intensify their actions at this time in order to prevent the transfer of German divisions from the Baltic to the Karelian Isthmus. In order to misinform the German command, a few days before the Vyborg operation, the Soviet command began to spread rumors about the imminence of a major Red Army offensive in the Narva area. For this, a number of intelligence and other activities were carried out.
Finland. The main forces of the Finnish army opposed the Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus: units of the 3rd corps under the command of Lieutenant General J. Siilasvuo and the 4th corps of General T. Laatikainen. The reserve of the commander-in-chief KG Mannerheim was also located in this direction. On June 15, they were united into the Karelian Isthmus task force. The group consisted of: five infantry divisions, one infantry and one cavalry brigade, the only Finnish armored division (located in the operational reserve in the Vyborg region), as well as a significant number of separate units. Three infantry divisions and an infantry brigade occupied the first line of defense, two divisions and a cavalry brigade occupied the second line. In total, the Finns had about 100 thousand soldiers (according to other sources - about 70 thousand people), 960 guns and mortars, more than 200 (250) aircraft and 110 tanks.
The Finnish army relied on a powerful defensive system that had been created on the Karelian Isthmus during the three years of the war, as well as on the improved Mannerheim Line. The deeply echeloned and well-prepared defense system on the Karelian Isthmus was named "Karelian shaft". The depth of the Finnish defense reached 100 km. The first line of defense was along the front line, which was established in the fall of 1941. The second line of defense was located approximately at a distance of 25-30 km from the first. The third line of defense ran along the old "Mannerheim line", which was improved and additionally reinforced in the Vyborg direction. Vyborg had a circular defensive belt. In addition, the rear, fourth line of defense was located outside the city.
In general, the Finnish army was well-equipped, had extensive experience in fighting in wooded, swampy and lake areas. The Finnish soldiers had high morale and fought hard. The officers supported the idea of "Greater Finland" (due to the annexation of Russian Karelia, Kola Peninsula and a number of other territories) advocated an alliance with Germany, which was supposed to help the Finnish expansion. However, the Finnish army was significantly inferior to the Red Army in guns and mortars, tanks, and especially in aircraft.
The offensive of the Red Army.
On the morning of June 9, the artillery of the Leningrad Front, coastal and naval artillery began to destroy the enemy's fortifications that had been discovered in advance. On the 20-kilometer sector of the front in front of the positions of Gusev's 21st Army, the density of ground artillery fire reached 200-220 guns and mortars. The artillery fired continuously for 10-12 hours. On the first day, they tried to destroy the long-term defensive structures of the enemy to the entire depth of the first line of defense. In addition, they waged an active counter-battery fight.
At the same time, Soviet aviation dealt a massive blow to enemy positions. The operation was attended by about 300 attack aircraft, 265 bombers, 158 fighters and 20 reconnaissance aircraft of the 13th Air Force and naval aviation. The intensity of the air strikes is indicated by the number of sorties per day - 1,100.
The air-artillery strike was very effective. Later, the Finns admitted that as a result of Soviet fire, many defensive structures and barriers were destroyed or severely damaged, and minefields were blown up. And Mannerheim wrote in his memoirs that the thunder of Soviet heavy guns was heard in Helsinki.
In the late evening, reinforced forward battalions of the 23rd Army began reconnaissance in force, trying to penetrate the Finnish defense system. Little success was achieved in some areas, but no progress was made in most areas. The Finnish command, realizing that this was the beginning of a major offensive, began to compact the battle formations.
In the early morning of June 10, Soviet artillery and aviation resumed attacks on Finnish positions. The ships of the Baltic Fleet and coastal artillery played an important role in the strikes in the seaside direction. The artillery preparation was attended by 3 destroyers, 4 gunboats, batteries of the Kronstadt and Izhora coastal defense sectors, and the 1st Guards Naval Railway Brigade. Naval artillery attacked Finnish positions in the Beloostrov area.
The effectiveness of the artillery preparation and air strikes on June 9-10 is evidenced by the fact that 130 pillboxes, armored caps, bunkers and other enemy fortifications were destroyed only in a small area in the Beloostrov region. Almost all of the barbed wire were demolished by artillery fire, anti-tank obstacles were destroyed, and minefields were blown up. The trenches were badly damaged, and the Finnish infantry suffered heavy losses. According to the testimony of the prisoners, the Finnish troops lost up to 70% of the composition of those units that occupied the forward trenches.
After a three-hour artillery barrage, units of the 21st Army went on the offensive. Artillery, after the completion of the artillery preparation, supported the advancing troops. The main blow was struck on the front section of the Rajajoki - Staryi Beloostrov - Hill 107. The offensive began successfully. The 109th Rifle Corps, under the command of Lieutenant General I.P. Alferov, advanced on the left flank - along the coast, along the railway to Vyborg and along the Primorskoe highway. In the center, along the Vyborg highway, the 30th Guards Corps of Lieutenant General N.P. Simonyak advanced. On the right flank in the general direction of Kallelovo, the 97th Rifle Corps of Major General M.M.Busarov was advancing.
Gusev's army broke through the enemy's defenses on the very first day (in Moscow, this success was celebrated with a salute). The 30th Guards Corps advanced 14-15 km in a day. Soviet soldiers liberated Old Beloostrov, Mainila, crossed the Sestra River. In other areas, the promotion was not so successful. The 97th corps went out to the Sister.
To develop the success, the command of the Leningrad Front created two mobile groups from tank brigades and regiments, they were attached to the 30th Guards and 109th Rifle Corps. On June 11, Soviet troops advanced another 15-20 km and reached the enemy's second line of defense. Near the village of Kivennape, which was a key node of the Finnish defense, a Finnish tank division counter-attacked the Soviet troops. Initially, her attack had some success, but the Finns were soon pushed back to their original positions.
On the same day, Cherepanov's 23rd Army began its offensive. The army struck with the forces of the 98th rifle corps of Lieutenant General G.I. Anisimov. In the afternoon, the right-flank 97th corps of the 21st Army was transferred to the 23rd Army. Instead of Gusev's 21st army, the 108th rifle corps was transferred from the front reserve.
The Finnish 10th Infantry Division, which held the defenses in the direction of the main attack, was defeated and suffered heavy losses. She fled to the second line of defense. On June 11, she was taken out to the rear for re-formation and replenishment. The Finnish command was forced to urgently transfer troops from the second line of defense and from the reserve (3rd infantry division, cavalry brigade - they were in the second line of defense, tank division and other units) into the defense zone of the 4th army corps. But this could no longer radically change the situation. Realizing that it would not be possible to hold the first line of defense, by the end of the day on June 10, the Finnish command began to withdraw troops to the second line of defense.
In addition, Mannerheim began to transfer troops to the Karelian Isthmus from other directions. On June 10, the Finnish commander ordered the transfer of the 4th Infantry Division and the 3rd Infantry Brigade from eastern Karelia. On June 12, the 17th division and the 20th brigade were sent to the Karelian Isthmus. Mannerheim hoped to stabilize the front on the second line of defense.
Liberation of Vyborg.Breakthrough of the second line of defense of the "Karelsky Val" (June 12-18).
June 12, 1944 the offensive of the Red Army stalled somewhat. The Finnish command transferred reserves, and the Finns, relying on the second line of defense, increased their resistance. The 23rd Army advanced only 4-6 km. In the 21st Army's offensive zone, units of the 109th Corps captured the settlement of Raivola, and units of the 30th Guards Corps stormed Kiwennapu. Formations of the 108th corps tried to immediately break through the second line of defense, but failed.
The Soviet command decided to pull up forces and transfer the main blow from the Srednevyborgskoye highway, where the Finns concentrated significant forces in the Kivennapi area, to the Primorskoye highway strip. In the Terijoki area, the forces of the 108th and 110th rifle corps were concentrated (the 110th corps was sent from the front reserve). The main artillery forces were also pulled up, including the 3rd Guards Breakthrough Artillery Corps. On June 13, there was a regrouping of forces and preparations for a powerful new strike. At the same time, units of Cherepanov's 23rd Army continued to attack Finnish positions and captured a number of enemy strongholds.
On the morning of June 14th, the Finnish fortifications inflicted a strong beat Soviet artillery and aviation. In the offensive zone of the 23rd army, the artillery preparation lasted 55 minutes, in the zone of the 21st army - 90 minutes. Units of the 109th Rifle Corps, which was advancing along the Vyborg railway, as a result of many hours of stubborn battle with the support of one of the front's mobile groups (1st Red Banner Tank Brigade) captured an important enemy stronghold of Kuterselka, and then Mustamyaki.
The Finns fiercely resisted all day and repeatedly launched counterattacks. At night, the Finnish command threw a tank division under the command of General R. Lagus into the attack. Initially, her offensive had some success, but by morning she suffered significant losses and retreated 5 km to the north. The Finns, having lost hope of holding the second line of defense, began to retreat to the third line of defense.
On June 15, units of the 108th Rifle Corps attacked along the Primorskoe Highway and the railway, they, with the support of tanks and self-propelled guns, were able to capture another well-fortified enemy defense center - the village of Myatskyulya by the end of the day. The settlement was protected by a powerful system of engineering structures, including armored caps, pillboxes and pillboxes. To destroy the enemy fortifications, the Soviet command used the heavy guns of Kronstadt and railway artillery. As a result, the second line of defense of the "Karelsky Val" was broken through in a section of 12 km. The Soviet command introduced a fresh 110th Rifle Corps into the resulting gap. This endangered the encirclement of the Finnish troops, who were still holding their defenses. On July 14-15, the troops of the 23rd army of Cherepanov also successfully attacked. Soviet troops finally passed the enemy's first line of defense, reached the second line and punched it in a number of sectors.
On June 15-18, units of the 21st Army advanced 40-45 km forward and reached the third zone of the enemy's defense. Parts of the 108th corps, with the support of tankers, took Fort Ino. On June 18, units of the corps broke through the defenses of the Finnish army and captured the city of Koivisto with a swift blow. As a result, the third line of defense of the "Karelian Wall" was partially broken through.
The Finnish army found itself in a critical situation in the Vyborg direction. The Finnish command urgently sent all available reserves and troops from southeastern Karelia to the Karelian Isthmus. The 17th Infantry Division was already on its way, the 11th and 6th Divisions were loaded onto the wagons. In addition, the 4th Division, an infantry brigade and several other units were expected to arrive. All the main forces were concentrated for the defense of Vyborg. The reserves - the armored division and the 10th Infantry Division, set aside for recovery and replenishment, were located west of Vyborg, where, as the Finnish command believed, the main blow of the Red Army would be delivered.
On June 18-19, 20 bombers and 10 fighters were transferred from Estonian airfields to Finland. On June 19, the Finnish government asked Adolf Hitler to urgently transfer six German divisions, equipment and aircraft to Finland. However, the Germans sent by sea only the 122nd Infantry Division and the 303rd Assault Gun Brigade, and aircraft from the 5th Air Fleet. In addition, the 200th German regiment, formed from Estonian volunteers, arrived in Finland. The German command could not give more, the Wehrmacht itself had a hard time.
At dawn on June 19, the batteries of the railway brigade opened fire on the city and the Vyborg station. Soviet troops went to storm the Finnish positions. To strengthen the blow of the 21st Army, the 97th Rifle Corps was again transferred to it. With the support of artillery, aviation and tanks, rifle units seized the most important bonds of enemy resistance and broke through the "Mannerheim line", reaching directly to Vyborg. By the end of the day, the enemy's third line of defense had been broken through at a front 50 km from the Gulf of Finland to Lake Muolan-Järvi.
At the same time, the 23rd Army's offensive continued. Soviet troops finally broke through the second line of enemy defense and captured Valkjärvi. The army went to the Vuoksa water system. Parts of the 3rd Finnish corps withdrew to the Vuoksa defensive line.
The Vyborg region was defended by significant forces. However, the Finnish command, bewildered by the fact that Soviet troops in the shortest possible time broke through all their main defensive lines, did not manage to properly organize the defense of the city. At night, Soviet sappers made passes through the minefields, and in the morning Soviet tanks with a landing party on board broke into Vyborg. Parts of the 20th Infantry Brigade, which formed the garrison of the city, stubbornly defended themselves, but in the afternoon they were forced to leave Vyborg. By the end of the day, Soviet soldiers completely liberated the city from enemy forces. However, the Soviet troops were able to advance further north from the city only slightly due to the approaching 10th and 17th Finnish infantry divisions, as well as German units.
The Finnish army lost the most important stronghold, which, according to the plans of the Finnish command, was to bind significant forces of the Red Army with stubborn defense for a long time. This defeat was a severe blow to the morale of the Finnish army.
Tanks MK IV "Churchill" on the streets of the liberated Vyborg
Continuation of the offensive. Marine landings.
In view of the successful development of the Vyborg operation, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to continue the offensive. On June 21, 1944, Directive No. 220119 "on the continuation of the offensive on the Karelian isthmus" was issued. The Leningrad Front received the task to reach the Imatra-Lappeenranta-Virojoki line by June 26-28.
On June 25, the Leningrad Front launched an offensive in a 30-kilometer stretch - from the Vuoksa River to the Vyborg Bay. The operation was attended by four rifle corps of the 21st Army (109th, 110th, 97th and 108th), a total of 12 rifle divisions. In addition, the 30th Guards Rifle Corps was in reserve. However, the Soviet rifle divisions were drained of blood and weakened by the previous fierce battles. Divisions numbered 4-5 thousand infantry on average. There were not enough tanks and other equipment. The Military Council of the Leningrad Front asked the Supreme Command Headquarters for significant reinforcements: two rifle corps, one engineer brigade, tanks and self-propelled guns to replenish the retired armored vehicles, as well as a significant amount of other weapons and ammunition. The headquarters of the Supreme Command refused to the front commander Govorov in strengthening the strike group, believing that the Leningrad Front had enough means to break through the enemy's defenses.
The Finnish army at this time was significantly strengthened. Reinforcements arrived from Karelia and German troops from the Baltic states. On June 24-25, the 17th, 11th and 6th Infantry Divisions appeared at the front. In addition, in the area from Vyborg to Lake Vuoksi, the defense was already held by three divisions - the 3rd, 4th and 18th, and two brigades - the 3rd and 20th. The 10th Infantry Division and the Panzer Division were in reserve. German troops arrived - the 122nd German Infantry Division and the 303rd Assault Gun Brigade. As a result, the Finnish command concentrated practically all available forces on well-prepared positions. In addition, Germany supplied Finland with 14 thousand faust cartridges before the Soviet offensive. Their widespread use has led to some deterrent effect. Germany also strengthened the aviation component of the Finnish army: at the end of June, 39 Messerschmitt Bf-109G fighters arrived, and 19 more aircraft arrived in July.
On June 25, 1944, after an hour of artillery preparation, the divisions of the 21st Army launched an offensive in the area north of Tali. For several days there were stubborn battles, the Finns constantly counterattacked. As a result, at the end of June, Soviet troops were able to advance only 6-10 km, and at the beginning of July, only 2 km. As Mannerheim wrote:
“We didn't even dare to hope for such an ending. It was a real miracle. "
The offensive of the 23rd Army.
The 23rd Army received the task of crossing Vuoksa in the Vuosalmi area and, advancing along the eastern bank of the river, reach the flank of the main Finnish grouping from the north-east. The army was supposed to attack Kexholm with part of its forces. However, units of the 23rd Army also did not achieve decisive success.
On June 20, the army reached the Vuoksa River. At the same time, parts of the Finnish 3rd Army Corps retained a foothold on the southern bank of the river. On the morning of July 4, a powerful artillery strike was struck at the enemy's bridgehead. However, despite the significant superiority in infantry, artillery and aviation, units of the 98th Rifle Corps were able to eliminate the enemy bridgehead only on the seventh day. The battle was notable for great ferocity - the commander of the Finnish 2nd Infantry Division I. Martola, which defended the bridgehead, at a critical moment asked permission to withdraw the remnants of the garrison, but the commander of the 3rd Army Corps, General J. Siilasvuo, ordered to fight to the last. As a result, almost all the defenders of the Finnish bridgehead were killed.
On July 9, after artillery preparation and under the direct cover of artillery fire, units of the 23rd Army launched an offensive. The 142nd Infantry Division successfully crossed the river and occupied a bridgehead up to 5-6 km along the front and up to 2-4 km in depth. In other sectors, it was not possible to cross the river, so units of the 10th and 92nd rifle divisions began to transfer to the bridgehead already captured by the 142nd rifle division.
The Finnish command urgently increased its grouping in this direction. Parts of the 15th Infantry Division and the 19th Infantry Brigade from the 3rd Corps, a Panzer Division and a Jaeger Brigade were transferred here. Units of the 3rd Infantry Division later arrived. On July 10, the Finnish army launched a counteroffensive, trying to destroy the Soviet bridgehead. Fierce fighting continued until 15 July. The Soviet troops withstood the blow and were even able to slightly expand the bridgehead, but they did not succeed in developing the offensive. After that, active hostilities were no longer carried out. Thus, although the 23rd Army did not break through the German defenses, it was able to create an opportunity for a further offensive in the Kexholm direction.
The Soviet offensive in late June - early July did not bring the expected success. On July 11, 1944, the troops of the Leningrad Front, advancing on the Karelian Isthmus, by order of the Headquarters, stopped active hostilities and went on the defensive. Part of the forces of the 21st and 23rd armies were withdrawn from the Karelian Isthmus to the Baltic states.
Simultaneously with the frontal offensive, the Soviet command tried to carry out a deep coverage of the Finnish army with the help of amphibious assault forces. At the end of June, the forces of the Baltic Fleet carried out the Bjork landing operation, and at the beginning of July they landed a landing on the islands of the Vyborg Bay.
After the liberation of Vyborg, the islands of the Bjork archipelago (Beryozovye Islands) were in the rear of the advancing Soviet troops, which gave the Finnish army the opportunity to land troops and reconnaissance groups in the rear of the Leningrad Front. In addition, these islands closed the entrance to the Vyborg Bay for the ships of the Baltic Fleet. The islands were defended by a garrison of 3 thousand soldiers with 40 guns. The Finnish command was aware of the threat to the garrison of the islands, so it strengthened the minefields in their area, set up reinforced patrols and strengthened the German-Finnish naval grouping (up to 100 ships and vessels).
On June 19, the front commander Govorov ordered the Baltic Fleet to occupy the islands. The operation was planned to be carried out by the forces of the fleet, since the ground forces were busy with battles in other directions. The direct control of the operation was carried out by the commander of the Kronstadt naval defense region, Vice-Admiral Yu. F. Rall. A brigade of skerry ships and the 260th separate brigade of the marines (about 1600 fighters) were subordinate to him.
On the night of June 20, a reinforced company of marines was landed on the island of Nerva. There was no enemy on the island, and he became a springboard for a further offensive. A coastal battery, several machine-gun bunkers and engineering barriers were erected on the island. On the same night, Soviet torpedo boats sank the German destroyer T-31 off the island. Half of the crew were killed or captured, the other half were rescued by Finnish boats.
On June 21, a reconnaissance detachment - a marine corps company - was landed on the island of Piisari (now North Birch Island), it occupied a bridgehead. Contrary to intelligence data, there was a strong enemy garrison on the island - the Soviet detachment was attacked by three infantry companies. The landing was reinforced with one more company. The Finnish command sent a detachment of ships to the island, which began shelling the Soviet bridgehead. However, with the help of the fleet and aviation, which sank the landing-artillery ship, the torpedo boat and another ship damaged, the attack of the enemy ship detachment was repelled. In addition, the Soviet Air Force played a large role in the defeat of the island's garrison - 221 sorties were made in a day. However, the battle dragged on, then Rall transferred the entire 260th Marine Brigade to the island, along with 14 guns. By dawn on June 23, the island was cleared of the enemy. On June 23, Soviet landings captured the islands of Björkö and Torsari, their garrisons offered little resistance and retreated.
The Finnish command, deciding that it was pointless to hold the islands and would lead to heavy losses, decided to evacuate the garrison. On June 25, Tuppuransaari Island was captured. The Finnish garrison, after a small skirmish, fled, leaving behind two guns and 5 machine guns. On June 27, without a fight, they occupied the island of Ruonti.
Thus, the goal of the landing operation was realized. The Baltic Fleet received a base for a further offensive. This was the first successful landing operation of the Baltic Fleet in the entire war. The victory was achieved due to the good interaction of the marines, navy and aviation.
35 guns and other property were seized on the islands. The Finns lost about 300 people, 17 ships and vessels were sunk, 18 were damaged. 17 enemy aircraft were shot down. Soviet troops on the island of Piisaari lost 67 people, 1 boat "small hunter" and 1 armored boat were sunk, 5 ships were damaged, 16 aircraft were killed or missing.
Landing on the islands of the Vyborg Bay.
On July 1-10, 1944, a landing was carried out on the islands of the Vyborg Bay. Front Commander Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov assigned the Baltic Fleet the task of clearing the islands in the Vyborg Bay from the enemy: Teikarsaari (Igryvy), Swonionsaari (Krepysh) and Ravansaari (Maly Vysotsky), etc. 1st Army LF to the northern coast of the Gulf - to strike in the rear of the Finnish group. The port of Koivisto became the initial base for the landing. The operation was in charge of the commander of the Kronstadt naval defense region, Vice-Admiral Yu. F. Rall. He was operatively subordinate to the command of the 59th Army.
The islands were defended by the 1st Finnish Cavalry Brigade. The adjacent coast of the Vyborg Bay was defended by the Finnish 2nd coastal defense brigade. These formations were part of the 5th Army Corps, the commander of which had at his disposal three Finnish and one German infantry divisions. After the loss of the Bjork Islands, the Finnish command hastily strengthened the defenses of the islands, and minefields were installed. Finnish and German ships and boats that had left the Bjork archipelago and transferred from remote areas of the Gulf of Finland were pulled to the coast. 131 coastal artillery guns were placed on the islands.
On July 1, an airborne detachment (one battalion and a reconnaissance group) was landed on Teikarsaari (Playful) island. Several tenders were damaged by the action of enemy coastal artillery, 1 armored "small hunter" and 1 tender were blown up by mines and died. The enemy immediately put up stubborn resistance. To support the garrison - two companies (350 people with several guns), two companies were transferred. We pulled up a detachment of German and Finnish ships (18 pennants, including two destroyers). During the naval battle, three Soviet torpedo boats and two enemy patrol boats were killed. In addition, the Finnish garrison was supported by coastal batteries with fire. As a result, the Soviet landing force was dropped into the sea. Soviet ships were able to pick up 50 people.
The main reason for the death of the landing was the poor organization of the interaction of the landing with the coastal artillery (it turned out to be ineffective), aviation (the support of the Air Force was insufficient). The riflemen were not prepared for amphibious operations, the detachment did not have its own artillery and little means of communication.
On July 4, three regiments of the 224th Infantry Division launched an assault on Teikarsaari, Suonionsaari, and Ravansaari. The Soviet command took into account the mistakes of July 1: the fleet constantly provided fire support, brought up ammunition and reinforcements; Soviet aviation carried out constant strikes against enemy positions (up to 500 sorties per day); coastal artillery fired continuously. Only the 1st Guards Red Banner Krasnoselskaya Naval Railway Artillery Brigade fired about 1,500 large-caliber shells. Four light tanks were even landed on Swanionsaari Island. By 17 o'clock the islands of Swanionsaari and Ravansaari were cleared of the enemy. On the same day and night from 4 to 5 June, several more small islands were captured.
Things took a bad turn on Teikarsaari. During the landing, a sea hunter was blown up by a mine and killed, where the regiment headquarters with the commander of the landing detachment was, communication was lost. For this reason, the assistance of aviation and coastal artillery turned out to be ineffective. In addition, the island was not completely blocked, which allowed the enemy to transfer reinforcements to it. In the course of a fierce battle, the enemy first managed to stop the advance of the landing, then cut it with a series of counterattacks. By the morning of July 5, the landing was defeated, only isolated centers of resistance resisted.
At the same time, fierce battles were going on at sea. The Finnish-German detachment attacked the Soviet ships. In the naval battle, 4 minesweepers and 1 landing barge were destroyed, several enemy ships were damaged. The Soviet Air Force also attacked enemy ships and reported the destruction of a gunboat, a patrol boat and two barges. The Baltic fleet lost, mainly due to mines, 4 armored boats, 1 small hunter, 1 patrol boat. Several more ships were damaged.
The Soviet command first tried to take the remnants of the landing to Teikarsaari. However, the fire of enemy artillery did not allow solving this problem. It was possible to take out only one small group (20 soldiers) with the commander of the 160th regiment, Major S. N. Ilyin. Then they decided to throw all their strength into the storming of the island. By 11 o'clock in the afternoon, under continuous heavy enemy fire, two rifle battalions landed on the island, by 16:30 - two more battalions and four light tanks. Aviation constantly struck enemy positions (more than 300 sorties were made). In order to prevent the transfer of Finnish troops from the mainland to the island, a detachment of ships was transferred to the northern tip of the island. This deprived the Finnish garrison of external support. The Finnish command decided to withdraw the garrison from the island. Soviet aviation and navy concentrated their efforts on combating enemy watercraft. 3 patrol boats, a gunboat, a patrol boat, 3 medium and small transports were destroyed and a significant number of ships were damaged. By evening, the island was cleared of the Finns. The last Finnish soldiers were swimming across the strait.
On July 7-8, the island of Hapenensaari (Podberezovy) was captured. The Finns stubbornly resisted, but after reinforcing the landing, they left the island. On July 7, an attempt was also made to land an assault force on the coast of the Gulf of Finland in the area of the Karpila Peninsula. But enemy coastal batteries sank two patrol boats and abandoned the landing. On July 9-10, the landing force captured the island of Koivusaari (Bereznik). In total, by July 10, Soviet troops occupied 16 islands. On July 10, the front command stopped the landing operation in connection with the beginning of negotiations between the USSR and Finland about peace.
In the future, the operation was never resumed. The 21st Army was unable to break through the Finnish defenses and the landing behind the lines of the Finnish group lost its meaning. The landing operation on the islands of the Vyborg Bay led to partial success, some of the islands remained in the hands of the enemy. The capture of the islands led to significant losses in people and ships. Killed 1400 paratroopers, 200 people from the crew of the ships, lost 31 ships. According to Finnish data, only the killed Soviet troops lost 3 thousand people. According to Soviet data, the Finns lost 2.4 thousand people killed, more than 110 guns and machine guns, 30 ships.
Results of the Vyborg operation.
In 1941-1944, the Finnish army together with the Wehrmacht besieged Leningrad. Even after the complete liberation of Leningrad (the first "Stalinist blow": the complete elimination of the blockade of Leningrad) from the blockade, Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus were only 30 km from the second capital of the USSR. As a result of the Vyborg operation, the Finnish troops were finally thrown back from Leningrad.
In the course of the operation, the armies of the Leningrad Front in just 10 days hacked several zones of the Finnish defense, which were strengthened for several years, advanced 110-120 km and occupied Vyborg.
The Finnish army suffered a heavy defeat, having lost more than 32 thousand people in the battles on June 10-20 (according to other sources - 44 thousand). To stabilize the front and prevent a military catastrophe, the Finnish command had to urgently transfer troops from southern and eastern Karelia, which greatly facilitated the second stage of the strategic Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation - the Svir-Petrozavodsk operation.
The Finnish government, realizing that a military defeat was imminent, began to look for the possibility of concluding peace with the USSR. Already on June 22, Finland, through the Swedish embassy, turned to the USSR with a request for peace.
This operation showed the greatly increased skill and power of the Red Army, in a few days it broke through several strong enemy lines of defense, including the infamous Mannerheim Line. Even the most powerful defense lost out to the skillful interaction of infantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft.
Svirsk-Petrozavodsk operation.
On June 21, 1944, the second stage of the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation began - the Svir-Petrozavodsk operation. The troops of the Karelian Front, as well as the forces of the Ladoga and Onega military flotillas, went on the offensive. The operation ended with the complete victory of the Soviet troops, they advanced 110-250 kilometers in the western and southwestern directions, liberating most of the Karelo-Finnish SSR from the enemy. The prerequisites were created for Finland to withdraw from the Second World War.
Offensive plan.
On February 28, 1944, the commander of the Karelian Front, Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov, presented the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command the general concept of the upcoming offensive. The main blow was planned to be delivered in the Kandalash direction towards the Finnish border and further along the territory of Finland to the Gulf of Bothnia, in order to cut off the main forces of the Finnish army from the German grouping in Lapland. In the future, it was planned, if necessary (Finland will continue to persist), to develop an offensive in a southern direction, to central Finland. At the same time, they wanted to deliver an auxiliary blow in the Murmansk direction. The Supreme Command headquarters approved the plan of the Karelian Front and until the end of spring Meretskov's troops were preparing for its implementation.
However, then, at the suggestion of the 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff A.I. Antonov, it was decided to change the general idea of the offensive of the Karelian Front. First, they decided to defeat the Finnish army in order to bring Finland out of the war, and only then take an offensive against the German group in Lapland. The Supreme Commander approved the plan. At the same time, in the Petsamo and Kandalaksha region, the troops had to continue preparing for the offensive in order to create for the enemy the appearance of an impending offensive. The new offensive plan involved the delivery of two powerful successive strikes: first, the troops of the right flank of the Leningrad Front on the Karelian Isthmus were to go on the offensive, then the forces of the left wing of the Karelian Front in southern Karelia.
On May 30, Meretsky was summoned to the Headquarters of the Main Military Commission, where he was given a new task - to defeat the Finnish troops in southeastern Karelia. The front was supposed to go on the offensive on 25 June. Meretskov tried to defend the original plan, since it was necessary as soon as possible to regroup the forces from the Kandalaksha and Murmansk directions to the Petrozavodsk ones. However, the Headquarters insisted on its own way. The troops of the left flank of the Karelian Front were to deliver the main blow from the area of Lodeynoye Pole. The troops of the Karelian Front, with the support of the Onega and Ladoga military flotillas, received the task of breaking through the Finnish defenses, crossing the Svir River and, developing an offensive in the directions of Olonets, Vidlitsa, Pitkyaranta, Sortavala and part of the forces to Petrozavodsk (7th Army), and Medvezhyegorsk, Porismaozero, Kuolismaozero (32nd Army). The troops of the Karelian Front were to defeat the Finnish Svirsk-Petrozavodsk grouping, liberate Petrozavodsk, the Karelo-Finnish SSR, and reach the state border in the Kuolisma area. At the same time, the forces of the right flank of the Karelian Front had to demonstratively continue preparations for an offensive in the Petsamo and Kirkenes area.
The main role was assigned to the 7th Army under the command of Major General Alexei Nikolaevich Krutikov. It was supposed to deliver its main blow to the enemy from the Lodeynoye Pole area, force the Svir and advance along the coast of Lake Ladoga, northwest to the state border. The 7th Army was to occupy Olonets, Vidlitsa, Salmi, Pitkyaranta and Sortavala. Part of the forces of the 7th Army delivered an auxiliary blow to Petrozavodsk.
The offensive of Krutikov's army was to be facilitated by the Ladoga Flotilla under the command of Rear Admiral Viktor Sergeevich Cherokov. In addition, in the interfluve of Vidlitsa and Tuloksa, it was planned to land a landing in the composition of two brigades of the marines in order to cut the strategically important railroad and highways. On Lake Onega, the 7th Army's offensive in the Petrozavodsk direction was facilitated by the Onega military flotilla under the command of Captain 1st Rank Neon Vasilyevich Antonov.
The 32nd Army under the command of Lieutenant General Philip Danilovich Gorelenko was to strike north of Lake Onega. The army received the task of breaking through the enemy's defenses in the Medvezhyegorsk direction, advancing in the direction of Porosozero, Kuolisma, crushing the Masselian operational group of the Finnish army, and partly supporting the liberation of Petrozavodsk. The remaining three armies of the Karelian Front (14th, 19th and 26th) received the task, in the event of the transfer of German troops from Lapland to southern Karelia, to strike at the enemy on the right wing of the front.
Forces of the parties.
THE USSR. Before the start of the operation, the 7th Army was significantly strengthened at the expense of the reserves of the front and the reserves of the Supreme Command Headquarters. In the direction of the main attack at Lodeynoye Pole, there were two arrow corps: the 4th rifle corps of Major General P.V. Gnidin (two divisions, one division - the 368th rifle division, operated in the eastern sector, in the Ascension area), 37- 1st Guards Rifle Corps of Lieutenant General P.V. Mironov (three divisions). On the Petrozavodsk direction, the 99th rifle corps of Major General S.P. Mikulsky (three divisions) and the 368th rifle division of the 4th corps were supposed to attack. Two brigades of the Marine Corps were to take part in the landing operation. In the second echelon of Krutikov's army there were two corps - the 94th rifle corps of I.I.Popov (three divisions), the 127th light rifle corps of Major General Z.N. Alekseev (three brigades), and one marine brigade. In addition, the army included the 150th and 162nd fortified areas, the 7th Guards and 29th tank brigades (131 tanks), the 92nd regiment of amphibious tanks (40 tanks), 6 separate guards self-propelled artillery regiments ( more than 120 self-propelled guns), two battalions of amphibious vehicles (200 vehicles), the 7th Guards Artillery Breakthrough Division, as well as a significant number of other formations.
Gorelenko's 32nd army was to strike with the forces of three rifle divisions (289th, 313rd and 176th) and one tank regiment (30 vehicles). From the air, the offensive of the Karelian Front was supported by the 7th Air Army under the command of Major General of Aviation Ivan Mikhailovich Sokolov. It consisted of 875 aircraft. But, since the army provided air cover for the entire Karelian front, the offensive could be supported by 588 machines. Therefore, the 13th Air Army of the Leningrad Front had to support the breakthrough of the enemy's defense line on the Svir River with part of its forces. The coordination of the actions of the two air fronts was carried out by the representative of the Headquarters, Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov.
In total, the troops of the front, which were allocated for the offensive, numbered more than 180 thousand soldiers (according to other sources, more than 200 thousand people), about 4 thousand guns and mortars, 588 aircraft, more than 320 tanks and self-propelled guns.
Finland. By order of Mannerheim, in December 1941, the Finnish army began to build a deeply echeloned defense system on the isthmus between Lake Ladoga and Onega lakes. Its construction and improvement continued until the summer of 1944. The first Finnish defensive zone ran along the northern bank of the Svir and around the bridgehead on the southern bank of the river in the section from Oshta to Svirstroi. It consisted of two or three tranches. The trenches were covered with barbed wire in several rows. In many areas along the banks of the Svir River, the Finns flooded rafts or special slingshots with barbed wire to make it difficult to cross the water barrier. Minefields were set up in the areas that were most convenient for the landing. Particularly powerful defensive formations were in the Lodeynoye Pole sector.
The second line of defense ran along the Obzha - Megrera - Megrozero line. It consisted of several strong strongholds located on the possible directions of the Red Army's offensive. A powerful defense center was located in the Megrozero area, where one flank rested against the forest, where there were no roads, and the other flag was covered by a swamp. In front of the front edge were anti-tank ditches, granite holes and minefields. Machine-gun nests were placed on the heights. To protect the infantry from air strikes and artillery fire, reinforced concrete shelters were erected with supplies of water, provisions, ammunition, provided with telephone communications and electricity. An even more powerful defense unit was the Sambatux. Here, in addition to bunkers, there were many long-term reinforced concrete firing points (five per one kilometer of the front).
In addition, there were strong rear positions. They were located along the banks of the Tuloksa rivers (it went to the Petrozavodsk region), Vidlitsa (to Syamozero) and Tulemayoki. Already near Finland itself, the Pitkäranta-Loimola defensive line was underway. The defense of the Finnish army was facilitated by a fairly developed network of highways and railways. The Medvezhyegorsk - Petrozavodsk - Svirstroy railway worked normally. The Lodeynoye Pole - Olonets - Vidlitsa highway was in good condition.
On the isthmus between Lake Onega and Segozero, the Finnish army prepared two main defensive lines and several auxiliary lines in the rear. The first line of defense was along the Povenets - White Sea-Baltic Canal - Khizhozero - Maselskaya - Velikaya Guba line. The second Finnish line of defense ran along the Pindushi - Medvezhyegorsk - Chebino - Kumsa line. One of the auxiliary lines passed along the Kudamguba - Porosozero line.
On the isthmus between the Ladoga and Onega lakes, the defense was held by the Finnish operational group "Olonets" under the command of Lieutenant General P. Talvel. It consisted of the 5th and 6th Army Corps, the Ladoga Coastal Defense Brigade and some separate units. On the bridgehead, on the southern bank of the Svir River, the positions were occupied by units of the 11th and 7th Infantry Divisions, from Podporozhye to Lake Ladoga - the 5th and 8th Infantry Divisions, the 15th Infantry Brigade. The 20th Infantry Brigade was in reserve. On the rear lines, closer to Finland, units of the 4th and 6th infantry divisions were stationed (they will soon be transferred to the Vyborg direction).
On the isthmus between Lake Onega and Segozero, the Masel operational group held the defense. It consisted of the 2nd Army Corps of General E. Mäkinen (one infantry division and three brigades), 3 separate infantry battalions and the Onega coastal defense brigade. In total, the Svirsk-Petrozavodsk enemy grouping, according to Soviet data, had about 130 thousand people in its composition (about 76 thousand soldiers against the 7th army and 54 thousand - against the 32nd army), about 1 thousand guns and mortars, 30 tanks and armored cars. From the air, Finnish troops supported 203 aircraft from the German 5th Air Fleet and the Finnish Air Force.
Before the offensive.Weakening of the Finnish defense.
The Finnish troops had a powerful defense, but before the advance of the Karelian Front, it was significantly weakened by the transfer of forces to the Karelian Isthmus. On June 9-10, the Leningrad Front struck. Already on June 10, the first line of defense was broken. On June 14-15, the second line of defense was broken through. The Finnish command urgently began to transfer reserves and troops from other sectors of the front to the Karelian Isthmus. The situation was so difficult that the Finnish commander-in-chief Mannerheim was ready to abandon the defense of Karelia in order to free up troops to defend the Vyborg direction.
On June 12, the first units of the 4th Infantry Division will arrive on the Karelian Isthmus. Then units of the 17th Infantry Division and the 20th Infantry Brigade were transferred to the Karelian Isthmus, followed by the 6th and 11th divisions and the management of the 5th Army Corps. Considering the weakening of the Svirsk-Petrozavodsk grouping, the impossibility of reinforcing it with reserves in the event of an offensive by the Red Army (all the main forces were thrown against the advancing armies of the Leningrad Front), and intelligence data on the imminent enemy offensive in Karelia, Mannerheim decided to start a covert withdrawal of troops to the second zone defense. On the isthmus between the Ladoga and Onega lakes, the Finns had to retreat from the bridgehead in the section Onega Lake - Svirstroy beyond the Svir River.
The headquarters, having received the reconnaissance of the transfer of part of the enemy forces to the Karelian Isthmus and the regrouping of the Finnish troops, instructed the KF to start the offensive earlier than planned, on June 21. On June 20, frontline reconnaissance spotted the retreat of Finnish troops from the southern bridgehead of the Svir River and the 32nd Army's defense zone. Meretskov gave the order for an immediate transition to the offensive. By the end of June 20, the forces of the 7th Army reached Svir, and units of the 32nd Army on the night of the 21st crossed the White Sea-Baltic Canal and moved towards Medvezhyegorsk.
Air strike.
One of the important prerequisites for the success of the Svir-Petrozavodsk operation was the destruction of the dam of the Svir-3 hydroelectric power station. The aviation of the Baltic Fleet was supposed to solve this problem. The hydroelectric power station had to be destroyed in order to reduce the water level in the Svir above the dam and thereby facilitate the task of forcing the river by the 368th rifle division and to remove the threat of flooding of the area by the Finns when the 7th army crossed the Svir in the lower reaches.
The strike was supposed to be delivered by 55 bombers. Their crews were trained at a specially prepared training ground. Then the planes were concentrated in the area of Novaya Ladoga. On June 20, at 10:05 am, the bomber group delivered the first powerful blow to the dam. 250-, 500- and 1000-kg bombs were dropped, along with them, sea mines were thrown off. In total, naval aviation made 123 sorties. 64 large-caliber bombs and 11 mines were dropped. The problem was successfully solved. The dam was destroyed, and the water rampart literally swept away the Finnish fortifications, which were located near the coast below the dam.
On June 21, at 8 o'clock in the morning, a powerful artillery preparation began. The Finnish positions were struck by guards mortars. At the same time, several hundred bombers and attack aircraft appeared over the Finnish positions. As Meretskov recalled, massive fire struck the Finns in the second and third trenches, tanks and self-propelled guns were fired on the opposite bank by direct fire. There came a short break and rafts with soldiers sailed from the Russian coast. The lurking Finnish firing points, those that survived, opened fire on the troops crossing the river. However, it turned out that it was a military trick - scarecrows were put on rafts and boats, they were led by 16 hero-volunteers. Subsequently, they were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The Finns gave out their firing positions. Soviet observers spotted the locations of enemy firing points. Targeted fire was opened at them. Another 75 minutes of artillery preparation (in general, the artillery preparation lasted three and a half hours) and the second powerful air strike. The enemy positions were attacked by 360 bombers and attack aircraft of the 7th and 13th air armies.
The crossing of the Svir began at about 12 noon. The reconnaissance echelon crossed the river in five minutes and began to make passes through the Finnish barriers. Two hundred amphibians (they made several voyages) and other floating craft entered the river in front of the stunned enemy, who suffered heavy losses. Finnish rear guards fired rifle and machine-gun fire, fired mortar batteries with several shots, while the main forces hurriedly retreated to the second line of defense.
The first to cross the river were the soldiers of the 98th and 99th Guards Divisions of Mironov's corps and 114th and 272nd divisions of Gnidin's corps. They were supported by amphibians and amphibious tanks of the 92nd regiment. By 16 o'clock, Soviet troops occupied a bridgehead 2.5-3 km deep. By evening, the sappers had built two bridges and twenty ferry crossings. Heavy weapons were being transferred over them. By the end of the day, a bridgehead was occupied on an area 12 km wide and 6 km deep.
On June 22, from the Ladoga Lake side, the river steamers Titan, Khasan, Vesyegorsk, Shiman and Gorlovka were brought into Svir. Under enemy fire, they passed through the minefields up the river to the place of the breakthrough and began to transfer troops and equipment. On June 22, the 7th Army continued its offensive. The Finnish command withdrew forces to the second line of defense, resisting with strong rearguards, which blocked up and mined roads, and blew up the crossings. The 368th rifle division, with the support of the Onega flotilla, crossed the Svir in the Ascension area. The 99th Rifle Corps liberated Podporozhye and also crossed the river. By the end of the day, the Svir was forced along its entire length.
The headquarters expressed dissatisfaction with the slow development of the offensive of the Karelian Front, although it had a fourfold superiority over the enemy. The 7th Army was tasked with liberating Olonets no later than June 23-24 and occupying Pitkyaranta on July 2-4. The right wing of the army was to liberate Petrozavodsk as soon as possible. The 32nd Army was supposed to liberate Medvezhyegorsk on June 23. At the same time, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided that the main task had been solved - the enemy's front had been hacked, the Finnish group was weakened by the transfer of forces to the Vyborg area and was retreating, therefore, the 94th rifle corps from the second echelon of the army, which did not take part in the operation, was withdrawn to the reserve.
Tuloksin landing operation and liberation of Petrozavodsk.
On June 23, in the direction of the main attack of the 7th Army, the divisions of the 4th and 37th corps continued their planned offensive. Soviet soldiers entered the area of the enemy's second line of defense: Sambatuksa - Megrera - Sarmagi - Obzha. Parts of the 99th Rifle Corps, after crossing the Svir in the Podporozhye region, did not meet organized resistance of the Finnish troops and quickly moved along the forest road to Kotkozero and to the Petrozavodsk-Olona highway, this created a threat to envelop the Finnish group.
Landing operation.
At that moment, the front command decided to start an amphibious operation - with the help of the Ladoga flotilla, to land troops in the rear of the Finnish group in the interfluve of Vidlitsa and Tuloksa. The paratroopers were supposed to intercept the highway and railway that ran along the shores of Lake Ladoga, deprive the enemy of the possibility of transferring reserves, transporting ammunition, and also quickly retreating. With the successful development of the operation, it became possible to cover the "Olonets" operational group.
In the first echelon of the airborne detachment was the 70th Marine Rifle Brigade under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A.V. Blak (more than 3.1 thousand people). In the second echelon there was the 3rd separate marine brigade under the command of engineer-captain 1st rank S.A. Gudimov (more than 2 thousand soldiers). Almost the entire Ladoga flotilla was involved in the operation - 78 ships and boats. The flotilla was divided into four detachments: a troop transport unit, a landing craft detachment, a security detachment, an artillery support detachment (5 gunboats, 2 armored boats). The operation was personally led by the commander of the flotilla, Rear Admiral V.S.Cherokov. From the air, the landing was supported by the planes of the 7th Air Army and the aviation of the Baltic Fleet. In total, three assault regiments, two bomber regiments, one fighter regiment, reconnaissance aircraft (230 aircraft in total) were involved. The original landing base was Novaya Ladoga.
Taking into account the nature of the enemy's defenses, the coast was defended by the Finnish Ladoga coastal defense brigade, whose units were scattered at a great distance from each other (the Finnish command hoped for the possibility of a quick transfer of troops from other directions), the operation was well prepared and sufficient forces were prepared for the landing. Before the landing, reconnaissance was carried out, the organization of the landing and support of the landing battalions with ship fire was well developed. Each unit had spotters of fire with radio stations, duplicated communication channels were prepared. Each connection was assigned certain ships that supported them with fire. In addition, the commander of the landing detachment had his own artillery headquarters and could concentrate the fire of the artillery support detachment in any threatened sector.
On June 23, 1944, at 5 o'clock in the morning, the Ladoga flotilla began artillery preparation. At 5:30 am, the strike was struck by aircraft. At about 6 o'clock, ships and vessels, under cover of a smoke screen, approached the shore and began to disembark the paratroopers. At the same time, the gunboats continued to iron out the enemy's positions. In four hours, two echelons of the 70th Marine Brigade landed. During the day, the entire brigade with reinforcement units was landed - 3,667 people with 30 guns, 62 mortars, 72 anti-tank guns, 108 heavy and light machine guns.
For the Finns, this operation came as a complete surprise. Initially, there was practically no resistance. During the landing, the landing party lost only 6 people wounded. A bridgehead was captured 4.5 km along the front and 2 km in depth. The paratroopers cut the Olonets-Pitkyaranta road. At the landing site, an enemy artillery unit was defeated, 3 guns, 10 tractors and vehicles with ammunition were captured.
However, the Finnish command quickly orientated itself and began hastily transferring reinforcements to the threatened area. Finnish counterattacks have already begun in the afternoon. The Finns tried to throw the troops into the lake. Initially, the Finnish attacks were chaotic and scattered, but soon the onslaught intensified and took on a well-organized character. Units of the Finnish 15th Infantry Brigade and a separate Jaeger Battalion, and then an armored train, were transferred to the landing site of the Soviet assault force. A stubborn battle went on all night. The Soviet Air Force made 347 sorties per day. Finnish aviation tried to strike at the Ladoga flotilla. A group of enemy aircraft (14-18 aircraft) attacked the landing ships in the morning, but was repelled by air cover fighters. The Finns managed to slightly damage only one landing craft.
On June 24, the situation worsened significantly, and a crisis situation arose in the middle of the day. The Finns were constantly receiving reinforcements, and their firepower increased significantly. Finnish troops tried to destroy the landing force with a decisive blow. The landing force began to experience a shortage of ammunition. Due to worsening weather, the delivery of ammunition from Novaya Ladoga was difficult, as was air support. But, despite the bad weather conditions, the pilots were still able to make several flights and dropped containers with ammunition onto the bridgehead. Rear Admiral Cherokov, in order to support the landing, ordered the ships to come close to the shore and maximize the fire on the enemy, as well as transfer part of the available ammunition to the shore. As a result, the landing party withstood the enemy's blow.
Realizing that the landing would be defeated without reinforcements, the Soviet command decided to transfer the second echelon. Despite the stormy weather, the formations of the 3rd Separate Marine Brigade were landed ashore. As a result, the total number of the airborne detachment increased to 5 thousand soldiers. The situation changed in favor of the Soviet troops. They not only repelled all enemy attacks, but also expanded the bridgehead. At night and in the morning of June 26, the remaining units of the 3rd brigade, artillery and anti-aircraft regiments (59 guns, 46 mortars) were landed on the bridgehead. Given that the 7th Army continued to successfully advance, the Finnish command abandoned further attacks on the bridgehead and focused on the evacuation of troops.
By cutting off the railway and highway to Pitkärantu, Soviet troops significantly worsened the Finnish troops' ability to retreat. The Finns had to abandon heavy equipment, property, supplies and retreat along country roads, bypassing the bridgehead. On the night of June 27-28, the landing force linked up with the advancing units of the 7th Army, and took part in the liberation of Vidlitsa. The Ladoga Flotilla continued to support units of the 7th Army.
As a result, the Tuloksin landing operation became one of the most successful landing operations of the Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic War. The operation ended in victory and achieved all of its goals. The Ladoga Naval Flotilla was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for this success. Five marines became Heroes of the Soviet Union, many soldiers were awarded orders and medals.
The landing of a large assault force in the rear of the Finnish grouping and bypassing the main line of defense by units of the 99th Rifle Corps created a real threat to encircle the 5th and 8th Finnish infantry divisions. Therefore, the Finnish command decided to withdraw the troops to the western bank of Vidlitsa.
On June 25, the 4th Rifle Corps captured the powerful nodes of enemy resistance - the settlements of Sarmagi and Obzha. On June 26-27, corps units crossed Tuloksa and joined up with the landing party. The troops of the 37th Guards Rifle Corps liberated Olonets on June 25. The next day, the guards occupied Nurmolitsy. On June 28-29, units of the Guards Corps, overcoming the resistance of the 8th Finnish Infantry Division of the enemy, made their way to the Torosozero area, and on June 30 reached the Vidlitsa River. At this time, units of the 99th Rifle Corps were fighting in the Vedlozero area. On the right flank of the 7th army, units of the 368th rifle division, 69th rifle brigade and 150th fortified area successfully advanced from Ascension to Sheltozero and Petrozavodsk.
With the withdrawal of the 7th Army's troops to the line of the Vidlitsa River, the first stage of the offensive in the Svir-Olonets direction was completed. The Olonets enemy grouping suffered heavy losses, lost three defensive lines, retreated across the Vidlitsa River and took up defenses on its western bank. The Finnish troops were forced to retreat by a roundabout route and country roads, abandoning some of their heavy weapons and various property, but at the same time they avoided defeat and retained their combat effectiveness.
On the offensive sector of Gorelenko's 32nd Army, the Soviet troops were opposed by the 1st and 6th Infantry Divisions and the 21st Infantry Brigade. The Finns built a powerful defense, which, like on the Svir, had many bunkers, reinforced concrete firing points with armored caps, several lines and trenches, barbed wire fences, minefields. The forest roads were blocked by log heaps. The tank-hazardous directions are covered with granite obolb. At the same time, the Soviet shock group - the 289th, 313rd and 176th rifle divisions, was approximately equal in strength to the Finnish group. True, the Finns did not have tank formations, and the 32nd Army had a tank regiment.
On June 20, Gorelenko ordered a reconnaissance in force in the sector of the 313rd and 289th divisions. As a result, the army command received information that the Finnish troops were regrouping and preparing to withdraw. The troops of the 32nd Army were ordered to pursue the enemy along the entire front. On the night of June 20-21, the forward battalions of the 313rd Infantry Division crossed the White Sea-Baltic Canal and with a sudden blow drove the Finns out of the first line of defense. Then the main forces of the division crossed the channel.
On June 21, Soviet soldiers liberated Povenets and, developing the offensive, reached Medvezhyegorsk. At the same time, parts of the 176th and 289th rifle divisions, after a short artillery barrage, wedged into the enemy's defenses and in the evening reached Lake Vozhema and Malyga station, 14 km south of Maselskaya station.
The fierce battle for Medvezhyegorsk went on for almost a day. Only when the 289th divisions came here from the northern direction on the morning of June 23, a joint blow from the east and north managed to liberate the city from the enemy. By the end of June 24, the entire Finnish Medvezhyegorsk fortified area was cleared of the enemy. Retreating, the Finnish troops, as usual, destroyed bridges, crossings, destroyed roads, mined not only highways, but also forest paths, and made blockages. In the first five days of fighting alone, units of the 32nd Army had to build 26 bridges, restore 153 km of roads and neutralize more than 7,000 mines.
After the liberation of Medvezhyegorsk, the 313rd division continued its offensive in two main directions. Two regiments moved in the direction of Yustozero - Koikory - Spasskaya Guba and further to Suoyoki, Suoyarvi. Then the Soviet troops had to reach the state border. One rifle regiment was supposed to clear the railway and highways in the Medvezhyegorsk - Kondopoga section. From there, the regiment had to turn to Spasskaya Guba in order to connect with the main forces of the division. However, part of the forces of the 313rd division continued the offensive in the Petrozavodsk direction.
Parts of the 176th and 289th divisions were advancing in the direction of Porosozero - Luisvara - Kuolisma. This direction abounded with small lakes and swamps, there were no good communication routes. Finnish troops skillfully used all the benefits of the terrain, quickly erected field fortifications, especially on narrow inter-lake defiles. To bypass them, it was required to walk tens of kilometers along the impassable, virgin forest. It took a long time. Therefore, the offensive proceeded more slowly than planned. So, Soviet troops only reached the Yustozero region by June 30.
Liberation of Petrozavodsk. Continuation of the offensive of the 7th Army (June 28 - August 9).
By the end of June 26, the troops of the right wing reached the Ladva station. The Onega military flotilla was active. On the morning of June 28, she landed a landing in the area of the Uiskaya Bay (about 20 km south of Petrozavodsk). Soldiers of the 31st separate battalion of the marines under the command of I.S. Molchanov immediately liberated the village of Derevyannoye and intercepted the highway, cutting off the escape route for the Finnish troops.
At this time, intelligence reported that the Finns were not going to defend Petrozavodsk and were actively mining and destroying the city. Therefore, the command decided to divide the forces of the landing squad. Part of the battalion remained a barrier on the highway in Derevyannoye, another part moved along the road to the city, and the third part was again loaded onto ships and went at full speed to Petrozavodsk. At about one o'clock in the afternoon, the Marines were dropped off in the city. Petrozavodsk was liberated, the Finns surrendered it without a fight. In the evening, another unit of the Marine Corps battalion arrived in the city. In the city, the Soviet marines saw a terrible picture; they freed more than 20 thousand people from five concentration camps.
On June 29, units of the 368th division also reached the city, formations of the 313rd division of the 32nd army approached from the north. As a result, Soviet troops established control over the strategically important Kirov railway along its entire length. It should be noted that the fascist Finnish troops severely destroyed the city. Industrial enterprises, power plants, bridges were destroyed. In just a week, sappers removed more than 5,000 mines.
On July 2, the 7th Army continued its offensive on the Vidlitsa River. The blow was delivered by three corps: the 4th Rifle Corps near the shores of Lake Ladoga, the 37th Guards Rifle Corps in the center, and the 99th Rifle Corps on the right flank, at Vedlozero. By July 3, the Finnish defense was broken and the shock units of the 4th and 37th Guards Rifle Corps reached the next defensive zone of the enemy, it passed along the rather wide Tulemajoki River. Soviet troops on the move captured a powerful enemy defense center - the village of Salmi. However, it was possible to break through the Finnish defense only after three days of fierce fighting. The guardsmen were able to force the Tulemayoki and advance another 15-20 km.
On July 6, the Soviet command threw reserves into battle - the 27th light rifle corps, reinforced by the 7th tank brigade. The corps struck in the area between the 4th and 37th corps and was supposed to reach Pitkyaranta. On July 10, Soviet troops took Pitkyaranta. Units of four Soviet rifle corps on a wide front reached the rear Finnish line of defense in the Pitkäranta-Loimola sector. Here, four Finnish divisions and one infantry brigade put up stubborn resistance. Soviet divisions attacked the Finnish fortifications for several days, but could not break through them. The offensive of the 7th Army was exhausted, there were no more reserves.
As a result, the offensive stopped at the Pitkyaranta - Loimola line, and the Winter War ended there. Until the beginning of August, the corps of the 7th Army tried to break through the Finnish defenses, but they did not achieve success. On August 4, the 7th Army went over to the defensive. The headquarters took the 37th Guards Corps, the 29th Tank Brigade, the Guards Mortar Brigade, the 7th Artillery Breakthrough Division, and other formations to the reserve and to other sectors of the front.
Continuation of the offensive of the 32nd Army.
On the right wing of the Karelian Front, the 32nd Army continued to pursue the enemy. Parts of the 176th and 289th rifle divisions advanced in the direction of Porosozero - Luisvara - Kuolisma. Parts of the 313rd Infantry Division, together with the 368th Division (after the liberation of Petrozavodsk, was transferred to the 32nd Army) advanced on Suojärvi and Jagliajärvi.
By July 20, advancing in difficult conditions of wooded and swampy terrain and off-road, Soviet troops liberated Porosozero, Kudamaguba, Luisvara, Yaglyarvi, Suoyarvi and many other settlements. On July 21, units of the 176th Infantry Division took Lengonvary and reached the state border. Soviet troops plunged 10-12 km into Finnish territory, advancing in the direction of Vikiniemi. On July 25, the 289th division also crossed the Finnish state border.
However, the Soviet divisions were weakened by the previous offensive (two divisions numbered only about 11 thousand people), their rear lines fell behind, communications were stretched. There were no reserves. Therefore, the counterstrike of the Finnish troops led to a serious crisis. The Finnish command reinforced the troops available in this sector at the expense of reserves. Operational group "R" was formed under the command of Major General E. Raappan (21st Infantry Brigade, cavalry brigade and several separate battalions, about 14 thousand people in total). At the end of July, the Finnish group attacked the unprotected flanks of two Soviet divisions (Battle of Ilomantsi). Finnish troops operated in small, mobile groups, taking advantage of the dispersed forces of the enemy, attacking and encircling individual formations. Soviet divisions hit the "cauldron". By August 2, the Soviet divisions were isolated from each other and dismembered into several pockets of resistance. In the future, the Finns tried to destroy the surrounded Soviet units, but they repulsed all enemy attacks. However, the situation was dire. There was not enough ammunition, three or four shots of enemy artillery were answered with one. The Finns did not have the strength to quickly destroy the Soviet divisions, but the siege could lead them to a rather quick death.
The command of the Karelian Front immediately took measures to release the encircled divisions. First, the 70th naval rifle brigade was transferred to the combat area, but it was unable to release the 176th division. On August 4-5, units of the 3rd and 69th Marine Brigades and part of the forces of the 29th Tank Brigade arrived in the Kuolisma area. The offensive was personally led by Army Commander Gorelenko. After several days of stubborn fighting, contact with the 176th and 289th Infantry Divisions was restored. Taking into account the fact that both divisions suffered heavy losses, and their supply was associated with great difficulties, they were taken to more advantageous positions a few kilometers from the border. The Finns also suffered heavy losses and were unable to build on this local success.
After this battle, the front stabilized and by August 10, active hostilities in Karelia ended. Individual skirmishes continued until the end of August. The Battle of Ilomantsi did not affect the general situation, although the Finns did their best to fan the success. The Svir-Petrozavodsk operation ended with the victory of the Soviet troops, and the local success of the Finnish army could not prevent the defeat of Finland in the war.
Results.
The Svirsk-Petrozavodsk operation ended in complete victory. Finnish troops were defeated, their defensive lines fell one after another, most of the Karelo-Finnish SSR was liberated. The Karelian front advanced 180-200 km, clearing the territory of over 47 thousand square meters from the enemy. km, liberated Petrozavodsk, Medvezhyegorsk, Kondopoga, Olonets, more than 1250 settlements and 42 railway stations. Control was restored over the strategically important Kirov railway along its entire length, the Svir River and the White Sea-Baltic Canal.
Researchers note that the Karelian Front could have done better, but several factors prevented it.
Firstly, this is the complexity of the terrain and the lack of developed communications, especially in the northern part of the Karelian SSR.
Secondly, there were serious miscalculations of the Headquarters, which at the last moment changed the original plan of the offensive and deprived the front of reserves after the first stage of the offensive. As a result, the front offensive of the Karelian Front began 11 days later than the operation of the Leningrad Front, which allowed the Finnish command to transfer troops from one direction to another. And the front did not have time to implement all the preparations for the operation.
Thirdly, the Stavka noted the poor organization of command and control by the front command, the presence of "inactive and incapable people" in the front leadership. As a result, the chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant General B.A. Pigarevich and other high-ranking officers of the Karelian Front.
The headquarters of the Supreme Command, counting on the speedy conclusion of peace, on September 5 ordered the troops of the Karelian Front not to carry out any active actions. In addition, the front was deprived of reserves and lost its striking power. There was no point in spending forces and resources in protracted battles in a secondary direction, the Red Army was preparing for the liberation of Belarus and battles in Eastern and Southeastern Europe.
The headquarters abandoned a further offensive against Finland. The Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation solved all the main tasks. The Finnish army suffered a heavy defeat, its main defensive lines on the Karelian Isthmus and in southeastern Karelia were broken. Soviet troops threw the enemy back from Leningrad, eliminating the threat to the second Soviet capital from the north and north-east, liberated Vyborg and Petrozavodsk, and reached the Finnish border.
The defeat of the Finnish army seriously changed the strategic situation in the entire northern sector of the Soviet-German front, creating conditions for the successful liberation of the Baltic states and an offensive in the North. The Baltic Fleet received freedom of action in the entire eastern part of the Gulf of Finland; now it could be based on the islands of the Vyborg Bay and the Bjerk Islands.
The offensive operations of the Leningrad and Karelian fronts put fascist Finland on the brink of defeat. Already in August, the Finnish leadership abandoned the alliance with the Third Reich, and on September 19, an armistice was signed in Moscow between the Soviet Union and Finland. The defeat on the Karelian Isthmus and in Karelia did not allow the Finnish military-political leadership to hope that Finland would withstand a new major offensive by Soviet troops. It could lead to the complete defeat and occupation of Finland by Soviet troops.
Therefore, the Finns preferred to start negotiations in order to bargain for easy peace terms, without significant losses. Moscow, focused on more important tasks, stopped the offensive and went to peace negotiations. sources
But since the battles for it, so many fairy tales and stories have grown around this fortified line that we decided to transfer the story about it to the Historical Myths cycle, which will appear in OK-inform a little later. And they decided to start with a much less well-known defensive line Vammelsuu-Taipale, or the BT Line, which in the USSR was called the "Karelian shaft". It is enough to get on the train, drive for about an hour and find yourself on the battlefield of 1944. Interest in military history is growing, and more and more often tourists can be seen in the forest trenches and even organized groups sightseers.
In 1941, Finland sided with Germany. Military action was approved by the Parliament of Suomi after the bombing of the Finnish capital by Soviet aircraft on June 25
In 1941, Finland sided with Germany. The military action was approved by the Suomi parliament after the bombing of the Finnish capital by Soviet aircraft on June 25. While historians are breaking spears over these events, trying to understand what it was, we, together with the Finnish army, will move on.
Mannerheim's troops quickly seized the initiative, went on the offensive and threw the Red Army back not only to the old border, but also beyond it (in October 1941, Petrozavodsk was surrendered under their onslaught). On the Karelian Isthmus, the Finnish troops ran into the Soviet line of defense.
By the beginning of 1942, the front line had stabilized, and the Finns began to prepare their defenses. On the Karelian Isthmus, there was no point in building defenses on the old line (the same one that we called the "Mannerheim Line"). After the events of 39-40, it was deliberately destroyed by Soviet sappers.
A new fortified line was conceived in depth from the front line. It got its name from two settlements: it began with one, and ended with the other. Vammelsuu is now the village of Serovo, and Taipale is the modern Solovyovo. The defensive line crossed the entire Karelian Isthmus and consisted of rather simple structures, in contrast to the Mannerheim Line: small machine-gun points, sometimes supplemented with armored canopies, infantry shelters of various shapes made of concrete, as well as a system of frontal fortifications: bumps, ditches, and wire barriers.
The modest scale of the fortifications is explained by several reasons: on the one hand, Finland was at war and experienced a shortage of funds and resources. On the other hand, according to the available resources, a different type of fortification was selected: not large nodes with huge pillboxes (although there were also such ones), but based on a lot of "dispersed" small shelters for 20 - 25 people.
A different type of fortification was chosen: not large nodes with huge pillboxes (although there were also such ones), but based on a lot of "scattered" small shelters for 20 - 25 people.
Labor battalions, consisting of persons unfit for health or age to serve in the army, as well as prisoners and sometimes even captured Soviet soldiers, worked on the construction of the line. It was also clear that there was no time to build a large-scale defense line. Well, and for 1941, when the design of the line began, another factor was significant - the uncertainty of the situation: where the new border will pass, what Finland will be after the end of the (successful) war, whether it will need a defensive line on the Karelian Isthmus in the future.
However, already in the winter of 1942, it became clear that the war was developing according to a completely different scenario, different from what the German allies had assumed, and it was only about the impending defense of the isthmus. The lack of resources forced the Finns to build mainly field fortifications, only supplementing them with concrete structures. The BT Line, which in the end was never completed, apart from being incomplete, had another serious drawback: the lack of depth. That is, the system of trenches and pillboxes was one, did not have a second, third and further lines where troops could withdraw if necessary. You can compare it, for example, with the Kursk Bulge, where the Soviet army built defense lines (generally without concrete structures) with a total depth of 30 to 100 kilometers, which ensured the successful transformation of the Kursk defensive operation into an offensive.
The Finnish command was well aware of this shortcoming, projects for deepening the defense line were repeatedly put forward (meaning, of course, not deepening into the ground, but the creation of new lines of trenches and shelters in the depths, behind the main one). But there were not enough resources and forces for such work: even the main part of the VT line had to be fully built, armed and filled with troops according to plan only in the fall of 1944.
One of the important centers of defense was the Vammelsuu (Serovo) area. The Finns envisioned a breakthrough by the Soviet troops along the line of the modern Primorskoe highway or parallel to it and built a lot of fortifications, traces of which can be seen to this day. The construction was supervised at the highest level. Gustav Mannerheim visited the line several times, for which there is documentary evidence and photographs.
The Finns envisioned a breakthrough by the Soviet troops along the line of the modern Primorskoe highway or parallel to it and built a lot of fortifications, traces of which can be seen to this day.
By the beginning of the Vybor offensive operation (June 1944), Soviet troops arrived completely different, not at all like those inexperienced soldiers and officers who stormed the Mannerheim Line in 1939. Behind the shoulders of the troops that entered the battlefield were long battles on the Leningrad front, a breakthrough and complete lifting of the blockade of Leningrad. The tasks in the Vyborg direction were already less difficult for them.
On June 9, Soviet troops began an offensive from the front line in the Sestroretsk-Beloostrov region. The 109th Rifle Corps of the 23rd Army was advancing in the direction of the Primorskoye Highway and the railway to Vyborg. The main attack was planned in the Kivenappa area (Pervomaiskoe). However, faced with stubborn resistance there, the leadership of the front shifted the direction of the main attack to the coastal direction. On June 14-15, the battle unfolded near Kuuterselkä (Lebyazhye), north of the Vammelsuu junction. It was there that the VT line was broken, which provided troops in other directions, including the seaside, with the possibility of a successful offensive.
The counterattack was not successful and on June 5, the Finnish command gave an order to retreat in the Kuuterselkä area, the Soviet troops entered the breakthrough and created a danger of encirclement for the Finnish units holding the defenses in the Metsakylä (Molodezhnoe) area. Finnish troops left the fortified knot Vammelsuu, and Soviet troops continued their offensive towards Vyborg.
Pavel Luknitsky, a well-known war correspondent and writer, who left three volumes of memoirs, was present at the breakthrough at Kuurteselkä and described the events as follows: “The battle is in full swing. Our troops are breaking into a powerful belt of the enemy defense. This belt starts from the Gulf of Finland, crosses the Karelian Isthmus, stretching to the northeast. Its left wing - an important stronghold of Mätsäkylä - abuts against the bay.
Life returned to a peaceful course. For many decades, concrete fortifications stood useless in forests and fields. Often they were destroyed or even country houses were placed on them.
One of the strongest next strongholds of this line is the tract and the village of Kuterselka - in the depths of the isthmus. Kuterselka's fortifications fall one after another. The efforts of the tankers interacting with the infantry are indicated right there in front of us on the map, which lies in the middle of a raincoat-tent stretched out under a pine tree. Every minute receiving from the radio operators the reports of the operating tank platoons, S.M. Sibirtsev, with strokes of a red pencil, cuts deeper and deeper into the square denoting the area of the village of Kuterselki, on the outskirts of which we ourselves are located. Above us, bombers howl, dive, air battles are taking place, all kinds of weapons rumble around in the forest, the chatter of machine guns, the rumble of explosions clog the ears so that you have to pause and shout to hear each other. "
Soviet troops moved towards Vyborg, and silence reigned over the Karelian Isthmus. Life returned to a peaceful course. For many decades, concrete fortifications stood useless in forests and fields. Often they were destroyed or even country houses were placed on them.
V last years In the wake of interest in the history of the Great Patriotic War, thanks to the actions of enthusiasts, the understanding came that these are not just pieces of concrete, not just enemy positions - these are, in fact, the places of battles, a kind of monument to Soviet soldiers who passed through the Karelian Isthmus in 1944 and achieved a quick exit from war of one of the allies of Nazi Germany.
The creation of the memorial and the gradual museumification of the Kuuterselkä fortified area began. The author has something to do with another project, which may soon be implemented on the western part of the BT line, where fierce battles also unfolded in 1944. It is hoped that these historical monuments will no longer be abandoned.
The main events of the Soviet-Finnish war 11/30/1939 - 03/13/1940:
|
USSR Finland |
Beginning of negotiations on concluding a mutual assistance agreement |
|
|
Finland |
General mobilization announced |
|
|
The formation of the 1st corps of the Finnish People's Army (originally the 106th Mountain Rifle Division) began, which was staffed by Finns and Karelians. By November 26, there were 13,405 people in the corps. The corps did not participate in hostilities |
||
|
USSR Finland |
Negotiations were interrupted and the Finnish delegation left Moscow |
|
|
The Soviet government appealed to the Finnish government with an official note, which reported that as a result of artillery shelling, allegedly carried out from the territory of Finland in the area of the border village of Mainila, four soldiers of the Red Army were killed and eight were wounded. |
||
|
Denunciation of the Non-Aggression Pact with Finland announced |
||
|
The severance of diplomatic relations with Finland |
||
|
Soviet troops were ordered to cross the Soviet-Finnish border and begin hostilities |
||
|
Troops of the Leningrad Military District (commander of the 2nd rank army commander K. A. Meretskov, member of the Military Council A. A. Zhdanov): |
||
|
7A attacked on the Karelian Isthmus (9 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 3 separate tank brigades, 13 artillery regiments; commander of the 2nd rank army commander V.F. Yakovlev, and from December 9 - 2nd rank army commander Meretskov) |
||
|
8A (4 rifle divisions; commander of the divisional commander I.N. Khabarov, since January - commander of the 2nd rank G.M.Stern) - north of Lake Ladoga in the Petrozavodsk direction |
||
|
9A (3rd rifle division; commander of corps commander M.P. Dukhanov, from mid-December - corps commander V.I. Chuikov) - in central and northern Karelia |
||
|
14A (2nd RD; Divisional Commander V.A.Frolov) advanced in the Arctic |
||
|
The port of Petsamo was taken on the Murmansk direction |
||
|
In the town of Terijoki, the Finnish communists formed the so-called People's Government, headed by Otto Kuusinen |
||
|
The Soviet government signed an agreement of friendship and mutual assistance with the government of the "Finnish Democratic Republic" Kuusinen and refused any contacts with the legitimate government of Finland headed by Risto Ryti |
||
|
Troops 7A overcame the operational obstacle zone 25-65 km deep and reached the front edge of the main defense zone of the "Mannerheim Line" |
||
|
USSR expelled from the League of Nations |
||
|
An offensive of the 44th rifle division from the Vazhenvara area on the road to Suomussalmi in order to provide assistance to the 163rd division surrounded by the Finns. Parts of the division, stretched out along the road, were repeatedly surrounded by the Finns during January 3-7. On January 7, the division's advance was stopped, and its main forces were surrounded. The division commander, brigade commander A.I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar I.T. Pakhomenko and chief of staff A.I. Volkov, instead of organizing defense and withdrawing troops from the encirclement, fled themselves, leaving the troops. At the same time, Vinogradov gave the order to get out of the encirclement, abandoning equipment, which led to the abandonment of 37 tanks, 79 guns, 280 machine guns, 150 cars, all radio stations, and the entire convoy on the battlefield. Most of the fighters died, 700 people left the encirclement, surrendered - 1200. For cowardice Vinogradov, Pakhomenko and Volkov were shot in front of the division's formation |
||
|
The 7th Army is divided into 7A and 13A (commander of corps commander V.D.Grendal, from March 2 - corps commander F.A.Parusinov), which were reinforced by troops |
||
|
The government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legitimate government of Finland |
||
|
Front stabilization on the Karelian Isthmus |
||
|
Repulsed the attack of the Finns on the part of the 7th Army |
||
|
On the Karelian Isthmus, the North-Western Front was formed (commander of the 1st rank commander S.K. Timoshenko, member of the Military Council Zhdanov) consisting of 24 rifle divisions, a tank corps, 5 separate tank brigades, 21 artillery regiments, 23 air regiments: |
||
|
A new 15A was formed from parts of the 8th Army (commander, commander of the 2nd rank M.P. Kovalev) |
||
|
After the artillery barrage, the Red Army began to break through the main line of defense of the Finns on the Karelian Isthmus |
||
|
Summ's Fortified Knot taken |
||
|
Finland |
The commander of the troops of the Karelian Isthmus in the Finnish army, Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman is suspended. In his place was appointed Major General A.E. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps |
|
|
Units 7A went to the second line of defense |
||
|
7A and 13A launched an offensive in the strip from Lake Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay |
||
|
A foothold on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay was seized |
||
|
Finland |
The Finns opened the sluices of the Saimaa Canal, flooding the area northeast of Viipuri (Vyborg) |
|
|
50th corps cut the Vyborg-Antrea railway |
||
|
USSR Finland |
Arrival of the Finnish delegation to Moscow |
|
|
USSR Finland |
Conclusion of a peace treaty in Moscow. The USSR inherited the Karelian Isthmus, the cities of Vyborg, Sortavala, Kuolajarvi, islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Rybachy Peninsula in the Arctic. Lake Ladoga was completely within the borders of the USSR. The USSR leased part of the Hanko (Gangut) Peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there. Finland returned to the Petsamo area, captured by the Red Army at the beginning of the war. (The border established by this treaty is close to the border according to the Treaty of Nishtad with Sweden in 1721) |
|
|
USSR Finland |
The assault on Vyborg by units of the Red Army. Cessation of hostilities |
The grouping of Soviet troops consisted of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th - north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th - in northern and central Karelia, the 14th - in Petsamo.
Soviet tank BT-5
Soviet tank T-28
The 7th Army's offensive on the Karelian Isthmus was opposed by the Isthmus Army (Kannaksen armeija) under the command of Hugo Esterman.
For the Soviet troops, these battles became the most difficult and bloody. The Soviet command had only "fragmentary intelligence information about concrete strips of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus." As a result, the allocated forces to break through the "Mannerheim Line" were completely insufficient. The troops were completely unprepared to overcome the line of bunkers and bunkers. In particular, there was little large-caliber artillery needed to destroy pillboxes. By December 12, units of the 7th Army were able to overcome only the support zone of the line and reach the front edge of the main defense zone, but the planned breakthrough of the zone on the move failed due to clearly insufficient forces and poor organization of the offensive. On December 12, the Finnish army carried out one of its most successful operations at Lake Tolvajärvi.
Breakthrough attempts continued until the end of December, but they were unsuccessful.
The 8th Army advanced 80 km. It was opposed by the IV Army Corps (IV armeija kunta), commanded by Juho Heiskanen.
Juho Heiskanen
Part of the Soviet troops was surrounded. After heavy fighting, they had to retreat.
The offensive of the 9th and 14th armies was opposed by Task Force Northern Finland (Pohjois-Suomen Ryhm?) Under the command of Major General Villjo Einar Tuompo. Its area of responsibility was a 400-mile stretch of territory from Petsamo to Kuhmo. The 9th Army was leading an offensive from the White Sea Karelia. She wedged into the enemy's defenses at 35-45 km, but was stopped. The 14th Army, advancing on the Petsamo area, achieved the greatest success. By interacting with the Northern Fleet, the troops of the 14th Army were able to capture the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the city of Petsamo (now Pechenga). Thus, they closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.
Front kitchen
Some researchers and memoirists try to explain Soviet failures, including the weather: severe frosts (up to -40 ° C) and deep snow up to 2 m. However, both the data of meteorological observations and other documents refute this: until December 20, 1939, on On the Karelian Isthmus, the temperature ranged from +2 to -7 ° C. Further, until the New Year, the temperature did not drop below 23 ° C. Frosts up to 40 ° C began in the second half of January, when there was a calm at the front. Moreover, these frosts interfered not only with the attackers, but also with the defenders, as Mannerheim wrote about. There was also no deep snow until January 1940. Thus, the operational reports of the Soviet divisions dated December 15, 1939 indicate a depth of snow cover of 10-15 cm. Moreover, successful offensive operations in February took place in more severe weather conditions.
Destroyed Soviet tank T-26
T-26
An unpleasant surprise was the massive use of Molotov cocktails by the Finns against Soviet tanks. For 3 months of the war, the Finnish industry produced over half a million bottles.
Winter War Molotov cocktail
During the war, Soviet troops first used radar stations (RUS-1) in combat conditions to detect enemy aircraft.
Radar "RUS-1"
Mannerheim Line
The Mannerheim Line (Finn. Mannerheim-linja) is a complex of defensive structures on the Finnish part of the Karelian Isthmus, created in 1920 - 1930 to contain a possible offensive strike from the USSR. The line was about 135 km long and about 90 km deep. Named after Marshal Karl Mannerheim, on whose orders the plans for the defense of the Karelian Isthmus were developed back in 1918. On his own initiative, the largest structures of the complex were created.
Name
The name "Mannerheim Line" appeared after the complex was created, at the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish winter war in December 1939, when Finnish troops began a stubborn defense. Shortly before that, in the fall, a group of foreign journalists arrived to get acquainted with the fortification works. At that time, much was written about the French Maginot Line and the German Siegfried Line. The son of the former adjutant of Mannerheim Jorm Galen-Kallela, who accompanied the foreigners, came up with the name "Mannerheim Line". After the outbreak of the Winter War, this name appeared in those newspapers whose representatives inspected the buildings.
History of creation
Preparations for the construction of the line began immediately after Finland gained independence in 1918, the construction itself continued with interruptions until the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939.
The first plan of the line was developed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Rappe in 1918.
The work on the defense plan was continued by the German Colonel O. von Brandenstein. It was approved in August. In October 1918, the Finnish government allocated 300,000 marks for construction work. The work was carried out by German and Finnish sappers (one battalion) and Russian prisoners of war. With the departure of the German army, the work was significantly reduced and everything was reduced to the work of the Finnish training sapper battalion.
In October 1919, a new plan for the defensive line was developed. It was led by the Chief of the General Staff, Major General Oscar Enkel. Major design work was carried out by a member of the French military commission, Major J. Gros-Coissy.
According to this plan, 168 concrete and reinforced concrete structures were built in 1920-1924, of which 114 were machine-gun, 6 artillery and one mixed. Then there was a three-year break and the question of resuming work was raised only in 1927.
The new plan was developed by V. Karikoski. However, the work itself began only in 1930. They took the greatest scope in 1932, when, under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Fabricius, six two-embrasure bunkers were built.
Fortifications
The main defensive zone consisted of a system of defense nodes stretched out in a line, each of which included several wood-earthen field fortifications (DZOT) and long-term stone-concrete structures, as well as anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. The nodes of defense themselves were placed on the main defensive line extremely unevenly: the gaps between individual nodes of resistance sometimes reached 6-8 km. Each defense unit had its own index, which usually began with the first letters of the nearby settlement. If the account is kept from the coast of the Gulf of Finland, then the designations of the nodes will follow in the following order:
Pillbox scheme:
"N" - Humaljoki [now Ermilovo] "K" - Kolkkala [now Malyshevo] "N" - Nyayukki [not a creature.]
"Ko" - Kolmikeyala [not being.] "Well" - Hulkeyala [not being.] "Ka" - Karhula [now Dyatlovo]
"Sk" - Summakulya [not being.] "La" - Lyahde [not being,] "A" - Eyuryapyaa (Leipyasuo)
"Mi" - Muolaankyla [now Mushroom] "Ma" - Sikniemi [not being.] "Ma" - Mälkela [now Zverevo]
"La" - Lauttaniemi [non-existent.] "No" - Neisniemi [now Cape] "Ki" - Kiviniemi [now Losevo]
"Sa" - Sakkola [now Gromovo] "Ke" - Kelya [now Port] "Tai" - Taipale (now Solovyovo)
Dot SJ-5, covering the road to Vyborg. (2009)
Dot SK16
Thus, 18 defense nodes of varying degrees of power were built on the main defensive zone. The system of fortifications also included a rear defensive zone covering the approach to Vyborg. It included 10 defense nodes:
"R" - Rempetti [now Key] "Nr" - Nyarya [now does not exist] "Kai" - Kaipiala [not being.]
"Nu" - Nuoraa [now Sokolinskoe] "Kak" - Kakkola [now Sokolinskoe] "Le" - Leviyainen [not being.]
"A.-Sa" - Ala-Saine [now Cherkasovo] "Y.-Sa" - Julia-Saine [now V.-Cherkasovo]
"Not" - Heinjoki [now Veshchevo] "Ly" - Lyukyulya [now Ozernoye]
Dot Ink5
The center of resistance was defended by one or two rifle battalions, reinforced with artillery. Along the front, the knot occupied 3-4.5 kilometers and a depth of 1.5-2 kilometers. It consisted of 4-6 strong points, each strong point had 3-5 long-term firing points, mainly machine-gun and artillery, which constituted the skeleton of the defense.
Each permanent structure was surrounded by trenches, which also filled the gaps between the resistance nodes. The trenches in most cases consisted of a communication course with machine-gun nests brought forward and rifle cells for one or three shooters.
The rifle cells were covered with armored shields with visors and embrasures for shooting. This protected the shooter's head from shrapnel fire. The flanks of the line rested against the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The coast of the Gulf of Finland was covered by coastal batteries of large caliber, and in the Taipale area on the shore of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120-mm and 152-mm coastal guns were created.
The fortifications were based on the terrain: the entire territory of the Karelian Isthmus is covered with large forests, dozens of small and medium-sized lakes and rivers. Lakes and rivers have swampy or rocky steep banks. In the forests, rocky ridges and numerous large boulders are found everywhere. Belgian general Badu wrote: “Nowhere in the world natural conditions were not as favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia. "
Reinforced concrete structures of the "Mannerheim line" are divided into buildings of the first generation (1920-1937) and the second generation (1938-1939).
A group of Red Army soldiers examines an armored canopy at a Finnish bunker
The pillboxes of the first generation were small, one-story, for one or three machine guns, did not have shelters for the garrison and internal equipment. The thickness of the reinforced concrete walls reached 2 m, the horizontal coverage - 1.75-2 m. Subsequently, these pillboxes were strengthened: the walls were thickened, armor plates were installed on the embrasures.
The Finnish press dubbed the second generation pillboxes “million” or millionaire pillboxes, since the value of each of them exceeded a million Finnish marks. A total of 7 such pillboxes were built. The initiator of their construction was Baron Mannerheim, who returned to politics in 1937, who obtained additional appropriations from the country's parliament. Some of the most modern and heavily fortified pillboxes were Sj4 Poppius, which had flanking fire embrasures in the western casemate, and Sj5 Millionaire, with flanking fire embrasures in both casemates. Both pillboxes fired flanking fire across the entire hollow, covering each other's front with machine guns. The pillboxes of the flanking fire were called the Le Bourget casemate, after the French engineer who developed it, and became widespread during the First World War. Some pillboxes in the Hottinen area, for example Sk5, Sk6, were converted into casemates of flanking fire, while the frontal embrasure was walled up. The pillboxes of the flanking fire were well camouflaged by stones and snow, which made it difficult to detect them, in addition, it was almost impossible to pierce the casemate with artillery from the front. "Millions" pillboxes were large modern reinforced concrete structures with 4-6 embrasures, of which one or two were guns, mainly of flanking action. The usual weapons of the pillboxes were Russian 76-mm cannons of the 1900 model of the year on casemate machines Durlyakher and 37-mm anti-tank guns "Bofors" of the model 1936 on casemates. Less common were the 76-mm mountain cannons of the 1904 model of the year on pedestal mounts.
The weak points of Finnish long-term structures are as follows: the inferior quality of concrete in buildings of the first term, oversaturation of concrete with flexible reinforcement, the absence of the first term of rigid reinforcement in buildings.
The strong qualities of the pillboxes consisted in a large number of firing embrasures that shot through the immediate and immediate approaches and flanking the approaches to neighboring reinforced concrete points, as well as in the tactically correct location of structures on the ground, in their careful camouflage, in the saturated filling of gaps.
Destroyed pillbox
Engineering barriers
The main types of antipersonnel obstacles were wire nets and mines. The Finns installed slingshots that were slightly different from the Soviet slingshots or Bruno's spirals. These antipersonnel obstacles were complemented by anti-tank obstacles. Nadolbs were usually placed in four rows, two meters from one another, in a checkerboard pattern. Rows of stones were sometimes reinforced with barbed wire, and at other times by ditches and scarps. Thus, anti-tank obstacles turned into anti-personnel ones at the same time. The most powerful obstacles were at an altitude of 65.5 near bunker No. 006 and on Khotinen near bunkers No. 45, 35 and 40, which were the main ones in the defense system of the Mezhdbolotny and Summsky resistance centers. At bunker No. 006, the wire netting reached 45 rows, of which the first 42 rows were on metal stakes 60 centimeters high embedded in concrete. Nadolby in this place had 12 rows of stones and were located in the middle of the wire. To blow up the nadolba, it was necessary to pass 18 rows of wire under three to four layers of fire and 100-150 meters from the enemy's front line. In some cases, the area between the bunkers and the bunkers was occupied by residential buildings. They were usually located on the outskirts of the settlement and were built of granite, and the thickness of the walls reached 1 meter or more. The Finns turned such houses into defensive fortifications when needed. Finnish sappers managed to erect about 136 km of anti-tank obstacles and about 330 km of barbed wire along the main line of defense. In practice, when, in the first phase of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War, the Red Army came close to the fortifications of the main defensive zone and began to make attempts to break through it, it turned out that the above principles, developed before the war based on the results of survivability tests of anti-tank obstacles using the then in service Finnish army of several dozen outdated light tanks "Renault", proved to be untenable in front of the power of the Soviet tank mass. In addition to the fact that the nadolbs moved from their place under the pressure of T-28 medium tanks, detachments of Soviet sappers often blew up the nadolby with explosive charges, thereby arranging passageways for armored vehicles in them. But the most serious flaw was undoubtedly good overview anti-tank lines from distant artillery positions of the enemy, especially on open and flat terrain, such as in the area of the defense junction "Sj" (Summa-yarvi), where the main defensive zone was broken on 02/11/1940. As a result of repeated artillery shelling, the nadolbs were destroyed and there were more and more passages in them.
Between the granite anti-tank nadolb there were rows of barbed wire (2010) Blockages of stones, barbed wire and in the distance the SJ-5 pillbox covering the road to Vyborg (winter 1940).
Terijoki government
On December 1, 1939, the newspaper Pravda published a message stating that the so-called People's Government had been formed in Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen. In the historical literature, Kuusinen's government is usually referred to as "Terijoki", because after the outbreak of the war it was located in the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk). This government was officially recognized by the USSR.
On December 2, in Moscow, negotiations were held between the government of the Democratic Republic of Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen, and the Soviet government, headed by VM Molotov, at which the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship was signed. Stalin, Voroshilov and Zhdanov also took part in the negotiations.
The main provisions of this agreement corresponded to the requirements that the USSR had previously presented to Finnish representatives (transfer of territories on the Karelian Isthmus, sale of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, lease to Hanko). The exchange provided for the transfer of significant territories in Soviet Karelia to Finland and monetary compensation. The USSR also pledged to support the Finnish People's Army with weapons, assistance in the training of specialists, etc. The agreement was concluded for a period of 25 years, and, if a year before the expiration of the agreement, none of the parties announced its termination, it was automatically renewed. for 25 years. The treaty entered into force from the moment of its signing by the parties, and ratification was planned “as soon as possible in the capital of Finland - the city of Helsinki”.
In the following days, Molotov met with officials from Sweden and the United States, at which the recognition of the People's Government of Finland was announced.
It was announced that the previous government of Finland had fled and, therefore, no longer ruled the country. The USSR declared in the League of Nations that from now on it would negotiate only with the new government.
RECEPTION Comrade MOLOTOV OF THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR OF WINTER
Accepted comrade. Molotov, on December 4, the Swedish envoy, Mr. Winter, announced the desire of the so-called "Finnish government" to begin new negotiations on an agreement with the Soviet Union. Comrade Molotov explained to Mr. Winter that the Soviet government did not recognize the so-called "Finnish government", which had already left Helsinki and headed in an unknown direction, and therefore no question could now be raised about any negotiations with this "government". The Soviet government recognizes only the people's government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, has concluded an agreement with it on mutual assistance and friendship, and this is a reliable basis for the development of peaceful and favorable relations between the USSR and Finland.
V. Molotov signs an agreement between the USSR and the Terijoki government. Standing: A. Zhdanov, K. Voroshilov, I. Stalin, O. Kuusinen
The "people's government" was formed in the USSR from the Finnish communists. The leadership of the Soviet Union believed that the use in propaganda of the fact of the creation of a "people's government" and the conclusion of a mutual assistance treaty with it, testifying to friendship and alliance with the USSR while maintaining Finland's independence, would make it possible to influence the Finnish population, increasing corruption in the army and in the rear.
Finnish People's Army
On November 11, 1939, the formation of the first corps of the "Finnish People's Army" (originally the 106th Mountain Rifle Division), called "Ingermanlandia", began, which was staffed by Finns and Karelians who served in the troops of the Leningrad Military District.
By November 26, there were 13,405 people in the corps, and in February 1940 - 25 thousand servicemen who wore their national uniform (sewn from khaki cloth and looked like the Finnish uniform of the 1927 model; claims that it was a trophy uniform of the Polish army , erroneous - only part of the greatcoats was used from it).
This "people's" army was supposed to replace the occupying units of the Red Army in Finland and become the military support of the "people's" government. "Finns" in confederates held a parade in Leningrad. Kuusinen announced that they will be given the honor of hoisting the red flag over the presidential palace in Helsinki. The Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks prepared a draft instruction "How to start the political and organizational work of the communists (note: the word" communists "is crossed out by Zhdanov) in the areas liberated from the white rule, which indicated practical measures to create of the Popular Front in the occupied Finnish territory. In December 1939, this instruction was applied in work with the population of Finnish Karelia, but the withdrawal of Soviet troops led to the curtailment of these measures.
Despite the fact that the Finnish People's Army was not supposed to participate in hostilities, from the end of December 1939, FNA units began to be widely used to solve combat missions. Throughout January 1940, the scouts of the 5th and 6th regiments of the 3rd SD FNA performed special sabotage missions in the sector of the 8th Army: they destroyed ammunition depots in the rear of the Finnish troops, blew up railway bridges, and mined roads. FNA units took part in the battles for Lunkulansaari and during the capture of Vyborg.
When it became clear that the war was dragging on, and the Finnish people did not support the new government, the Kuusinen government receded into the shadows and was no longer mentioned in the official press. When the Soviet-Finnish consultations on the issue of concluding peace began in January, it was no longer mentioned. On January 25, the government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legitimate government of Finland.
Leaflet for volunteers - Karelians and Finns, citizens of the USSR
Foreign volunteers
Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, detachments and groups of volunteers from different countries the world. The largest numbers of volunteers came from Sweden, Denmark and Norway (Swedish Volunteer Corps), as well as Hungary. However, among the volunteers were citizens of many other states, including England and the United States, as well as a small number of Russian White volunteers from the Russian General Military Union (ROVS). The latter were used as officers of the "Russian People's Detachments", formed by the Finns from among the prisoners of the Red Army. But since the work on the formation of such detachments was started late, already at the end of the war, before the end of hostilities, only one of them (numbering 35-40 people) managed to take part in hostilities.
Preparing for the offensive
The course of hostilities revealed serious gaps in the organization of command and control and supply of troops, poor preparedness of the command staff, and the lack of specific skills among the troops necessary for waging war in winter in Finland. By the end of December, it became clear that fruitless attempts to continue the offensive would lead nowhere. There was a relative calm at the front. Throughout January and early February, there was a strengthening of troops, replenishment of material reserves, reorganization of units and formations. Subdivisions of skiers were created, methods of overcoming mined terrain, obstacles, methods of dealing with defensive structures were developed, personnel were trained. For the assault on the Mannerheim Line, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and member of the military council of the Leningrad Military District Zhdanov.
Timoshenko Semyon Konstaetinovich Zhdanov Andrey Alexandrovich
The front included the 7th and 13th armies. In the border areas, a tremendous amount of work was done to hastily build and re-equip communication lines for the uninterrupted supply of the army in the field. The total number of personnel was increased to 760.5 thousand people.
For the destruction of the fortifications on the "Mannerheim Line" divisions of the first echelon were assigned destruction artillery groups (AR) consisting of from one to six divisions in the main directions. In total, these groups included 14 divisions, in which there were 81 guns with a caliber of 203, 234, 280 mm.
203 mm howitzer "B-4" mod. 1931 year
Karelian Isthmus. Combat map. December 1939 "Black Line" - Mannerheim Line
During this period, the Finnish side also continued to replenish the troops and supply them with weapons coming from the allies. In total, during the war, 350 aircraft, 500 guns, more than 6 thousand machine guns, about 100 thousand rifles, 650 thousand hand grenades, 2.5 million shells and 160 million cartridges were delivered to Finland [source not specified 198 days]. About 11.5 thousand foreign volunteers, mostly from Scandinavian countries, fought on the side of the Finns.
Finnish autonomous skier squads armed with machine guns
Finnish machine gun M-31 "Suomi":
TTD "Suomi" M-31 Lahti
|
Applicable cartridge |
9x19 Parabellum |
|
Sighting line length |
|
|
Barrel length |
|
|
Weight without cartridges |
|
|
Weight of a box magazine for 20 cartridges empty / loaded |
|
|
Weight of a box magazine for 36 cartridges empty / loaded |
|
|
Weight of a box magazine for 50 rounds empty / loaded |
|
|
Mass of a disk magazine for 40 rounds empty / loaded |
|
|
Mass of a disk magazine for 71 cartridges empty / loaded |
|
|
Rate of fire |
700-800 rpm |
|
Bullet muzzle velocity |
|
|
Sighting range |
500 meters |
|
Magazine capacity |
20, 36, 50 rounds (box) 40, 71 (disc) |
At the same time, fighting continued in Karelia. The formations of the 8th and 9th armies, operating along the roads in continuous forests, suffered heavy losses. If in some places the achieved lines were held, in others the troops retreated, in some places even to the border line. The Finns widely used the tactics of partisan warfare: small autonomous detachments of skiers armed with machine guns attacked the troops moving along the roads, mainly in the dark, and after the attacks they went into the forest, where the bases were equipped. Snipers inflicted heavy losses. According to the firm opinion of the Red Army (however, refuted by many sources, including Finnish), the most dangerous were snipers, "cuckoos" who fired from trees. The formations of the Red Army that had broken forward were constantly surrounded and bursting back, often abandoning equipment and weapons.
The Battle of Suomussalmi was widely known, in particular, the history of the 44th Division of the 9th Army. From December 14, the division advanced from the Vazhenvar area along the road to Suomussalmi to the aid of the 163rd division surrounded by Finnish troops. The advance of the troops was completely unorganized. Parts of the division, stretched out along the road, were repeatedly surrounded by the Finns during January 3-7. As a result, on January 7, the division's advance was stopped, and its main forces were surrounded. The situation was not hopeless, since the division had a significant technical advantage over the Finns, but division commander A.I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar Pakhomenko and chief of staff Volkov, instead of organizing the defense and withdrawing troops from the encirclement, fled themselves, leaving the troops. At the same time, Vinogradov gave the order to leave the encirclement, abandoning the equipment, which led to the abandonment of 37 tanks, more than three hundred machine guns, several thousand rifles, up to 150 vehicles, all radio stations, the entire convoy and horse train on the battlefield. More than a thousand people from among those who left the encirclement were wounded or frostbite, some of the wounded were taken prisoner, since they were not taken out during the flight. Vinogradov, Pakhomenko and Volkov were sentenced to death by a military tribunal and shot publicly in front of the division's formation.
On the Karelian Isthmus, the front stabilized by December 26. Soviet troops began thorough preparations for breaking through the main fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line", conducted reconnaissance of the defensive zone. At this time, the Finns unsuccessfully tried to disrupt the preparation of a new offensive by counterattacks. So, on December 28, the Finns attacked the central units of the 7th Army, but were repulsed with heavy losses. On January 3, 1940, at the northern tip of the island of Gotland (Sweden) with 50 crew members, a Soviet submarine S-2 under the command of Lieutenant Commander I. A. Sokolov sank (probably blown up by a mine). The S-2 was the only RKKF ship lost by the USSR.
The crew of the submarine "S-2"
On the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Main Military Council of the Red Army No. 01447 of January 30, 1940, the entire remaining Finnish population was subject to eviction from the territory occupied by Soviet troops. By the end of February, 2,080 people were evicted from the regions of Finland occupied by the Red Army in the battle zone of the 8th, 9th, 15th armies, of which: men - 402, women - 583, children under 16 - 1095. All resettled Finnish citizens were accommodated in three villages of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: in the Interposelka of the Pryazhinsky District, in the village of Kovgora-Goymae, Kondopozhsky District, in the village of Kintezma, Kalevala District. They lived in barracks and were obliged to work in the forest in logging. They were allowed to return to Finland only in June 1940, after the end of the war.
February offensive of the Red Army
On February 1, 1940, the Red Army, pulling up reinforcements, resumed the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus along the entire width of the front of the 2nd Army Corps. The main blow was delivered in the direction of Sum. Artillery preparation also began. Since that day, every day for several days, the troops of the North-Western Front under the command of S. Timoshenko rained down 12 thousand shells on the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line. The Finns answered rarely, but accurately. Therefore, the Soviet artillerymen had to abandon the most effective direct fire and conduct from closed positions and mainly in areas, since the reconnaissance of targets and adjustments were poorly adjusted. Five divisions of the 7th and 13th armies carried out a private offensive, but were unable to succeed.
On February 6, an offensive began on the Summa strip. In the following days, the front of the offensive expanded both west and east.
On February 9, the commander of the North-Western Front, Army Commander 1st Rank S. Timoshenko, sent directive No. 04606 to the troops. According to it, on February 11, after a powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the North-Western Front should go on the offensive.
On February 11, after ten days of artillery preparation, the general offensive of the Red Army began. The main forces were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. In this offensive, ships of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Naval Flotilla, created in October 1939, operated together with the land units of the North-Western Front.
Since the attacks of Soviet troops on the Summa area did not bring success, the main blow was shifted to the east, in the direction of Lyakhde. In this place, the defending side suffered huge losses from artillery barrage and the Soviet troops managed to break through the defense.
In the course of three-day intense battles, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the "Mannerheim Line", introduced tank formations into the breakthrough, which began to develop success. By February 17, units of the Finnish army were withdrawn to the second line of defense, since there was a threat of encirclement.
On February 18, the Finns closed the Saimaa Canal with the Kivikoski dam and the next day the water began to rise in Kärstilänjärvi.
By February 21, 7th Army had reached the second line of defense, and 13th Army - towards the main line of defense north of Muolaa. By February 24, units of the 7th Army, interacting with the coastal detachments of the Baltic Fleet sailors, captured several coastal islands. On February 28, both armies of the North-Western Front launched an offensive in the strip from Lake Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. Seeing the impossibility of stopping the offensive, the Finnish troops retreated.
At the final stage of the operation, the 13th army advanced in the direction of Antrea (present-day Kamennogorsk), and the 7th - on Vyborg. The Finns put up fierce resistance, but were forced to retreat.
(To be continued)
