And the Ottomans and Selims are the Crimean partisans. Ismail Gasprinsky adyna kyrymtatar jumhuriet kutyuphanesi. partisan detachments of Crimea
List of partisans - Crimean Tatars who held leadership positions* in the partisan detachments of Crimea in 1941–1944 Aedinov Ablyaz (1905, according to other sources, 1907 - 08.1942, Crimea). Senior political instructor, instructor of the political department of the 51st Army. Commander of the Red Army detachment of the 4th district (01.11.1941 - 06.1942). Aimed to settle down to organize the underground. Captured by the Germans and executed. Ametov Abibulla (1907 - 02.1943, Crimea). Secretary of the Seitler RC of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, fighter, commissar of the Ichkinsky detachment (09.17.1942 - 10.10.1942), transferred to the Biyuk-Onlar detachment, commissar (10.10.1942 - 10.25.1942) chief of the detachment from 10.25.1942, later - fighter of Seitler-Zuysky, 6th Red Army, 7th detachment of the 2nd sector. Missing. Awarded the medal "For Military Merit". Ametov Bekir (1908(9) - 01/01/1944). Secretary of the Stalinist Republican Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Kerch. Sent to partisan detachments 06/26/1943 Commissar of the 6th partisan detachment of the 1st brigade, 6th detachment of the 5th brigade of the TsOG (11/25/1943 - 12/22/1943). He was captured in the Dolgorukovskaya Yayla region and, after torture, was executed by the Nazis. Ametov Seit-Ali (b. 1905, Biyuk-Ozenbash village). Member of the Feodosia underground organization of M. M. Polishchuk until November 1943, commissar of the 9th partisan detachment (11/25/1943 - 12/03/1943) of the 3rd brigade, chief of food of the 12th detachment of the same brigade, according to GAARC, deserted in February 1944 Memet Appazov (1914, Degermenkoy - 10/26/1943, Khyralan ridge district) Lieutenant, platoon commander of the 91st regiment of the 51st Army. From 11/14/1941 to 10/09/1942 group commander of the Red Army detachment. In evacuation on the mainland. The group commander, chief of staff of the 7th detachment of the 1st sector (06/23/43 - 07/15/43), 1st autonomous detachment (from 07/15/1943) arrived in the forest for the second time in June 1943. Killed in battle. Awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Ashirov Abdul-Kerim (Abkerim) (b. 1907, Biyuk-Yankoy village). Artel worker named after. Chkalova, Simferopol district, fighter of the 3rd Simferopol partisan detachment, Alushta detachment. In evacuation on the mainland (10/26/42 - 06/25/43). Commissioner of the 8th partisan detachment of the 7th brigade of the Southern Union. Awarded the medal "For Courage". Belyalov Nafe (b. 1914). Chairman of the military tribunal of the 48th OKD, chairman of the military tribunal for the 3rd and 4th regions of the partisan detachments of the Crimea, commissar of the 1st detachment of the 1st sector (10/25/1942 - 01/11/1943), chairman of the military tribunal of the partisan detachments of the Crimea, 08/17/1943 evacuated to the mainland. Betkeliev Mussa. Secretary of the Balaklava Republic Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, commissar of the Balaklava detachment since (01. 11.1941 - 02/08/1942), political instructor of the group, deserted 04/02/1942. Gaziev Gafar (1910 - 02/08/1942, Crimea). Head Raizo, Balaklava district. Commander of the Balaklava detachment from 11/01/1941, died in the vicinity of the village. Alsou. Ibraimov. Instructor of the Kuibyshev Republic Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, commander of the Kuibyshev detachment, deserted in November 1941. Izmailov Asan (b. 1906). Instructor of the Sudak Republic Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), commissar of the Sudak detachment (11/01/1941 - 03/08/1942), fighter until 03/12/1942, deserted. Ilyasov Enver (b. 1922). One of the leaders of the underground organization in the city of Feodosia, in the forest since November 1943, commander of the 9th detachment of the 3rd brigade (11/25/1943 - 12/03/1943), chief of staff of the detachment, group commander. Irsmambetov Ismail (1911, village Adzhi Mendy - 1975, Andijan). Komsomol assistant to the head of the Crimean headquarters of the partisan movement. Awarded the Order of the Red Stars." He was the editor of the newspaper “Komsomolets” and the magazine “Yash Leningiler”. Islyamov Seidamet (1910, Degermenkoy village - 1985, Bogatoye village, Belogorsk district, Crimean region). Soldier of the 1st Simferopol partisan detachment (from 11/01/1941). In evacuation on the mainland (09.10.1942 - 27.06.1943), commander of a reconnaissance group, commissar of the 4th partisan detachment of the 4th, then 6th brigade of the Southern Union (until 04/20/1944). Awarded the medal "For the Defense of Sevastopol". Kadyev Seithalil (1913, Friedenthal village - 1979, Belgorod, RSFSR). Head of the Karasubazar RO NKVD, in the partisan movement from November 1941 to April 1944, assistant commander of the Karasubazar detachment, 6th Red Army detachment, 3rd detachment of the 2nd sector, 3rd, 5th detachments of the 1st brigade, 5th th detachment of the 3rd reconnaissance brigade, deputy commander of the 3rd reconnaissance brigade. He was awarded the medals “Partisan of the Patriotic War”, 1st class, “For Military Merit”. Kolesnikov Dzhebbar (b. 1908, village of Otuzy). Second Secretary of the Leninist Republic of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). In partisan detachments from 08/28/1943. Commissar of the 8th detachment of the 3rd brigade of the Eastern connection (from 11/01/1943), then commissar of the 3rd brigade of the Eastern connection (02/19/1944 - 03/05/1944). Kurbetdinov Bekir (b. 1905). A soldier of the 148th Shuma battalion, went over to the partisans in November 1943. Chief of Staff of the 9th Detachment of the 7th Brigade (from 11/14/1943). Kurtumerov Ramazan (b. 1905 (1904), Shuma village). Head reception office of the Presidium of the Armed Forces of the KASSR, sent to the forest on June 26, 1943. Commissioner of the 17th detachment of the 6th (1st) brigade of the Northern Union (11/25/1943 - 02/13/1944). Evacuated to the mainland due to injury. Awarded the medal "For Courage". Mamutov Mustafa (b. 1905, Stilya village). Teacher of secondary school No. 12 Simferopol. Political instructor of the company 4th joint venture 351st rifle division of the 51st army. Sent to the forest on 06/26/1943, from 11/14/1943 to 04/20/1944 commissar of the 9th detachment of the 7th brigade of the Southern Union. Menadzhiev Saradzhadin (1916–1995, Taman). Art. lieutenant, commander of a reconnaissance group of the Black Sea Fleet, abandoned in the forest in the spring of 1943. Commissioner of the 10th detachment of the 7th brigade (11/15/1943 - 01/28/1944). Sent to the mainland. Molochnikov Memet (b. 1912, Bakhchisarai). Secretary of the military tribunal of the 2nd Crimean, then 48th Cavalry Division. In the partisan movement from November 1941 to April 1944, fighter, political instructor of the group, secretary of the military tribunal of the Crimean partisan detachments. Commissioner of the 2nd, 1st detachment of the 7th brigade of the Southern Unit. Awarded the Order of the Red Star. Subsequently a participant in the national movement. One of the authors of the “Address of the 18”. Muratov Kurtseit (b. 1908). State Security Captain, Head of the Kirov Regional NKVD. In the partisan movement from November 1941 to April 1944, Commissar of the partisan detachment, head of the operational group of the 3rd brigade of the Eastern Union. Awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class, and the medal “For Courage”. Lived in Perm. Muratov Ramazan (b. 1907, Biyuk-Yankoy). Soldier of the 14th Guards. mortar regiment, participant in the battles near Volokolamsk. Sent to the forest on July 22, 1943, fighter, group commander of the 3rd detachment of the 4th brigade, commissar of the 2nd detachment of the 4th brigade, transferred to commissar of the 9th (Southern Unit) detachment of the 7th brigade. From 02/24/1944 to 04/20/1944 commander of the 9th detachment. He was imprisoned for participating in the Crimean Tatar national movement. Murtazaev Osman (b. 1903). Art. lieutenant, in the Red Army from August to November 1941, participant in the battles near Perekop, then in captivity, in partisan detachments from October 5, 1943. Chief of Staff of the 2nd Detachment of the 4th Brigade (11/25/1943 - 01/28/1944) , then appointed deputy detachment commander for the rear. Mustafaev Refat (b. 1911, Biyuk-Yankoy village). Battalion Commissar. Secretary of the Crimean regional committee of the CPSU (b) from March 16, 1940, the underground regional committee of the CPSU (b) from October 1942 to August 1943, was sent to the forest as an authorized underground regional committee, flew to the mainland without permission, after which he was sent to the forest commissar of the partisan detachment, then of the 3rd brigade (11/25/1943 - 02/19/1944). Commissioner of the Eastern Union (02/19/44 - 04/20/1944). Mustafaev Shevkhi (b. 1914). Chief of Staff of the 11th Detachment (No. 1 named after Appazov) of the 7th Brigade. Osmanov Ablyaziz (1909, village of Savryutino, Bakhchisaray district - 01/24/1944). Secretary of the Sudak district committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. He was appointed to the post of commissar of the 1st district of partisan detachments of the Crimea, but for some reason did not take office, commissar of the Sudak detachment, commissar of the 6th detachment of the 2nd sector. Evacuated to the mainland. Thrown into the forest again in the summer of 1943, commissar of the 5th Autonomous Detachment (07/15/1943 - 11/1943), 7th Detachment of the 3rd Brigade. Killed in battle, buried in the town of Berlyuk. Selimov Mustafa Weis (b. 1910, village of Kokkoz, Simferopol district, Tauride province). Member of the CPSU(b) since 1931, senior political instructor. Served in the Red Army in 1939–1940. Department manager, head of the personnel department, instructor of the Bakhchisarai Republic Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, secretary of the Komsomol Republic Committee. Since 1941, secretary of the Yalta district committee of the CPSU(b). He was appointed commissar of the 4th district of the Crimean partisan detachments, but was recalled by the regional committee. Sent to the forest in the summer of 1943 as secretary of the Crimean regional committee of the CPSU (b). Commissioner of the detachment, brigade, Southern Unit (01/29/1944 - 04/20/1944). Since 1944 in deportation: deputy. Chairman of the Begovat District Executive Committee, since 1945 Director of the Central Asian branch of the All-Union Institute "Magarach" in Kibray (Tashkent region). Tyncherov Talyat (1908, Simferopol - 1968, ibid.). Commander of the 4th detachment of the 2nd brigade (11/25/1943 - 01/21/1944), chief of staff of the 2nd brigade of the Central Operational Group, (02/25/1944 - 03/14/1944), commander of the 3rd detachment of the 2nd brigade of the Eastern Union ( 03/14/44 - 04/09/1944). Khairullaev Izzet (1907, Seitler-Vakuf village - 1980, Sukhumi). Member of the Crimean headquarters of the partisan movement, commissar of the 22nd detachment of the 6th brigade (01/10/1944 - 01/24/1944), commissar of the 4th brigade of the Southern Union. Khalilov Emir (b. 1911). Head of the department of the Sudak Republic of Kazakhstan of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, fighter, commissar of the Sudak detachment (03/08/1942 - 04/19/1942), political instructor of the group, evacuated to the mainland. Emirov Asan (b. 1907). Participant in the defense of Sevastopol. Commissioner of the 20th detachment of the 5th brigade of the Northern Union (October 1943 - April 1944). Yusufov (Yusupov) Emirkhan (1908 - 12/06/1942, Crimea). Commander of the Sudak detachment (11/01/1941 - 03/1942), Group Commander of the 7th detachment of the 2nd sector, died.
The unbending courage of the Soviet people was manifested in the fight against fascism during the Great Patriotic War in Crimea. The Crimean partisans fought heroically against the Nazi invaders, showing selfless devotion to their socialist Motherland.
The organizers of the partisan and underground struggle were the Crimean regional committee, city and district party committees, which, following the instructions of the Central Committee, did a great job of forming partisan detachments and underground groups. By the beginning of November 1941, 29 partisan detachments had been created on the peninsula. The Bureau of the Crimean Regional Party Committee appointed a civil war participant as commander of the partisan movement A. V. Mokrousova, Commissioner - Secretary of the Simferopol City Party Committee S. V. Martynova. The partisan detachments were headed by secretaries of city and district party committees, party, Soviet and Komsomol workers 3. F. Amelinov, V. A. Bolotova, V. G. Eremenko, I. N. Kazakov, E. D. Kiselev, A. A. Litvinenko , N. D. Lugovoi, V. I. Nikanorov, V. I. Filippov, V. I. Cherny; economic managers M. A. Makedonsky, M. I. Chub; Red Army commanders D.I. Averkin, B.B. Gorodovikov, G.L. Seversky, F.I. Fedorenko and others.
The Biyuk-Onlarsky, Zuysky, Ichkinsky, Karasubazarsky, and Starokrymsky district party committees remained almost entirely behind enemy lines.
In November 1941, soldiers, commanders and political workers of those units who, covering the withdrawal of Soviet troops to Sevastopol, found themselves in the fascist rear, joined the ranks of the partisans. These were mainly soldiers and officers of the 184th Infantry and 48th Separate Cavalry Divisions and Marine Corps units.
The territory of deployment of partisan detachments was divided into five districts. Their leaders were A. A. Satsyuk (1st region - Old Crimean forests), I. G. Genov (2nd region - Zuysky and Belogorsk forests), G. L. Seversky (3rd region - forests of the state reserve), I.M. Bortnikov (4th district - outskirts of Yalta), V.V. Krasnikov (5th district - outskirts of Sevastopol). Partisan detachments were also based in the Kerch region, in the Adzhimushkay and Starokarantinsky quarries. This was essentially the 6th district, which was headed by I. I. Pakhomov. The general leadership of the detachments was carried out by the headquarters of the partisan movement in Crimea, headed by A.V. Mokrousov.
From the first days of the occupation, the Crimean partisans launched active military operations. When the battles took place near Sevastopol and on the Kerch Peninsula, they provided all possible assistance to units of the Red Army. By committing sabotage on highways and railways, attacking enemy garrisons, and collecting intelligence data, they brought victory closer.
During the first period of the partisan struggle, which ended with the end of the heroic defense of Sevastopol, detachments of people's avengers destroyed over 12 thousand enemy soldiers and officers.
In the summer of 1942, when the Nazis completely occupied Crimea, the situation for the partisans became significantly more complicated. Given the important strategic importance of the peninsula, the Nazi command concentrated large military forces here. Enemy garrisons were stationed in almost every settlement. Actively collaborated with the occupiers in their repeated attempts
destroy the partisan detachments, local nationalist elements and other renegades. But even when the peninsula became a deep rear, the fascists failed to extinguish the flame of the people's war. Some of the partisans, by decision of the regional party committee, were transferred to cities and villages to help the underground. Those who remained in the forests continued to carry out subversive work on enemy communications.
By the fall of 1943, the number of fighters in partisan detachments had increased significantly. Villagers, underground fighters, prisoners of war liberated by patriots from concentration camps went into the forest. During this, the third, period of the partisan movement in the Crimean forests, there were 33 detachments, united in 7 brigades. On January 15, 1944, the number of Crimean partisans was 3,733 people: Russians - 1944 (52%), Crimean Tatars - 598 (16%), Ukrainians - 348 (9%), Georgians - 134 (3.6%), Armenians - 69 (1.8%).
At the new stage of the struggle against the occupiers, which was becoming increasingly widespread, a decision was made in Moscow to create the Crimean headquarters of the partisan movement.
General management of the activities of partisans and underground fighters was carried out by the regional underground center, which since August 1943 was headed by the secretary of the Crimean regional party committee P. R. Yampolsky. In November, he informed the chief of staff of the partisan movement, the first secretary of the regional party committee, V.S. Bulatov: “The enemy evaluates the partisan movement in Crimea at this time as a third front on the Crimean peninsula... Infantry without tanks, guns, artillery and mortars is not against us now coming..."
During this period, the partisans defeated large enemy garrisons in Zuya, in the villages of Sorokino, Tsvetochny, Generalskoye, Monetny, Golubinka. Combat operations were constantly carried out on the railways. On the night of September 9-10, 1943, sabotage groups simultaneously blew up rails in several areas and derailed an enemy train. As a result, traffic on the Crimean railways stopped for five days.
The Military Council of the North Caucasus Front and the command of the Separate Primorsky Army provided great assistance to the Crimean partisans. Ammunition, food, and medicine were regularly delivered to the forest. A group of Red Army combat commanders was sent to command positions in the detachments.
At the beginning of 1944, three partisan formations were formed in Crimea; The Northern was headed by P.R. Yampolsky, the Southern - M.A. Makedonsky, the Eastern - V.S. Kuznetsov.
Winter and spring of 1944 were the period of the most active military operations of the Crimean partisans. In total, during the war, the patriots destroyed and captured over 33,000 enemy soldiers and officers, destroyed 79 military trains, 2 armored trains, dozens of fuel and ammunition depots, blew up 3 railway bridges, and captured many trophies.
During the preparation of the Crimean offensive operation, detachments of the Northern Union controlled the enemy’s advance along the Simferopol - Alushta and Simferopol - Belogorsk roads. The southern unit operated in the Yalta area, on the Simferopol - Bakhchisarai - Sevastopol highway. And in the April days of 1944, partisans, together with Soviet troops, took part in the liberation of Simferopol, Yalta, Bakhchisarai, Belogorsk, Zuya and other settlements of the peninsula.
From the very beginning of the German occupation of Crimea, in the fall of 1941, many residents of Simeiz went to the mountains and became members of the Yalta partisan detachment. In the fall of 1942, sailors of the Black Sea Fleet made several landings on the shore. Many residents of the village died at the hands of the invaders, who practiced reprisals against civilians in response to partisan attacks. The Red Army liberated Simeiz on April 16, 1944. In May 1943 in Simeiz An underground patriotic group was organized led by G. S. Leonenko. It included V. M. Devisheva, L. A. Ermakov and others (Crimean Regional Partarchive, f. 1, op. 24, d. 375, pp. 61, 62.). They delivered the newspaper “Red Crimea” and partisan leaflets and distributed them among the population. Having obtained a radio receiver, the patriots received reports from the Sovinformburo and rewrote them. From underground workers, village residents learned about the situation on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Participants in the underground maintained close ties with the partisans and carried out their tasks until the arrival of the Red Army.
Liberation from fascist slavery brought to the working people of Crimea spring 1944. On April 16, troops of the 16th Rifle Corps of the Separate Primorsky Army under the command of Major General K.I. Provalov and the 26th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 19th Tank Corps under the command of Colonel A.P. Khrapovitsky entered Simeiz. The rapid advance of Soviet troops and the coordinated actions of the partisans deprived the enemy of the opportunity to completely destroy the village. On the main avenue of Simeiz, where the population greeted the liberating soldiers, red banners were hung, saved by the pioneer L. Ermakov (now L. A. Ermakov works as a doctor in Simeiz). Among the many residents of Simeiz who bravely fought the hated enemy at the front, an artilleryman Guard Sergeant N. T. Vasilchenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The scientist-astronomer Simeiz I.G. Moiseev went through the military path. He courageously fought against the enemy in partisan detachments of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, participated in the Slovak uprising of 1944, and fought for the liberation of Czechoslovakia. In November 1967, a monument to 15 Simeiz residents who died in the Great Patriotic War was erected in the center of the village. The underground members made a significant contribution to the fight against the Nazi occupiers. They carried out political and propaganda work among the population. They committed sabotage and transmitted intelligence data about the location and actions of enemy troops to the partisans and the command of the Red Army.
From October to December 1941, the activities of underground patriotic groups were led by an underground center created by decision of the Bureau of the Crimean Regional Committee, headed by I. A. Kozlov, an experienced conspirator, party member since 1905.
The underground center was located in Kerch; after the liberation of the city by airborne units in early 1942, it was legalized. In April 1942, I. G. Genov was appointed commissioner for underground affairs of the Crimean regional party committee, and in October 1942, a regional underground party center was created, which included I. G. Genov and N. D. Lugovoy. Since August 1943, the work of underground patriotic groups was organized and directed by the underground party center led by P.R. Yampolsky. It included E. P. Stepanov, E. P. Kolodyazhny, N. D. Lugovoy and others. A total of 220 underground organizations operated in Crimea during the temporary occupation. There were over 2,500 people in their ranks.
The Motherland highly appreciated the exploits of the Crimean partisans and underground fighters. Simferopol was liberated on April 13. After the liberation of the entire Crimea, the representative of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters, Marshal Vasilevsky, signed a proposal to award the title of Hero of the Soviet Union to the most famous partisan commanders: A. Vakhtin, N. Dementyev, G. Gruzinov, V. Kuznetsov, M. Makedonsky, F. Fedorenko. Over 3,000 patriots received government awards. The Order of Lenin was awarded to A. A. Voloshinova, N. M. Listovnichaya, A. F. Zyabrev, V. K. Efremov, P. D. Silnikov, N. I. Tereshchenko (all posthumously), V. I. Babiy, A. N. Kosukhim, V. I. Nikanorov, G. L. Seversky, M. I. Chub and others. The head of the Sevastopol underground organization V.D. Revyakin was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Bedin Ivan Stepanovich, For participation in the partisan movement in Crimea, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, medals “Partisan of the Patriotic War”, “For the Defense of Sevastopol” ».
Motyakhin Ivan Ermolaevich.
For participation in the partisan movement in Crimea he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Order of the Red Star: Barybkina Feodora Evdokimovna, Grishko Mikhail Davidovich, Leonova Galina Ivanovna, Leonov Fedor Konstantinovich, Pshenichny Dmitry Mikhailovich, Podtochilina Lidiya Andreevna, Zhigarev Vladimir Semenovich, Yarmola Evgeniy Petrovich, Tyuterev Kuzma Romanovich.
Chub Mikhail Ilyich, commander of a partisan detachment. For participation in the partisan movement in Crimea he was awarded the Order of Lenin .
Tyuterev Kuzma Romanovich.
For participation in the partisan movement in Crimea, he was awarded the medal “Partisan of the Patriotic War”, II degree, the Order of the Badge of Honor in September 1943 and the Order of the Red Star in July 1944.
The last award was made by order of the chief of the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement No. 435 on 07/25/46. In accordance with this order, the medal “Partisan of the Patriotic War” was awarded to another one hundred and forty-five former Crimean partisans
Working with archival documents, the author identified a kind of “partisan guard”: thirty-seven people who each had four government awards. Even with a quick study of the list, it is striking that it does not include such legendary personalities as Fedorenko, Sermul, Kadyev, Muratov...
This is explained by the fact that the first two went to the front, the other two ended up in deportation and therefore subsequent awards did not affect them.
Considering the fact that the medal “For the Defense of Sevastopol”, by its status, is not awarded for
a manifestation of personal courage, and to the entire composition of the army, air force and navy units that took part in the defense of the city. The medal “Partisan of the Patriotic War” de facto also acquired a similar status; one can draw the sad conclusion that fifty-six of the best Crimean partisans, those who went through the entire epic from November 1941 to April 1944, were awarded only one or two combat awards for everyone. Of this glorious cohort, only one of them is alive today - the former commander of the 6th partisan detachment of the Southern Union, Nikolai Dementyev, who was nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and undeservedly did not receive it. I would like to believe that the awards will still find their heroes.
Monument to Yalta partisans installed on Ai-Petri
Mass grave of partisans of the Yalta detachment who died in battle with the Germans on December 13, 1941.
The inscription on the monument reads: “To the people's avengers-partisans of Crimea who gave their lives in the fight against the fascist invaders in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.”
Monument to partisans and underground fighters of Crimea
On May 9, 1978, in Simferopol on Kievskaya Street, in front of the Mir cinema building, a monument to the partisans and underground fighters of the Crimea was unveiled (authors: sculptor N.D. Soloshchenko, architect E.V. Popov). On a high pedestal there is a sculptural composition depicting two patriots. One of them is wounded, but, supported by a comrade in arms, remains in the ranks. The monument symbolizes the unbending courage of the Soviet people, shown by them in the fight against fascism, and their devotion to their socialist Motherland.
The monument to partisans in Old Crimea was built in 1961.
On the edges there are memorial plaques made of white marble in the form of shields, the inscription: “April 1944. Your names will live forever in the hearts of Soviet people!” Old Crimean underground fighters and partisans who died on the eve of the liberation of Old Crimea are buried in the park, and those who died on Mount Burus are reburied .
The names of the commander of the partisan group, the former mathematics teacher of the Old Crimean high school, the communist N.I. Kholod, young patriots, yesterday’s schoolchildren live in people’s memories. The Starokrymsky detachment opened its combat account in the fall of 1941. At the end of October 1943, almost the entire youth underground group left for the partisan forest. It was headed by Georgy (Yuri) Stoyanov. Young underground fighters - fearless, daring, elusive - made their way to the locations of enemy units; they did not miss a single transport convoy, they looked, counted, and remembered. And then valuable intelligence data was delivered to the partisan forest. In the partisan forest, young underground fighters formed the combat core of the Komsomol youth detachment named after the Lenin Komsomol. Its commander was a young Red Army officer A. A. Vakhtin. In January 1944, the detachment's favorite, Yura Stoyanov, died a hero's death in battle on Mount Burus; in March - April, the Nazis captured and killed in dungeons I. I. Davydov, brothers Mitya and Tolya Stoyanov.
Day of Partisans and Underground Workers- a memorable date in Russia, which is celebrated on June 29, starting in 2010. The Day of Partisans and Underground Workers will be celebrated with commemorative events.
Established by the State Duma of Russia in March 2009, on the initiative of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), party, Soviet, trade union and Komsomol organizations create partisan detachments and sabotage groups to fight German troops.
Medal "Partisan of the Great Patriotic War"
established. The author of the medal drawing is the artist N.I. Moskalev, the drawing is taken from the unrealized project of the medal “25 Years of the Soviet Army”. .jpg)
As is known from historical documents, the actions of the partisans and the work of the underground played a huge role in the successful outcome of the Great Patriotic War. In total, more than one million partisans - men, women and children - operated behind enemy lines. Currently, many documents telling about the true feat of partisans and underground fighters during the war are still stored in state archives under the heading “Top Secret”. Perhaps the introduction of this “military” memorial date will serve as a reason for research and the discovery of unknown pages of partisan glory. And there is no doubt that the establishment of the Day of Partisans and Underground Workers was a tribute to deep respect for the lives and heroism of the people, thanks to whom the Motherland was liberated in 1945. On this Day, many commemorative events are held throughout the country with the laying of flowers at the monuments of those killed during the Great Patriotic War and other memorials. Living veterans, partisans and underground fighters who operated behind enemy lines are also honored. 
Greater Yalta was liberated from the fascist invaders on April 16, 1944. Partisans and underground fighters, all of them - young and adults, doctors and workers, fragile girls and strong men - covered each of us with themselves, gave us peace and a bright sky above our heads.
Sources
1. Broshevan V.M. Crimean headquarters of the partisan movement, 2001. - 101 p. 2. GAARC. - F.151, op.1, d.197, L. 28. 3. Lugovoy N.D. Partisan suffering: 900 days behind enemy lines. Simferopol: Elinyu, 2004. 4. Arunyan L.E. - teacher of history and law at Simeiz UVK.
This year marks the anniversary of the birth of Mustafa Selimov, one of the leaders of the partisan movement in Crimea, an active participant in the national movement of the Crimean Tatar people.
Mustafa Selimov was born in 1910 in the village of Kok-Koz (now Sokolinoe) near Bakhchisaray. At the age of 11, he was orphaned - first his father Weis-agaa died, and then his mother, Adzhire. Mustafa and his sister Fatime were left alone. Until the age of 18, Mustafa was engaged in agricultural work. At the age of fifteen he joined the Komsomol. After graduating from school, he worked for some time as the head of the regional library, then returned to his native village. A few years later he was elected deputy chairman of the collective farm and secretary of the village council.
Next is a party career. In 1931, Mustafa was accepted into the ranks of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), appointed manager of the Bakhchisarai district party committee, and after completing courses in Marxism-Leninism, he was transferred as an instructor of the district party committee, then as secretary of the Komsomol Republic Committee. Three years later, Selimov was drafted into the Red Army, and upon his return he was appointed head of the personnel department of the Bakhchisaray district party committee.
From 1941 to 1943 he worked as first secretary of the Yalta district party committee. During the occupation of Crimea, Mustafa Selimov was one of the leaders of the underground organization. From November 7, 1941, he took part in the defense of Sevastopol. He was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War.
After the temporary liberation of Kerch, he heads here, but soon Crimea is already completely occupied. At this time, Selimov is in Krasnodar, providing the partisans and underground fighters of Crimea with everything they need. In June 1943, together with a group of party and Soviet workers, he was airborne behind enemy lines in the forests of Crimea, where he was first a commissar of a partisan detachment, then a brigade, and later a commissar of the Southern Unit of Crimean partisan detachments, with which he participated in battles against the invaders.
And although the partisans, together with the Red Army, liberated the peninsula from German troops, this did not save Mustafa Selimov, as well as his other comrades in the Crimean Tatar partisan movement, from deportation.
“Hand over your weapons,” the NKVD members ordered Selimov and his fellow partisans on the eve of deportation.
On May 18, 1944, the Crimean Tatars - both ordinary people and representatives of the party and economic elite - were sent in calf cars to places of exile - mainly to Uzbekistan.
In the NKVD document dated September 19, 1945, preserved in the State Archives of the Russian Federation, we read: “Taking into account that Selimov during the occupation was the leader of the partisan movement in Crimea, that the family did not live in the occupied territory, that the check carried out by the 1st Special Department of the NKVD and the case “ “A” The NKGB of the Crimean region did not establish any incriminating materials on him, the NKVD of the Crimean region made a decision to petition the NKVD of the USSR for the release of Selimov and his family from the special settlement.”
The verdict of the Special Settlement Department of the NKVD of the USSR regarding the “leader of the partisan movement in Crimea” is adamant: “Release without the right to enter Crimea.”
I would like to note that some former leaders of the former Crimean Autonomy in places of special settlements already in the first years worked in relatively privileged positions, which, of course, were incommensurate with the positions they had in Crimea. Selimov, in particular, was appointed director of the Magarach Institute in the Tashkent region.
A letter from five Crimean Tatar communists dated September 7, 1956 was addressed to members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and personally to Mikhail Suslov, a member of the Presidium; it raised the question of the return of the Crimean Tatars to their homeland and the restoration of Crimean autonomy within the Ukrainian SSR. File No. was preserved in the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History in Moscow. 56, which included materials related to the restoration of the rights of deported peoples. It also contains appeals from the Crimean Tatars.
As follows from the letter, this is the second appeal of the authors to the Central Committee of the CPSU (the first was sent in early April 1956): “We ask, during the period of liquidation of the consequences of the cult of personality, along with other issues of great political importance, to resolve the issue of the return of the undeservedly deported Crimean Tatar people to their native land - to Crimea, on the restoration of the Autonomy of the Crimean Republic within the Ukrainian SSR... and on the return or compensation of property left during the eviction, in order to enable the people to quickly establish a normal life... We also do not understand the measures currently being carried out by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, when from every citizen – a Crimean Tatar is required to sign a signature not to enter Crimea and to renounce movable and immovable property belonging to him, with a warning about non-issuance of a passport in case of non-issuance of the above signature. All this suggests that the Crimean Tatars still have limited rights.”
The letter was signed by: Refat Mustafayev - before the war, former third secretary of the Crimean regional party committee, during the war, commissar of the Eastern Union of Crimean partisan detachments; Shamil Alyadinov - former chairman of the Writers' Union of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic; Mustafa Selimov - before the war, secretary of the Yalta district party committee, during the war - commissar of the Southern Union of Crimean partisan detachments; Amet-Usni Penerji - before the war, chairman of the Sudak regional executive committee; Izmail Khairullaev - before the war, Chairman of the Alushta district executive committee, during the war - commissar of the 4th brigade of the Southern Unit of Crimean partisan detachments.
Despite the fact that the letter was written by communists and, of course, people loyal to the authorities, one cannot fail to note the clarity of the demands formulated in the letter, including the return of property or compensation for its loss.
In connection with the letter of five Crimean Tatar communists, the Department of Party Organs of the Central Committee of the CPSU gave instructions to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan “to carry out additional work among the Crimean Tatars, so that the removal of the regime of special settlements from them does not give the right to return to the areas of their previous residence and property confiscated from them” and “to give necessary clarifications" for "former senior officials of Crimea."
In conclusion, the message said that it would be “expedient to invite to Moscow for a conversation members of the CPSU Central Committee from among the Crimean Tatars, consisting of: Murtazaev V., Mustafaev R., Selimova M., Alyadinov Sh., Bolat Yu., warning them about the cessation of activities , aimed at arousing and inciting autonomist sentiments among immigrants from Crimea.”
So, in 1956-1957, Crimean Tatar communists, including Mustafa Selimov, openly declared their disagreement with the decisions of the party and, in fact, formed an internal opposition in its ranks. The sets of documents preserved in the funds of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan allow us to confidently say that the Crimean Tatar communists, who put national principles above party ones, became the main object of dissatisfaction with the authorities during this period.
An interesting document, dated January 1967, entitled “List of the most active supporters of the idea of returning the Tatars to Crimea and granting them national autonomy (according to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan)” was preserved in the State Archive of the Russian Federation. The list opens with Mustafa Selimov, who is characterized as follows: “Mustafa Veisovich Selimov, a member of the CPSU since 1931, former secretary of the Yalta district party committee, works as deputy director of the Tashkent Institute “Uzgiprovodkhoz”, is one of the leaders of the “initiative group.” Selimov’s behavior in 1958 was discussed at the bureau of the Kuibyshev district party committee. For violating party discipline, which was expressed in organizing collective letters from Crimean Tatars to the CPSU Central Committee, he was severely reprimanded with a warning. After this, he stopped his inflammatory work among the Tatars, and in 1964 he resumed it again. He often held illegal meetings with the leaders of the so-called. “initiative groups” of regions and districts. In December 1964 he headed the “delegation” of Crimean Tatars in Moscow. At one of the meetings in Fergana in the summer of 1966, Selimov proposed disseminating a version among the Tatars that they were supposedly not being allowed to leave Uzbekistan because labor was needed here.”
Mustafa Selimov worked in high positions. Until April 1945, he was deputy chairman of the Bekabad district executive committee, then until August 1948 - director of the Central Asian branch of the All-Union Research Institute of Winemaking and Viticulture "Magarach". After six years he worked at the All-Union Institute of Plant Growing. From 1955 to 1959 he was Deputy Director of the Union Research Cotton Institute, and from 1959 to 1961 – Deputy President of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the Uzbek SSR. Then he was deputy head of the Main Directorate of Science and Propaganda of the Ministry of Agriculture of the UzSSR. In 1963-1966 he worked as head of the department of the State Committee for Cotton Growing of Central Asia, and from 1966 - deputy director of Uzgiprovodkhoz. He was awarded the medal "For Labor Valor".
But at the same time, he never forgot that he was a Crimean Tatar and did not move away from the national movement.
In the second half of the 1970s, attempts were made in Uzbekistan to create administrative units for the compact settlement of Crimean Tatars in the Mubarek and Bakhoristan regions. It was supposed to create an administrative-territorial unit for the Crimean Tatars in these two regions. The implementation of this plan would be another “final solution” to the Crimean Tatar national issue. It was assumed that by moving a certain number of Crimean Tatars into these areas, opening several schools for them in their native language, newspapers, and also creating a local administration of “persons of Crimean Tatar nationality,” it would be possible to declare that the Tatars “who previously lived in Crimea” were satisfied and they have nothing more to demand.
They tried to involve many influential people among the Crimean Tatars in the implementation of the project, including Mustafa Selimova, but he stated that the Crimean Tatars see the solution to their national problem only in returning to Crimea and restoring autonomy in their historical homeland.
They say that the party authorities repeatedly offered him to return to Crimea. But he refused every time, answering that he would return to his homeland only with his people...
Mustafa Selimov died in 1985. He did not live long before the return of his people to Crimea...
Gulnara Bekirova, Crimean historian, member of the Ukrainian PEN Club
1941-1945
From a memo from the leadership of the partisan movement in Crimea to the Commander of the North Caucasus Front S.M. Budyonny about the combat activities of the partisans from November 1, 1941 to July 1942.
(spelling and punctuation preserved)
The Crimean Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) instructed the city and district committees of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to recruit volunteers for partisan detachments, which, in the event of the German occupation of Crimea, must go into the forest and operate behind Nazi lines. Along with this, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was instructed to recruit sabotage groups to leave them in the rear of the invaders.
Soon after this, the secretary of the OK CPSU(b) of Crimea, Comrade Bulatov, instructed Comrade Mokrousov to outline a scheme for the organization, location and combat activities of the detachments. In addition, the regional committee ordered the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, district and city party committees to prepare food and uniforms, take it all to the forest and base it there. The base from which volunteers were recruited was the destruction battalions, party and Soviet activists.
The number of partisans was determined by geographical conditions, i.e. the amount of forest area that could more or less safely shelter the partisans was taken. It was assumed that from 5,000 to 7,500 people could be accommodated and actively operate in the Crimean forests. From this calculation, a plan for the delivery of food, uniforms and weapons was built. It was assumed that the Germans would not last in Crimea beyond May, so the delivery plan was built for six months: November-April.
The partisans must go into the forest from all districts and cities, except for the districts - Leninsky, Mayak-Salynsky and the city of Kerch, which must remain in the quarries of the Kerch Peninsula. According to the plan, the Crimean forests were divided into five regions: 1st region Eastern edge of the forest - Ortalan, Kapsihor; 2nd district Ortalan-Kapsikhor, highway Simferopol-Alushta.
3rd district highway Simferopol-Alushta, Mangush exclusively Gurzuf. 4th district Mangush-Gurzuf, Biyuk-Karalez, Mukhalatka. District 5 from this line to the western border of the forest. In the 1st region, food should be based and detachments should be deployed: Feodosia, Kirovsky district, Stary Krym and Sudak.
The 2nd district is planned for the districts of Ichki, Kolay, Seytler, Dzhankoy, Biyuk-Onlar, Karasubazar, Zuya.
3rd district - two Simferopol urban detachments, Simferopol rural, Alushta, Evpatoriya, Telmansky, a detachment of NKVD employees 4th district - Bakhchisaraysky, Krasno-Perekopsky, Larindorfsky, Yalta, Ak-Sheikhsky, Ak-Mechetsky, Kuibyshevsky.
5th district - Sevastopol, Balaklava, Freidorf and Saki detachments. A total of 29 units should arrive. At the end of October, the bureau of the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved: commander of the partisan movement of the Crimea, Comrade Mokrousov, commissar of the secretary of the Simferopol Civil Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Comrade Martynov, chief of staff of Major Smetanin, head of the first district, Comrade Satsyuk, commissar of the secretary of the Sudak Republic of the Russian Communist Party of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ) Comrade Osmanov, chief of staff - Captain Zakharevich; head of the second district, Comrade Genova, commissar of the secretary of the Dzhankoy RK of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Comrade Fruslov, chief of staff, Comrade Makal; Head of the third district of Art. political instructor Seversky, commissar of the secretary of the Central Republic of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in Simferopol, Comrade Nikanorov, chief of staff, Comrade Seleznev;
head of the fourth district, Comrade Bortnikov, commissar of the secretary of the Yalta Republic of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Selimov, chief of staff, Comrade Vergasov; head of the fifth district, Comrade Krasnikov, commissar, Comrade Sobolev, chief of staff, Comrade Ivanenko. The commanders and commissars of the detachments were approved by the city and district committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.
By November 1, 24 detachments arrived in the forest and occupied the areas designated by the district commanders. The following detachments did not arrive in the forest: Krasno-Perekopsky, Larindorfsky, Freidorfsky and Kuibyshevsky, a detachment of NKVD workers, instead of which came a commandant platoon of the headquarters of the main leadership of 20 people, staffed by prison workers. Of the comrades approved by the OK VKP(b), for reasons unknown to us, Sobolev, Fruslov, Osmanov, Selimov, Zekirya did not appear, in whose place they were appointed: to the 1st district - Vyalkov from the 48th Cavalry Division, to the Vasilenko region, in the 2nd district - regimental commissar Popov, Colonel Comrade Lobov was appointed chief of staff instead of Makal, in the 4th district commissar Amelinov. The number of troops was from 100 to 150 people. Subsequently, three detachments were formed from the remnants of military units and single groups of Red Army soldiers remaining in the forest and the military commander - Gorodovikov, Kurakov, Aedinov, numbering 100-120 people in the detachment. In addition, the remaining units were also replenished by groups and single military personnel. As a result, in November there were 27 partisan detachments with a total strength of 3,456 people.
As can be seen from the above, the bulk were not military. As mentioned above, the following detachments did not come to the forest: Krasno-Perekopsky, Freidorfsky and Larindorfsky and a detachment of NKVD workers. On November 2, Greenberg took the Telman detachment to Yalta, and Krasnikov disbanded the Saki detachment, which went to Sevastopol, explaining this by the disintegration of the detachment. They fled from the forest, but then the commissar of the 1st district Osmanov, the commissar of the Seitler detachment Puzakin, the commissar of the Karasubazar detachment Kaplun returned, and the commander of the Seitler detachment Evstafiev did not return.
Some people left the Seitler detachment, which was soon replenished with military personnel. Vereshchagin was appointed commander of the detachment. In November-December, desertion became rampant. During this period, 891 people deserted, mostly Tatars. In total, by July 1942, about 1 (200 people) deserted, mainly from the 5th, 4th, 3rd and 1st regions. The reasons for desertion were the instability of some elements, the sharp transition of the Tatar population to the Nazis, the desire of some connect with the Red Army (Sevastopol detachment, Feodosiya - commissar Yakubovsky, Kirovsky - commander Aldarov, chief of staff Panarin).
Hunger was a terrible phenomenon in the life of the partisans. As mentioned above, the delivery of food was planned for six months. In fact, more was brought, but as a result of many reasons, a lot of food did not have time to be transported to the forest from transshipment, and it fell into the hands of the fascists or was dismantled by the local population, and those products that were stored were also mostly plundered by the fascists. In this they were helped by traitors, mainly from the Tatars, who took part in the transportation and deployment. The 5th, 4th and 3rd districts were hit the hardest.
The 5th region, whose bases were on the Mekenzi Mountains and near the village of Aytodor, lost its bases in the first days, as soon as the Nazis approached there. Soon the same fate befell the 4th and 3rd districts. By January, all the detachments, except for the Yevpatoriya and Ak-Mechetsky ones, had no bases; they ate from the wild animals of the reserve, horses and captured food from the local pro-fascist population, and sometimes received from collective farmers (village Laki). All attempts to seize food from the enemy were unsuccessful, for the reason that the transportation of troops, food and ammunition was and is now carried out under strong security, often with the participation of tanks or wedges.
There were hundreds of cases when the partisans were unable to take anything from damaged cars or carts, because groups of partisans were attacked by escort groups or groups that quickly arrived at the scene of the attack from nearby garrisons. The difficulty of obtaining food in the surrounding villages was that the detachments were located surrounded by Tatar villages, and the Tatar population was hostile to the partisans and armed by the Germans.
It was difficult to penetrate into Russian or other villages, and especially to take out food, because in all the villages there were garrisons and there were detachments of local fascists.
Sevastopol (Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD of Crimea, Comrade Smirnov) knew, through Krasnikov's walkie-talkie and through live communication, about the famine in the partisan detachments, but did not take action, and only after Seversky wrote to Comrade Oktyabrsky, then in April 1942. They began to serve a small amount of food. Other areas were in a better position, but many troops were half-starved, and they were saved by the fact that food began to be dropped there at the beginning of March.
We asked the Military Council of the Caucasian and then the Crimean Front to drop food to Seversky, they promised us, but this did not happen until the end of April. As a result of all this, 250 people died from starvation in three regions, and this contributed to desertion. Despite the difficulties experienced by the partisans, encirclement by local fascists, the presence of large garrisons, and enhanced road security, the detachments acted actively, except for Selikhov’s landing group, which trailed behind. In addition to many battles in the forest, as well as for the villages of Koush, Ortalan, Baksan and Suuk-Su, the detachments carried out 631 operations, including 124 food operations, destroyed 7984 soldiers and officers, 787 trucks, 36 cars, small convoys (15- 20 carts) - 31, 3 tankettes, 23 motorcycles, 22 tank trucks, 6 tractors, 2 military railway trains were blown up, 25 bridges were blown up, 400 meters of railway tracks were damaged, 40 km of cables were cut, 441 people were shot by fascists and various traitors.
Our losses: killed - 341 people, wounded - 241 people, missing - 110 people. Due to the fact that the archives of the central headquarters are buried in the forest, it is not possible now to describe the combat activities of each detachment, so we are forced to limit ourselves to summary data.
Over the course of 8 months, several mergers of detachments were carried out, as well as the displacement and relocation of command and political personnel. The chief and commissar of the 1st district, Satsyuk and Vyalkov, were removed for inactivity, cowardice and other offenses; head of the 5th district Krasnikov; commander of the Zuysky detachment Litvinenko; commander and commissar of the Karasubazar detachment Timokhin and Kaplun; the commander of the Kirov detachment Aldarov was shot for corruption and desertion; Commissioner of the 2nd District Popov was removed; commander of the Evpatoria Kalashnikov detachment; commander of the 1st Simferopol detachment Soldatchenko; Commissar of the Seitler detachment Puzakin; The commander of the 1st Simferopol detachment, Shchetinin, was transferred to private, and then appointed chief of staff of the 4th region. The commander of the Kolai detachment, Gubarev, and Commissar Shtepa, were executed by the verdict of the Revolutionary Tribunal for the murder of a wounded soldier, the murder of two lieutenants, and for the disarmament and non-acceptance of 15 Red Army soldiers into their detachment, who were subsequently killed by the Romanians.
The chief of staff of the 5th district, Ivanenko, who went over to serve in the Gestapo, was shot; the head of the 2nd district, Genov, was removed by the Military Council of the Caucasian Front. The head of the 4th district, Bortnikov, was replaced by Major General Averkin; the NKVD of Crimea commissioner of the Biyuk-Onlar detachment Feldman was removed. In connection with the appointment of Gorodovikov and Furik, the head of the 1st district Mokrous, Commissioner Ponomarenko, was transferred to the detachment. Subsequently, movements were made in connection with the liquidation of the 4th and 5th districts, as well as in connection with the merger of the small detachments of Ichkinsky with Kolaisky, Zuysky with Seytlersky. The best units should be considered:
Feodosiysky - commander Mokrous, commissar Ponomarenko; Gorodovikov's detachment, Dzhankoy detachment - commander Ryumshin, commissar Klevetov; Ichkinsky - commander Chub, commissar Bedin; Kurakov's detachment 4th Red Army; Alushtinsky - commander Ivanov, commissar Eremenko; Yalta - the commander was Krivoshta, commissar Kucher; Red Army - commander Aedinov, commissar Sukhinenko; Bakhchisaraisky - commander Macedonian, commissar Cherny; 2nd Simferopol - commander Chussi, commissar Tretyak; The Zuisky detachment is commander Kamensky, Commissar Lugovoi is in first place in communication with the population, reconnaissance and food supply, as well as the detachments of Chub and Kurakov. Of all the detachments, the worst of all is the 1st Red Army - commander Smirnov, commissar Polyansky. 4th Red Army - commander Nezamov, commissar Sidorov. These two detachments were formed from the Selikhov landing group.
Currently, due to the abolition of the 4th and 5th districts, as well as the merger of some detachments, the number of detachments and the number of fighters is: 1st district - the head of the Chub district, Commissioner Furik, 4 detachments, number 517 people 1) Red Army No. 2 - commander Isaev, commissar Svinoboev, 2) Karasubazarsky - commander Zaretsky, commissar Kamansky, 3) Kirovsky - commander Pozyvaev, commissar Kryukov, 4) Feodosiysky - where Sudaksky is included - commander Mokrous, commissar Ponomarenko.
2nd district - district head Kurakov, vrid. Commissar Lugovoy, 7 detachments, totaling 950 people, 1) Dzhankoysky detachment, commander Shashlyk, commissar Kiselev, 2) Krasnoarmeysky No. 4 - commander Mitko, commissar Sidorov, 3) Krasnoarmeysky No. 3 - commander Baranovsky, commissar Egorov, 4) Krasnoarmeysky No. 1, commander Smirnov, commissar Polyansky, 5) Ichkino-Kolaisky, - commander Yuriev, commissar Bedin, 6) Zuisky - commander Kamensky, commissar Mozgov, 7) Biyuk-Onlarsky - commander Solovey, commissar Orlov.
3rd district - chief Seversky, commissar Nikanorov, 6 detachments, total number 560 people, Simferopol No. 1 - commander Seleznev, commissar Filippov, 2) Simferopol No. 2 - commander Chussi, commissar Tretyak, 3) Evpatoriya - commander Ermakov, commissar Fartushny , 4) Alushtinsky - commander Amelinov, commissar Eremenko, 5) Sevastopolsky - commander Zinchenko, commissar Krivoshta, 6) Bakhchisaraysky - commander Makedonsky, commissar Cherny.
Platoon at the commander's headquarters of 38 people, commander Fedorenko, commissar Boyko. In total, as of July 1, 1942, there were 2,125 people. The detachments are provided with food for 7-8 days. The squads are fully provided with rifles. There are approximately 200 cartridges per soldier, heavy machine guns - 8, Degtyarev - 23, machine guns -56, but not all have cartridges, company mortars -16, battalion -1, 46 mm guns - 88 2.76 mm -2, explosion . substances about 130 kg, not everyone is provided with hand grenades, they are well equipped, but not everyone has an overcoat.
The connection between the main headquarters and the districts, as well as between the district headquarters and the detachments, is extremely lively. District headquarters have messengers with whom they send mail to neighboring districts, and if the mail is intended for the General Headquarters, from an area close to the headquarters, mail is carried by the messengers of this district. For example, a detachment has its own messengers who carry mail to the district headquarters and back, district messengers carry mail to the neighboring one either to the district leadership, or to the main headquarters if it is located in this area. Approximately - the liaison officers of the first district deliver mail to the second district, hand it over to the district communications chief, and he passes it on to the main headquarters through the latter's liaison officers who are with him.
The most difficult thing was that communication was carried out by the 3rd, 4th, 5th districts when the headquarters moved to the 2nd district, and when the headquarters was in the third district, the same picture was with the first and second districts. Due to the fact that the roads Simferopol - Alushta, Kara-subazar - Uskut are heavily guarded, communication is very difficult.
There were cases, especially in winter, when communication was disrupted for a month, and in the first days, without waiting for messengers from the 1st and 2nd regions, we had to allocate a special group, which with great difficulty reached these areas, losing two people (one killed, one missing) and one wounded.
For the entire period from November to July, 21 people were killed as messengers maintaining contact with the General Headquarters, and 10 between districts. Communication with the mainland was maintained with Sevastopol through Krasnikov’s walkie-talkie, messengers from the main headquarters and the 5th district and messengers sent by Sevastopol residents . Radio communication was established by the Military Council of the Cavalry. front, which sent five radio operators with two stations to the 2nd region; the first region received one radio operator in February and one in March, who came with a walkie-talkie from the steppe.
The worst was in the 3rd district. Despite our repeated requests, it was only in the month of May that the radio operator arrived in the Zuysky detachment for Seversky, who was held by the authorized OO for the Zuysky detachment Kharchenko for more than a month, citing Kapalkin’s order, and only after our categorical order the radio operator was sent to Seversky. In addition, communication is maintained by airplanes, and once a group of people arrived in the 3rd district from Sevastopol by boat.
As was seen above, the main core of the partisans were volunteers. It was assumed that when the Red Army retreated from Crimea, not all units would have time to cross to the Caucasian coast and those remaining in Crimea should settle in the forest. Therefore, even when drawing up the scheme, the question of subordination and possible misunderstandings on this basis came up, especially knowing that discipline requires, in the event of loss of contact with immediate superiors, the subordination of the junior in rank to the senior, there was a fear that there might be bosses who do not recognize the chiefs approved by the regional committee will decide to subjugate all the military, which could result in a mess.
Therefore, the scheme and our order provided for the subordination of all commanders who found themselves in the forest to the leadership of the partisans. Subsequently, an order was given in this spirit for the border troops and the 51st army. We learned about this already while in the forest, and not officially, but from the words of Major Izugenev and after Major General Averkin. Unfortunately, many commanders and commissars did not want to carry out this order, they tried to get through to Sevastopol, as a result, the cadres surrendered, and only small groups managed to get to Sevastopol.
There were no cases of forcible annexation of the remnants of units, but there were cases when the partisans, knowing that these remnants would not make their way to Sevastopol, but would end up with the fascists, disarmed those who did not want to stay in the forest. Mokrousov and Martynov themselves held a meeting with Izugenev and the commander of the border regiment (I don’t remember the number) Martynenok, but neither Izugenev nor Martynenok remained. As a result, as we know, they later came to Sevastopol with a small group consisting exclusively of senior political personnel. All the rest surrendered to the Nazis.
Before our eyes, the remnants of one regiment, retreating through the reserve, surrendered in batches. And two days before that, Mokrousov told the regiment commander that if it was impossible for him to get through to Yalta, he had to stay in the forest. To this, the regimental major (I don’t remember his last name) replied: “The Nazis will cross this line only over my corpse.”
Despite the desire of the commanders and commissars to break through, approximately 1,000 people settled in the forest, including the remnants of the 48 cavalry. divisions of 100-120 people from Gorodovikov’s regiment. At the head of these remnants were Commissar Popov and Chief of Staff Lobov. General Averkin, under very mysterious circumstances, fought off these remnants on Demerdzhi-yayle, made his way to the headquarters of the main leadership and received command over the 4th region, and in December he was killed by the fascists in the Uzenbash area.
The partisans greeted their military comrades as if they were family, providing them with all possible assistance with food, clothing and ammunition. Except for the cases in the Kolai detachment, where the detachment commander Gubarev and commissar Shtepa disarmed a group of 13 military men and expelled them from the detachment, as a result of which the group died, for which Gubarev and Shtepa were shot. The command and political personnel of the Red Army who found themselves in the forest received appointments in place of non-military ones. It was indicated above that the chiefs of staff, the Central Headquarters and the districts were military.
Subsequently, the military headed the detachments and were appointed to responsible positions in the regions. Popov, Lobov, Vyalkov, Major General Averkin, Aedinov, Seversky's chief of staff Captain Kalugin, Lieutenant Colonel Shetinin, etc., and now the majority of the military are in the detachments. Relations with the military are very good, with the exception of Lobov, Popov and Selikhov. Moreover, when we heard rumors about the bad relationship between Popov and Lobov and the former head of the 2nd district, Genov, we wrote to them about it. In response, we received a refutation and confirmation of very good relations from Popov and Genov.
However, after this, the commander of the Dzhankoy detachment, Ryumshin, who died bravely in battle, wrote to us about the unhealthy relationship between the three. When we came to the headquarters of the 2nd district in February, it turned out that this “friendly” troika was at knifepoint, and Lobov, Popov dragged Selikhov and a number of other comrades into this squabble. Selikhov’s walkie-talkie started working, and soon an order followed to remove Genov and appoint Selikhov, a weak-willed and untalented individual, in his place.
Martynov and I called Lobov, Popov and Genov in order to sort things out and reconcile them, but we saw that nothing would come of it. Genov was accused of inability, openly called a shepherd, that he did not provide food to the military (on inspection it turned out that the military received food equally with the partisans) and some other minor sins. If Lobov and Popov had not pursued some goal, they could have helped Genov in eliminating his shortcomings in military knowledge and worked well.
In order to defuse this atmosphere and strengthen the leadership of the 1st region, we appointed Lobov as chief of staff there; he became diplomatically ill. Selikhov’s radio started working, and three days later an order came from the Front Commander to leave Lobov as chief of staff of the 2nd region. Having received this order, Lobov instantly recovered.
In order to get to know the political staff and identify relationships, we gathered them all for a meeting. Here we were met with hostility by all the commanders and political workers of the remnants of the 48th division. Most of all they found fault with the words of Mokrousov, who said: “Why are you running around with a lousy cavalry division” and said that the behavior of Popov and Lobov double-dealing borders on Trotskyism.
Moreover, the expression “lousy division” did not refer to the 48th division, but not to the existing remnants, which Lobov and Popov identified with the former division. We knew about Gorodovikov as a good commander from the stories of his fellow soldiers who were in the detachments of the 3rd region, and from the reports of Genov, so we had in mind to give him the 4th region. When this was brought up, Gorodovikov obeyed.
Here Popov came forward and introduced himself as the commander of a division, which was subordinate only to him and no one could dispose of it without his knowledge. However, we did not agree with this statement and appointed Gorodovikov as head of the 4th district.
Apparently, Selikhov’s radio started working again, and on the 3rd day we received an order to create a military group, which included Gorodovikov’s detachment with the subordination of this group to Selekhov. When checking the detachments, it turned out that Popov kept Kaplun as commissar of the Karasubazar detachment, who threw away his party card.
While processing our order to intensify actions, he began to engage in quiet squabbles, aggravated relations between the military and non-military, had a concubine, and was idle. All this forced us to raise the question of replacing him, which is what happened; the Military Council appointed Buskadze in his place. After his removal, instead of working honestly, he was idle (Buskadze’s report), gathered the offended (Kvashnev, Kasyanov, Egorov, Polyansky and others), intrigued and engaged in project-making. Having received the appointment of the commissar of the 2nd district, he, having arrived at Headquarters, began to curse the head of the district Kurakov, the leadership of the partisan movement, wrote an order to transfer the translator Bella Trakhtenberg, Lobov’s concubine, from our detachment to his own, wrote an order to remove the commissioners from work OO, appointed by us, and about the appointment of others in their place, including the slacker Kasyanov, and when he arrived at the landing site, he tried to forcibly put Kvashnev on the plane out of turn, while threatening him with a stick and swearing obscenely at the deputy. Martynov, who was authorized by us for evacuation, Domnin (See the material we sent to the Special Department of the Front). This open rebellion by Popov outraged us, Mokrousov arrested Popov and handed him over to a military tribunal, which he informed you about by telegram on the same day.
Lobov has elusive intrigue, if not worse. All his work is aimed at baiting and making things worse. He slandered us to the Military Council of Crimea. The Front, accused us of persecuting the military, adhered to it and encouraged the commanders to devote more time to reconnaissance, which essentially amounted to disrupting the operation. He adhered to the tactic of keeping the detachments in a group, and when moving our headquarters, he drove Selikhov’s detachments after us, contrary to our orders. By order, the detachment of Gorodovikov and Kurakov was to withdraw from the Kokasan area to Terka, and he brought this detachment and the military.
When our headquarters moved from the Kokasan region in May, Selikhov himself suggested the idea of conducting a pre-operation in villages located north of Kazanly.
We approved this plan. Instead, Selikhov drove the 2nd detachment to the Terke area, and when Mokrousov scolded Selikhov for this, he said that he received Lobov’s order for this. Colonel Lobov refused this. When Selikhov fell ill, Martynov and Lobov went to talk to him about the evacuation of him and Buskadze, he agreed subject to your permission, and when Lobov wrote an order for the temporary release of Selikhov due to illness, Lobov began to tell Mokrousov that the order was written incorrectly, since there was no report from Selikhov.
In response to Mokrousov’s remark that you said that you talked to him, “no, I didn’t say that,” Lobov lied. This infuriated Mokrousov, and he covered him with obscenities and said in a fit of irritability: “T. Soroka, shoot Lobov.” But no one shot him, and Mokrousov would not have allowed this. I must admit that Mokrousov acted very, very badly here.
T. Bulatov posed the question, what is our opinion if the partisan detachment is divided into two independent regions with direct subordination to the mainland. We are writing to the mainland because we still do not know to whom we obey. We were sent directives by the Military Council of the Crimean Front, the Crimean Regional Party Committee, the Primorsky Army, the NKVD of Crimea, and now the Military Council of the Cavalry. front. All this stunned us, and we did not know “which god to pray to”! This must be ended and the partisan movement must be subordinated to one leadership.
The issue of division is difficult for us to resolve. Of course, if there is good regular communication by radio and air with the body to which the partisans are subordinate, and the difficulty of communication between areas separated by the Simferopol-Alushta highway, dismemberment would perhaps be useful, and since we have no reason to hope for this, then the abolition of a single leadership in Crimea could have a detrimental effect on business, and even if people like Lobov and Popov end up at the head of the administration of independent regions. For these reasons we cannot offer anything.
Prospects for replenishing people and supplying troops Unfortunately, we began to establish contact with the population of the steppe regions only in April. Before this it was almost impossible, since we had neither clothes nor documents with which our people could travel from the forest, and in winter it was impossible to walk hundreds of miles and spend the night in a field. For these reasons, we only knew by hearsay about the life and mood of the peasants.
As for the Tatar population of the mountainous regions, from the first days of the occupation of Crimea by the fascists, the overwhelming majority of them followed the fascists, which excluded the possibility of us carrying out work other than intelligence work. After establishing contact with the village, it was established that the overwhelming majority of the peasants were Soviet-minded, but the terror had strangled them so much that people were afraid of each other and even close relatives.
Even before this, the Zuysky detachment, thanks to the energy and popularity of the commissar of the detachment, Comrade Lugovoy, had a close connection with the collective farmers of the Zuysky district, especially with the village of Barabanovka, from where it received various information and food, and subsequently almost all the inhabitants of this village went to the forest to Lugovoy . When we established contact with the steppe regions, as discussed below, it turned out that the peasants were not averse to partisanship and going into the forest, but fear for the families that the Nazis would destroy if their relatives joined the partisans held them back.
At that time, the Nazis had not yet had time to rob the village completely, and there was food there that would have been given to the partisans, but it was not possible to organize its delivery to the forest due to highly developed espionage, the lack of horses and the difficulties associated with transportation, especially across the Simferopol highway. Feodosiya, heavily guarded, and passing Tatar villages. Now this situation has worsened due to increased surveillance and terror, collective farmers have no food and there is no hope for a harvest, since only seeds can produce a harvest, so the only source is the delivery of food to Crimea from Kuban.
Collective farmers will go into the forest with their families, which should not be allowed. In particular, our agent came to us in July from the village of Besheran and asked the question whether it was possible to lead people into the forest. We said - only without families. He left to negotiate with them. It is difficult to say how this issue will be resolved. Our opinion boils down to the fact that there will be an influx of population into partisan detachments, and it can be organized subject to the evacuation of family members from the forest to the mainland and an increase in food drops.
Thus, the population will act against the Nazis also in the steppe. The partisan cadres, having survived the hungry winter, are overwhelmingly sick and exhausted. For these reasons, it is unlikely that people will hold out for long, especially if Crimea is not liberated before winter. Therefore, the question arises about replacing them with new, fresh people, which practically can be done without much difficulty. The change of people can be done by air with a TB landing on Karabi Yaila and by sea with a boat approach between Otuzy-Kozy, Novy Svet, Kapsikhor and at Semidvorye. There are no such opportunities in the Seversky area. These points have been explored, and now it is only necessary to resolve this issue practically.
Our opinion in this case boils down to the following: a) Kurakov and Chub give the order of approach of the boats. b) Boats go to these points with people and food. c) On the shore they are met by armed people with packs plus those to be evacuated. d) Landed people and detachments lift the load onto themselves and on their packs and go with it to the camps.
They began organizing underground work in Crimea in April. For this purpose, politically literate and organizationally capable comrades were selected and sent to the districts as party representatives. We decided that, in order to avoid the possibility of provocations and betrayal, not to create party groups right away, but began by creating groups of Soviet patriots and only after comrades showed their devotion to our cause in concrete cases, to create party groups from among them...
Organized groups launched propaganda work among the population, using newspapers and magazines delivered to us in the forest. The groups are tasked with: conducting mass propaganda work among the population, organizing and carrying out work to disrupt various types of enemy activities, commit acts of sabotage, recruit new members, etc.
According to the data received from the district representatives, it is clear that there is a new intensification of oppression and terror by the fascists over the population. All food, livestock, poultry and clothing are taken from the population. The occupiers switched from “voluntary” methods of seizing the population for transportation to Germany to methods of undisguised violence. They give an allocation for the locality, the headman supplies a stipulated number of people for removal. Intolerable conditions have been created for the population, and if they do not join the partisan detachments, it turns out that it is because the Gestapo has launched a demagogic campaign about reprisals by the partisans against anyone who appears in the forest.
But there are those who want to go to the partisans. This is despite the fact that our agitation is not yet firmly established. We instructed the district party representatives to oppose fascist demagoguery with our Soviet truth. Organize explanations to the population about the actual state of the war, about the atrocities of the invaders, about the facts of political and economic lawlessness of the population, that the partisans are and will deal with the occupiers and traitors of our people, and that the partisans will gladly meet everyone who wants to help them in their selfless struggle. Consequently, there is a base for replenishing partisan detachments.
It is only necessary, through skillfully and energetically staged agitation, to awaken the population’s thoughts about the need for a merciless fight against the occupiers, by any means and under any conditions, to show the population, using concrete facts of the atrocities of the fascists, that the only way out for our people from lawlessness. Comrade Davydkin gives a special report on intelligence and intelligence activities.
Basically, the work consisted of providing intelligence data, according to which the Crimean Front command could fully determine the enemy’s intentions and build their operational plans. In particular, from our reports on the grouping of tank formations in the triangle Koktebel - Feodosia - Old Crimea, one could unmistakably judge that the enemy was aiming his main attack at our left flank. This was the case before the Kerch disaster and before the fall of the hero - Sevastopol. Unfortunately, as we heard rumors, many of our radiograms, which provided important intelligence information about the enemy’s preparations for an attack on Kerch, were deciphered after the fall of Kerch. Whether this was true or not needs to be verified.
In March, at the request of the Military Council of the Crimean Front, we presented a list of particularly distinguished partisans for an award. A total of 67 people were represented, and the Military Council did not require characteristics of those represented. The performance has not yet taken place. At the same time, everyone nominated by Selikhov for the award has already been awarded.
Commander of the Crimean partisan movement, Colonel (Mokrousov)
Commissioner Secretary of the Simferopol Civil Code of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Art. battalion commissar (Martynov)
Chapter 26. Partisans and traitors
Having occupied Crimea, the Germans and Romanians, even before the capture of Sevastopol, began reprisals against civilians on the peninsula. According to the most likely estimate, the Germans and their accomplices killed up to 50 thousand civilians in Crimea, the vast majority of whom were Russians and Jews.
In 1941–1944, 85.5 thousand people, mostly Russians, were taken from Crimea to Germany for forced labor. Of these, 64 thousand returned in 1945–1947.
After the landing in Kerch and Feodosia, the Nazis feared the landing of Soviet troops in Yalta and on January 14, 1942, they drove 1,300 men aged 17 to 55 to the Potato Town camp near Simferopol. By July 1942, when the Yalta residents were liberated, more than 500 people had died from hunger and disease. According to the city's Extraordinary State Commission, about 900 civilians became victims of the Nazis in Yalta, not counting those killed in the “Potato Town”. The number of victims is derived from the volume of burials.
Having captured the city of Kerch in November 1941, the Germans immediately issued an order that stated: “Residents of Kerch are invited to hand over to the German command all the food available in each family. If any food is found, the owner is subject to execution." By next order (No. 2), the city government ordered all residents to immediately register all chickens, roosters, ducks, chicks, turkeys, geese, sheep, cows, calves, and draft animals. Owners of poultry and livestock were strictly prohibited from using poultry and livestock for their own needs without special permission from the German commandant. After the publication of these orders, general searches began in all houses and apartments.
Upon the arrival of the Red Army in Kerch in January 1942, when examining the Bagerovo ditch, it was discovered that for a kilometer in length, 4 m wide and 2 m deep, it was overflowing with the corpses of women, children, old people and teenagers.
The list of German crimes alone can take several pages. Of course, the natural reaction to the German repression was to strengthen the partisan movement.
However, Soviet and party bodies were preparing for partisan warfare even before the German invasion of Crimea. On October 23, 1941, by a decree of the Bureau of the Crimean Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, A.V. was appointed commander of the partisan detachments of the Crimea. Mokrousov. The choice of the regional committee was successful. Black Sea sailor Mokrousov participated in the October Uprising in Petrograd, and from March 1918 - at command posts in the Red Army. In August-November 1921, he commanded the Crimean Insurgent Army, operating in the rear of Wrangel. In 1937–1938, Mokrousov fought in Spain.
By the same decree, the secretary of the Simferopol city party committee, S.V., was appointed commissar of partisan detachments. Martynov, and the chief of staff - I.K. Sour cream.
According to the same resolution, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Crimea allocated two million rubles for the partisan movement.
The core of many partisan detachments were the surrounded soldiers and commanders of the 51st and Primorsky armies. By mid-November 1941, there were at least 1,315 encirclements in the partisan detachments. Among them are 438 commanders and political workers, including Major General D.I. Averkin, Colonel I.T. Lobov, Lieutenant Colonel B.B. Gorodovikov, Major I.V. Kharchenko, captains I.G. Kurakov, N.P. Larin, D.G. Isaev, military commissars A. Aedinov, P. Lakhtikov, M. Khalansky and others.
On October 31, 1941, by order No. 1, Mokrousov announced the organization of five partisan regions located in mountainous and forested areas, and appointed commanders, commissars and chiefs of staff of these regions. 24 partisan detachments were created on a voluntary basis from party and Soviet activists, from fighters of extermination battalions. Three independent detachments were formed later from the commanders and soldiers of the Primorsky and 51st armies, who lingered in the mountains and forests of Crimea during the retreat to Sevastopol and Kerch. In total, by the end of 1941, the partisan detachments numbered more than 3,700 people, including 1,315 fighters and commanders who joined the detachments during the retreat of the armies.
The bases of the five partisan regions were located in the mountains and forests of Yalta from Old Crimea to Balaklava. In the Kerch region, three detachments were created, which were based in the underground quarries. Food and other supplies were designed for a significantly smaller number of partisans than actually turned out to be. Moreover, these reserves could not be replenished by the population, since there were almost no settlements in the mountainous and forested areas.
The partisan detachments were located in a very small area, which made it difficult for them to maneuver. The partisans did not have topographic maps. Subsequently, they confiscated Soviet tourist maps with the situation marked on them, right down to the shepherd's paths, from the killed German officers.
In the post-war years, Soviet propaganda exaggerated the successes of the partisan movement and constantly used the cliches “the earth was burning everywhere under the notes of the occupiers,” “all Soviet people rose to fight,” etc. Therefore, I will turn to German documents.
Already on November 20, Manstein issued an order: “Behind the front, the struggle also continues. Guerilla snipers, dressed in civilian clothes, shoot at individual soldiers and small units. Using sabotage methods, planting mines and infernal machines, the partisans are trying to disrupt our supplies... They destroy crops and enterprises, mercilessly dooming the urban population to starvation.”
Soon guerrilla warfare began in earnest. “According to the reports we have received,” says a memo dated November 14, 1941, compiled by a counterintelligence officer of the 11th Army, “a well-organized, centrally led partisan organization is operating in the southern part of Crimea. At its disposal in the mountains of Yalta are large and small bases, which contain a lot of weapons, food, entire herds of livestock and other supplies... The partisans’ tasks include the destruction of communications and transport facilities and attacks on rear services and transport convoys.”
According to Mokrousov’s report dated March 21: “The total number of partisan detachments is 26, united in 4 districts, the 5th district was liquidated on March 18, 1942 for operational reasons and all personnel were transferred to the 4th district. The total number of personnel is 3180 people.
A total of 156 combat operations were carried out. In addition, 78 combat operations were carried out when attacking enemy units during combing. Manpower was destroyed - 4,040 soldiers and officers. 350 vehicles with ammunition, food and people were destroyed. 2 tanks were knocked out, 12 convoys were destroyed, 1 mill, 6 bridges were blown up and Beshui-Kopi was put out of action. 10,000 m of telephone and telegraph cable were removed.
Our losses: 175 people killed, 200 people wounded, 58 missing and 15 messengers. Major General Comrade Averkin is among the missing. The fate of the Sevastopol detachment is still unknown...
The partisan detachments are provided with food on a starvation ration for no more than 10 days, but the 3rd and 4th regions are not provided with food at all, as a result of which 18 deaths and 30 people were recorded. at death's door.
All units lack medicines (bandages, iodine, cotton wool, etc.) and surgical instruments.
During their stay in the forest, the soldiers' uniforms became unusable, mainly shoes, clothes, and underwear. Ammunition and weapons are provided, with the exception of the 2nd region. There are absolutely no anti-tank grenades, mines and explosives...
Over the course of 4 months, 362 of the identified traitors and traitors to the Motherland were destroyed in populated areas of the mountainous and wooded part of Crimea and in partisan detachments...
The overwhelming majority of the Tatar population in the foothill and mountain villages is pro-fascist, from among whose residents the Gestapo created volunteer detachments that are currently used to fight the partisans, and in the future the possibility cannot be ruled out against the Red Army...
The activities of partisan detachments are complicated by the need for an armed struggle on two fronts: against the fascist occupiers, on the one hand, and against armed gangs of mountainous and wooded Tatar villages.”
On December 5, 1941, Manstein sent his senior commander, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group South, a report on the organization of the fight against partisans and the successes achieved in this. The report said: “To eliminate this danger (according to our information, there are 8 thousand partisans in Crimea), we took decisive measures; sometimes troops had to be diverted to fight the partisans (sic!).
At this time, the following are taking part in actions against partisans:
a) headquarters for combating partisans (Major Stefanus); its task is to collect information and provide recommendations on the implementation of necessary activities;
b) Romanian mountain rifle corps with the 8th cavalry and 4th mountain rifle brigades;
c) 24th, 52nd and 240th anti-tank fighter divisions;
d) in the sector of the 30th Corps: the Romanian motorized cavalry regiment and units of the 1st Mountain Infantry Brigade;
e) in the Kerch mines; engineer battalion and units of infantry regiments of the 46th Infantry Division;
f) cordons are set up on various mountain roads and escort teams are used.
To date, the following results have been achieved: 19 partisan camps were liquidated, 640 were destroyed and 522 partisans were captured, a large number of weapons, equipment and ammunition were captured or destroyed (including 75 mortars, 25 machine guns, 20 cars and a large number of trucks, 12 warehouses for equipment and ammunition), as well as livestock, fuel and lubricants and two radio installations."
The partisans also fought against the economic activities of the Germans. The occupiers created the main economic department “South”, which led the economic department “Dnepropetrovsk”, which included the territory of the Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye regions, Northern Tavria and Crimea. In Crimea, the Germans opened two economic branches - in Kerch and Sevastopol. But they failed to restore industrial production, and agriculture was restored only to a small extent.
According to the report of the Crimean branch of the SD dated April 8, 1942, “the partisans, whose activities are still active, began to abandon attacks on individual German soldiers or single vehicles and switched mainly to massive raids on villages and other actions with the aim of capturing food."
This coincides with data from other German sources. “On the night of February 7-8, Kosh was attacked by 300 partisans.” “On February 9, 150 partisans... broke into the village of Shlia and completely plundered it.” A few days earlier, the partisans occupied the village of Kazanly. After which 500 partisans attacked Baksan and 200 partisans raided the village of Beshui.
At the beginning of 1942, the commander of the 30th Corps, General von Salmuth, established the exact number of hostages to be shot for each killed or wounded German or Romanian: “All hostages must be imprisoned in concentration camps. Food for the hostages is provided by the population of their villages. For every German or Romanian soldier killed by the partisans, 10 hostages should be shot, and for every wounded German or Romanian soldier, one hostage; if possible, executions should be carried out near the place where the German or Romanian soldier was killed. The corpses of those shot should not be removed for three days.
Arrests of hostages in places where there are no troops (and especially in the mountains) should be carried out by the 1st Romanian Mountain Brigade. For this purpose, the corresponding points must be temporarily occupied by troops."
Below were lists of the locations of concentration camps for hostages, as well as the units and units responsible for their maintenance. The last paragraph of Salmut's order read: "Concentration camps are to be established at the following points":
Table 8
| Name of the locality | Part (unit) responsible for the creation of the concentration camp |
| Kuchuk-Muscomya | 124th Infantry Regiment |
| Alsou | 1st Romanian Mountain Regiment |
| Varnutka | 266th Infantry Regiment |
| Biyuk-Muskomya | 105th Infantry Regiment |
| Hayta | 14th Romanian Machine Gun Battalion |
| Kayaks | 172nd Artillery Regiment |
| Sakhtik | 72nd Engineer Battalion |
| Foros | 72nd Tank Battalion |
Here you should pay attention to two points. Firstly, the source is German official documents first published in London in 1954, so they cannot be labeled as Soviet propaganda. Secondly, it clearly follows from the document that the reprisals in Crimea were carried out not by SS troops, who were not there at all then, but by German and Romanian field units.
And here is a German leaflet from the same source, posted in Simferopol: “On November 29, 1941, 40 male residents of the city of Simferopol were shot, which was a repressive measure:
1) for the death of a German soldier who, on November 22, 1941, was blown up by a mine in an area about which the commandant’s office had not received any information about possible mining;
From the beginning of 1942, the command of the Soviet Army established air communications with the partisans. During the period from April 7, 1942 to October 1, 1943 alone, 507 sorties were flown into the partisan detachments of the Crimea, of which 274 were carried out by Li-2, TB-3 aircraft and 233 by U-2 and PR-5 aircraft.
A total of 270,729 kg of cargo were delivered, including 252,225 kg of food, 600 sets of uniforms, 120 machine guns, five anti-tank rifles, four DP light machine guns, 1,980 grenades, 92,563 rounds of ammunition (various), 885 miscellaneous mines, 3,487 kg of tola, 54 sets of radio supplies , two sets of printing houses.
During the same period, 776 people were removed from partisan detachments, of which 747 were sick and wounded partisans, seven people and 22 children were recalled. And 137 people were sent to partisan detachments, of which 78 were cured partisans, 30 demolitions, 15 party activists, 14 command and leadership workers.
An interesting quote from a letter from Commissioner P.R. Yamoplsky to the Secretary of the Crimean Regional Committee V.S. Bulatov on October 14, 1943: “An unfortunate incident happened with a tank. We captured a serviceable medium tank, drove it far away from the battlefield, got stuck in a ravine close to the forest, we had no tankers, we fiddled around until the engines jammed. Fedorenko made a decision and burned the tank. I scolded him to the hilt for such a decision, but you can’t return the tank. Now he is given the task of getting another tank instead.”
But along with the successes of the partisan movement, any objective historian must also recognize the fact that the Germans used the so-called Khivi in Crimea, and on a much larger scale than in any other region of the USSR occupied in 1941–1944.
So, for example, in the fall of 1943, the defense of the coast from the village of Koktebel to Dvuyakornaya Bay (wide beaches and convenient landing sites, he himself came from these places) was guarded by the Azerbaijani Khivi battalion. It consisted of 60 Germans and 1090 Azerbaijanis. The battalion was armed with 42 light machine guns, 80 heavy machine guns, 10 battalion and 10 regimental mortars, as well as 16 anti-tank guns. At the same time, the railway from Vladislavovka to Islam-Terek was guarded by a Khiwi company consisting of 150 Georgians.
However, the real support of the Wehrmacht in Crimea were the Crimean Tatars, who served in the Khivi, in self-defense units and other units.
In order to attract the Crimean Tatars and Turkey to the fight against the “Bolsheviks,” the Reich leadership began to use Crimea as bait in the summer of 1941. At the end of the summer of 1941, employees of the German embassy in Turkey met with the leaders of the Crimean Tatar emigration. The visit to Berlin in October 1941 of Turkish generals Ali Fuad Erden (head of the military academy) and Husnu Emir Erkilet contributed to a positive solution to the issue of involving the Crimean Tatar emigration in active German politics. During the negotiations, Ali Fuad expressed the hope that after the end of hostilities in Crimea, an administration would be formed in which Crimean Tatars would largely participate. This, in turn, could greatly influence the Turkish government in favor of the decision to have Turkey enter the war on the side of Germany.
The statement of an active member of the pro-German group in Turkey, Nuri Pasha (Enver Pasha’s brother), is eloquent: “Granting freedom to such a small area as Crimea would not be a sacrifice for the German Empire, but a politically wise measure. This would be propaganda in action. In Turkey it would find an even greater response.”
It is necessary to note the duality that took place in German propaganda on the “Eastern Question”. On the one hand, the invasion of the USSR began under the slogan of “destruction of the Bolshevik-Asian beast,” and propaganda was built in this direction. Leaflets and brochures with photographs of Soviet soldiers of various Asian nationalities and the following text were distributed among German soldiers in huge quantities: “This is what the Tatar-Mongol creatures are like! The Fuhrer’s soldier is protecting you from them!” The SS propaganda organs published the brochure “Der Untermensch” as a reference manual for German troops. Soldiers were encouraged to view the local population as harmful germs that needed to be destroyed. The peoples of the East were called in the brochure “dirty Mongoloids, bestial bastards.”
But, on the other hand, it was precisely in relation to the so-called “eastern” peoples that the German command demanded that maximum respect be shown locally. Thus, Manstein issued two orders on November 20 and 29, 1941, in which he demanded respect for the religious customs of the Muslim Tatars and called for not allowing any unjustified actions against the civilian population.
An important element in coordinating the work of the Wehrmacht High Command, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and repressive structures to involve the Crimean Tatars in the anti-Soviet struggle was the creation of a representative office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the headquarters of the 11th Army in Crimea. The duties of the representative were performed by the leading employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Major Werner Otto von Hentin.
German propaganda bore fruit. Of the 90 thousand residents of Crimea mobilized into the Red Army in July - August 1941, 20 thousand were Tatars. All of them became part of the 51st Army operating in the Crimea, and during the retreat almost all deserted.
After the occupation of Crimea, the Germans organized recruitment points for Crimean Tatars into the German army and local paramilitary forces. The work of the recruitment commissions ended in February 1942. As a result, about six thousand people were enrolled in Tatar volunteer formations in 203 settlements and about four thousand people in five prisoner of war camps (in Nikolaev 2800 people), a total of about 10 thousand volunteers. By January 29, 1942, 8,684 Crimean Tatars were recruited into the German army, and the rest were separated into small groups of 3-10 people and distributed among companies, batteries and other military units stationed near Sevastopol and on the Kerch Peninsula.
According to the Simferopol Muslim Committee, village elders organized about four thousand more people to fight the partisans. In addition, about five thousand volunteers were supposed to leave later to replenish military units. According to German documents, with a population of Crimea of about 200 thousand people, the Crimean Tatars gave the German army 20 thousand. If we consider that about 10 thousand people were drafted into the Red Army, then we can assume that all combat-ready Tatars in 1942 were fully taken into account.
14 Tatar “self-defense” companies were formed with a total number of 1,632 people; these companies were soon transformed into ten battalions of 200–250 people each. These battalions were used for guard duty, guarding prisons, SD facilities, and in operations against partisans.
The 147th and 154th Tatar battalions were stationed in Simferopol, the 148th in Karasubazar, the 149th in Bakhchisarai, the 150th in Old Crimea, the 151st in Alushta, the 152nd in the Krasny state farm "(SD camp), 153rd - in Dzhankoy, 155th - in Yevpatoria, 156th - in Yalta.
With the beginning of the occupation of Crimea, the Nazi Security Service (SD) immediately created the Muslim Committee, and then on its basis the Tatar Committee with its center in Simferopol. Jelal Abduraimdov was appointed chairman. The committee had six departments: for recruiting volunteers for the German army; to provide assistance to families of volunteers; culture; religion; propaganda and agitation; administrative and office. Local committees have also been established in some cities and towns.
To organize pro-German self-government in Crimea, the German authorities brought from Turkey the elderly Jafar Seydamet, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the “Crimean Regional Government” of 1918. Later, to form a more solid administration, the German leadership planned the last khan of the Crimean Tatars, Sultan Giray.
The Tatar Committee had a number of printed organs, including the newspaper Azat Krym (Liberated Crimea, editor Mustafa Krutyev) and the magazine Ana-Yurt (Motherland), which campaigned for the creation of a Tatar state under German protectorate .
What did “Liberated Crimea” write? Here, for example, on March 3, 1942: “After our brothers - the Germans - crossed the historical ditch at the gates of Perekop, the great sun of freedom and happiness rose for the peoples of Crimea.”
March 10, 1942 Alushta. At a meeting organized by the Muslim Committee, “Muslims expressed their gratitude to the Great Fuhrer Adolf Hitler - Effendi for the free life he had given to the Muslim people. Then they held a service for the preservation of life and health for many years to Adolf Hitler - effendi.”
In the same issue: “To the Great Hitler - liberator of all peoples and religions!” Two thousand Tatars from the village of Kokkozy and the surrounding area “gathered for a prayer service ... in honor of the German soldiers. We made a prayer to the German martyrs of the war... The entire Tatar people prays every minute and asks Allah to grant the Germans victory over the whole world. Oh, great leader, we tell you with all our hearts, with all our being, believe us! We, Tatars, give our word to fight the herd of Jews and Bolsheviks together with German soldiers in the same ranks!.. May Allah thank you, our great master Hitler!”
March 20, 1942 “Together with the glorious brothers - the Germans, who arrived in time to liberate the world of the East, we, the Crimean Tatars, declare to the whole world that we have not forgotten the solemn promises of Churchill in Washington, his desire to revive the Jewish power in Palestine, his desire to destroy Turkey, capture Istanbul and the Dardanelles, raise an uprising in Turkey and Afghanistan, etc., etc. The East is waiting for its liberator not from lying democrats and swindlers, but from the National Socialist Party and from the liberator Adolf Hitler. We took an oath to make sacrifices for such a sacred and brilliant task."
And here is a pearl from April 10, 1942: “To the liberator of oppressed peoples, the son of the German people, Adolf Hitler. We, Muslims, with the arrival of the valiant sons of Great Germany in Crimea, with your blessing and in memory of long-term friendship, stood shoulder to shoulder with the German people, took up arms and began to fight to the last drop of blood for the great universal ideas put forward by you - the destruction of the red Jewish Bolshevik plague to the end and without a trace.
Our ancestors came from the East, and we waited for liberation from there, but today we are witnesses that liberation is coming to us from the West. Perhaps for the first and only time in history it happened that the sun of freedom rose from the west. This sun is you, our great friend and leader, with your mighty German people. Presidium of the Muslim Committee".
As we see, Gorbachev, with his notorious “universal human values,” had a worthy predecessor.
In April 1942, enlightened Aryans suddenly became seriously concerned about the state of agriculture and livestock farming of the Tatar population. For this purpose, courses for sheep breeders were created near Yevpatoria, and courses for winegrowers near Yalta. At these courses, young Tatars learned to shear sheep, grow grapes, drive all types of cars, jump with a parachute, shoot all types of small arms, as well as encryption and much more, apparently so necessary in peasant life. But, alas, when these enlightened young men appeared behind the front line, they were captured by the villains from the NKVD. I think that now all these innocently repressed sheep farmers and winegrowers have been posthumously rehabilitated.
The Crimean Tatars actively participated in the assault on Sevastopol in June-July 1942. Here is what the Sevastopol historian Captain 2nd Rank I.S. writes about this. Manyushin: “On July 2, the boat on which senior lieutenant V.K. Kvariani and Sergeant P. Sudak, received holes in the hull, and began to settle from the water received. One engine stalled, and the boat had to turn to the shore occupied by the Nazis. All this happened in the coastal area near Alushta. On the shore there was a battle between the paratroopers and an armed group of Tatars. As a result of the unequal battle, all those who survived were captured. The wounded Tatars shot at point-blank range. The Italian soldiers arrived in time and sent some of the prisoners by car, and some by boat to Yalta.”
"IN. Mishchenko, who walked in one of the columns of prisoners, testifies that out of three thousand of their column, only half of the prisoners reached the “potato field” camp in Simferopol. The rest were shot along the way by a convoy of Germans and traitors from the Crimean Tatars."
“In the Sudak region, a self-defense group was involved in liquidating the landing force. At the same time, 12 paratroopers were burned alive. One of the punitive expeditions ended with a long blockade of partisans, as a result of which 90 people died of hunger."
Enough. I think that what has been said is quite enough.
In the summer of 1942, the capture of Sevastopol and Paulus’s advance to Stalingrad turned the heads of the leaders of the Reich, and many of them began to propose getting rid of the Tatar allies: “The Moor has done his job...”
In June 1942, prominent official Alfred Frauenfeld sent an extensive memorandum to Hitler on the future structure of Crimea, in which he proposed to resettle Germans from South Tyrol to Crimea. On July 2, Hitler said that he considered this proposal very useful. It was also planned to place 140 thousand Germans from Trasistria and two thousand German settlers from Palestine on the peninsula, but then it was decided to use Transnistria Germans.
There was no shortage of proposals for the transformation of Crimea in 1942–1943. Thus, the head of the Labor Front and the head of the Kraft durch Freude organization, Robert Ley, proposed converting Crimea into a giant resort for German youth.
To substantiate the original belonging of Crimea to Germany, A. Frauenfeld organized an archaeological expedition in July 1942 under the leadership of SS Brigade Fuhrer von Alvensleben and army officers Colonel Kalk and Captain Werner Baumelburg. They conducted a survey of the surroundings of Bakhchisarai and the medieval fortress of Magnul-Kale.
On July 5, 1942, a meeting was held between the Wehrmacht command and the police, where the issue of methods for evicting racially “inferior” residents from Crimea was discussed. It was decided to create special camps to conduct a “racial survey” of the population.
By July 1942, the German leadership finally abandoned its plans to grant self-government to the Crimean Tatars. On July 27, at the Werwolf headquarters, over dinner, Hitler announced his desire to “cleanse” Crimea.
The reluctance of the Turkish leadership to enter the war on the side of Germany became the basis for stopping the discussion of issues about the future status of the Turkic peoples living in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union. And they stopped looking at the Crimean Tatars as a connecting link in German-Turkish relations.
In the 1970-980s, a number of Russian “dissidents,” exposing “Stalin’s crimes,” proved to us that not all Tatars served the Germans, but only “separate groups,” while others were partisans at that time. However, there was also an anti-Hitler underground in Germany, so should we now count the Germans among our allies in World War II? Let's look at the specific numbers.
Let us turn to the data of the “democratic” historian N.F. Bugaya: “According to approximate data, the units of the German army stationed in Crimea consisted of more than 20 thousand Crimean Tatars.” That is, almost the entire Crimean Tatar population is of military age. It is significant that this unseemly circumstance is actually recognized in a very characteristic publication (“The book forms the documentary historical basis of the measures taken in the Russian Federation for the rehabilitation of abused and punished peoples”).
How many Crimean Tatars were among the partisans? On June 1, 1943, there were 262 people in the Crimean partisan detachments, of which 145 were Russians, 67 Ukrainians and... six Tatars.
On January 15, 1944, according to the party archive of the Crimean Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, there were 3,733 partisans in Crimea, of which 1,944 were Russians, 348 were Ukrainians, and 598 were Tatars. Finally, according to a certificate on the party, national and age composition of the Crimean partisans as of April 1944, among the partisans there were: Russians - 2075, Tatars - 391, Ukrainians - 356, Belarusians - 71, others - 754.
So, even if we take the maximum of the given figures - 598, then the ratio of Tatars in the German army and in the partisans will be more than 30 to 1.
In connection with the advance of the Red Army in October 1943, the leaders of the Tatar nationalists began to leave Crimea. During the evacuation from the peninsula along with German units in March-April 1944, at least three thousand Crimean Tatars left. Most of them, like the refugees of 1943, settled in Romania, some were allowed to move to Germany.
The Tatar units taken from Crimea to Romania in June 1944 were consolidated into the Tatar SS Cavalry Regiment of three battalions. But later, on the territory of Hungary, the regiment was reorganized into the First Tatar Mountain Jaeger Brigade of the SS (about 2,500 people) under the command of Standartenführer Fortenbach. On December 31, 1944, the brigade was disbanded and became part of the Eastern Turkic SS unit (combat group “Crimea” consisting of two infantry battalions and one cavalry hundred). These formations constantly suffered losses, and the remnants of the Tatars in March 1945 joined the Azerbaijani battle group as separate units.
Some of the Crimean Tatars were transported to France and entered the reserve battalion of the Volga Tatar Legion, which was stationed near the city of Le Puy. At the end of the war, several hundred Tatars joined the 35th SS Police Division and the air defense auxiliary service in France.
After the liberation of Crimea, state security agencies resettled the Crimean Tatars to the Uzbek SSR. This is a very delicate issue now, and I will quote the following document in full:
“State Defense Committee to Comrade Stalin I.V.
The NKVD and NKGB bodies are carrying out work in Crimea to identify and seize enemy agents, traitors to the Motherland, accomplices of the Nazi occupiers and other anti-Soviet elements.
Weapons illegally kept by the population included 5,995 rifles, 337 machine guns, 250 machine guns, 31 mortars and a large number of grenades and rifle cartridges...
By 1944, over 20 thousand Tatars had deserted from the Red Army units, betrayed their Motherland, went into the service of the Germans and fought against the Red Army with arms in hand...
Considering the treacherous actions of the Crimean Tatars against the Soviet people and based on the undesirability of further residence of the Crimean Tatars on the border outskirts of the Soviet Union, the NKVD of the USSR submits for your consideration a draft decision of the State Defense Committee on the eviction of all Tatars from the territory of Crimea.
We consider it advisable to resettle the Crimean Tatars as special settlers in the regions of the Uzbek SSR for use in work both in agriculture - collective farms, state farms, and in industry and construction.
The issue of settling the Tatars in the Uzbek SSR was agreed upon with the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Uzbekistan, Comrade Yusupov.
According to preliminary data, there are currently 140–160 thousand Tatar population in Crimea. The eviction operation will begin on May 20–21 and end on June 10. At the same time, I present a draft resolution of the State Defense Committee and ask for your decision.
People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. Beria."
According to the Resolution of the Defense Committee, it was proposed: “All Tatars should be evicted from the territory of Crimea and settled for permanent residence as special settlers in the regions of the Uzbek SSR. Entrust the eviction to the NKVD of the USSR. Oblige the NKVD of the USSR (Comrade Beria) to complete the eviction of the Crimean Tatars before June 1, 1944.
Establish the following procedure and conditions for eviction:
Allow special settlers to take with them personal belongings, clothing, household equipment, dishes and food in an amount of up to 500 kg per family.
Oblige the NKPS (comrade Kaganovich) to organize the transportation of special settlers from Crimea to the Uzbek SSR by specially formed trains according to a schedule drawn up jointly with the NKVD of the USSR. Number of trains, loading stations and destination stations at the request of the NKVD of the USSR. Payments for transportation are made according to the tariff for transportation of prisoners.
The People's Commissariat of Health of the USSR (comrade Miterev) allocates one doctor and two nurses with an appropriate supply of medicines for each train with special settlers, in a timely manner in agreement with the NKVD of the USSR, and provides medical and sanitary care for special settlers en route.
The People's Commissariat of Trade of the USSR (Comrade Lyubimov) must provide all trains with special settlers with hot meals and boiling water every day. To organize food for special settlers on the way, allocate food to the People's Commissariat of Trade...
Oblige the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Uzbekistan, Comrade. Yusupov... ensure that arriving special settlers are provided with personal plots and provide assistance in the construction of houses with local building materials.
To oblige the Agricultural Bank (comrade Kravtsova) to issue special settlers sent to the Uzbek SSR in the places of their resettlement a loan for the construction of houses and for economic establishment of up to 5,000 rubles per family with an installment plan of up to 7 years.
Oblige the People's Commissariat of the USSR (Comrade Subbotin) to allocate flour, cereals and vegetables to the Council of People's Commissars of the Uzbek SSR for distribution to special settlers during June - August this year. in monthly equal quantities... Providing flour, cereals and vegetables to special settlers during June-August. d. produce free of charge, in exchange for agricultural products and livestock accepted from them in the places of eviction.”
On April 2 and May 11, 1944, the State Defense Committee adopted resolutions No. 5943ss and No. 5859ss on the eviction of the Crimean Tatars from the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to the Uzbek SSR.
The operation was carried out quickly and decisively. The eviction began on May 18, and already on May 20, Serov and Kobulov reported:
“Telegram addressed to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria.
We hereby report that, begun in accordance with your instructions on May 18, this year. The operation to evict the Crimean Tatars was completed today, May 20, at 16:00. A total of 180,014 people were evicted, loaded into 67 trains, of which 63 trains, numbering 173,287 people, were sent to their destinations, the remaining 4 trains will also be sent today.
In addition, the district military commissars of Crimea mobilized 6,000 Tatars of military age, who, according to the orders of the Head of the Red Army, were sent to the cities of Guryev, Rybinsk and Kuibyshev.
Of the 8,000 special contingent sent at your direction to the Moskovugol Trust, 5,000 are also Tatars.
Thus, 191,044 persons of Tatar nationality were removed from the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.
During the eviction of the Tatars, 1,137 people were arrested against anti-Soviet elements, and a total of 5,989 people were arrested during the operation.
Weapons seized during the eviction: 10 mortars, 173 machine guns, 192 machine guns, 2650 rifles, 46603 ammunition.
In total, during the operation the following were confiscated: 49 mortars, 622 machine guns, 724 machine guns, 9888 rifles and 326887 ammunition.
There were no incidents during the operation.
It should not be forgotten that neither in May 1944 nor in the next two years could anyone guarantee that the war between the USSR and the Allies on the one hand and Germany on the other would not develop into a war between the Allies and the USSR. England and the United States concentrated a huge fleet in the Mediterranean Sea in May 1944, and it is not difficult to imagine that if war broke out with the USSR, it would end up in the Black Sea. Could Stalin in such a situation abandon the Crimean Tatars, who had stabbed Russia in the back so many times? In May 1944, weapons sufficient for a wartime rifle division (without an artillery regiment) were confiscated from the Crimean Tatars. How many other weapons were hidden in different types of caches? After all, only naive people could keep it at home. And the NKVD troops had no time to search for weapons during the deportation.
Since the 70s of the 20th century, Tatar nationalists and their supporters among the “liberal intelligentsia” have been constantly raising the issue of “deportation of the Crimean Tatar people”, “genocide” of this people, etc., etc.
There is no doubt that Stalin (and it was he who was responsible for the resettlement of the Tatars; Beria, Serov and others were only executors of his will), of course, dealt very harshly with the Crimean Tatars.
But why whip up hysteria and engage in verbiage? Let's start with what deportation is. There is simply no such word in any Russian (before 1917) or Soviet (before 1991) official document. Let's open the "Dictionary of Foreign Words", published in Moscow in 1979. It says: "Deportation is expulsion from the state as a criminal or administrative punishment." Question: from which state were the Crimean Tatars evicted? From USSR to USSR. As the cat Behemoth liked to say: “Congratulations for lying.”
Now, what is genocide? This is the extermination or significant reduction in the number of people of a given nationality. Let's count: less than 200 thousand Crimean Tatars were evicted, arrested and mobilized into the Red Army in May 1944. But in 1991, according to various sources, from two to five million (!) people who considered themselves Crimean Tatars wanted to return to Crimea. I would like to note that from the 15th century to 1941, the size of the Tatar population in Crimea was relatively stable. So, if we talk about the size of the Tatar population, Stalin did not commit genocide, but a demographic explosion, which would have been impossible if the Tatars had remained in Crimea.
It is worth noting that not all Crimean Tatars were deported to Uzbekistan. Thus, according to Vlada Selina, “participants of the Crimean underground who operated behind enemy lines and members of their families were also exempted from the status of special settler. Thus, S.S.’s family was released. Useinov, who was in Simferopol during the occupation of Crimea, was a member of an underground patriotic group from December 1942 to March 1943, then was arrested by the Nazis and shot. Family members were allowed to live in Simferopol.”
Crimean Tatars - front-line soldiers - immediately asked to free their relatives from special settlements. Such appeals were sent to the deputy. commander of the 2nd aviation squadron of the 1st fighter aviation regiment of the Higher Officer School of Air Combat, Captain E.U. Chalbash, major of the armored forces Kh. Chalbash and many others... Often requests of this nature were satisfied, in particular, the family of E. Chalbash was allowed to live in the Kherson region.
Tatar women who married Russians were also exempt from eviction.”
History does not like the subjunctive mood, but let’s try to imagine what would have happened if Hitler had won. I’m afraid that then the Tatars would have to go not to the east to their historical homeland, but to the west to the cultural European cities of Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau, etc.
Finally, it is worth remembering how in France, which had almost no war, in 1944–1945, patriots dealt with collaborators without trial or investigation, that is, with everyone who collaborated even a little with the Germans. The whole world went around the photo of the massacre of a French woman who gave birth to a child from a German soldier. And the French intelligentsia chose to completely forget about all this.
Didn’t the same Poles and Czechs deport millions of innocent German citizens in 1945-1946? So what? Are the native intelligentsia moaning there about genocide and deportation? Does he propose to return the deportees and their descendants and erect monuments to the deported people?
It is clear that all this hysteria is the work of politicians and businessmen who are fomenting interethnic conflicts for their own selfish purposes.
The return of the Tatars to Crimea, the serious strengthening of their political and economic positions on the peninsula, as well as Turkey’s intervention created a factor of instability in Crimea. And now the question is not whether or not an ethnic conflict will begin in Crimea, but when it will begin.
