Mine division. Baltic Fleet. Ship formations Mine Division
The combined operation of the German naval and ground forces "Albion" is associated with Moonsund (the strait separating the Moonsund archipelago from the mainland coast of Estonia). For Russia, the Moonsund operation of September 29 – October 7, 1917 was the last military operation during the Great War.
In operational terms, for the Germans, the Moonsund operation was an amphibious assault operation to capture the islands of the archipelago. The strategic goal of the operation was to capture the Gulf of Riga, the most important promising bridgehead. In addition, having captured the islands, the Germans deprived the Russian command of the opportunity to use their aviation in the Gulf of Riga (the airfields were mainly on the island of Ezel) and protected the coastal flank of their 8th Army from any surprises.
The German fleet was so much stronger than the Russian Baltic Fleet that no operational and tactical art of the latter could balance its chances in an open battle at sea. Based on the balance of forces, the Russian naval command based its war plan in the Baltic theater of operations on the concept of defending the most dangerous operational directions for Russia using positional warfare. The narrow Gulf of Finland and the entrances to the Gulf of Riga and Bothnia made it possible to block them with mine and artillery positions. By themselves, these positions could not prevent the breakthrough of the enemy fleet, but they constrained the enemy’s maneuvering and allowed the Russian naval forces to act on the flank of the enemy breaking through the minefields.
By the spring of 1916, the following were created: 1) Central mine and artillery position on the Nargen-Porkallaudd line; 2) A forward mine-artillery position, which consisted of a minefield between Gangeudd and Cape Takhona (the northern tip of Dago Island - its flanks were to be protected by batteries on Russare Island, south of Cape Gangeudd) and on the island. Dago (near Cape Takhona); 3) Abo-Oland fortified position (closed the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia) and 4) Moonsund fortified position (along with minefields in the Irben Strait, it protected the entrance to the Gulf of Riga).
The advanced position allowed the forward deployment of the Baltic Fleet from Helsingfors to the west. A special place in the defense system was occupied by the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga, which included, in addition to the outdated battleship Slava, several cruisers and almost the entire Mine Division of the Baltic Fleet. The main operational task of this group was to defend the entrance to the Gulf of Riga through the Irbe Strait - the northern flank of the minefield was secured by the Moonsund position, and the southern flank rested on the coast of the Gulf of Riga captured and fortified by the Germans.
Capturing the coast of the Gulf of Riga is one of the most important tasks of the German forces during the fighting in the Baltic states in the summer of 1915. It was then that the Irbe operation of the German fleet was carried out. But the breakthrough of the German fleet into the Gulf of Riga did not achieve the main goal - the destruction of Russian naval forces in the gulf. The main goal of the Irben operation - maintaining dominance in the gulf to assist the troops of the coastal flank of the German Neman Army - was also not achieved. However, the enemy owned the coast as a base for the deployment of subsequent military operations.
The entire set of mine and artillery positions created by the Russian command by the summer of 1916 in the Baltic theater of operations constituted a single powerful fortified system, the center of which was the Forward Position (with the main forces of the Baltic Fleet deployed on it), with the flanks in the form of the positions of the Irbe Strait and Olandsgaf (behind which there should have been auxiliary units of the fleet). The central and rear positions ensured the stability of the defensive system and guaranteed the reliability of the protection of the sea approaches to Petrograd.
The combat stability of the system of Russian mine and artillery positions largely depended on the competent and active maneuvering of the naval forces of the fleet. The weakest links of the system were the flank positions - Irbenskaya and Olandsgafskaya: they had only one flank each, adjacent to their coastal fortifications (the other flank of the Olandsgafskaya position overlooked Swedish territorial waters, and the southern flank of the Irbenskaya position abutted the Courland coast, occupied and fortified by German troops ). Under the cover of coastal batteries, German ships could move freely along the Courland coast - only in 1917, after the installation of a 305-mm battery on Cape Tserel, which covered the entire width of the Irben Strait with its fire, the work of German minesweepers on the fairway along this coast was difficult.
The Moonsund fortified position was an important element in the Russian defense system in the Baltic - it formed an intermediate link between the Irben and Forward positions. Possession of Moonsund ensured communications in the Gulf of Riga, made it possible to successfully defend the Irbene Strait, as well as assist the flank of the Northern Front, and ensured freedom of maneuver in the Baltic theater of operations.
The main vulnerability of the Moonsund position is its accessibility to enemy landings (almost the entire coastline was favorable for landing), which the enemy did not fail to take advantage of in the 1917 campaign. The islands of Ezel and Dago, the entrances to Tagalaht and Leo bays, and Soelosund were not sufficiently protected. The most vulnerable point of the archipelago was Soelosund - the strait separating the largest (Dago and Ezel) islands and leading from the Baltic Sea into Moonsund. On the island of Ezel, just before the entrance to the strait, there were two largest bays - Tagalakht and Mustelgam - convenient for a large fleet.
Accordingly, the main burden of the defense of the islands lay on their garrison, which was insufficient both in quantitative and qualitative terms, and by the autumn of 1917, it had also decomposed morally and psychologically. Deployed behind the mine and artillery positions, the Russian fleet was a serious combat force, capable of going to sea at any moment and attacking both the enemy troops making a sea crossing and the landing troops. But, on the one hand, its combat effectiveness was also undermined by revolutionary events, and on the other, having, thanks to the Kiel Canal, the opportunity to transfer ships of any class to the Baltic, the Germans concentrated large forces and assets from the High Seas Fleet at the beginning of the Moonsund operation.
Map of the area of the Moonsund operation.
The Germans involved in the operation more than 300 ships, 102 aircraft (94 were based at the St. Helena air base and nearby airfields, plus 8 seaplanes in the 16th air squadron), up to 25,000 landing troops (control of the 23rd reserve corps, 42nd and 77th I infantry divisions, 2nd scooter brigade) with 40 guns, 80 mortars, 220 machine guns [Chishwitz A. von. Capture of the Baltic Islands by Germany in 1917. M., 1937. P. 28-29]. The landing party was accepted onto transports in the city of Libau.
The group operated: the battlecruiser Moltke, 10 newest battleships (3rd and 4th squadrons - battleships Bayern, König, Grosser Kurfürst, Kronprinz, Markgraf; Friedrich der Grosse ", "König Albert", "Kaiserin", "Prince Regent Luitpold", "Kaiser"), 9 light cruisers (2nd and 6th reconnaissance groups - "Königsberg", "Karlsruhe", "Nuremberg", " Frankfurt", "Danzig", "Kolberg", "Strasburg", "Augsburg"; "Emden" was the flagship of the destroyer force), over 100 destroyers and destroyers, 6 submarines (Kurland flotilla) and more than 100 auxiliary vessels (transports , minesweepers, motor boats, etc.). The naval “Special Operations Detachment” was commanded by Vice Admiral E. Schmidt, and the landing corps was commanded by General von Katen.
2. E. Schmidt
3. von Katen
4. German battleship-dreadnought Prinz Regent Luitpold
5. 280-mm guns of the battlecruiser Moltke.
The naval forces of the Gulf of Riga included: 2 obsolete battleships (Citizen and Slava), 3 old cruisers (Admiral Makarov, Bayan, Diana), 12 new destroyers (Novik type) and 14 old destroyers: 4th (“General Kondratenko”, “Border Guard”), 5th (“Vsadnik”, “Amurets”, “Finn”, “Moskvityanin”, “Emir of Bukhara”), 6th (“Guarding”, “Don Cossack”, “Zabaikalets”, “Army”, “Ukraine”, “Turkmen Stavropol”, “Terrible”), 11th (“Winner”, “Zabiyaka”, “Thunder”), 12th (“Desna” ", "Samson", "Lieutenant Ilyin", "Captain Izylmetyev"), 13th ("Avtroil", "Konstantin", "Izyaslav", "Gabriel") destroyer divisions, the destroyer "Novik", 3 English submarines ( S-26, S-27, S-32), 3 gunboats (“Khivinets”, “Brave”, “Threatening”), auxiliary vessels (about 100). During the operation, reinforcements arrived, including several destroyers.
6. Battleship "Slava" in the parking lot
Accordingly, the Germans, having concentrated forces that were many times superior to the Russians both quantitatively and qualitatively, guaranteed an unconditionally successful outcome of the operation for themselves. The enemy's superiority was overwhelming.
For the Russian side, the situation was aggravated by a number of unfavorable circumstances. The first is technical. So, if on the large ships of the Gulf of Riga Naval Forces the condition of the mechanisms was relatively satisfactory, then the destroyers and smaller ships were so “torn” that their material part required constant bulkheads and repairs. The Gulf of Riga forces, like the entire fleet in 1917, due to poorly completed repair work and the almost complete lack of constant monitoring of the equipment by the command staff, were in much worse condition than before.
When characterizing the Russian defensive positions, it should be noted that the rare minefields placed on the approaches to Soelosund and near the bays could not serve as a serious obstacle for the enemy. In fact, there was no full-fledged mine position in the Irben Strait. The bulk of the coastal batteries were not camouflaged, and the largest seaplane station was located close to Tagalakht Bay - under possible enemy attack.
There were 39 coastal batteries (caliber 47-305 mm), but half of them were anti-aircraft. The personnel of the batteries was about 1.5 thousand people [Pukhov A.S. Battle of Moonsund. L., 1957. P. 40].
The main defense force of the Irben Strait is 305-mm battery No. 43 at Cape Tserel. But the battery had a limited field of fire, and from long distances it was impossible to inflict serious damage on the enemy with four guns. The battery was very vulnerable to fire from the sea, in particular from Leo Bay.
7. 305-mm gun of battery No. 43 at Cape Tserel.
8. Dislocation of Russian batteries on the Moonsund Islands.
Naval aviation (4 bus stations) consisted of 36 aircraft [Kosinsky A. M. Moonsund operation of the Baltic Fleet of 1917. L., 1928. P. 41].
The second unfavorable circumstance is moral and political. The morale of the islands' garrisons (parts of the 107th and 118th infantry divisions, border guards, sappers - 15 battalions and 5 squadrons) was left imprinted by the general decomposition and decline in discipline in the Russian army (after the revolutionary events of February 1917 and the spring-summer " deepening the revolution"), distrust of officers, interference of committees in all aspects of military operations.
The condition of the fleet personnel was also not the best. There were often cases of non-execution of orders, including combat ones.
Added to all the negative factors was the fact that the people in the units were already tired and demoralized by air raids before the active enemy operation began. So, on September 5, another raid on the Tserel battery led to a fire and explosion of the cellars. Colonel K.V. Loman, Lieutenant Colonel Maklyutin and about 120 other artillerymen and infantrymen were killed.
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Admiral Nikolai Ottovich Essen always stood out for his exceptional personal courage, adhered to the most daring tactical decisions, and showed himself to be a fearless and skillful naval commander. He repeatedly took responsibility for the most important decisions and always stood for the active use of the fleet and its weapons, in particular mines, and was an opponent of passive forms of warfare. He was convinced that “the fleet exists only for war, and therefore everything that is not related to combat training should be discarded as not only unnecessary, but also harmful.”
Naval school and service on ships of the Russian fleet
Nikolai Ottovich von Essen was born in St. Petersburg on December 11, 1860 in the family of a prominent statesman. His father, Otto Vasilyevich, was an example of loyalty to his cause and duty for his son. The Essen family had almost two centuries of maritime traditions and gave the fleet seven Knights of St. George. - Admiral Essen is the pride of the Russian fleet.
Nikolai Essen, who had great abilities and enviable diligence in studying science, stood out noticeably among his classmates with his deep knowledge of the general scientific and special disciplines studied at the school. With particular enthusiasm, he studied higher mathematics, mechanics, weapons, maritime practice and some other disciplines directly related to the theory of the ship and the use of combat weapons of the armored fleet. With great benefit, he conducted training practice on ships of the Baltic Fleet, during which cadets and midshipmen consolidated their theoretical knowledge and gained practical experience in the use of weapons and control of the ship. - (The most detailed story about N.O. Essen)
Since 1902 - commander of the newest cruiser of the 2nd rank "Novik", captain 2nd rank N.O. von Essen. Having accepted the ship at a shipyard in Germany, N.O. Essen transferred it to Port Arthur as part of the Pacific Ocean squadron.
Participation in the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905
Golden saber with the inscription "For bravery." - von Essen Nikolai Ottovich
Novik's bold steps against the backdrop of the first failures were noticeable. For the battle on January 27, 1904 near Port Arthur N.O. Essen was awarded the Golden St. George Saber with the inscription “For Bravery,” and 12 Novik crew members received St. George Crosses. At the request of the squadron commander S.O. Makarov, on March 16, 1904, captain 2nd rank Essen was assigned to command the squadron battleship Sevastopol. -
Squadron battleship "Sevastopol" in Kronstadt. September 1900
Beginning in August 1904, the military activities of N.O. Essen, as the commander of the squadron battleship "Sevastopol", was most closely associated with the defense of Port Arthur, and above all with artillery support for the defenders of the fortress. He was usually entrusted with the most important and difficult tasks associated with the destruction of the most active enemy batteries that systematically fired at the fortress.
The death of Makarov made a demoralizing impression on most of the flagships and officers of the Pacific Fleet. Fear of mines and the desire to remain in the fortress, which was soon besieged by the Japanese, became the predominant “tactical techniques” of the Arthurian commanders. At meetings of flag officers and captains with Rear Admiral V.K. Vitgeft in May-June, all the commanders of large ships, except Essen, almost unanimously spoke out against going to sea and fighting the Japanese fleet, which puzzled even the admiral himself, who also considered it impossible to defeat the Japanese in a naval battle. - Tsushima - Personnel of the Russian Fleet in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.
Reflecting a night attack by Japanese destroyers on the squadron battleship "Sevastopol"
For six nights, the Sevastopol, together with the gunboat Brave, fought off more than 30 Japanese destroyers, sank 2 of them, and inflicted heavy damage on five. - Red gaoliang. Anton Utkin. - Around the World No. 2 (2773) February 2005
When the destruction of the ships of the squadron began on December 19, 1904, "Sevastopol", the only one of all, through the efforts of its commander, was towed to a deep place and scuttled, which did not allow the Japanese to raise and use it... the main thing that N.O. Essen took out from This campaign is a rich experience of observing and reflecting on a lost war.
Command of the Baltic Fleet
BUT. Essen understood perfectly well that success in preparing the fleet for war depends primarily on the degree of training of the personnel and their attitude towards service, i.e. fulfilling his military duty. Acquaintance N.O. Essen with the personnel of the fleet, and primarily with the officers, showed that the morale of many of them was at a low level. Under the influence of the defeat of the Russian fleet in the war with Japan, they lost faith in their weapons and began to become disillusioned with naval service. Decadent moods appeared among some of the officer corps, and military discipline noticeably deteriorated.
Head of the Active Baltic Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral N.O. von Essen with a group of officers on board the gunboat Beaver on the tenth anniversary of the capture of the Taku forts. Revel, June 4, 1910. - Gunboats of the Baltic Fleet “Gilyak”, “Koreets”, “Beaver”, “Sivuch”. - Gangut No. 34-35.
To rectify the situation, it was necessary, first of all, to change the existing system of training and education of personnel in the fleet. It was from this N.O. Essen began his naval leadership activities in the Baltic, first as commander of the 1st Mine Division, and then of the fleet, and achieved exceptionally high results. Within two years, he turned the mine division into the best formation of the fleet, for which he received gratitude from the tsar, who, observing the division’s training, highly appreciated its combat training.
Mine division, thanks to N.O. Essen, became a real school for training and education of officers of the Baltic Fleet, and above all for ship commanders, whom Nikolai Ottovich, like all outstanding naval commanders of the Russian fleet, considered as a decisive link that ensured success in combat training of personnel on the ship and the success of the ship in battle. Many officers, having gone through a good Essen school in a mine division, later received assignments to large ships: battleships and cruisers, and transferred to them the principles of combat training used in a mine division.
In the system of combat training of ships and fleet formations, Admiral N.O. Essen adhered to his teacher’s two famous mottos: “At sea means home” and “Remember the war.” Having turned these mottos of S. O. Makarov into the principles of combat training, Nikolai Ottovich instituted a rule first in the mine division, and then throughout the entire Baltic Fleet - to sail as much as possible in order to practice combat missions at sea, and to spend less time at the base. - Nikolai Ottovich Essen. - Russian Imperial Navy / "InfoArt". Preparation of materials: Alexander and Dmitry Loparev.
Participation in the First World War
On the night of July 30-31, 1914, the commander of the Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral N.O. Essen telegraphed the Minister of the Navy: “Please inform me about the political situation. If I do not receive an answer tonight, I will put up a barrage in the morning” (Fleet in the First World War, vol. 1, p. 90).
On the morning of July 31, by order of Essen, a mine-laying detachment consisting of the ships Ladoga, Narova, Amur and Yenisei began laying mines in the area of the main mine-artillery position. To cover the minelayers, a brigade of battleships and a brigade of cruisers, which included the destroyer Novik, were deployed. So he entered the war.
By the fall of 1914, having become convinced that the German fleet was not yet going to make a breakthrough to the eastern coast of the Gulf of Finland, and preferring not to risk its main forces, the Essen headquarters developed a new operation plan, which, along with defensive actions, also included offensive ones. The plan, in particular, envisaged the laying of active minefields in the southern and southeastern parts of the Baltic Sea, as well as the destruction of enemy merchant ships and observation posts (TsGA Navy, f. 479, op. 1, d. 970, l. 27). - Yu.G. Stepanov, I.F. Tsvetkov “Destroyer Novik”. Leningrad; Shipbuilding, 1981.
Tsvetkov I.F. Admiral N.O. von Essen - Commander of the Baltic Fleet on the eve and during the First World War // Germans in Russia: People and Fates: Collection. Art. St. Petersburg, 1998.
Starting from August 1, the Baltic squadron led by the armored cruiser Rurik, on which Admiral N.O. Essen held her flag, concentrated on the central position, maneuvering behind the minefield. Meanwhile, cruisers and destroyers took turns (cruisers during the day and destroyers at night) on patrol duty at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland in order to warn the fleet commander in time about the appearance of the enemy.
Admiral N.O. Essen with officers on board the destroyer "Border Guard". -
His high intelligence, military talent and great organizational skills provided invaluable services to the Russian fleet, and his fatherly and fair attitude towards his subordinates inspired deep love for him among all the fleet personnel. They worked for him and with him, not out of fear, but out of conscience... - Count G.K. On the Novik. Baltic fleet in war and revolution. - St. Petersburg: Gangut, 1997.
Destroyer "Novik".
Admiral Nikolai Ottovich Essen, the youngest full admiral in the history of Russia, the most talented student and follower of S.O. Makarov, the last in a number of outstanding naval commanders of the Russian fleet.
Devoting himself entirely to the cause, Essen cared little about his health and still tried to act energetically. On May 1, he left on a destroyer for Revel and, having caught a serious cold in the cold Baltic wind, finally fell ill with lobar pneumonia. On the third day, doctors in Reval recognized the situation as dangerous, and on May 7 (20), 1915, N.O. Essen died.
Von Essen's favorite destroyer "Border Guard", accompanied by an honor guard of St. George's cavaliers, on May 9 (22), 1915, delivered the coffin with the body of the commander of the Baltic Fleet to Petrograd, to the Embankment of England. With a huge crowd of people and troops, the coffin was loaded onto a gun carriage, and six horses, behind which a huge funeral procession lined up, delivered the admiral’s body to the Church of the Savior on the Waters, and then to the Novodevichy cemetery.
Destroyer "Border Guard" with the body of N.O. Essena leaves Revel, May 1915. - Domestic ships of the Russo-Japanese and First World Wars
The original monument at the grave of Admiral Essen at the Novodevichy cemetery has not survived. The red granite tombstone with an enamel photograph was restored by the Naval Academy in 1960 for the centenary of the naval commander's birth. - von ESSEN Nikolai Ottovich (1860-1915)
Naval Minister Admiral I. Grigorovich then vowed to name the best of the new ships after Essen. But, alas, he did not keep his oath. - Essen Nikolai Ottovich. - Slavic world
Three frigates of Project 11356 for the Russian Navy, the first of which is planned to be laid down at the Yantar Shipyard (Kaliningrad) in January 2011, will be named after the Tsarist admirals. This was reported by a source in the defense industry.
The first to be laid down is the frigate Admiral Grigorovich, followed by Admiral Essen and Admiral Kolchak. However, the names have not yet been finalized, the source noted.
About the admiral's foresight
Admiral N.O. Essen prepared the fleet for war on air. - Gangut: Collection of articles: Issue 46. (edited by Kuznetsov L.A.)
Compiled by Nakhimovets, graduated in 1953, captain 1st rank N.A. Veryuzhsky.
Veryuzhsky Nikolay Aleksandrovich (VNA), Gorlov Oleg Aleksandrovich (OAS), Maksimov Valentin Vladimirovich (MVV), KSV.
198188. St. Petersburg, st. Marshala Govorova, building 11/3, apt. 70. Karasev Sergey Vladimirovich, archivist. [email protected]
BRIGADES
CRUISERS
BRIGADE OF CRUISERS OF THE BALTIC SEA MARINE FORCES
1917-1921
- 1st cruiser brigade of the Baltic Fleet. 1917-1918.
- Brigade of cruisers of the Baltic Fleet. 1918-1919.
- Brigade of cruisers of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces. 1920-1921.
F. r-100, 31 storage units, 1916-1921
SHIPS OF THE BATTLE
BRIGADE OF LITTLE SHIPS OF THE BALTIC FLEET
Petrograd. Kronstadt. 1920-1921
F. r-304, 47 items, 1920-1921
TORPEDO BOATS
TORPEDO BOAT BRIGADE OF THE RED Banner BALTIC FLEET
1933-...
F. r-1960, 597 items, 1925-1940
Participation in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. The fund contains: orders of the brigade commander; flagship historical and log books; materials from the political department.
2nd brigade of torpedo boats of the Red Banner baltic fleet
19??-19??
F. r-2147, 20 units, 1940
TRAWLING AND BAGGING
MSWLEENING AND MEANING BRIGADE OF THE RED Banner BALTIC FLEET
1918-1939
- A detachment of minesweepers of the Baltic Sea. 1918.
- Head of mine sweeping in the Baltic Sea. 1918.
- Head of trawling protection affairs of the Baltic Sea. 1918-1920.
- Baltic Sea trawling division. 1920-1922.
- Baltic Sea trawling squad. 1922-1923.
- Baltic Sea trawling and barrage squad. 1923-1924.
- Trawling and barrage brigade of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. 1924-1939.
F. r-40, 606 items, 1917-1940
Laying minefields in the Petrograd area, trawling fairways and certain areas in the Gulf of Finland; participation in the Ice Transit of ships and vessels from Helsingfors to Kronstadt in the spring of 1918. The fund contains: orders for the brigade and divisions; states; reports, summaries, dispatches, reports on the conduct of mine sweeping operations, deployment, re-equipment, navigation of ships.
DIVISIONS
GUNNER BOATS
GUNNBOAT DIVISION OF THE RED Banner BALTIC FLEET
1939-1940
F. r-1890, 7 units of storage, 1939-1940
Participation in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. The fund preserved: orders of the division commander; materials on the disbandment of the division.
GUARD SHIPS
1st DIVISION OF GUARD SHIPS FOR PROTECTING THE WATER REGION OF THE RED BANNARY BALTIC FLEET
193?-...
F. r-1895, 11 items, 1938-1940
Participation in hostilities during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. The fund contains: a report on the combat activities of the patrol ship Purga, materials from the patrol ships Burya, Snow, Cloud.
7 DIVISION OF GUARD VESSELS OF THE BALTIC SEA
1917-19??
F. r-1621, 3 units of storage, 1917-1918
The fund has preserved: journals of incoming and outgoing papers of the head of the division.
minesweepers
1st DIVISION OF MINESWEEPERS FOR PROTECTION OF THE WATER REGION OF THE RED BANNARY BALTIC FLEET
1939-19??
F. r-1911, 8 units of storage, 1939-1940
Participation in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. The fund contains: reports on military operations.
UNITS
LARGE SHIPS
1st and 2nd DETACHMENTS OF LARGE SHIPS OF THE BALTIC SEA NAVAL FORCES
United Fund. 1919-1920
- 1 detachment of large ships of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces. 1919-1920.
- 2 detachment of large ships of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces. 1919-1920.
F. r-97, 71 items, 1919-1920
Participation in the civil war of 1918-1920. The fund contains: plans for measuring the depths of the mouth of the Neva River (1919); information about the condition of the detachment's ships, repair work and preparation of ships for long-term storage, sending sailors to the land front and to suppress the counter-revolutionary rebellion at the Krasnaya Gorka fort, preparing ships for sending to the Caspian Sea and transferring guns and ammunition of battleships to the Onega military flotilla.
LIGHT FORCES
LIGHT FORCES DETACHMENT OF THE RED Banner BALTIC FLEET
1939-1940
F. r-929, 95 units, 1939-1940
Participation in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, escorting transport ships, performing patrol duty. The fund contains: materials for personnel.
ICEBREAKING AND RESCUE
ICEBREAKING AND RESCUE FORCE OF THE BALTIC SEA MARINE FORCES
Petrograd. 1918-1922
F. r-113, 115 units, 1918-1922
Rescue and escort of ships and fleet auxiliary vessels; transportation of goods. The fund contains: orders for the detachment; squad annual reports; orders from the icebreaker commander Kuivasto.
MINE FIGHTER BOATS
MINE FIGHTER BOAT SQUAD AND BASE LOVAT MARINE FORCES OF THE BALTIC SEA
1920-1922
- A squad of mine destroyer boats. Nizhny Novgorod. 1920-1921.
- A detachment of mine destroyer boats and the Lovat base of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces. 1921-1922.
F. r-106, 17 units, 1916-1922
SECURITY OF SHIPS
VESSEL SECURITY TEAM OF PETROGRAD DISTRICT
1918-19??
F. r-1616, 1 unit of storage, 1918-1919
The fund has preserved: materials on personnel.
FLOATING PRODUCTS
FLOATING BARACKS No. 1 OF THE BALTIC FLEET
Kronstadt. 19??-19??
F. r-648, 14 units, 1917-1918
PRACTICAL
PRACTICAL DETAIL OF THE BALTIC SEA MARINE FORCES
1929-1930
F. r-883, 8 units, 1929-1930
Training of personnel. Voyage of the battleship Paris Commune and the cruiser Profintern from Kronstadt to Sevastopol through the Baltic and North Seas, the Bay of Biscay, the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean and the Black Seas. The collection contains: the flagship historical magazine; squad orders.
VESSELS
HEAD OF THE ACTIVE BALTIC SEA VESSEL TEAM
Petrograd-Kronstadt. 1919-1920
F. r-109, 181 items, 1919-1920
Defense of Kronstadt and Petrograd during the civil war of 1918-1920. The fund contains: the flagship historical journal of the detachment headquarters; reports from ship commanders; materials on the training and dispatch of sailors to the land front.
A SQUAD OF VESSELS OF THE BALTIC FLEET IN LONG-TERM STORAGE IN PETROGRAD
Petrograd. 1919-1922
F. r-110, 16 units, 1919-1922
Transfer of battleships to long-term storage; organization of storage of ships delivered to the port. The fund contains: orders for the detachment.
FINNISH-LADOGA DETACHMENT OF BORDER SECURITY VESSELS OF THE BALTIC SEA MARINE FORCES
1922-192?
F. r-1711, 3 units of storage, 1922-1923
The fund preserved: orders from the head of the detachment; minutes of party meetings.
TRANSPORT AND YACHT
TRANSPORT AND YACHT SQUAD OF THE BALTIC SEA
Petrograd. 1919-19??
F. r-377, 6 units, 1919-1921
Providing storage for yachts; carrying out guard duty by crews. The fund contains: orders of the chief of the 1st brigade of large ships of the Baltic Sea.
TRAINING SHIPS
TRAINING SHIPS OF THE RED Banner BALTIC FLEET
192?-19??
F. r-851, 664 items, 1922-1940
Organization of practical voyages for cadets of naval educational institutions, participation in foreign campaigns; retraining of specialists from private and junior command staff of the reserve. The fund contains: orders of the detachment commander; plans, reports, correspondence about voyages, maneuvers, and foreign campaigns of the detachment.
SKERRY
Skerry troop of the baltic sea
1917-19??
F. r-1617, 5 items, 1917-1918
The fund preserved: orders of the head of the 3rd division of patrol vessels; minutes of the committee and general meetings of the team of the 5th division of patrol boats.
Skerry Detachment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet
Transund. 1940-...
- Skerry detachment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Kronstadt. 1940.
- Skerry detachment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Oranienbaum. 1940.
- Skerry detachment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Transund. 1940-...
F. r-2072, 6 storage units, 1940-1941
The fund contains: orders for the detachment.
CONNECTIONS
SHIPS OF THE BATTLE
FORMATIONS OF THE BALTIC SHIPS OF THE RED Banner BALTIC FLEET
United Fund. 1917-1939
- 1st brigade of battleships of the Baltic Fleet. 1917-1919.
- 2nd brigade of battleships of the Baltic Fleet. 1917-1919.
- 1 semi-brigade of battleships of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. 1921-1922.
- Semi-brigade of battleships of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. 1925-1926.
- Brigade of battleships of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces. 1926.
- Division of battleships of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. 1926-1931.
- Brigade of battleships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. 1931-1935.
- Brigade of battleships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. 1936-1939.
- Division of patrol ships of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. 1930-1935.
- Division of patrol ships of brigades of battleships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. 1935-1939.
F. r-852, 492 items, 1917-1939
Participation in the October armed uprising in Petrograd, in the suppression of the Kerensky-Krasnov rebellion of 1917, the civil war of 1918-1920, the ice passage of ships and vessels of the Baltic Fleet from Helsingfors to Kronstadt in the spring of 1918. The fund contains: materials on the withdrawal of ships from Helsingfors in Kronstadt, defense of Fort Ino; the beginning of peace negotiations with Germany; information about the condition, modernization and repair of equipment on ships; flagship historical and radiotelegraph magazines.
SUBMARINE FORCE
SUBMARINE FORCES OF THE RED Banner BALTIC FLEET
United Fund. 1918-1941
- Headquarters of the Baltic Sea submarine division. 1918-1922.
- Headquarters of a separate submarine division of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces. 1922-1924.
- Headquarters of the submarine brigade of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces. 1924-1934.
- Headquarters of the 1st submarine division. 1919-1922, 1924-1934.
- Headquarters of the 2nd submarine division. 1919-1922, 1924-1934.
- Headquarters of the submarine training division. 1933-1934.
F. r-107, 1728 items, 1918-1940
DESTROYERS
DESTROYER FORMATIONS OF THE RED Banner BALTIC FLEET
United Fund. 1917-1939
- Mine division of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. 1917-1922.
- Separately floating division. 1922-1924.
- Brigade of destroyers of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. 1924-1935.
- A brigade of destroyers of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. 1935-1939.
- 1st brigade of destroyers of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. 1939.
- 2nd brigade of destroyers of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. 1939.
- A brigade of destroyers of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. 1939.
F. r-103, 955 items, 1917-1940
Participation in the October armed uprising in Petrograd in 1917, the Ice transition of ships and vessels of the Baltic Fleet from Revel and Helsingfors to Kronstadt and Petrograd in the spring of 1918; sending a detachment of ships to the Volga along the Mariinsky system in August 1918. The fund contains: materials on combat training, personnel; flagship historical magazines.
TRANSPORT FLEETIES
TRANSPORT FLEET OF THE BALTIC SEA MARINE FORCES
Petrograd. 1920-1921
F. r-112, 16 storage units, 1920 1921
SQUADRONS
SQUADRON OF THE RED BANNARY BALTIC FLEET
1939-...
F. r-1135, 372 items, 1939-1944
Participation in hostilities during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. The collection contains: the flagship historical magazine; materials on personnel.
This event coincided with the arrival of Captain 1st Rank von Essen, newly appointed head of the 1st Mine Division, to the port of Emperor Alexander III. Soon an order was received to promote him to rear admiral.
All ready-made destroyers were concentrated in the port. The division included: four destroyers of the "Border Guard" type, which made up the Special Purpose half-division (the admiral raised his flag on the "Border Guard"); 1st Division – four destroyers of the “Volunteer” type and four “Vsadnik” type; 2nd Division - eight destroyers of the "Ukraine" type; 3rd Division - eight destroyers of the "Mechanical Engineer Dmitriev" type and 4th Division of eight destroyers of the "Light" ("French") type. But many of them were still being completed in Riga and Helsingfors, and stern guns were installed on the 4th division, and it was stationed in the Neva. The admiral made every effort to quickly assemble the entire division, which he managed to achieve by the spring of 1907.
In essence, then it was the only combat unit of the Baltic Fleet, which over time could carry out serious combat service and become the core of the reviving Baltic Fleet.
In addition to the Mine Division, there was also a detachment of ships designed to sail with the ship's midshipmen. It consisted of the battleships “Tsesarevich” and “Slava” and the cruiser “Bogatyr” and went on overseas voyages in the winter. All other large ships were either under repair or being completed. As I indicated above, the work proceeded very slowly, due to the lack of money from the Naval Ministry.
It was impossible to find a more suitable officer for the post of head of the Mine Division than Admiral Essen. Not to mention his military service during the Japanese War and extensive experience in commanding ships, he had exceptional organizational skills, and he would undoubtedly have developed into an outstanding naval commander. In addition, he enjoyed great fame and authority among the personnel, was loved by officers and commands, and his personality was charming.
At the Mine Division he was to lay a solid foundation for the future naval power of the Baltic Sea. Create a cadre of brilliant commanders and officers. Develop an organization for the maritime theater of the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland. In a word, to prepare everything for the moment when new ships enter service. Now we can say that Admiral Essen coped with these tasks brilliantly - from a core of 36 destroyers in 1906, by 1915 he had two brigades of battleships, 2 brigades of cruisers, 2 mine divisions, a submarine detachment, etc. ., etc. But even then no one doubted that he would cope with the difficult task of reviving the fleet. Young officers were especially happy about the appointment of Admiral Essen, seeing in him the dashing commander of the Novik cruiser during the Japanese War.
Almost from the first day of the admiral’s arrival, vigorous organizational work began on all the destroyers of the division. First of all, the admiral had to face the issue of properly staffing the destroyers with officers and crews, and this caused a large number of movements and an influx of new officers and crews from ships that were under repair. In general, there was a great shortage of officers.
In particular, I was transferred to the destroyer “Volunteer”. This appointment pleased me extremely, since I found myself on a ship of higher combat qualities, and, in addition, it was pleasant to leave under the command of Vecheslov.
It was already late autumn (late September) of 1906; there was nothing to think about sailing this year. And even before sailing, it was necessary to organize the division, put it in combat condition, train the crews and force the officers to get used to their ships.
At Volunteer I immediately felt great. The commander was captain 2nd rank A.G. Pokrovsky, senior officer A.V. Dombrovsky, then Lieutenant V.V. Vitgeft, midshipman L.B. Zayonchkovsky (my corps comrades) and the ship's mechanic, Staff Captain Khomentovsky. The entire cast was extremely nice, and somehow we immediately became friends and got along.
The commander was extremely proud of his ship and strived for it to be the best of all the destroyers in the division. This desire of his for the ship to be “the best” immediately affected the entire personnel, and we all tried to ensure that everything was really better for us than for others. It was not easy, since other destroyers were striving for the same thing, but the tone given by the commander played a big role, and our “Volunteer” was soon singled out by the admiral himself.
The destroyers were supposed to spend the coming winter “in reserve,” that is, to stand in the port with a full complement of officers and crew and in such readiness of all mechanisms as to be able to go to sea in the shortest possible time (approximately a week). In former times, not only destroyers, but also all large ships of the Baltic Fleet “finished company” for the winter, that is, officers and crews were written off as crews were available and some of the mechanisms were dismantled. In the spring, the ships “started a campaign” - they armed themselves; officers and crews returned to them. This order has been established since the old days, when ships were wooden and, of course, it would have been impossible to spend harsh winters on them. This would be detrimental to the health of the crews.
But since then everything has completely changed: the ships became iron, the first steam heating appeared, and in general it was already possible to create such hygienic living conditions for the crew so that they would not suffer from the winter cold. However, the authorities of the pre-Tsushima period did not consider it necessary to change the old order, and ships continued to be disarmed in the fall and armed in the spring. Since the ships were on campaign for four months a year (from mid-May to mid-September), it follows that the fleet would not have been able to defend the shores of the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland for eight months if war had suddenly broken out. But few people thought about this in those days. “Ending the campaign” for eight months was considered saving money, and little thought was given to the combat readiness of the ships.
Thus, the fact that the division would spend the winter in reserve, and that the full officers and crews would live on their ships all year round, was an innovation and seemed very risky to officers imbued with the Dotsushima spirit. We, young officers, on the contrary, terribly welcomed this measure, since we really did not like life on the shore and serving in crews.
But, of course, on the destroyers we had to think carefully about how to protect the premises from the cold. Although the sides inside were protected with small cork or cork sheets, they still sweated a lot. The entrance hatches had to be lined with boards, otherwise cold air would rush in when they were opened. To save coal, steam for steam heating was taken from the shore. In severe frosts, there were often cases where water pipes froze, and sometimes even steam heating pipes. Electricity was also taken from the shore.
In general, life gradually got better, and everyone felt not bad at all, even in the most severe frosts. There were no more diseases than if we lived on the shore, but we had to very strictly monitor the sanitary condition of the interior and do “general cleaning” once a week. It was especially difficult with warm clothes, which took up a lot of space, and there was extremely little of it.
In any case, the very first winter proved that there was no need to transfer teams ashore for the winter, and militarily this was a great advantage. Subsequently, the crews were even destroyed, leaving only one crew, the 1st Baltic in Kronstadt and the 2nd Baltic in St. Petersburg, for detachments of recruits and for the temporary accommodation of sailors who were transferred elsewhere. In addition, the 1st Baltic Crew kept records of all officers and sailors of the Baltic Fleet.
To avoid confusion, we will restore the chronology of the formation of mine forces in the Baltic after the Russo-Japanese War.
Initially, in February 1906, the mine cruisers that entered service, built with voluntary donations from the population, were included in the Practical Defense Detachment of the Baltic Sea coast under the command of the retinue of Rear Admiral Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich. Soon after the Grand Duke fled from the fleet, by order of the chief commander of the fleet and ports and the head of the naval defense of the Baltic Sea, Vice Admiral K.P. Nikonov dated September 28, 1906, all mine cruisers from the Practical Detachment were consolidated into a separate Detachment of Mine Cruisers under the command of Captain 1st Rank N.O. von Essen. In October 1906, destroyers were added to the detachment, and it became known as the 1st detachment of mine ships of the Baltic Sea, while being directly subordinate to the main commander of the fleet.
Initially, it included the mine cruisers: “Ukraine”, “Kazanets”, “Moskvityanin”, “Volunteer”, “Finn”, “Okhotnik”, “Emir of Bukhara”, “Amurets”, “Ussuriets”, “Zabaikalets”, “ Border Guard", "Siberian Shooter", "General Kondratenko", "Horseman", "Gaydamak", "Guarding", "Terrible", "Don Cossack", "Trukhmenets"; destroyers “Vidny”, “Thundering”, “Combat”, “Mechanical Engineer Zverev”, “Mechanical Engineer Dmitriev”, “Stormy”, “Attentive”, “Impressive”, “Hardy”, “Vigilant”; transport "Angara".
By order of the Naval Department of December 8, 1907, the 1st detachment of mine ships was renamed the Division of Destroyers from April 1, 1908. It consisted of four divisions of eight destroyers each (according to the 1907 classification, mine cruisers were also called destroyers), three destroyers at the disposal of the division commander, as well as auxiliary vessels. Until November 24, 1908, the division was commanded by N.O. von Essen, then captain 1st rank His Serene Highness Prince A.A. Liven.
On March 12, 1909, the Baltic Sea destroyer division was renamed the 1st Mine Division; until October 11, 1911, it was headed by A.A. Liven.
By the already mentioned order of the chief commander of the fleet and ports and the head of the naval defense of the Baltic Sea, Vice Admiral K.P. Nikonov dated September 28, 1906, part of the older destroyers was consolidated into a Destroyer Detachment under the command of Captain 1st Rank M.V. Knyazev to protect the skerry area (since October 1906 - the 2nd detachment of mine ships of the Baltic Sea). From April 1, 1908, the detachment was called the Destroyer Division, which, in turn, was renamed the 2nd Mine Division on March 12, 1909.
In April 1915, the 1st and 2nd Mine Divisions were united into the Mine Division.
The current version of the page has not yet been verified by experienced participants and may differ significantly from the one verified on June 29, 2017; requires verification.
In the Baltic Fleet in 1908, the 1st mine division consisting of 37 destroyers and the 2nd mine division consisting of 10 destroyers and 16 destroyers were formed. In 1916, during the First World War, both of these divisions were combined into one. In 1922, the mine division of the Baltic Fleet was disbanded. In the Black Sea Fleet, a mine division consisting of 1 cruiser, 17 destroyers and destroyers and 4 submarines was formed in 1911. In 1914 it was reorganized into a mine brigade. In 1920-1921, a mine division consisting of 10 destroyers and 5 destroyers existed as part of the Volga-Caspian Military Flotilla, then it was reorganized into a separate division of destroyers of the Naval Forces of the Caspian Sea.
In the 1940s, destroyer divisions were created in the Navy of the USSR Armed Forces as formations of light fleet forces
