View from the trench. Memoirs of a front-line soldier about the Battle of Rzhev and party workers at the front. Summer battle for Rzhev German memories of the Battle of Rzhev
75 years ago, one of the most terrible tragedies in human history began - the Battle of Rzhev. This was Stalin's monstrous crime against the people. At the end of 1941, the Red Army had just moved the front away from Moscow and liberated the first regional city of Kalinin. The fresh divisions that arrived from Siberia were better able to fight in the Russian frosts. This gave the Red Army a clear advantage. However, Joseph Stalin, who was in the Kremlin, was so frightened by the prospect of a new German offensive on Moscow that he began to give crazy orders, as a result of which several million soldiers died. Near Rzhev, as a result of Stalin’s cowardice and mediocrity and the Red commanders’ stupid execution of his criminal orders, almost all of the Siberian divisions were killed.
“We advanced on Rzhev through corpse fields,” Pyotr Mikhin exhaustively describes the summer battles. He says in the book of memoirs: “Ahead is the “valley of death.” There is no way to bypass or bypass it: a telephone cable is laid along it - it is broken, and at any cost it must be quickly connected. You crawl over the corpses, and they are piled in three layers, swollen, teeming with worms, and emitting a sickening, sweet smell of decomposition of human bodies. The explosion of a shell drives you under the corpses, the ground shakes, the corpses fall on you, showering you with worms, a fountain of putrid stench hits your face... It’s raining, there’s knee-deep water in the trenches. ... If you survive, keep your eyes open again, hit, shoot, maneuver, trample on the corpses lying under the water. But they are soft, slippery, and stepping on them is disgusting and regrettable.”
The commander of the Western Front, Zhukov, wrote: “In general, I must say, the Supreme Commander realized that the unfavorable situation that developed in the summer of 1942 was also a consequence of his personal mistake made when approving the plan of action for our troops in the summer campaign of this year.”
The millions of victims at Rzhev were carefully hushed up by Soviet historiography and are still being hushed up to this day. It is because of this that many soldiers have not yet been buried, and their remains are scattered throughout the Rzhev forests. In which state is this possible? What people can look at this with indifference? The truth about the Battle of Rzhev began to emerge only after the collapse of the USSR and thanks to the efforts of Rzhev local historians and the Rzhev public.
Rzhev firefighters put forward a popular initiative to award Rzhev the title of “city of soldier’s glory,” namely soldier’s glory, not military glory. For the Red commanders had nothing to be proud of in this battle - it was the soldiers who bore the brunt. Rzhev local historians found support among German researchers of the history of the Second World War. They provided materials from their side. A terrible picture of a senseless murder, similar to a cult sacrifice, began to emerge, when unarmed Soviet soldiers were driven towards German machine guns, and were finished off from behind by well-armed NKVD barrage detachments. Thanks to the activity of Russian and German researchers and local historians, a memorial appeared in memory of those killed near Rzhev.
The calls of Rzhev local historians and the general public were finally heard in the Kremlin: the title “city of military glory” was introduced, but not “soldier’s”, as the public proposed. And this title was awarded to Rzhev, along with many other cities, including rear ones. Our authorities do not want to repent and ask for forgiveness from the millions of innocent soldiers killed.
Recently, as a mockery of the memory of the millions of innocent souls of soldiers who died near Rzhev, the authorities in the Rzhev region erected a monument to Stalin, who left Moscow for the only time towards the front; he visited Rzhev, which had already been liberated for several months by that time. A terrible and disgusting story. And it’s a shame that the governor of the Tver region, Igor Rudenya, and the respected deputy from United Russia, Vladimir Vasiliev, took part in this action. Maybe they don't know what they're doing? Maybe they don't understand what an insult they are doing to the public?
On January 5, 1942, Joseph Stalin gave the order to liberate Rzhev from the Nazis within a week. It was completed only after 14 months. Rzhev was occupied by German troops on October 15, 1941. The city was liberated from January 1942 to March 1943. The battles near Rzhev were among the most fierce, groups of fronts carried out offensive operations one after another, losses on both sides were catastrophic. The fighting took place not only in the Rzhev region, but also in the Moscow, Tula, Kalinin, and Smolensk regions. The Battle of Rzhev is the bloodiest in the history of mankind. “We flooded them with rivers of blood and piled mountains of corpses,” this is how writer Viktor Astafiev characterized its results.
WAS THERE A BATTLE?
Official military historians have never acknowledged the existence of the battle and avoid this term, arguing for the lack of continuous operations, as well as the fact that it is difficult to separate the end and results of the Battle of Moscow from the Battle of Rzhev. In addition, introducing the term “Battle of Rzhev” into historical science means recording a major military tactical failure.
Veteran and historian Pyotr Mikhin, who went through the war from Rzhev to Prague, in the book “Artillerymen, Stalin gave the order! We died to win” states: “If it weren’t for Stalin’s haste and impatience, and if instead of six unsupported offensive operations, in each of which just a little bit was missing for victory, one or two crushing operations had been carried out, there would have been no Rzhev tragedy.” In popular memory, these events were called “Rzhev meat grinder”, “breakthrough”. The expression “they drove us to Rzhev” still exists. And the very expression “driven” in relation to soldiers appeared in popular speech precisely during those tragic events.
“RUS, STOP DIVIDING CRUSKS, WE WILL FIGHT”
At the beginning of January 1942, the Red Army, having defeated the Germans near Moscow and liberated Kalinin (Tver), approached Rzhev. On January 5, the draft plan for the general offensive of the Red Army in the winter of 1942 was discussed at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Stalin believed that it was necessary to launch a general offensive in all main directions - from Lake Ladoga to the Black Sea. An order was given to the commander of the Kalinin Front: “In no case, no later than January 12, capture Rzhev... Confirm receipt, convey execution. I. Stalin."
On January 8, 1942, the Kalinin Front began the Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation. Then it was not only possible to interrupt the German defense 15-20 km west of Rzhev, but also to free the inhabitants of several villages. But then the fighting dragged on: the Germans fought back fiercely, the Soviet army suffered huge losses, and the continuous front line was torn apart. Enemy aircraft almost continuously bombed and shelled our units, and at the end of January the Germans began to encircle us: their advantage in tanks and aircraft was great.
Rzhevit resident Gennady Boytsov, who was a child at the time of those events, recalls: back in early January, a “corn farmer” arrived and dropped leaflets - news from his native army: “From the text of the leaflet, I forever remembered the following lines: “Mash up the beer, kvass - we’ll be with you on Christmas " The villages were agitated and agitated; Residents' hopes for a quick release after Christmas gave way to doubts. They saw Red Army soldiers with red stars on their caps on the evening of January 9.”
Writer Vyacheslav Kondratiev, who took part in the battles: “Our artillery was practically silent. The artillerymen had three or four shells in reserve and saved them in case of an enemy tank attack. And we were advancing. The field along which we walked forward was under fire from three sides. The tanks that supported us were immediately disabled by enemy artillery. The infantry was left alone under machine-gun fire. In the first battle, we left a third of the company killed on the battlefield. From unsuccessful, bloody attacks, daily mortar attacks, and bombings, the units quickly melted away. We didn't even have trenches. It's hard to blame anyone for that. Because of the spring thaw, our food supply was poor, famine began, it quickly exhausted the people, and the exhausted soldier could no longer dig the frozen ground. For the soldiers, everything that happened then was difficult, very difficult, but still everyday life. They didn’t know it was a feat.”
The writer Konstantin Simonov also spoke about the difficult battles at the beginning of 1942: “The second half of winter and the beginning of spring turned out to be inhumanly difficult for our further offensive. And the repeated unsuccessful attempts to take Rzhev became in our memory almost a symbol of all the dramatic events experienced then.”
From the memoirs of Mikhail Burlakov, a participant in the battles for Rzhev: “For a long time we were given crackers instead of bread. They were divided as follows - they were laid out in equal piles. One of the soldiers turned around and was asked who, pointing to this or that pile. The Germans knew this and, to make jokes in the morning, they would shout at us over the loudspeaker: “Rus, stop dividing crackers, we’ll fight.”
ARMAMENT AND TRAINING.
Good technical equipment gave the Germans a multiple advantage. The infantry was supported by tanks and armored personnel carriers, with which there was communication during the battle. Using the radio, it was possible to call and direct aircraft, and adjust artillery fire directly from the battlefield.
The Red Army lacked either communications equipment or the level of training for combat operations. The Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead became the site of one of the largest tank battles of 1942. During the summer Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, a tank battle took place, in which up to 1,500 tanks took part on both sides. And during the autumn-winter operation, 3,300 tanks were deployed on the Soviet side alone.
Many outstanding military leaders attended the Rzhev Academy: Konev, Zakharov, Bulganin... Until August 1942, the Western Front was commanded by Zhukov. But the Battle of Rzhev became one of the most inglorious pages in their biographies.
“THE GERMAN COULD NOT STAND OUR STUPID PERSISTENCE”
The next attempt to capture Rzhev was the Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation - one of the most fierce battles of the war. Only the top leadership knew about the offensive plans, radio and telephone conversations and all correspondence were prohibited, orders were transmitted orally.
The German defense on the Rzhev salient was organized almost perfectly: each settlement was turned into an independent defense center with pillboxes and iron caps, trenches and communication passages. In front of the front edge, 20-10 meters away, solid wire barriers were installed in several rows. The arrangement of the Germans could be called relatively comfortable: birch trees served as railings for stairs and passages, almost every department had a dugout with electrical wiring and two-tier bunks. Some dugouts even had beds, good furniture, dishes, samovars, and rugs.
Soviet troops were in much more difficult conditions. A participant in the battles on the Rzhev salient, A. Shumilin, recalled in his memoirs: “We suffered heavy losses and immediately received new reinforcements. Every week new faces appeared in the company. Among the newly arriving Red Army soldiers there were mainly villagers. Among them there were also city employees, the lowest ranks. The arriving Red Army soldiers were not trained in military affairs. They had to acquire soldiering skills during battles. They were led and hurried to the front line. ... For us, trenchmen, the war was not fought according to the rules and not according to conscience. The enemy, armed to the teeth, had everything, and we had nothing. It was not a war, but a massacre. But we climbed forward. The German could not stand our stupid stubbornness. He abandoned villages and fled to new frontiers. Every step forward, every inch of land cost us, the trenchers, many lives.”
Some soldiers left the front line. In addition to a heavily armed detachment, usually numbering about 150 people, special groups of machine gunners were created in each rifle regiment, tasked with preventing the fighters from retreating. At the same time, a situation arose that the barrier detachments with machine guns and machine guns were inactive, since the soldiers and commanders did not look back, but the same machine guns and machine guns were not enough for the soldiers themselves on the front line. Pyotr Mikhin testifies to this.
“We often found ourselves without food and ammunition in deserted swamps and without any hope of help from our own. The most offensive thing for a soldier in war is when, with all his courage, endurance, ingenuity, dedication, and selflessness, he cannot defeat a well-fed, arrogant, well-armed enemy occupying a more advantageous position - for reasons beyond his control: due to lack of weapons, ammunition, food, aviation support, remoteness of the rear,” writes Mikhin.
A participant in the summer battles near Rzhev, writer A. Tsvetkov, in his front-line notes, recalls that when the tank brigade in which he fought was transferred to the near rear, he was horrified: the entire area was covered with the corpses of soldiers: “There was a stench and stench all around. Many feel sick, many vomit. The smell of smoldering human bodies is so unbearable for the body. It’s a terrible picture, I’ve never seen anything like it...”
Mortar platoon commander L. Volpe: “Somewhere ahead to the right we could see [the village] Cheap, which we got at an extremely high price. The entire clearing was strewn with bodies... I remember the completely dead crew of an anti-tank gun, lying near its cannon turned upside down in a huge crater. The gun commander was visible with binoculars in his hand. The loader holds the cord in his hand. The carriers, frozen forever with their shells that never hit the breech.”
The offensive did not bring much results: it was possible to capture only small bridgeheads on the western banks of the rivers. The commander of the Western Front, Zhukov, wrote: “In general, I must say, the Supreme Commander realized that the unfavorable situation that developed in the summer of 1942 was also a consequence of his personal mistake made when approving the plan of action for our troops in the summer campaign of this year.”
FIGHTING “FOR A TINY TUBERCLE”
The chronicle of tragic events is sometimes shocking with amazing details: for example, the name of the Boynya River, along the banks of which the 274th Infantry Division was advancing: in those days, according to the participants, it was red with blood.
From the memoirs of veteran Boris Gorbachevsky “The Rzhev Meat Grinder”: “Not taking into account the losses - and they were huge! - the command of the 30th Army continued to send more and more battalions to the slaughter, this is the only way to call what I saw on the field. Both commanders and soldiers understood more and more clearly the senselessness of what was happening: whether the villages for which they laid down their lives were taken or not, this did not help in the least to solve the problem, to take Rzhev. Increasingly, the soldier was overcome by indifference, but they explained to him that he was wrong in his too simple trench reasoning...”
On September 21, Soviet assault groups broke into the northern part of Rzhev, and the “urban” part of the battle began. The enemy repeatedly launched counterattacks, individual houses and entire neighborhoods changed hands several times. Every day German aircraft bombed and shelled Soviet positions.
Writer Ilya Erenburg wrote in his book of memoirs “Years, People, Life”: “I will not forget Rzhev. For weeks there were battles for five or six broken trees, for the wall of a broken house, and a tiny hillock.”
The 17-month occupation of Rzhev is the greatest tragedy in its centuries-old history. This is a story of the resilience of the human spirit, and meanness, and betrayal.
The Rzhev city concentration camp operated in the city. Writer Konstantin Vorobyov, who went through the hell of the camp, wrote: “Who and when was this place cursed? Why is there still no snow in this strict square, framed by rows of thorns, in December? The cold fluff of December snow is eaten with crumbs of earth. The moisture has been sucked out of the holes and grooves throughout the entire expanse of this damned square! Patiently and silently waiting for the slow, cruelly inexorable death from hunger, Soviet prisoners of war..."
But the main tragedy of Rzhev was that residents died not only from backbreaking labor in the construction of enemy defensive fortifications of the city, but also from shelling and bombing of the Soviet army: from January 1942 to March 1943, the city was shelled by our artillery and bombed by our aircraft. Even the first directive from Headquarters on the tasks of capturing Rzhev said: “to smash the city of Rzhev with might and main, without stopping in the face of serious destruction of the city.” The “Plan for the Use of Aviation...” in the summer of 1942 contained: “On the night of July 30-31, 1942, destroy Rzhev and the Rzhev railway junction.” Having been a major German stronghold for a long time, the city was subject to destruction.
"RUSSIAN HUMAN RINK"
On January 17, 1943, the city of Velikiye Luki, 240 kilometers west of Rzhev, was liberated. The threat of encirclement became real for the Germans.
The German command, having used up all its reserves in winter battles, proved to Hitler that it was necessary to leave Rzhev and shorten the front line. On February 6, Hitler gave permission for the withdrawal of troops. On March 2, 1943, the Germans themselves abandoned the city. For the retreat, intermediate defensive lines were created, roads were built along which military equipment, military equipment, food, and livestock were exported. Thousands of civilians were driven to the west, allegedly of their own free will.
Leaving Rzhev, the Nazis drove almost the entire surviving population of the city - 248 people - into the Intercession Old Believer Church on Kalinin Street and mined the church. For two days in hunger and cold, hearing explosions in the city, the residents of Rzhevites expected death every minute, and only on the third day did Soviet sappers remove explosives from the basement, find and clear a mine. The released V. Maslova recalled: “I left the church with a 60-year-old mother and a daughter of two years and seven months. Some junior lieutenant gave his daughter a piece of sugar, and she hid it and asked: “Mom, is it snow?”
Rzhev was a continuous minefield. Even the ice-bound Volga was densely strewn with mines. Sappers walked ahead of the rifle units and subunits, making passages in the minefields. Signs began to appear on the main streets with the inscription: “Checked. There are no mines."
On the day of liberation - March 3, 1943 - 362 people remained in the completely destroyed city with a pre-war population of 56 thousand, including prisoners of the Intercession Church.
At the beginning of August 1943, a rare event happened - Stalin left the capital for the only time towards the front. He visited Rzhev and from here gave the order for the first victorious salute in Moscow in honor of the capture of Orel and Belgorod. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief wanted to see with his own eyes the city from where the threat of a new Nazi campaign against Moscow had been coming for almost a year and a half. It is also curious that Stalin was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union on March 6, 1943, after the liberation of Rzhev.
LOSSES
The losses of both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in the Battle of Rzhev have not been truly calculated. But it is obvious that they were simply gigantic. If Stalingrad went down in history as the beginning of a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War, then Rzhev - as a bloody struggle of attrition.
From the book of memoirs of Pyotr Mikhin: “Ask any of the three front-line soldiers you met, and you will be convinced that one of them fought near Rzhev. How many of our troops were there! ... The commanders who fought there were bashfully silent about the battles of Rzhev. And the fact that this silence crossed out the heroic efforts, inhuman trials, courage and self-sacrifice of millions of Soviet soldiers, the fact that this was an outrage against the memory of almost a million victims - this, it turns out, is not so important.”
According to TASS materials
Despite the fact that more than seven decades have passed since the days when the Great Patriotic War ended, the Battle of Rzhev to this day continues to attract the attention of both professional researchers and everyone who wants to preserve the memory of past years. Many materials related to it became available to the general public only in recent years, and made it possible to see the events that took place in greater detail.
Enemy bridgehead on the outskirts of Moscow
As evidenced by materials on the history of the Great Patriotic War, the offensive of Soviet troops on the Western Front in the period 1941-1942 led to the formation of the so-called Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge. This term is usually understood as the territory occupied by the Germans, which measured 200 km along the front and went almost 160 km in depth. Due to its strategically advantageous position, it was considered by the German command as the most convenient springboard for a general attack on Moscow.
For this purpose, the Nazis concentrated 2/3 of all the forces of the Army Center on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge. In this situation, the Battle of Rzhev of 1942-1943, which lasted for 13 months with minor interruptions, was a large-scale military operation, thanks to which the enemy’s plans were not destined to come true. It was carried out by the forces of the Kalinin and Western fronts.
Important strategic operation
The term adopted today - the Battle of Rzhev, includes a whole series of individual offensive operations, the purpose of which was to push the Germans as far as possible from Moscow, and, by clearing the territory of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bulge, thereby depriving them of a strategic advantage.
Fulfilling the task assigned to them, Soviet troops already in the first months of the operation liberated Mozhaisk, Kirov, Lyudinovo, Vereya, Medyn and Sukhinichi from the enemy, which allowed them, developing the offensive, to divide the German forces into several separate groups and then destroy them.
Tragic mistakes of command
However, such a favorable development of events was prevented by Stalin’s unexpected decision to transfer a significant part of the 1st Shock Army under the command of Kuznetsov and almost the entire 16th Army of Rokossovsky to other directions. The remaining units, immeasurably weakened by such an untimely redeployment of the main forces, were unable to complete the operation begun, as a result of which the initiative passed to the enemy, and the Battle of Rzhev fizzled out.
Trying to correct the situation, in the last days of January 1942, Stalin ordered significant reinforcements to be sent to Rzhev, and the 33rd Army of Lieutenant General M.G. was urgently transferred there. Efremova. However, instead of the intended breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, this group of troops itself was surrounded, as a result of which it was destroyed, and its commander, a former hero of the Civil War, committed suicide.
This failed operation resulted in a real tragedy that brought huge losses to the Soviet army. According to official data alone, there were about 273 thousand killed, missing or captured. Only a little more than eight hundred soldiers of Efremov’s destroyed army were able to escape from the enemy ring.
Liberation of Rzhev
However, despite such a tragic failure, the Battle of Rzhev continued. At the beginning of June 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters set the task of liberating a number of key cities in the Kalinin region, and primarily Rzhev, from the Germans. The forces of two fronts were involved in its implementation. As before, it was Western, commanded by G.K. Zhukov, and Kalininsky - I.S. Konev.
The offensive on Rzhev began on July 30, and the first blow of the united fronts was so powerful that very soon the troops approached the city at a distance of 6 km. It seemed that the goal had been achieved and the Battle of Rzhev, the significance of which was so great, was close to a victorious conclusion. But meanwhile, overcoming this last line of enemy defense took almost a month, and cost several thousand soldiers' lives.
When, finally, at the end of August, the advanced units of the Soviet troops entered the city, the political department of the front decided to invite the official representatives of the American President Roosevelt, who were then in the country, to show off the victory that the Battle of Rzhev brought to them. However, as it soon became clear, the triumph was premature. Within a few days, having brought up reinforcements, the Germans regained their previous positions.
Planning for Operation Mars
Having changed tactics, the Soviet command set the forces of the united fronts the task of overcoming the defense line of the Center group, and thereby creating the preconditions for the elimination of all enemy troops gathered on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky salient. The location of the decisive strike was chosen to be the area of the least concentration of enemy forces. It was located between the Osuga and Gzhat rivers. No offensive has yet been undertaken on it. The operation was codenamed "Mars".
The planned offensive also pursued another important goal - with its help, the high command intended to divert significant German forces from Stalingrad, where the battle was entering its decisive phase. For this purpose, as a form of misinformation, the Germans were given information that significantly overestimated the number of Soviet troops sent to break through the defenses of the Center group.
An offensive that turned into a new tragedy
At this stage, the Battle of Rzhev, the losses in which even then exceeded 300 thousand people, began, as before, with temporary successes. The forces of the 39th Army with a lightning strike knocked out the enemy from the village of Molodoy Tud, and, continuing the offensive, cleared the Tula region of enemies. At the same time, the 1st Mechanized Corps dealt a significant blow to the enemy in the area of the city of Bely. But very soon this attempt to turn the tide of the battle turned into incalculable losses and bloodshed for our soldiers.
Having stopped the advance of the Soviet troops with a powerful and unexpected counterattack, the Nazis destroyed the 20th Army and surrounded two corps - the 6th Tank and the 2nd Guards Cavalry. Their fate was equally tragic. G.K. Zhukov tried to save the situation. He insisted on continuing the offensive, but, despite all his efforts, new attempts to break through the enemy’s defenses also failed.
By December, the results of the Battle of Rzhev were catastrophic. Only, according to official data, the failed Operation Mars cost the lives of 100 thousand Soviet troops. Many researchers believe that this data is also very incomplete. The year 1942, which was coming to an end, did not bring the long-awaited victory at Rzhev.
"Buffalo" is losing ground
Analyzing the current situation, the German command understood that the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge formed during previous battles was their most vulnerable place, and sooner or later, the troops located on its territory would be surrounded. In this regard, Colonel General Kurt Zeitzler, who commanded this group of troops, turned to Hitler with a request for permission to withdraw the formations entrusted to him to a new line of defense passing through the city of Dorogobuzh.
After receiving the corresponding order from Berlin, the Germans began to implement it. This large-scale withdrawal operation was codenamed “Wuffel,” which translated means “Buffalo.” The enemy managed to carry it out with virtually no losses, which, according to military historians, was the result of well-thought-out and well-planned actions.
Liberation of the city of Rzhev
By the end of March 1943, the Germans abandoned the entire Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge, battles for which continued throughout the last year. After their departure, they left the cities of Vyazma, Gzhatsk, Olenino and Bely completely burnt and destroyed.
Pursuing the retreating enemy, Soviet troops moved forward, and on March 3, 1943, the 30th Army, completely re-equipped after earlier losses, entered Rzhev. The city turned out to be practically empty, only the rearguard of the 9th Army of the Wehrmacht, which had retreated by that time, remained in position, creating the illusion of the presence of the Germans.
Leaving Rzhev behind, the Soviet troops continued to develop their offensive, and were forced to stop only after reaching the city of Dorogobuzh, where the enemy had created a powerful defense line. It became obvious that at this stage further advance was impossible, and the fighting took on a positional character. It was possible to dislodge the enemy from the line he occupied only in the summer of 1943 after the successful completion of the operation near Kursk.
The price of victory in the Battle of Rzhev
According to historians, the events that unfolded in the period 1942-1943 on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge are one of the bloodiest episodes of the Great Patriotic War. No wonder they were popularly called “Rzhev meat grinder” and “Prorva”.
The truth about the Battle of Rzhev, and about those losses that were the result of rash and hasty decisions of the command and Stalin personally, was hidden for many years. And she was truly terrifying. The irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops, which include those killed, missing, captured and those who died from wounds in hospitals, amounted to 605 thousand people, according to the most conservative estimates. And these bloody statistics reflect only the picture of the battles of 1942-1943 on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge.
Dead city
The city of Rzhev, which was at the center of hostilities for 13 months, was completely destroyed by both German shells and Soviet artillery and air strikes during attempts to liberate it by the time the Germans finally abandoned it. Of the 5,442 residential buildings, only 298 remained relatively intact.
There were also huge casualties among the civilian population. It was established that out of 20 thousand residents of the city who found themselves under occupation, by March 1943, only 150 people remained alive. All these data allow us to imagine how dearly the Battle of Rzhev was won, the events of which will never be erased from the memory of the people.
Result of the battle
However, one should not lose sight of the enormous significance that the Battle of Rzhev had during the war. Thanks to the stubborn offensive actions of the Soviet troops, the Germans were forced to retreat, which made it possible to move the front line away from Moscow by more than 160 km. In addition, the battle near Rzhev attracted significant enemy forces and contributed to the successful completion of the Battle of Stalingrad. It is also impossible not to take into account the moral factor, since the news of the liberation of Rzhev had a beneficial effect on the morale of the entire Soviet army.
About the Rzhev battles
For three years at the front I had to participate in many battles, but again and again the thought and pain of memories return me to the battles of Rzhev. It’s scary to remember how many people died there! The Battle of Rzhev was a massacre, and Rzhev was the center of this massacre. I never saw anything like this during the entire war. My story about the battles on Rzhev land only slightly exposes the underwater part of the iceberg of the Rzhev tragedy. This is just what I saw and experienced myself. However, my “trench” truth is confirmed not only by historians and living veteran witnesses who survived those battles, but also by the book of the German general Horst Grossmann “Rzhev - the cornerstone of the Eastern Front.”
The Germans held the city due to the advantage of their positions, superiority in the air, weapons and material support: they were better armed than we were, occupied pre-equipped positions on the heights, and we, under bombs and shells, climbed onto their machine guns from below, from the swamps. It was bitter and insulting for our soldiers to endure failures for reasons beyond their control, to suffer from a lack of weapons, from inexperience of command, to compensate for all these shortcomings with their veins, nerves, stomachs, torment, blood and lives.
More than sixty years have passed since the end of the Battle of Rzhev. But, despite its grandeur, not inferior in scale to either the Battles of Stalingrad or Kursk, few people know about it. Unless a war veteran who was in that meat grinder will never forget it. Yes, Alexander Tvardovsky could not help but remember her after the war in his poem “I was killed near Rzhev.” Nobody else! - neither generals, nor authorities, nor military historians, nor writers, nor even journalists - no one! did not say a word about it AS ABOUT THE BATTLE.
Our losses in killed and wounded in the Battle of Rzhev approached TWO AND A HALF MILLION PEOPLE. But Rzhev was never taken.
Therefore, officially, the GREATEST BATTLE OF RZHEV is still not called a BATTLE, but is listed in the rank of “battles of local significance.” Ask any of the three front-line soldiers you met, and you will be convinced that one of them fought near Rzhev. The question arises: where does this belittlement and silence come from? In the history of World War II there was no more grandiose and more large -scale battle than the Rzhev battle - not by the number of troops involved - about ten million on both sides, neither in the covered territory - eight regions, nor by the duration of the battles - 17 months, nor in terms of quantity OPERATIONS
During the Battle of Rzhev, our side carried out an unprecedented number of military operations for one battle: six offensive and four defensive. 5 FRONTS, more than 30 ARMIES and CORPS were involved in the battles. An unprecedented number of TANKS took part in the battles - MORE THAN ONE AND A FIFTY THOUSAND units. Our losses also indicate the scale of the fighting: 2,060,000 people. This does not take into account the losses of the 39th Army, which in July 1942 was surrounded southwest of Rzhev, and the Germans alone captured 50,100 people. And without taking into account the losses of the Kalinin and Western fronts in the battles in the Rzhev and Sychevsky directions in November - December forty-two. Nobody calculated what the total losses were during the 17 months of the Rzhev confrontation. Because the fighting went on day and night for more than a year, the units were constantly replenished with new soldiers and officers. During the periods of the most fierce fighting, the divisions lost 300–350 people killed and 700–800 wounded per day. To this day, volunteer search teams of students and schoolchildren carry out cartloads of bones of soldiers who died in the swamps and bury them.
The circumference of the Rzhev salient along the front arc was 530 kilometers. In depth it went beyond Vyazma to 160 kilometers. And it was only 150 kilometers from Moscow. Both Stalin and Hitler were aware of the importance of this bridgehead, and therefore the former sought to eliminate it at all costs, and the latter tried with all his might to retain it. The following facts speak of the constant interest that both Hitler and Stalin showed in the battles for Rzhev. Hitler, when his troops were leaving Rzhev, wanted to hear on the phone the explosion of the bridge across the Volga. And Stalin, who had never gone to the front, could not resist visiting Rzhev on August 4, 1943, six months after the fighting.
It was not the fault of our soldiers and officers that the commanders, prompted by Stalin, carried out military operations that were not supported financially, and primarily from the air, although in concept they were daring and remarkable.
The Germans called Rzhev all sorts of things: “the key to Moscow”, “a pistol aimed at the chest of Moscow”, “a springboard for a jump to Moscow”. And they fought furiously near Rzhev. If we, following the example of Hitler, issued Stalin’s order No. 227 “Not a step back!”, reinforced by barrier detachments that lay behind the attackers with machine guns and fired at the retreating, then the Germans dealt with their retreating no less brutally.
The Germans also suffered high losses near Rzhev: in battalions of 300 soldiers there were up to 90, or even 20 people left. Our losses during the attack on the broken German defense in the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation were small. They began after delays due to rains, when the Germans' fear subsided and they again firmly settled in the internal, well-equipped lines.
We advanced on Rzhev through corpse fields. During the Rzhev battles, many “valleys of death” and “groves of death” appeared. It is difficult for anyone who has not been there to imagine what a stinking mess under the summer sun is, consisting of thousands of human bodies covered with worms.
Summer, heat, calm, and ahead is such a “valley of death.” It is clearly visible and under fire from the Germans. There is no way to bypass or bypass it: a telephone cable is laid along it - it is broken, and at any cost it must be quickly connected. You crawl over the corpses, and they are piled in three layers, swollen, teeming with worms, and emitting a sickening, sweet smell of decomposition of human bodies. This stench hangs motionless over the “valley.” The explosion of a shell drives you under the corpses, the ground shakes, the corpses fall on you, showering you with worms, and a fountain of noxious stench hits your face. But then the fragments fly by, you jump up, shake yourself off and move forward again.
Or in the fall, when it’s already cold, it’s raining, there’s knee-deep water in the trenches, their walls are slimy, and at night the Germans suddenly attack and jump into the trench. Hand-to-hand combat ensues. If you survive, keep your eyes open again, hit, shoot, maneuver, trample on the corpses lying under the water. But they are soft, slippery, and stepping on them is disgusting and regrettable.
What is it like for a soldier to rise up to attack a machine gun for the fifth time! Jump over your own dead and wounded who fell here in previous attacks. Every second, wait for the familiar push in the chest or leg. We fought for every German trench, the distance between them was 100-200 meters, or even a grenade throw. The trenches changed hands several times a day. Often half the trench was occupied by the Germans, and the other half by us. They annoyed each other with everything they could. They interfered with food intake: they forced a fight and took away lunch from the Germans. Songs were blared to spite the enemy. On the fly they caught grenades thrown by the Germans and immediately threw them back to their owners.
This fact speaks about the fierceness of the battles for Rzhev. In only one village of Polunino, which stands four kilometers north of Rzhev, THIRTEEN THOUSAND SOVIET SOLDIERS from SEVENTY-THREE DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES who fought here are buried in a mass grave. Their bodies were collected from the surrounding fields.
There were twelve thousand soldiers in each division and eight thousand soldiers in each brigade. True, no more than two thousand from each division participated directly in the battle at the same time, the rest served them. You can count how many of our soldiers took part in the battles just in the area of the village of Polunino!
As a result of the liquidation of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky salient, the threat to Moscow was finally removed. But the fact that Rzhev was not taken by us either in January, as Stalin ordered, or in August forty-two, and was abandoned by the Germans only in March forty-three, did not honor our command. That is why the commanders who fought there were so bashfully silent about the battles of Rzhev. And the fact that this silence crossed out the heroic efforts, inhuman trials, courage and self-sacrifice of millions of Soviet soldiers who fought near Rzhev, the fact that this was a betrayal and outrage against the memory of almost a million victims, whose remains for the most part have not yet been buried - It turns out that this is not so important.
The battle for Rzhev is the most tragic, bloodiest and most unsuccessful of all the battles fought by our army. And it’s not customary for us to write about failures.
Stalin's strategic miscalculation at the beginning of the war allowed Hitler to reach not only Rzhev, but also Moscow. Well, possessing an excellent defensive line Vyazma - Rzhev, the Germans, under the personal supervision of Hitler, stubbornly defended themselves.
When the 55th anniversary of the liberation of the city was celebrated in Rzhev, then, as at the celebration of the 50th anniversary, none of the distinguished guests from Moscow came to these celebrations. This neglect was repeated at the 60th anniversary of the celebrations. Neither Central Television, nor radio, nor newspapers said a word about the Rzhev celebrations. This means that the goal - to hush up, or rather, to forget this GREATEST TRAGEDY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR - has been achieved.
However, let the hypocritical authorities, the historians who serve them, the staunch military, and the writers sophisticated in floridity remain silent, but why the ubiquitous journalists did not notice the Rzhev festivities is not entirely clear. Most likely, due to their youth, they are not aware of this area, they do not know their history.
Finally, on March 2, 1943, the Germans themselves abandoned the city. The decisive reason for the Germans' flight from Rzhev was their defeat at Stalingrad. In addition, the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts advanced so far around the city that it became pointless to remain there.
About receiving a party card
On New Year's Eve 1943, our division was withdrawn from near Rzhev. At the end of August, I was accepted as a candidate for the party, and then suddenly, when I was preparing intelligence officers for the search, they called me to the political department of the division to receive a candidate card.
At night I made my way to the rear of the regiment and from there to the rear of the division . The rear areas were located about fifteen kilometers from us, in the area of the village of Deshevki. The Germans burned all the villages near Rzhev, so the staff and rear people lived, like us, in dugouts. There was no shooting here and you could walk around at full height. And their dugouts are taller than human height, like rooms, and have doors, and are protected from above by ramps made of thick logs. Yes, not like ours: a kennel covered on top with some kind of tin from an airplane wing to prevent the earth from falling out, and the door, as a rule, is a cape.
Naively, I thought that I, a lieutenant from the front line, would be met and immediately handed a document. But the sentry said: “Wait for the morning.” It was cool, I was tired, and there was nowhere to rest; they weren’t allowed into the dugouts. It's good that I was dry. He sat down on a hillock. Everything in the rear seemed strange to me. The first thing that struck me in the life of the rear guards was the time they got up. The sun has already risen, and they are still sleeping. On our front line, at dawn there is already shooting, all the people are on their feet, and sometimes you’ll trample in a wet trench all night. And here they sleep until eight o’clock, and get up when the sun gets hot. So they have to sit and wait for their working day to start.
Finally, sleepy people in their underwear began to emerge one by one from the dugouts of the prosecutor's office, the political department, the editorial office of the division newspaper and all other services. Yawning, they rubbed their eyes with their fists, looked out from under their palms at the sun and slowly walked towards the well-equipped toilets, also covered from above by a powerful roll just in case. No, you don’t look like that on the front line. I remember for the first time, when we had not yet secured a foothold, there were no continuous trenches, much less latrines, only a man would pop up to relieve himself, and a German would not sleep: fuck - and there was no soldier. It was sad to see people die in such poses. And there were jokers who made jokes about this too, not out of spite, of course, but more to cheer themselves up.
People in their underwear slowly, with gusto, washed themselves, orderlies courted their superiors: some carefully, without looking up, drained the water, others took care of their clothes: they cleaned them and lovingly, with two fingers, removed specks of dust, some polished their boots, others were already carrying bowler hats with breakfast. I asked one in long johns:
— When will candidate cards be issued?
“We have a working day from nine,” he answered decorously.
I returned to my hillock. Two more officers came up to me, they also came from the front line to receive their party cards. We wait. Only at twelve o'clock we received our documents. No one fed us or asked how we were fighting. Only the sentry was interested, and only because his superiors threatened to send him to the infantry. The major from the political department theatrically shook my hand, patted me on the shoulder and said:
- Beat the fascists, fight like a communist.
About political officers.
We were going to Moscow for the 50th anniversary of the Victory. There were four of us in the compartment. All from different cities of Russia and Ukraine. It so happened that we represented different types of troops: pilot, tankman, infantryman and artilleryman. We regretted that there was not a sailor among us: that would be interesting to listen to. It is rare for seasoned front-line soldiers to listen to each other with curiosity. Here we found out in detail the peculiarities of the combat activities of the pilot and tankman, infantryman and artilleryman.
— Guys, by any chance, did any of you commission? — the attack pilot addressed us. “Otherwise you’ll inadvertently offend someone.” — Having made sure that only combatant commanders were in the compartment, the pilot continued: “If anyone lived in the war, it was the political workers.” They didn’t fly, but they received orders. And even taller than us. I remember that for my first flights I was given the “Patriotic War” award, but the non-flying political officer was given the Order of the Red Banner of Battle. The tankman entered the conversation:
— That’s right, our political officers didn’t go into battle either. He wasn’t even entitled to a tank, although the deputy in charge had a tank.
“Ours mostly rubbed off near the kitchens.” I’m leading a battalion into an attack, and this trinity: political officer, party organizer, Komsomol organizer - sits in the rear, seemingly worrying about food; as if the foreman wouldn’t send the kitchen without them when it gets dark,” the battalion infantry commander spoke displeasedly about his political workers.
“Hey,” I joined in the conversation, “he was a cunning political officer.” And harmful. In three years I never went to the front line. Everyone was at headquarters, in the kitchen and in the rear: he was looking for food for himself or newer uniforms. And he kept the party organizer and the Komsomol organizer - young officers - with him all the time. For them, the front line was like a forbidden zone; they also never visited us. Apparently, they had such an order from above. All three of them knew only what to write political reports to the regiment.
“And in newspapers and books they are all heroes,” someone muttered in the darkness.
- Well, they printed the newspapers, and they were in charge of the books themselves. So they glorified their brother and themselves.
“What is true is true,” I agreed, “the majority of the writing people came out of the commissar’s overcoat.”
“I once wrote to the newspaper, and they said to me: “Why didn’t you reflect the role of the political instructor?” What will I reflect? How did he sit in the rear while we were fighting? But no! It’s all the same: “Show him as a hero, otherwise we won’t publish.”
- And that’s true, why hasn’t anyone written the truth about them yet? Are they afraid? But now you can tell the truth!
- Yes, write the truth! They will all suddenly snap: “We went on the attack for Stalin!”— the infantry battalion commander categorically intervened. “There are a lot of them, almost all of them survived.” Count how many battalion commanders died and how many there are. Yes, everyone became bosses after the war - only they were in the district and regional committees. How they wrote lies during the war, that they went on the attack shouting “For Comrade Stalin! Forward, attack! - this is what the majority of people still think. But in fact, no one remembered Stalin during the attacks. There was a short command: “Forward!” Well, sometimes you add obscenities for convincing. Was there any time for agitation? Therefore, whoever is now shouting that he went on the attack “For Stalin”, I’ll say right away: I took it from the newspapers, he didn’t go into any attack, he wasn’t even on the front line. By the way, they didn’t go on the attack, but ran, and how: if you don’t have time to reach the enemy trench, then everything is lost. I already know!
On this sad note the conversation died down. One by one everyone fell asleep. But I couldn’t sleep, disturbed by the topic, in the dark, under the sound of wheels, I indulged in memories. I also remembered the political workers of my division. Probably Karpov, my political officer, will come to the meeting again...
I returned home from the meeting and, impressed by what I heard, I decided to describe the combat episodes myself, and at the same time tell the truth about my political workers. Otherwise, indeed, as one of my fellow travelers said, the myth about the general heroism of the commissars during the Patriotic War will be established for centuries. And I know from my own experience: the political workers with whom I communicated at the front, with the exception of a few people, did not participate in battles and did not show any heroism. Many of them were slackers and cowards. They only knew how to write cidulki-denunciations, give orders, supervise - and not answer for anything.
At the end of the same forty-second year, three months after Stalin’s order “Not a step back” was issued, when repressive losses from the overzealous activities of special departments were added to the usual colossal losses of platoon, company and battalion commanders, Stalin ordered: platoon commanders, companies and battalions during attacks should not be in the chains of the attackers or in front of them, but behind their units. But nothing came of it. The political instructor was taken and removed from the company, but the commander was not so much removed, but it was impossible to place soldiers behind him: on the command “Forward!” not all fighters rise under bullets, they need to be raised by example or force, and for this the commander needs to be next to them, in a chain. So it happened: the political workers were saved, and the entire burden of the war was placed on the battalion officers, which is why the average platoon commander lived a day, the company commander lived for a week, and the battalion commander lived for at most a month.
The soldiers treated our good-natured political commander, Major Zakharov, with humor and, remembering his illiterate speeches, often made fun of him. But his successor, political officer Captain Karpov, was openly disliked. Having moved from party organizers to political officers, Karpov was still quiet, polite, but silent, uncommunicative and vindictive. The soldiers most of all did not like his unconcealed psychological attitude: to survive at all costs. This is where his pathological cowardice stemmed. Being secretive and withdrawn himself, he led the party organizer and Komsomol organizer away from communication with the personnel and his subordinates. One day, rear soldiers, out of curiosity and hostility, stole his diaries and destroyed them. At Karpov’s request, I began to look into this unpleasant matter. The soldiers answered with hidden humor and feigned misunderstanding:
— Keeping diaries at the front is strictly prohibited. How could a political officer violate this ban?! There were no diaries at all!
Political officer Karpov did not communicate with my intelligence officers and signalmen because he had never been on the front line. One day I asked him by phone to go to the battery, which was located in the rear just a hundred meters from him, and talk with the new commander Shchegolkov. Demoted from lieutenant colonel to captain, Shchegolkov drank heavily and left the observation post without permission, as a result of which the infantry suffered unjustified losses. I believed that the political head of the division was no less concerned about the fate of the battery than I was and would immediately rush to the battery. Besides, he and Shchegolkov are both forty, they are old enough to be my father, and Karpov is better off trying to reason with his one-year-old drunken battery commander. To my surprise, Karpov flatly refused, he was afraid of shelling and feared the disfavor of the authorities who looked after Shchegolkov. And the fact that the battery was lost and the infantry was dying without artillery support—that didn’t bother him. I turned to the regiment's political commander, Major Ustinov, so that he could influence Karpov, but he advised not to disturb Karpov. I heard the same answer from the division's political department. But when Shchegolkov left to drink in a combat vehicle, depriving the battery of mobility, I, at my own peril and risk, kicked the drunkard out of the division, and the authorities, in the interests of the cause, tolerated my arbitrariness.
Karpov and the political leadership of the regiment and division made it clear to me that I would not achieve any equality, any justice, and renaming commissars into political officers was a mere camouflage. Having become political officers, the commissars did not lose any actual power, but only cleverly avoided responsibility. They even retained the commissar's salary. Now the commander—the “sole commander”—was responsible for everything. We saw this at the regimental and battalion level. And after the war they learned that senior party leaders also used this shadow. And Stalin himself, and Khrushchev, Mekhlis, Golikov loved to “steer” in the war in a businesslike manner, despite the warnings of the commanders. They will do something stupid, kill hundreds of thousands of soldiers - and they will go to the bushes, and the commander as a scapegoat will be brought to justice.
I took out all my anger on the fascists. My division always came first. The inevitability of imminent death in battle dulled the fear not only of the Germans, but also of our own. However, a paradox emerged: I was more afraid not of death, but of captivity, because captivity was considered a betrayal. He was not afraid of the fascists, but he was gradually afraid of his special officers and political workers. Because in the turmoil of the battle we often found ourselves in the enemy’s position and could suspect that you were in contact with the Germans. The tragic death in the special department of lieutenants Volkov and Tsukanov, who in battle found themselves with their men in the rear of the Germans, aroused in me not only compassion for their fate, but also fear: I would not be in their position, because special officers, for reinsurance, easily will be shot.
After the war, former political officer Karpov worked in his pre-war position in one of the regional party committees until the end of the existence of these regional committees. Dry, not having lost his health during the war, he seemed fifteen years younger than his age, so he continued to work for the benefit of the party in his low post until he was eighty-five years old. I learned a lot from his letters that I had no idea about during the war years. Now he recognized my military merits, although during the war, as a former political informant from the political department told me, he “riveted” such things about me that I should not only have been awarded, but should have been tried by a military tribunal.
And now every time my former political officer comes to veterans’ meetings. He is already over ninety, but still comes. He spoke very kindly to me last time.
“You sent me battle episodes, and I will include them in my book, you fought,” he indirectly admitted that he himself did not participate in the battles.
Karpov needed my combat episodes and a laudatory review of the manuscript that he sent me. The writer's itch still overcomes him. I wrote a whole book. He asks me to give a good review. And there it is complete nonsense. I copied everything from front-line newspapers and inserted the names of fellow soldiers. His manuscript is both funny and embarrassing to read. He hasn’t even seen a single battle, but he writes everything in his own name, as if he were fighting the battle himself. There I saw a photograph: the caption under the photograph dryly says: “At an observation post near Kharkov.” When I saw the familiar edge of the forest in the photograph, I felt uneasy: it was here that we fought a fierce battle with the Germans and lost many people killed. It turns out that when we moved forward, the rear troops arrived at this very edge and started a party on it. Karpov, of course, for the sake of force, called this place an observation post in order to confirm his imaginary presence on the front line: He doesn’t know that at observation posts they don’t walk, don’t set up tents, but hide from the enemy’s eyes so that he couldn’t see anything through a stereo tube consider.
The political workers of our division were in the convoy, were not responsible for anything, none of them were either wounded or killed, but we fought, died and were responsible for everything. Not everyone then could dare to tell them the truth to their faces. Fortunately, I had brave combat prowess and recklessness, and the confidence in my imminent death dulled the fear not only of my enemies, but also of my own. Luckily, I survived and escaped with injuries. But he was not rewarded by his superiors and political authorities for his directness and independence.
The events of the Second World War - the Great Patriotic War - are moving further into the past. But interest in those difficult months and years when our people stood up for the defense of the Fatherland and defeated the fascist aggressors in fierce battles does not wane. Recently, documents and materials have come to light that allow us to take a different, new look at the harsh everyday life of those distant fiery years. Some, recalling the “battles for Rzhev,” imagine a map of military operations with many arrows and numbers of military formations, a large ledge with the notorious “bloody polygon” Rzhev - Zubtsov - Sychevka - Gzhatsk - Vyazma - Bely - Olenino.Others get the impression of local battles near the walls of the ancient Upper Volga city. This is where the reason for belittling the significance of those events lies: it is one thing to talk about local battles for individual cities, another thing is to see and show the scope, scale and tragedy of a months-long bloodbath. In military historical literature, the terms “battle”, “battle” are often found ", "battle".Often the difference between them is so blurred that the same battle is called both ways. At the same time, many publications list the battles of the Great Patriotic War: Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, for Leningrad, the Caucasus, the Dnieper. There is no Battle of Rzhev. Is this fair? In the initial period of the war there was no clear gradation of concepts - “battle”, “battle”, “battle” -.Stalin's order of February 23, 1943 talks about stubborn battles near Moscow, in the Caucasus, near Rzhev, near Leningrad and the Battle of Stalingrad. They are all in the same row. Moreover (for some reason they don’t pay attention to this), then the Supreme Commander-in-Chief calls all these battles “great battles.” Definitions of battle are given in the reference literature. Soviet Military Encyclopedia: “In the wars of the 20th century (World War II, Great Patriotic War), the concept of “battle” meant a series of simultaneous and sequential offensive and defensive operations of large groupings of troops, carried out in the most important directions or theater of military operations in order to achieve strategic results in the war (military campaign)".Great Soviet Encyclopedia (latest, third edition): “During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45, battle meant the struggle of large strategic groupings in an important strategic direction. The decisive force in these battles was front-line formations (for the enemy - army groups).” Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary: “Battle, a major battle that often decided the course of the war.During the Great Patriotic War, a battle was the name given to several interconnected major strategic operations...” From these definitions (with all the differences), a general idea can be obtained. At the same time, attention is drawn to the vagueness of the formulations, which opens the way to subjective assessments.
How did the events develop “in the Rzhev area” and to what extent do they fit the definition of “battle”? At the beginning of 1942, after a successful counter-offensive of the Red Army near Moscow, Soviet troops approached Rzhev. At the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, a decision was made to continue moving forward without an operational pause in order to complete the defeat of the Nazi Army Group Center. On January 8, the offensive operation began, called the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya.It was attended by troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts with the assistance of the Northwestern and Bryansk fronts. As part of the Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation, the Sychev-Vyazemsk and Toropets-Kholm operations were carried out. At first, success accompanied the Red Army. However, by the end of January the situation changed dramatically.The fascist German command hastily transferred 12 divisions and 2 brigades from Western Europe. As a result of counterattacks, the 33rd Army and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps were surrounded, only a narrow corridor connected the 22nd, 29th, 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps with their own, and later this was cut off. So The Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead appeared on wartime maps.From the dictionary-reference book “The Great Patriotic War of 1941-45”: “The Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead, a ledge formed in the defense of fascist German troops during the offensive of Soviet troops in the winter of 1941-42 in the western direction. The Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead had dimensions up to 160 km in depth and up to 200 km along the front (at the base). In the winter of 1942-43, about 2/3 of the troops of Army Group Center were concentrated here. The main forces of the Kalinin and Western fronts acted against this grouping. "From 2 to On July 12, the Wehrmacht carried out an offensive operation code-named “Seydlitz” against units of the Kalinin Front that were surrounded.For many years, they preferred not to talk about it. Within the framework of the summer Rzhev-Sychevsky operation, carried out by forces of two fronts, the Pogorelo-Gorodishche operation of the Western Front stands out. This is the only operation on the bridgehead that has received a wide description: a book by Colonel General L.M. Sandalov, “Pogorelo-Gorodishche Operation,” was published.This offensive of the Red Army brought some successes: dozens of settlements were liberated, including on Tver land - Zubtsov and Pogoreloe Gorodishche. The operation was defined as “the first successful offensive of Soviet troops in summer conditions.” In the Soviet Historical Encyclopedia, one line indicates the Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation of the Red Army, carried out on November 25 - December 20, 1942. And just recently, the journal “Questions of History” published a sensational article by the American military historian David M. Glantz, “Operation Mars (November-December 1942).” It says that almost simultaneously with Operation Uranus (the strategic offensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad), Operation Mars was carried out.The goal of the latter was to defeat the troops of Army Group Center on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead. Like the previous ones, it was not successful.
The last offensive operation, during which the bridgehead was liquidated, is called the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya and dates from March 2-31, 1943. Until today, it is unknown exactly how many lives the liberation of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead cost. Fifty years after the liquidation of the Rzhev ledge, the book " The secrecy has been removed" - a statistical study on the losses of the USSR Armed Forces in wars, hostilities and military conflicts. It contains the following data:
Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation (January 8 - April 20, 1942):
irretrievable losses of the Red Army - 272,320 people,
sanitary - 504569 people,
total - 776889 people.
Rzhev-Sychevsk operation (July 30 - August 23, 1942):
irretrievable losses of 51,482 people,
sanitary - 142201 people,
total -193383 people.
Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation (March 2-31, 1943):
irretrievable losses - 38862 people,
sanitary - 99,715 people,
total - 138,577 people.
In all three operations:
irretrievable losses - 362664 people,
sanitary - 746,485 people,
total - 1,109,149 people.
Irreversible losses include those killed on the battlefield, those who died from wounds during evacuation, those missing in action and captured, and medical losses - wounded, shell-shocked, burned and frostbitten military personnel who were evacuated from combat areas to army, front-line and rear hospitals.However, if we take into account that it is unknown how many wounded returned to duty, how many became disabled, how many died in hospitals, the overall figure of irretrievable losses loses its specific outline. The approximate nature of the data on losses on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead also lies in the fact that many the fighting on this section of the front remained outside the field of view of military historians. A participant in these events, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov gave an approximate figure for the total losses of the Red Army on the Rzhev Bulge - 2 million 60 thousand people. The losses of the Red Army on Rzhesko-Vyazemsky were great bridgehead.What is the number of Wehrmacht losses? One thing is obvious here: for all the pedantry and penchant for accuracy of the Germans, they also did not strive to speak openly on this topic. General H. Grossmann, who commanded the division on this section of the front, wrote a book entitled “Rzhev - the cornerstone of the Eastern Front.” Repeatedly and in detail talking about Soviet losses, the general “modestly” avoided specific data about his victims of this massacre, resorting to the definitions “large”, “serious”, “heavy”, etc. Some data on Wehrmacht losses in the Rzhev salient are possible found in Soviet publications.Thus, there is information that in the Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation of 1942, Army Group Center lost 330 thousand people in just three months. When describing the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation (summer 1942), it is said that the losses of the German army in it amounted to 50-80 percent of personnel. Thus, it becomes clear that the losses of both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in the brutal battle for the bridgehead on the distant approaches to Moscow has not really been counted.At the same time, it is obvious that they were simply gigantic. Comparing this, even very, very approximate information about the fallen, comparing them with the greatest battles of the Second World War, it becomes obvious that the battle for the Rzhev-Vyazma bridgehead was the bloodiest not only in the last world war, but in general in the history of mankind. The battle for The Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead occupies a special place in the history of the Great Patriotic War for many reasons.These include repeated offensive operations carried out by groups of fronts; and the monstrous losses in manpower and equipment suffered by both sides (as discussed above). In the same row is a huge number of Soviet armies that took part in hostilities: there is information about almost twenty armies, including shock and air forces.
One of the features of this battle is that it lasted 14 months. Of course, during strategic offensive operations, the ferocity and scale of the battle increased, but even in the intervals between massive offensives, the fighting here did not subside for a single day. The Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead became the site of the largest tank battles of 1942.During the summer Rzhev-Sychevsky operation, a tank battle took place in the area of Pogorely Gorodishche from August 7 to 10, in which up to 1,500 tanks took part on both sides. And during the autumn-winter operation of the same name (Operation Mars), according to the American researcher Glantz, 3,300 tanks were deployed on the Soviet side alone. Future marshals of the armored forces A. Kh. Babajanyan, M. E. Katukov, Army General A. L. Getman fought here. Many outstanding military leaders attended the Rzhev Academy; the Western Front was commanded by G. K. Zhukov until August 1942.At the same time, for several months he was the commander of the Western direction. I. S. Konev commanded the Kalinin Front; in August 1942, he replaced G. K. Zhukov as commander of the Western Front. Here is just a short list of military leaders who solved the problem of defeating the enemy on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead:
Colonel General (since 1944 - Army General) M. A. Purkaev - commander of the Kalinin Front since August 1942;
Lieutenant General (from 1959 - Marshal of the Soviet Union) M. V. Zakharov - from January 1942 to April 1943, chief of staff of the Kalinin Front;
Colonel General (since 1946 - Marshal of the Soviet Union) V. D. Sokolovsky - commander of the Western Front since February 1943;
Lieutenant General (since 1959 - Army General) D. D. Lelyushenko - Commander of the 30th Army;
N. A. Bulganin (in 1947 - 1958 - Marshal of the Soviet Union) - member of the Military Council of the Western Front.
The Battle of Rzhev became one of the most inglorious pages both in the biographies of these military leaders and in the history of the Great Patriotic War itself. That's why they were silent about it for half a century. But descendants need the truth, no matter how bitter it is.
STALIN AND HITLER IN THE BATTLE OF RZHEV
There is one unique event in the history of the Great Patriotic War: at the beginning of August 1943, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin left the capital for the front. Stalin, accompanied by Beria by train from Moscow, arrived first in Gzhatsk (there he met with the commander of the Western Front V.D. Sokolovsky and member of the Military Council of this front N.A. Bulganin), and then near Rzhev (here a meeting took place with the commander of the Kalinin Front A I. Eremenko).From near Rzhev, from the village with the beautiful name Khoroshevo, on August 5, Stalin gave the order for the first victorious salute in Moscow in honor of the capture of Orel and Belgorod. The event was indeed a rare one: during the entire Great Patriotic War, Stalin no longer went to the front (though if to be precise, it was a trip not to the front, in the usual sense of the word, but towards the front: Rzhev was liberated on March 3, Gzhatsk - on March 6).Therefore, it is probably interesting to find out not only the circumstances, but also the reason for this famous trip. D. A. Volkogonov expressed the opinion that Stalin needed this for his historical reputation. Let’s try to look at this event more broadly, moving back a year and a half ago. As you know, at the beginning of January 1942, the Red Army, having defeated the Germans near Moscow, approached Rzhev. The question arose: what to do next? On January 5, this was discussed with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Stalin was impatient and persistent. Here's just one document:
“To the commander of the Kalinin Front on January 11, 42, 1 hour 50 minutes No. 170007 ... Within 11 and in no case later than January 12, capture Rzhev. Headquarters recommends for this purpose the use of artillery, mortar, and aviation weapons available in the area forces and destroy the city of Rzhev with all its might, without stopping in the face of serious destruction of the city. Confirm receipt, convey execution. I. Stalin."The receipt of the order was apparently confirmed, but its execution was delayed for almost 14 months. The offensive near Rzhev faltered. Significant forces of the Red Army found themselves surrounded. Obviously, it was Stalin who personally led this winter-spring offensive on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead. In the summer of 1942, the Rzhev-Sychevsky operation was carried out on the bridgehead.Stalin set the same task: to take Rzhev at any cost. Finally, another major operation on the bridgehead - “Mars”.As already mentioned, its beginning is dated to the end of November. Zhukov cites other facts; he writes about the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of December 8, 1942. The troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts were tasked with defeating the enemy group in the Rzhev-Sychevka-Olenino-Bely area by January 1, 1943.The directive was signed by I.V. Stalin and G.K. Zhukov (on August 26, 1942, he was appointed Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief). Thus, it is obvious that Stalin attached great importance to the defeat of the Germans on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead and personally made decisions on the majority operations. From the personal and strictly secret message of British Prime Minister W. Churchill to I.V. Stalin: “Please accept my warmest congratulations on the occasion of the liberation of Rzhev.From our conversation in August, I know how much importance you attach to the liberation of this point... March 4, 1943." And one more thing. Perhaps this is a coincidence, but it is curious that the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union was not awarded to Stalin after the defeat of the Germans under Stalingrad (February 2, 1943), and March 6, 1943, when Rzhev and Gzhatsk were finally liberated.
Now let’s return to the topic of Stalin’s arrival in the village of Khoroshevo. In light of the above, we can conclude: of course, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief needed a trip to the front, first of all, for history. Moreover, he reported this to W. Churchill in the following way: “Although we have recently had some successes at the front, the Soviet troops and the Soviet command now require exceptional effort and special vigilance in relation to possible new actions of the enemy. In this regard, I we have to go to the troops more often than usual, to certain sectors of our front.”And the choice of place for the trip was far from accidental: the Supreme Commander-in-Chief wanted to see with his own eyes the cities from where the threat of a new German campaign against Moscow had been emanating for almost a year and a half. Over the long post-war years, Stalin’s trip towards the front “grew up” with legends. This was also facilitated by the fact that eyewitnesses of the event at different times told differently about what they saw. Thus, Marshal A.I. Eremenko, in the first version of his memoirs, published in No. 8 of the Ogonyok magazine for 1952, talked about L.P. Beria.
In later publications, Lavrenty Pavlovich is no longer remembered. But other facts appear that were missing earlier. Yu. Semenov, the author of the famous “Seventeen Moments of Spring,” has a cycle of short short stories called “Unwritten Novels.” The author himself noted in the preface to them that they would no longer become novels. At the same time, he emphasized that there is no fiction in these stories.
One of the chapters is dedicated to Stalin’s arrival near Rzhev. Yu. Semenov writes that Stalin informed Beria about his departure to the front only a day in advance - “so that the fact of his trip would not become known to anyone,” that “the guards began to patrol all highways and country roads within a radius of one hundred kilometers.” A reproduction has been preserved. from a painting by an unknown artist, which depicts Stalin’s arrival in Rzhev.The bridge across the Volga, or rather its entire right-bank half, attracts attention. It is known that the left bank span of the bridge was blown up by ours when leaving Rzhev. Another flight of Germans leaving the city. It is unknown from which photograph the artist painted the picture. On the shore: I.V. Stalin, A.I. Eremenko, L.P. Beria.There is no doubt that for Hitler, the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead was extremely important. The Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, F. Halder, made entries in his military diary every day. They detail the events and their assessment by the top of the Third Reich. The significance of the battles on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead is indicated by the index of geographical names.By 1942, next to Rzhev and Vyazma there are two words: look everywhere. Alexander Werth, a correspondent for the English newspaper The Sunday Times and the BBC radio company, wrote an interesting book “Russia in the War of 1941-1945”. Unlike many Soviet publications, it pays a lot of attention to the battles on the Rzhev salient. In particular, it is reported: “It was Hitler, contrary to the advice of many of his generals who suggested retreating to a great distance, who insisted not to give up Rzhev, Vyazma, Yukhnov, Kaluga, Orel and Bryansk, and all these cities, with the exception of Kaluga, were retained.” .
Among the legends persistently repeated by many is the story of Hitler’s arrival near Rzhev. Front-line soldier D. Shevlyugin even gives the date of this alleged event: “In the first days of our offensive (January 1942) (according to the testimony of prisoners), Hitler flew to Rzhev and demanded from the command of the group of troops defending the Oleninsko-Rzhev bridgehead (9th field , 3rd and 4th Tank Armies), hold it at all costs, considering Rzhev the “eastern gate” for a new offensive on Moscow."However, this fact is not confirmed by German sources. It is known that Hitler, like Stalin, often interfered in the actions of military leaders and made decisions on many important operations. H. Grossmann spoke about one such case: “One day Hitler decided to move the tank corps closer to the Gzhatsk position.Model (Colonel General, commander of the 9th Wehrmacht Army on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead - ed.) believed that it would be better to transfer it to the neighborhood of Rzhev.Both insisted on their point of view. The argument grew louder, and Model shouted more and more excitedly: “My Fuhrer, are you in command of the 9th Army or am I?” Struck by this harshness, Hitler wanted to confirm his point of view with an order. Then the Model said very loudly: “I am forced to protest.” Hitler’s retinue stood around, confused and frightened: she had never heard such a tone towards Hitler. But Hitler suddenly conceded: “Okay, Model, do as you want, but you will answer with your own head if things fail.” When the Germans, defeated at Stalingrad, were forced to leave the distant approaches to Moscow, Hitler expressed a desire to hear the explosion of the Volga bridge in Rzhev. The Fuhrer's wish was fulfilled. This symbolic explosion ended the Battle of Rzhev for Hitler.
BATTLE OF RZHEV 1941 - 1943
Rzhev had a special share in the Great Patriotic War: the city was not only under fascist occupation for seventeen months, but was a front-line city for a long time. All survivors of the battles near Rzhev emphasize that during the entire war they did not know battles equal to these in severity.In the summer and autumn of 1942, the land near Rzhev groaned from the tread of hundreds of tanks, from the explosions of bombs, shells and mines, and in small rivers water red with human blood flowed, entire fields were covered with corpses, in some places in several layers. Bitter and harsh truth about the brutal battles near Rzhev, called “battles of local significance,” for a long time did not find a worthy place either in journalism or in fiction. Only front-line poets Alexei Surkov, Sergei Ostrovoy, Sibgat Hakim, Viktor Tarbeev and, above all, Alexander Tvardovsky in his immortal poem “I was killed near Rzhev” could not avoid this sad topic. Forty-two mass graves are located on the territory of Rzhev and the region, Po According to the Rzhev military registration and enlistment office, they contain the ashes of soldiers from more than one hundred and forty rifle divisions, fifty separate rifle brigades, and fifty tank brigades. The fighting on the so-called Rzhev salient captured the territory of several neighboring districts of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions.According to published data from the archive of the armed forces, in only three offensive operations on this ledge, the total losses of our army amounted to more than 1 million 100 thousand soldiers and officers. 14-month bloody battles, in which armies of several fronts took part, were of great strategic importance in the first period of the Great Patriotic War. This was emphasized in the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin on the 25th anniversary of the Red Army and Navy on February 23, 1943: “Our people will forever preserve the memory of the heroic defense of Sevastopol and Odessa, of the stubborn battles near Moscow and in the foothills of the Caucasus , in the Rzhev region and near Leningrad, about the greatest battle in the history of wars at the walls of Stalingrad." only half a page, or more precisely, only 23 lines, But the author of the memoirs for almost a year commanded the very 30th Army, which fought directly under the walls of Rzhev from January 1942 until its liberation on March 3, 1943. The German command in its strategic plans attached The Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead is of enormous, not “local” significance. Even the title of the book by the German general, former commander of the 6th Infantry Division Horst Grossmann about the battles on the Rzhev salient is evidence of this: “Rzhev is the cornerstone of the Eastern Front.”The German command and Hitler personally repeatedly demanded that their troops hold Rzhev at any cost. In 1942, we still did not have enough forces, especially military equipment and ammunition, and Soviet military leaders were still gaining experience in conducting major offensive operations. Two offensive operations - at the beginning and at the end of 1942 - with the aim of eliminating the enemy’s Rzhev bridgehead, ended with the encirclement of a significant part of our troops. Rzhev was captured by the Nazi occupiers on the 115th day of the war during their “general” attack on Moscow under the code called "Typhoon".
With this ominous word, the fascist leaders emphasized the rapid nature of the final, as they believed, operation of the “lightning war.” The autumn days of 1941 were the most formidable during the entire Great Patriotic War. Army Group Center, which was advancing on Moscow, outnumbered the opposing troops of our three fronts in the number of troops and weapons by one and a half to two times.On September 30, 1941, fascist German troops broke through the defenses of the Bryansk Front, and on October 2 delivered a powerful blow to the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts, encircling the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies west of Vyazma by October 7th. At this time, the 22nd, 29th and 31st armies fought back to the Ostashkov-Selizharovo-Molodoy Tud-Sychevka line. A defensive line was created at this line for several months. Its construction was led by the headquarters of the 31st Army, which was located in Rzhev from the end of July 1941. But the threat of encirclement forced us to leave this line too. Until October, Rzhev suffered little from fascist aviation.With the beginning of the fascist offensive on Moscow, the city was subjected to almost continuous bombardment from the air: fascist vultures circled over the city all day and night, dropping high-explosive and incendiary bombs on industrial enterprises, the railway and residential areas.Houses were burning, people were dying. The Nazis, carrying out their plan to capture Moscow “in pincers,” sent large forces to the northwestern direction. On October 10, by decision of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, the Western and Reserve Fronts were united into one Western Front, which was headed by G. K. Zhukov, recalled by Stalin from Leningrad.Our troops fought back to Kalinin and the Mozhaisk defense line, which existed only on military maps. The 31st Army defended west of Rzhev. In the Olenin area, the Nazis were detained for four days by soldiers of the 119th Infantry Division and artillery units. For 4 days, from October 7 to October 10, the enemy was detained near Sychevka. An operational group of troops under the command of Major General V.S. Polenov was transferred here in vehicles, receiving orders to prevent the enemy from breaking through to Rzhev and Volokolamsk.On October 10, the enemy attempted to bypass Sychevka from the southwest. From here, the 41st German motorized corps, consisting of two tank and one motorized divisions, moved to Zubtsov. On October 11, units of the enemy's 41st motorized corps occupied Zubtsov and Pogoreloe Gorodishche, and on October 12, Lotoshino and Staritsa. Thus, the advanced units of the enemy, bypassing Rzhev, advanced to Kalinin. On October 13, German troops landed at the civilian airfield behind Shikhin. The paratroopers tried to break through to the Rzhev-Staritsa highway through Galakhovo and Timofevo.
But our troops defeated this landing in a fierce battle. On the same day, Zhukov’s deputy, Colonel General Konev, arrived from the Selizharov area in Rzhev to the headquarters of the 29th Army. It was clear that the enemy, having bypassed Rzhev from the southeast, would deliver the main attack on Kalinin through Zubtsov and Staritsa, and at the Selizharovo-Rzhev line, the infantry divisions of the 9th and 16th German armies delivered an auxiliary attack.In his memoirs, Konev wrote: “I ordered the 22nd Army to organize defense on the left bank of the Volga from Selizharov to Bakhmutov, covering the Torzhok direction. The 29th Army, consisting of six rifle divisions, covering Rzhev and the bridges across the Volga, was supposed to gather the main forces into a fist, transport them to Akishev on the right bank of the Volga and strike at the rear of the enemy group that had broken through to Kalinin.” I.S. Konev believed that the quick and precise execution of this maneuver could stop the enemy’s advance on Kalinin.But the commander of the 29th Army, Major General I. I. Maslennikov, not only did not comply with Konev’s order, but also secretly appealed to L. P. Beria. Konev learned about this only in 1953, when he was the chairman of the trial of Beria. At 5 pm on October 13, the advanced German units occupied the village of Danilovskoye near Kalinin.On this day, German aerial reconnaissance discovered that long columns of the Red Army were crossing the bridge in Rzhev. The command of the enemy's 206th Infantry Division received orders to block the withdrawal of our troops in Rzhev. A reinforced German reconnaissance detachment approached Muravyov while it was still dark on October 14, but our units launched a counterattack and drove him back.Fierce battles with two regiments of the 206th enemy division that approached from the west continued at the Muravyevo station and the village of Tolstikovo until October 15. On October 14, formations of the 41st motorized corps of the enemy's 3rd tank group, supported by aviation, threw back units of the 5th rifle division, which had just begun to organize the defense at Migalov, broke into the right bank part of Kalinin. This day, October 14, 1941, became the blackest day in the centuries-old history of the city of Rzhev.Our troops were forced to leave Rzhev. They went not to the east, but to the northwest, towards Lukovnikov-Torzhok. This retreat was accompanied by daily fierce battles with an enemy armed to the teeth. For three days, from October 17 to 19, the 178th Infantry Division, formed in Omsk, held back the enemy onslaught on the ancient Mologinsky tract, which leads from Rzhev to Torzhok.In these battles near the villages of Kresty-Mologino-Apolyovo-Frolovo, the Siberian division lost more than two and a half thousand people. On the marble slabs of the memorial erected in Mologino on the initiative of the Omsk worker Mikhail Borodulin, some of the names of the heroes who died here are carved: the father of Mikhail Borodulin - commander of platoon 693- th regiment junior lieutenant Efim Borodulin; Lieutenant Yuri Barbman, who in his last battle blew up the first enemy tank with a grenade, and was himself crushed by the second; battalion commander of the 386th regiment, Lieutenant Nikolai Kargachinsky, (who was barely 20 years old), but already famous for the destruction of enemy troops at the famous Solovyov crossing of the Dnieper near Smolensk... At the beginning of the war, your soldiers were armed mainly only with rifles.
With the capture of Rzhev and Kalinin by fascist German troops, there was a threat of the enemy breaking through the extended defense of the Western Front in this area and attacking Moscow from the north. In this tense situation, on October 19, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command formed the Kalinin Front, the commander of which was appointed Colonel General I. S. Konev. Until December 5, the troops of the Kalinin Front fought fierce defensive battles. At the end of November - beginning of December, the Nazi armies approached Moscow at a distance of 25-30 kilometers. They cut seven of the eleven railways that connected the capital with the country. But Moscow survived. The counterattacks launched on December 5-6, 1941 against the main enemy groups north and south of the capital developed into a counteroffensive of the Kalinin, Western and Southwestern fronts. On December 16, units of the 29th and 31st armies entered Kalinin. On January 1, 1942, the 247th, 252nd and 375th rifle divisions liberated Staritsa. Fighting broke out on the outskirts of Rzhev.
FIRST RZHEVSKO-VYAZEMSKY OPERATION FIRE CORRIDOR
By the beginning of January 1942, during the counter-offensive of the Red Army, the enemy was driven back 100-250 kilometers from the capital. It was the area 20-30 kilometers west of Rzhev, where the armies of the Kalinin Front went out in early January 1942, and was located two hundred and fifty kilometers from Moscow. On January 5, 1942, the draft plan for the general offensive of the Red Army in the winter of 1942 was discussed at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.Stalin believed that the most opportune moment had come to launch a general offensive in all main directions - from Lake Ladoga to the Black Sea. On January 8, 1942, the Kalinin Front launched the Rzhev-Vyazma operation, which was part of the general offensive of the Red Army and lasted until April 1942. The main role in this operation was given to the Western Front, which advanced with nine armies and two cavalry corps and delivered the main blow in the Vyazma region.The main blow to the enemy west of Rzhev was delivered by the 39th Army under the command of Major General I. I. Maslennikov. The commander of the Kalinin Front, Konev, who arrived at the army command post, introduced the army headquarters to the general plan of the upcoming operation and specified the breakthrough site on the ground. Concentrating on a narrow section of the front, the tanks, after a short artillery preparation, broke through the Nazi defense 15-20 kilometers west of Rzhev, in the area the villages of Nozhkino and Kokoshkino, located on the left and right banks of the Volga, which, within the Rzhev region, quickly carries its waters from west to east. Colonel A. V. Egorov, in those days the commander of a tank regiment, which was part of the 8th tank brigade under command of P.A. Rotmistrov, he spoke about overcoming the ice-bound Volga near the village of Nozhkino: “It’s not far from the Volga, but we are moving towards it all the time under enemy fire.Having emerged from the snow drifts, we notice the outlines of the village. This is Nozhkino. Behind it is the bank of the Volga. Let's speed up the pace. KV Senior Lieutenant Lyashenko rushed forward. He maneuvers and rushes straight to the firing position of the anti-tank battery. The German infantry, scattered through the forest, retreats. The KV was hit twice almost point-blank by a cannon. By some miracle, Lyashenko’s tank dodged these shells and crushed the gun that hit it. The KVs that arrived in time for Lyashenko completed the defeat of the Nazis and burst into the village....
Here it is, finally, the bank of the Volga, the great Russian river! We returned to her again. Just the consciousness of this gives us strength... That day we crossed the Volga, but then we moved forward slowly. The Germans launched violent counterattacks several times every day, trying to close the gap in their defenses and prevent our tanks from breaking through bypassing Rzhev from the north-west,” But the enemy could not hold back the onslaught of our units.The rifle divisions of the 39th Army, with heavy fighting, rushed south to the Sychevka area, and already in mid-January, having advanced 50-60 kilometers, they approached it from the west. But take Sychevka, the German supply and transport center on the Rzhev- Vyazma, failed. In the area of Osuga station and to the south, the road was defended by General Donhauser’s group, the 86th division recalled from the east, and an anti-aircraft regiment with an armored train. German sappers quickly restored the railway tracks that were undermined by our advanced units. The SS Division "Reich" and the 1st Panzer Division, hastily transferred from near Pogorely Gorodishche, in fierce battles were able to push back the divisions of the 39th Army that had reached the Sychevka railway station. Into a breakthrough 8 kilometers north-west of Rzhev, up to 10-15 kilometers wide 12 January, the 11th Cavalry Corps under the command of Colonel S.V. Sokolov and the 29th Army under Major General V.I. Shvetsov were introduced.The 29th Army was tasked with expanding the bridgehead west of Rzhev, holding the flanks at the point of breakthrough of the enemy defense and the divisions of the left flank, together with the 31st Army, capturing Rzhev. If the divisions of the 39th Army and the cavalry corps had attacked directly on Rzhev in early January , then the city, in which only German rear units and convoys were stationed, would have been liberated without significant destruction. During these days, German troops fled in panic from Rzhev and the Rzhev villages of Galakhovo, Polunino, Timofevo and others. General H. Grossmann was forced to mention this escape in his book: “The cars and sleighs are loaded. Everyone is trying to escape as quickly as they can.But with almost hungry and driven horses, you can only move in deep snow at a walk.” The command of the 9th German Army, taking advantage of the slow advance of our armies towards the city, hastily created defensive lines 8-10 kilometers west and north-west of Rzhev. The artillery commander of the 122nd Infantry Division, General Linding, subjugated all the rear supply and construction units, as well as the airlifted marching battalions and the alerted eastern Rzhev reserves of the VI Corps. The Germans, trying to close the gap, went on the offensive against the units approaching the Volga 29 1st Army not only from the east, but from the west, so far unsuccessfully, the SS cavalry brigade "Fegelein" tried to break through to the Volga.Great was the joy of the residents of the liberated villages, who survived the horrors of the three-month fascist occupation. Rzhevityanin Gennady Mikhailovich Boytsov, who turned 13 in May 1942, who then lived with his mother, grandfather and 15-year-old brother in the village of Filkovo, located near Pavlyukov, Pyatnitsky, Makarov, Krutikov, recalls how the residents of these villages received the first news from native army: at the beginning of January, a “corn farmer” arrived and dropped leaflets. From the text of the leaflet I will forever remember the following lines: “Mash up your beer, kvass - we’ll be with you on Christmas.”The villages were agitated and agitated; Residents' hopes for a quick release after Christmas gave way to doubts. They saw Red Army soldiers with red stars on their caps on the evening of January 9. Our skiers walked through the village, and later carts with machine guns passed by. And then the artillery arrived. The winter of 1941-1942 turned out to be extremely snowy and frosty. The horses, with difficulty, exhausted, pulled the heavy guns. The German group “Sychevka” began an offensive against Osuiskoye from the east, and the first wounded Red Army soldiers appeared in the villages.Soon the entire village was occupied by cavalry. The horsemen, well-armed, wearing new sheepskin coats and felt boots, confidently told the residents that there was no need to be afraid of the Germans now. Unfortunately, the optimism of the cavalrymen was not justified. The 11th Cavalry Corps advanced 110 kilometers to the south and, having cut the Minsk Highway on January 29, reached Vyazma. He had to overcome several kilometers to connect with the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps of General P. A. Belov, advancing from the east.Due to the lack of heavy tanks and artillery, this was not possible. The divisions of the left wing of the 29th Army had been attacking Rzhev from the west and southwest since January 12. Until January 19, the 174th, 246th and 252nd rifle divisions tried to break through to Rzhev through villages located on the left and right banks Volga: Lazarevo, Mitkovo, Spas-Mitkovo, Redkino, Burmusovo. Khoroshevo. But our divisions failed to reach Rzhev, advancing along the Volga under heavy artillery fire, air strikes, and repelling numerous counterattacks of enemy infantry and tanks. The fierce resistance of the Germans is evidenced by the three-day battles of the 908th Infantry Regiment of the 246th Division for the capture of the village of Nechaevo.The street of the village was literally littered with corpses, but the Germans held this point, not retreating even in hand-to-hand combat. The regiment's losses were enormous. On January 17, the regiment commander, Major V. S. Perevoznikov, also died. The 185th Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant Colonel S. G. Poplavsky fought for the village of Tolstikovo, from which there were ten kilometers to Rzhev. To the left of it, the 183rd Division of Major General K.V. Komissarov was advancing on the villages of Perkhurovo and Shunino in order to break through to Rzhev through Muravyevo, which is located five kilometers west of Rzhev. On the right was advancing the 381st Rifle Division under the command of Major General B.S. Maslov.In fierce battles on January 17-20, the villages of Tolstikovo, Perkhurovo, Shunino, Muravyevo and others changed hands several times. The offensive of units of the 29th Army was carried out most often without the support of tanks and aircraft, in incredibly difficult conditions: deep snow, frost reaching 25-30 degrees, the inability to warm up and dry out uniforms.The supply of ammunition, food and medicine from warehouses located tens of kilometers to the north did not meet the needs of the army. Gaps formed between divisions and even regiments weakened in battle; there was no continuous front line; fighting took place along roads and around villages. In mid-January, clear frosty days and nights set in, and enemy aircraft almost continuously bombed and shelled our units. It was not possible to expand the breakthrough corridor. This neck in the area of the villages of Nozhkino and Kokoshkino was dubbed the “fiery corridor.”
SURROUNDED
On January 22, 1942, the Nazis began implementing a plan developed by the Commander-in-Chief of the 9th Army, Colonel General Walter Model, to encircle the Red Army units that had broken through west of Rzhev. Along both banks of the Volga towards each other - from the west, from Molodoy Tud, and from the east, from Rzhev - powerful German groups went on the offensive. Parts of the VI Corps advanced from Rzhev: the group of General Lindig and the group “Center of Gravity” of General Recke.The 206th Infantry Division and the SS Cavalry Brigade "Fegelein" made their way towards them. The German offensive was supported by tanks, self-propelled guns, long-range and anti-tank artillery, as well as aviation from the VIII Flying Corps. Our command underestimated the enemy's forces and overestimated its own. The Germans broke through in the defense sector of the 246th Division, whose rifle units, after being transferred from the 29th Army to the 39th Army of the 252nd Division, found themselves stretched along both banks of the Volga.The German group "Center of Gravity", having occupied the villages of Klushino, Burgovo, Ryazantsevo, Zhukovo, Nozhkino, Kokoshkino and others during fierce, often hand-to-hand fighting, reached the heights at the confluence of the Sishka River and the Volga by the evening of January 22. On January 23, the eastern and western groups of Germans continued to press our units and at 12:45 they achieved their goal - they met near the village of Solomino, north of the Rzhev-Molodoy Tud road. Significant forces of the Kalinin Front - the 29th, 39th armies and the 11th cavalry corps - found themselves semi-encircled to the west and southwest of Rzhev and Sychevka.The commander of the Kalinin Front Air Force, General Rudenko, was tasked with organizing the air delivery of weapons, ammunition, medicine and food to the surrounded armies. The flights were carried out from the Migalovo airfield near Kalinin. But the front felt a shortage of aircraft: by the end of January 1942, on the entire Kalinin Front there were only 96 serviceable aircraft of seven different types. Very often, food and ammunition dropped by our planes ended up in territory occupied by the Nazis, and vice versa.One day, a whole detachment of transport planes, which was dropping supplies, missed and dropped the entire cargo to the Germans. General Maslennikov, seeing this, gave a desperate radio telegram: “We are dying of hunger, and you feed the Germans!” The radiogram reached Stalin. Stalin called Chief of the General Staff Vasilevsky and Air Force Commander Zhigarev and was so beside himself during the conversation that Vasilevsky was afraid that he would shoot Zhigarev with his own hands right there in his office.In the first days of February, ammunition consumption in the 29th Army decreased to one or two shells per day per gun, to two or three mines per mortar. To release those surrounded, front commander I. S. Konev ordered the 30th Army under the command of Major General D. D. Lelyushenko to be transferred to the Rzhev area.The offensive of the 30th Army divisions, which were transferred from the Pogoreloe Gorodishche army area and weakened by previous battles, began on January 26, took place in the most difficult conditions. There were few tanks, and there was almost no air cover for ground troops. During fierce battles, dozens of villages on both banks of the Volga: Klepenino, Solomino, Lebzino, Usovo, Petelino, Nelyubino, Nozhkino, Kokoshkino and others were wiped off the face of the earth. The offensive of our rifle units was carried out mainly at night, since German aviation intensively bombed and shelled the front line.Every meter of progress was achieved at a high price. In a number of places, the divisions of the 30th Army had only four or five kilometers to cover before they were surrounded. Scouts of the 359th Rifle Division, advancing in the area of the villages of Solomino and Lebzino, managed to penetrate the location of the 29th Army and at night transport more than a thousand wounded soldiers and commanders on carts. But the divisions of the 30th Army were unable to break through the narrow enemy corridor to join the 29th Army.In February 1942, the translator of the 30th Army E.M. Kogan (in the future - the writer Elena Rzhevskaya) translated Hitler's order captured from the Nazis; "Division headquarters. 02.02.1942. Secret. Immediately inform the unit. Order of the Fuhrer. Soldiers of the 9th Army! The gap in your sector of the front north-west of Rzhev is closed. In this regard, the enemy who broke through in this direction is cut off from his rear communications "If you continue to fulfill your duty in the following days, many Russian divisions will be destroyed... Adolf Hitler."Nazi troops gradually tightened the encirclement. The SS Cavalry Brigade "Fegelein" and von Resfeld's group advanced on Chertolino, Lindig's group on Monchalovo, the 246th Infantry Division advanced from the west, and the 46th Panzer Corps from the east. Exhausted by continuous battles and suffering irreparable losses, the encircled units created all-round defense in the Monchalovsky forests.All commanders of headquarters, special and rear units who were not urgently needed there were transferred to the infantry. It was necessary to conserve ammunition; there was no fuel for cars and tractors. The warriors were starving. If at the end of January the soldiers received hot food once a day, then from the beginning of February everyone was content with only hot pine broth and horse meat.The local population shared their meager food supplies with the fighters: potatoes, salt, flaxseed. In early February, the 39th Army, pushed west from Sychevka by the 6th Panzer Division of General Routh, broke through a narrow passage towards the Nelidovo station, where the 22nd was fighting. I am the army. At this time, the enemy launched a massive offensive from the Osuga station at the junction of the 29th and 39th armies. On February 5, enemy infantry, cavalry and tanks, supported by aviation, rammed through the villages of Botvilovo, Mironov, Korytovo, Stupino and others. The 1st Panzer Division and the SS Cavalry Brigade "Fegelein" coming towards it met at Chertolin and thereby cut off the 29th Army from its southern neighbor - the 39th Army. The 29th Army found itself completely surrounded west of Rzhev in the Monchalovsky forests on an area of approximately 20 by 10 kilometers.Having completed the encirclement of the 29th Army, the enemy immediately began dismembering and destroying it piece by piece. Day and night, the Nazis fired, bombed, and attacked our defenses from all directions. On February 9, our surrounded divisions were forced to retreat to the east in the face of superior enemy forces. On February 26, a group of 19 soldiers from the 2nd battalion of the 940th regiment of the 262nd Infantry Division of the 39th Army accomplished an unprecedented feat. All 19 fighters, led by political instructor Grigory Yakovlevich Moiseenko, died, but until the evening they detained the enemy near the small village of Korytse-Poludennoye. The Germans went on the attack both in a sparse line and in a psychic attack, fired at this handful of fighters from their guns, and dropped bombs on the brave men four times.Hero of the Soviet Union G. Ya. Moiseenko and his military friends were buried in a mass grave in the village of Pyatnitskoye. The defense front of each encircled division continued to narrow every day. The losses from constant bombing were great. Massive jacks of enemy aircraft forced the transfer of headquarters and wounded from villages to forests. It became more difficult to defend every hour.Front aviation could not provide significant assistance to the encircled. On February 10, a flight of fighters from the 180th Fighter Aviation Regiment, led by Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Sergei Vasilyevich Makarov, patrolled over our positions in the area of the villages of Solomino and Paikovo. Until February, Makarov made 260 combat missions, participated in 35 air battles, personally shot down 10 enemy aircraft and 13 in a group with his comrades. When Makarov’s flight had already headed for its airfield, 12 German bombers appeared over the village of Voskresenskoye.In an unequal battle, Makarov shot down two Messers, but his plane was also riddled with bullets from enemy planes and, engulfed in flames, fell outside the village of Voskresenskoye. A native of the Vyazemsky district of the Smolensk region, S.V. Makarov was buried in a mass grave in the Rzhev village of Bakhmutovo. In mid-February, the headquarters of the 29th Army received a request from I.V. Stalin by radio: “What is needed for you to hold out for two days?” Army commander V.I. Shvetsov replied that it was possible to hold out for two days, provided air support was provided. Immediately, the military council of the army sent out a directive to the divisions, which said: “Comrade Stalin has become aware of our situation. I.V. Stalin asked: we will be able to Will we hold out? Food and ammunition will be dropped from transport aircraft.As you can see. The High Command of the Red Army, personally Comrade Stalin, consider the area we are defending to be very important and are taking measures to help us." To assist the encircled 29th Army, it was decided to parachute into the area it held the parachute battalion of the 204th Airborne Brigade, led by Senior Lieutenant P. L. Belotserkovsky The drop of the battalion of five hundred people was carried out by single heavy transport aircraft on two flights on the night of February 16-17 to the area of the village of Okorokovo.The planes took off from the Lyubertsy airfield near Moscow and searched for the landing zone west of Rzhev, guided by primitive signals from fires forming a triangle and a quadrangle. But finding a limited landing area turned out to be so difficult that some crews did not complete the task: about a hundred paratroopers were returned to the airfield.At the moment of the landing, groups of enemy machine gunners, supported by eleven tanks from three sides - from Startsev, Stupin and Gorenok - broke through to the village of Okorokovo. The paratroopers had to enter the battle literally straight from the sky. With the onset of dawn, without stopping the battle, the paratroopers picked up cargo containers, bags of food and ammunition and shared them with the soldiers of the encircled units. However, at least half of everything dropped ended up in the hands of the Germans, since part of the drop area near Okorokovo ended up in their hands.
FOR BREAKTHROUGH
The decision to withdraw the troops of the 29th Army from the encirclement in a southwestern direction, to the location of the 39th Army, was made at the Army Military Council, where all division commanders and commissars were present. From the Erzovsky forest, bypassing Monchalovo, scattered parts of the divisions were gathered in the forests near the village of Okorokovo, 15 kilometers west of Rzhev.The most combat-ready units and subunits occupied a perimeter defense, providing the main forces with a way out of the encirclement. Frantic attacks of the Nazis were often repulsed with bayonet counterattacks. On February 18, the Nazis especially fiercely throughout the day fired artillery and mortar fire at the forests and bushes in which the main forces of the encircled were concentrated. The remnants of the army, cut into several parts, by February 18 held only about 12 square kilometers of territory.Hitler's aviation, with 20-30 planes, continuously bombed the entire surrounded territory. As survivors recall, it was “utter hell.” The losses were enormous. Thus, 15 bombers dropped bombs on the village of Bykovo, in which all the houses were filled to capacity with the wounded and frostbitten. After the bombing, only smoking firebrands remained from the village; there was no one to bury. In the first echelon of those leaving the encirclement were the army headquarters, the 185th and 381st rifle divisions and the 510th howitzer artillery regiment.The paratroopers covered the rear and flanks of the formations retreating to the south. We set out late at night, the soldiers were stuck in the snow up to their waists. The carts with the wounded were in the middle of the column. Hungry horses pulled the overloaded sleigh with great difficulty. Having knocked down German pickets, we crossed the Stupino-Afanasovo road. At dawn the aircraft attacked. When we were crossing the Afanasovo-Dvorkovo road along a hill, suddenly shots were heard from the right and left; tanks came out of the villages towards each other and began firing cannons and mortars. A third of the column managed to be drawn into the forest. The main part, stretching along the road, ended up in a large open field. German machine gunners cut it off from the forest and destroyed it.The breakthrough required unprecedented self-sacrifice from the soldiers and commanders and cost the 29th Army enormous sacrifices. Here is what Lieutenant General V.R. Boyko, Hero of the Soviet Union, wrote about this in his memoirs “With Thoughts on the Motherland”: “The 183rd division was entrusted with the task of covering this retreat, and it fought continuous battles. We were the last to emerge, the heaviest The Nazis' blows fell on you, especially on our rearguard. A day later, on the night of February 21, the Nazis managed to block our retreat routes.At dawn we rushed into the last battle. Many were killed or seriously wounded in this battle. The division commander, Major General Konstantin Vasilyevich Komissarov, died at a combat post, with whom we shared the hardships of combat life near Rzhev." Units of the 246th division, covering the withdrawal of the main forces of the army from the north, managed to break away from the advancing enemy on the night of February 19. Divisional commander Melnikov ordered to break through in groups of 10-12 people.On February 22, a fascist punitive detachment discovered and surrounded the divisional commander's group.Melnikov was captured, and the division's military commissar, regimental commissar Dolzhikov, was immediately shot by the Nazis. The fate of the 365th Infantry Division was tragic: surrounded in the winter of 1942, it almost completely died in the Monchalovsky forests. The entire division command, regimental and battalion commanders, commissars of all units and subunits were killed. Documents and banners of the division and regiments were lost, so the division was disbanded as an independent unit.The attempt to liberate Rzhev from the Nazi invaders by advancing on the city from the west ended in complete failure for the 29th Army. In January-February 1942, the 29th Army suffered huge losses. The exit from the encirclement, which began on the night of February 18, was completed, basically, by February 28. 5,200 people came out of the encirclement and joined the 39th Army, of which 800 were wounded, which is approximately half of the personnel of only one rifle division - and this is from 7 divisions of the shock group of the 29th Army, which was actually completely lost in the Monchalovsky forests .According to the Germans, over 2 months of fighting, the 29th and part of the 39th armies lost 26,647 killed, 4,888 prisoners, 187 tanks, 343 guns, 256 anti-tank guns, 68 aircraft, 7 anti-aircraft guns, 439 mortars and 711 machine guns. For a long time in the history of the Great Patriotic War, not a word was said about an entire army dying in the Rzhev forests.
FIGHTS OF LOCAL IMPORTANCE
In March-April 1942, the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts, trying to fulfill the directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, continued offensive battles. The troops of the 30th, 31st and 39th armies were supposed to defeat the Rzhev group of Germans and liberate the city of Rzhev no later than April 5.But instead of an offensive, it was often necessary to repel fierce counterattacks of a strong enemy who had a great advantage in tanks and aircraft. The 375th Rifle Division under the command of Major General N.A. Sokolov from the end of January to April 1942 repelled the fierce attacks of infantry and tanks of the enemy advancing along the Rzhev-Selizharovo highway 15-20 kilometers northwest of Rzhev. In these battles in February, the commander of the 1245th Infantry Regiment, Major E.F. Rumyantsev, was mortally wounded, and in March, the former commander of the 1243rd Regiment and appointed commander of the 1245th Regiment, Major S.V. Chernozersky, who returned from the medical battalion, was mortally wounded.In the city of Staritsa, two commanders of the 1245th regiment were buried nearby: in February - E.F. Rumyantsev, and in March - S.V. Chernozersky. The division commander of the 375th division formed in the Urals - a participant in the civil war, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Sokolov in January and In February 1942, he did everything possible and impossible to break through to the 29th Army encircled beyond the Volga. But the enemy was stronger.In the winter and spring battles of 1942, General Sokolov remained alive. He died on the outskirts of Rzhev. He was buried on Lenin Square in Tver. One of the streets in the city of Rzhev is named after him. Legendary in the 379th division was the name of the commander of the 1255th rifle regiment, Alexei Alekseevich Minin. This career officer, distinguished by his exceptional courage and tirelessness, was loved by the soldiers.The first time he was wounded in the battle of eastern Zubtsova. In the March battles for the village of Lyshchevo, Minin was wounded a second time, but continued to lead the battle. From here the soldiers of his regiment rushed to the village of Vaneevo, but Minin
When we hear the word “battle”, we mentally imagine a battle on some field, where during the day it is decided which of the rivals will be the winner. This terminology is familiar and understandable. But the Battle of Rzhev was different. It covered a colossal period of time and was a series of battles over two years.
Rzhev-Vyazma operation
The generally accepted time frame occupied by the Battle of Rzhev (January 8, 1942-March 31, 1943). During these days there were many periods of calm or trench warfare, when the troops did not launch offensives.
At the beginning of 1942, it was possible to push the Wehrmacht forces back from Moscow. But the counteroffensive, which became one of the turning points of the war, continued. The bet required the highest possible result. The Center group was located in this region.
Soviet forces on the Western and Kalinin Fronts were to dismember, encircle and destroy this force. In the first days of the January counteroffensive, starting from the 8th, everything went according to plan. It was possible to liberate Vereya, Kirov, Mozhaisk, Medyn, Sukhinichi and Lyudinovo. The prerequisites appeared for dividing the “Center” into several isolated groups.
Environment
However, already on the 19th, by order of Joseph Stalin, part of the attacking forces was transferred to other fronts. In particular, Kuznetsov's 1st Shock Army was sent to the Novgorod region near Demyansk, and Rokossovsky's 16th Army was redeployed to the south. This significantly reduced the silt of the Soviet troops. The remaining units simply did not have enough resources to complete the operation. The initiative was lost.
At the end of January, the 33rd Army under the command of Efremov was sent to Rzhev. These units again tried to break through the enemy’s defenses, but in the end they themselves found themselves surrounded. In April, the 33rd was destroyed, and Mikhail Efremov committed suicide.
The Soviet operation failed. According to official statistics, losses amounted to 776 thousand people, of which 272 thousand were irrecoverable. Only a few of the 33rd Army broke out of the encirclement, i.e. 889 soldiers.
Battles for Rzhev
In the summer of 1942, the Headquarters set the task of capturing cities in the Kalinin region. First of all, it was Rzhev. The armies of two fronts took up the matter again - Kalinin (General Konev) and Western (General Zhukov).
On July 30, another Soviet offensive began. It was extremely slow. Every piece of land passed and recaptured cost thousands of lives. Already in the first days of the operation, there were only 6 kilometers left to Rzhev. However, it took almost a month to recapture them.
We managed to approach the city only at the end of August. It seemed that the Battle of Rzhev had already been won. It was even allowed to allow official representatives of the American president to the front, who were supposed to look at the Soviet triumph. Rzhev was captured on September 27. However, the Red Army stayed there for a few days. German reinforcements were immediately brought up and occupied the city on October 1.
The next Soviet offensive ended in nothing. The losses of the Battle of Rzhev during this period amounted to about 300 thousand people, i.e. 60% of the Red Army personnel in this sector of the front.
Operation Mars
Already at the end of autumn and beginning of winter, another attempt was planned to break through the defenses of the Center group. This time it was decided that the offensive would take place in areas where it had not yet been undertaken. These were places between the Gzhat and Osuga rivers, as well as in the area of the village of Molodoy Tud. Here was the lowest density of German divisions.
At the same time, the command tried to misinform the enemy in order to divert the Wehrmacht from Stalingrad, where the decisive days of battle were approaching these days.
The 39th Army managed to cross Molodoy Tud, and the 1st Mechanized Corps attacked enemy tank formations in the area of the city of Bely. But this was a temporary success. Already at the beginning of December, the German counteroffensive stopped the Soviet soldiers and destroyed the same fate awaiting two corps: the 2nd Guards Cavalry and the 6th Tank.
Already on December 8, against the backdrop of these events, he insisted that Operation Mars (code name) be resumed with renewed vigor. But not a single attempt to break through the enemy’s defense line was successful. The troops under the command of General Khozin, Yushkevich and Zygin failed. Many found themselves surrounded again. According to various estimates, the number of dead Soviet soldiers during that period ranges between 70 and 100 thousand. The Battle of Rzhev in 1942 did not bring the long-awaited victory.
Operation Buffel
During previous battles, the so-called Rzhev ledge was formed, which was occupied by German troops. This was a vulnerable section of the front - it was the easiest to surround. This became especially acute after Soviet troops took the city of Velikiye Luki in January 1943.
Kurt Zeitzler and the rest of the Wehrmacht command began to strenuously ask Hitler for permission to withdraw troops. In the end, he agreed. The troops were to be withdrawn to a line near the city of Dorogobuzh. Colonel General Walter Model became responsible for this important operation. The plan was codenamed "Büffel", which translates from German as "buffalo".
Capture of Rzhev
A competent withdrawal of troops allowed the Germans to leave the ledge with virtually no losses. On March 30, the last Reich soldier left this area, which had been under attack for more than a year. The Wehrmacht left behind itself and the villages: Olenino, Gzhatsk, Bely, Vyazma. All of them were taken by the Soviet army in March 1943 without a fight.
The same fate awaited Rzhev. It was liberated. The 30th Army was the first to enter the city, which spent a long time on this section of the front and was staffed almost from scratch after bloody battles. This is how the Battle of Rzhev ended in 1942-1943. Strategic success led to the fact that in the Great Patriotic War the initiative again passed to the Soviet Union.
Pursuit of the enemy
The Soviet army left Rzhev behind and began an accelerated offensive against the abandoned German positions. As a result, in March we managed to move the front line to the west by another 150 kilometers. Communications of the Soviet troops were stretched. The vanguard moved away from the rear and support. Progress was slowed by the onset of a thaw and poor road conditions.
When the Germans gained a foothold in the Dorogobuzh area, it became clear that an army of such density could not be defeated, and the Red Army stopped. The next significant breakthrough will occur in the summer, when the Battle of Kursk ends.
The fate of Rzhev. Reflection in culture
The day before, 56 thousand people lived in the city. The city spent 17 months under occupation, during which it was completely destroyed. The local population either fled the day before or did not survive German rule. When the Soviet army liberated the city on March 3, 1943, 150 civilians remained there.
As for estimates of the total losses of the Red Army for more than a year of battles, Marshal Viktor Kulikov called the figure more than 1 million people.
The Battle of Rzhev left about 300 surviving households in the city, when before the battles there were 5.5 thousand of them. After the war it was literally rebuilt from scratch.
Bloody battles and huge losses are reflected in folk memory and many works of art. The most famous is the poem by Alexander Tvardovsky “I was killed near Rzhev.” The Tver region has many monuments. The Battle of Rzhev, the panorama museum of this event - all this still attracts a large audience of visitors. In the city of the same name there is also a memorial obelisk.
